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PREFACE 
 
 
Computational Transformation of the Public Sphere is the organic product of 
what turned out to be an effective collaboration between MA students and their 
professor in the Global Politics and Communication program in the Faculty of Social 
Sciences at the University of Helsinki, in the Fall of 2019. The course, Philosophy of 
Politics and Communication, is a gateway course into this MA program. As I had 
been eager to conduct research on the impact of new digital technologies and artificial 
intelligence (AI) on democratic governance, I saw this course as an opportunity to not 
only share, but also further develop my knowledge of this topic. 
 
The curriculum, which featured Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls, in addition 
to the luminaries John von Neumann, Alan Turing, and Claude Shannon, was 
demanding. The course culminated with students exploring the impact of our 
contemporary information revolution on specific cases and applications. As well, 
students had the opportunity to develop their skills as researchers, and thus welcomed 
opportunities to generate their own insights and findings. 
 
The course was designed so that a large component of work was devoted to 
research papers. In order to ensure that students had the time to delve into their topics, 
they worked in groups of five, with each team generating their own research questions 
and approaches. We vetted projects together, and each team member took on the 
responsibility for one component of their research. 
 
The volume stands as a remarkable collection of essays because the papers are 
strikingly timely and innovative. The information age with its new technologies of big 
data, machine learning, and algorithmic governance is a dynamic field. Hence young 
scholars have an important role to play in both mastering past classics in the studies of 
politics and communication, and quickly coming to terms with the tremendous 
opportunities and challenges posed by the digital revolution. Our volume provides a 
marvelous overview of our current moment, wherein cybersecurity and algorithmic 
governance are as important as, and now inseparable from, nuclear weapons and 
democracy. 
 
I am grateful to Vice Deans Juri Mykkänen and Juhana Aunesluoma for their 
intellectual encouragement and material support of this volume. I appreciate my 
conversations with Hanna Wass during which this project crystalized. Eeva Hagel and 
Kimmo Jokinen at Unigrafia Oy graciously printed the text. Veera Koskinen provided 
invaluable PR for this volume’s celebratory launch commemorating the Faculty of 
Social Sciences 75th Anniversary. 
 
 
   
 
  
 
S M Amadae, Editor
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
My spouse is giving a virtual philosophy talk at the Center for Philosophy of 
Social Science (TINT) at the University of Helsinki today. She will interact with her 
audience through a computer screen, and take questions from people who click on the 
“raise hand” icon, in the comfort of their own dwellings. This is the only way it is 
possible to give a lecture in the Spring of 2020, with everyone grounded, and tethered 
to their computers for the foreseeable future. 
 
Lectures and classes are playing out on computer, tablet, and phone screens. 
Our education and scientific participation are now dependent on having the right 
software, the right device, and the right Internet connection. We need to make sure we 
are properly illuminated on the outside as well as on the inside, and we need to know 
when to mute our microphones and when to turn on our cameras. In the age of the 
pandemic, Zoom is the new Agora, where we have all been forced to gather as a result 
of a different kind of invasion. 
 
Neither is there any kind of interpersonal communication, art, entertainment, 
education, commerce or yoga class taking place outside of our computers. While most 
of these arenas of our lives have had some technological elements for decades now, 
the sudden shift that took place in the beginning of 2020 is astonishing in its scope 
and impact on our lives. The interaction and interdependence between technology and 
society has never been so evident and all-encompassing. 
 
The essays in this volume were written just a few months ago, and even when 
we started to edit them, life was “normal”. The issues they are concerned with, while 
recognized as important in principle, have often been considered more “academic” 
than “practical” in nature.  However, this is increasingly changing. Debates about 
fusing and perhaps replacing deliberative democracy with algorithmic governance, 
privacy with totalitarian surveillance, or the consumption of news with microtargeted 
propaganda messages, are heating up. Most of these trends are being sold to us under 
the guise of progress, hailed not only as desirable but often inevitable, over our heads 
and out of our hands. Whereas some of these changes may indeed be desirable, 
nothing we have the power to collectively decide on can ever be inevitable. Cynicism 
and fatalism are the biggest obstacles we face on the precarious path to continued 
human existence in a rapidly technologizing world. 
 
The authors in this book agree that if we harness technology in the right ways, 
we can enhance the public sphere instead of allowing greed and ignorance to hollow it 
out. If we allow our inherent morality and wisdom to be part of the discussion around 
emerging AI technologies, we can all benefit from these innovations as a society, 
instead of having to write off some of our fellow humans. Using the digital tools at 
our disposal in the right way is also our only hope of being able to tackle global 
challenges such as security, climate change, or misogyny. 
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 We start our journey of exploration in Finland, looking at ways to best utilize 
digital technology to fortify the country from the internal threat of the erosion of the 
public sphere and democratic deliberation (I.1), as well as from newly emerging 
external cyberthreats, by aptly addressing securitization (I.2). In both cases, we 
must walk a fine line between individual freedoms and the common good. 
 
Next, we turn our attention to the new reality of politics around the world: 
refreshing, exciting, direct – and mendacious. We learn how the elevation of two 
reality TV actors to the presidency, one in the US and one in Ukraine, was made 
possible by hacking the electorate’s collective brain to blur the line between reality 
and fiction, as well as to straight up spoon-feed us what we have come to call 
alternative reality (II.2,3). A comparative analysis of two referenda in the United 
Kingdom, the Scottish Independence Referendum and the Brexit vote, highlights 
the massive and alarming shift that took place in just the course of a couple of years, 
identifying the current political predicament as resulting, at least partially, from the 
surgical and cynical removal of “informed” from the dignified process of informed 
decision-making (II.1).  
 
Being informed is necessary, but not always sufficient. The main challenge we 
need to overcome if we are going to neutralize the existential threat posed by 
climate change is to restore our trust in science, as well as our own ability to work 
together. In order to tackle the underlying problem, the dilemma of cooperation, we 
need not only a shared understanding of scientific reality, but also a common moral 
ground. In the battle for survival, everyone needs to take up their posts, from the 
officers of governments, through the correspondents of the media, down to each 
private citizen (III.2). Companies, increasingly as powerful as governments in many 
ways, must also do their part.  If they are caught promoting themselves at the expense 
of the environment, and our common good, through unsubstantiated pledges of 
sustainability (greenwashing), they must be held to account, and forced to comply 
with the environmental values they claim to stand for (III.1). 
 
In 1964, the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. warned against the dangers of 
science without morality: “The richer we have become materially, the poorer we have 
become morally and spiritually,” he said. “We have learned to fly in the air like birds 
and swim in the sea like fish, but we have not learned the simple art of living together 
as brothers.”1 Over half a century later, this is still as important a message as ever. As 
mobility has become increasingly more accessible, an examination of whether the 
emergence of ride-hailing applications offers increased emancipation and freedom 
for, in this case our sisters, is welcome (IV.1). With the arrival of a new kind of 
citizen to our ecosystem, the human robot, with whom (which?) we will also need to 
live together, more questions will need to be answered. In the case of Sophia, one of 
                                                        
1 Nobel Lecture, December 11, 1964, 
https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1964/king/lecture/ 
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the first such robots, we certainly have more questions than answers: Is Sophia an it 
or a she? Is it alive? Should this humanoid have robot rights, and if so, should those 
be accompanied by obligations? Can robot rights be elevated to, or even exceed the 
extent of human rights? These questions will prompt us to reconsider not just our 
relationship to machines, their relationship to each other, but also the relationships 
among ourselves (IV.2). 
 
Digital technology has the ability to affect the way we relate to each other in 
many different ways. It can be utilized to challenge our millennia old, ongoing battle 
against patriarchy, by offering us ways to connect, organize and make our voices 
heard, as we have seen in the case of the #MeToo movement (V.2). Technology can 
also be used to connect and organize by those left behind by the cruelty of 
neoliberalism, their unheard cries for help at the tormenting hands of some misguided 
expectation of masculinity echoing louder and louder in their chambers, until their 
frustration too often finds a violent outlet. Algorithms can help us find and rescue 
some of these victims who call themselves involuntary celibates but, ultimately, 
changes in the curriculum as well as in the public discourse to promote a healthy 
understanding of gender and sexuality will be necessary in order to eliminate gender-
based violence (V.1). 
 
Changes in legislation, as well as new laws will also be needed if we hope to 
keep up with the ways our consumption of news and political messages are changing 
through the introduction of new platforms of communication. Fake news is a clear 
and present danger to democracy, and yet it has been spreading unobstructed from the 
moment it was fanned into a global wildfire by social media, from the relatively 
harmless simmer of the tabloid media. We need to snap out of our helpless shock of 
watching institutionalized misinformation destroy everything in its path, from the 
credibility of science, through privacy, to the fairness of elections, and start making 
some tough decisions about how to put out the fire and rebuild what has been lost. 
This can be done through government regulation, by means of enlisting algorithmic 
tools, or by using a hybrid, Nordic model which promises to enhance citizens’ ability 
to recognize and resist misinformation through media literacy education (VI.1). 
Attempts to regulate, or take advantage of, the crime scene have been made in 
accordance with prevailing norms and values. While most social media companies are 
chasing profit, the EU has initiated GDPR to salvage privacy, the UN has plans to use 
big data for humanitarian efforts, and the US government has enlisted private 
companies to secretly capture and collect as much data on citizens as possible. 
Meanwhile, China decided to skip the middleman, and made surveillance a matter of 
state policy (VI.2,3).  
 
The question of how much control we are willing to hand over to algorithms 
in governing our lives is central throughout this volume. In the last two chapters the 
panda in the room is finally tackled head on. Can a political system that utilizes AI to 
realize totalitarian surveillance and control through an impersonal classification 
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system of its population ever be legitimate? Can it possibly be desirable? Ethics, 
consent, opacity and accountability will need to be carefully considered before we can 
answer these questions. One thing is clear, however. At the same time that we turn 
our concerned and critical gaze towards China’s social credit system, the West should 
not forget to put its own house in order with regard to its financial credit systems, and 
other processes increasingly outsourced to “black box” algorithms (VII.1,2). 
 
The essays collected in this volume adhere to a disciplined, scientific approach 
of examining emerging digital technologies. They carefully weigh multiple 
considerations, very much including moral ones, present different sides of the 
argument, cite sources, and offer criticism as well as policy recommendations. Most 
authors conclude that more research, discussion and a wider consensus is needed 
before we can implement change, or offer the right reaction to changes that have 
already been implemented. Now, with an accelerated reliance on technology, and a 
multiverse of possibilities ranging from the dystopian to the utopian ahead of us, the 
application of this kind of measured and systematic approach is more imperative than 
ever. 
 
We will, no doubt, defeat the current pandemic, and be able to attend lectures 
and visit museums again. But crises in our societies are ongoing, and new ones can be 
expected. The central question in all of these predicaments is whether a renewed 
sense of enlightenment, a resurgence of respect for knowledge, science, and morality 
is allowed to guide us through these dark tunnels, once again out into the light. When 
I read the essays in this volume, and consider the Faculty of Social Sciences at the 
University of Helsinki as a whole, I am hopeful that it will. 
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Abstract 
This research paper examines the impact of the digital revolution on citizens and 
governance. New technologies introduce tools and platforms that provide new forms of 
participation such as e-voting, initiatives and mass mobilization. The digital revolution 
and new technologies have improved citizens' political participation and engaged 
citizens in political decision-making. Alongside political inclusion, technology 
provides citizens with a platform for interaction with each other and political decision-
makers, which can be seen as contributing to the deliberative development of society.  
New technologies have improved the chance of citizens' participation, but the 
mere possibility of participation may not be sufficient to promote democracy and 
political participation. Engaging citizens in political decision-making may be 
challenging for “traditional reasons”: lack of political interest or knowledge. However, 
too much skepticism about citizen engagement is not entirely justified, as new 
technologies offer the potential to expand social capital. 
 
Keywords: Electronic democracy, online deliberation, electronic voting, citizens' 
initiatives, crowdsourcing, participatory budgeting, citizen-governance interaction 
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1. Introduction  
In this research paper we explore how the advent of new technologies in the 
21st century have impacted the interaction between citizens and governance in Finland. 
By new technologies we refer to all the new tools and networking platforms brought 
about by the digital revolution. These tools and platforms under our investigation 
include social media, web-based programs and new means of electronic participation, 
for example e-voting. 
We will narrow our focus to the Finnish experiences of new ways of 
communication in citizen-governance interaction. We expect to find case-based 
evidence about the implications of the digital revolution for the means of participation 
and conduct of governance. Our key research questions are: 
 
• What implications has the digital revolution of the 21st century had on citizen-
governance interaction in the Finnish context?  
• How have new tools and technologies changed the ways of conducting 
governance? 
• How could the Internet be made more friendly for democratic deliberation? 
• What problems does the digital revolution pose for participation, governance 
and respectful deliberation as well as a properly functioning public sphere? 
 
We decided to begin our research paper by defining some of the key concepts of 
our research, in order to have a common base for our individual contributions. Next, we 
move on to explore five specific cases of citizen-governance interaction in the digital 
era of the 21st century. In the first chapter, we explore how the Internet could be made 
more friendly to democratic deliberation. The second chapter addresses the question of 
e-democracy through a crucial practical aspect of it, namely electronic voting. The third 
case study looks at citizen initiatives: do they really matter and what motivates citizens 
to try to achieve their political goals through them? Our two final chapters explore 
cases of crowdsourcing in policy-making and participatory budgeting in the Finnish 
context. 
2. Key concepts 
Digital revolution 
Despite the widespread use of this concept, it is not always defined specifically in 
contemporary everyday use. The digital revolution is all about broad technological 
changes in politics, culture, economics and business. As a result of these changes 
digital technology will take a more prominent and central place in our everyday lives. 
No aspect of human life, communication or business will be completely separated from 
the digital revolution, which continues to expand (Meyer 2016).  
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The digital revolution includes the “rise of digital platforms, cutting edge forms 
of automation and Big Data” (Spence 2019). Although the concept of the digital 
revolution is already vastly used, we have not yet seen all of its implications.  Thus, we 
argue that the digital revolution will change our politics, economics and business 
during the time period of the 21st century as we proceed into the future.  
Luciano Floridi goes even further to describe how the digital revolution affects 
our everyday lives. He argues that the digital revolution will also change our social 
selves and the way we see ourselves. The digital revolution and ICT have put forward 
new concerns of privacy, openness and transparency. (Floridi 2014) These examples 
from Floridi’s writings exemplify how profoundly the digital revolution will shape our 
world.  
Henning Meyer argues that “there is a general lack of structured analysis of the 
ways in which technological progress translates into real life” (Meyer 2016). Thus, our 
research paper aims to capture one dimension of this large and complex transformation 
by examining the impact of the digital revolution on citizen-governance interaction in 
the Finnish context during recent years.  
We expect to find evidence for growing interconnectedness between citizens 
and government. We also hope to build a general view on the current situation of how 
new digital tools are used by Finnish governance. Can the digital revolution bring 
citizens closer to those who aspire to rule them? Have the challenges in citizen-
governance interaction changed with digital revolution, or are they more deep-rooted 
by nature?  
Public sphere and public opinion 
The theoretical point of view in this research paper is the thinking by Jürgen Habermas 
regarding the public sphere. Habermas defines this useful term in his article “The 
Public Sphere: An Encyclopedia Article” (1964) as follows:  
By the “public sphere” we mean first of all a realm of our social life in which 
something approaching public opinion can be formed. Access is guaranteed to all 
citizens. A portion of the public sphere comes into being in every conversation in which 
private citizens assemble to form a public body…Citizens behave as a public body 
when they confer in an unrestricted fashion—that is, with the guarantee of freedom of 
assembly and association and the freedom to express and publish their opinions—about 
matters of general interest. (Habermas 1964, p. 50, italics added)  
The formation and manifestation of public opinion is relevant in all the themes 
we address throughout this paper. A democratic system of governance requires these 
two processes in order to represent the political will of the citizens that it represents. 
Accurate representation is also the goal of the equal and unrestricted access that 
Habermas mentions.  
The digital revolution has had an undeniable impact on the public sphere and 
the forming of public opinion. This development has brought to life new platforms and 
forums, annihilated the significance of geographical distance in communication 
9
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between individuals, and made it easy for people to create their own publicities around 
what matters to them. It allows decision-makers and the governance in general to 
collect data about peoples’ opinions and preferences and to hear the voice of the 
general public more easily than before. In these ways, the digital revolution shortens 
the distance both between citizens and between citizens and governance. On the other 
hand, much of the discussion that takes place online does not necessarily count as 
quality deliberation, and the opinions that come across from discussions are not 
necessarily manifestations of public opinion as opposed to the voice of a few loud 
actors.  
Governance 
Andrew Heywood defines governance as “…a broader term than government. 
Although it still has no settled or agreed definition, it refers, in its widest sense, to the 
various ways through which social life is coordinated. Governments can therefore be 
seen as one of the institutions involved in governance” (Heywood 2007). In this 
research paper we use this definition. We prefer to use a concept that is reasonably 
wide to capture as many aspects of governance as possible in our Finnish context.  
Heywood continues to define three principal modes of governance: markets, 
hierarchies and networks (Heywood 2007). Our research will be focused on the latter 
two of these modes: hierarchies and networks. We are especially interested in tools of 
governance that are used to amalgamate and coordinate citizens’ preferences to policy-
outputs and policies.  In Habermas’ words these tools advance participation in the 
forming of public opinion, and inform the governance of it. For example, citizen 
initiatives and e-voting are such tools.  
We see four distinct values central to governance: participation, 
communication, pluralism and accountability. Governments have many tools for 
conducting governance which fulfill these values. Democratic governance has to keep 
up with the changing technological challenges and opportunities, and we wish to shed 
some light on how the Finnish government has succeeded in this during the recent 
years.  
3. How to make the Internet more friendly for democratic 
deliberation? 
The Internet has become an integral part of the public sphere, where people can debate 
about current political and societal issues. Despite its many possibilities, the Internet is 
not always an ideal environment for democratic deliberation. For example, anonymity, 
hate-speech and bubbles can weaken the Internet as a platform for good and respectful 
deliberation between individuals. In this research paper I investigate how the Internet 
could be made friendlier to democratic deliberation. 
10
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Deliberative democracy and the Internet 
André Bächtiger, John S. Dryzek, Jane Mansbridge and Mark E. Warren define 
deliberative democracy to mean “mutual communication that involves weighing and 
reflecting on preferences, values, and interests regarding matters of common concern” 
(Bächtiger et al. 2018, p. 2). I use this definition of deliberative democracy here 
because of its clarity and simplicity, compared to other definitions presented in 
academic research. 
Democratic deliberation refers to all forms of deliberation that fulfill democratic 
ideals. These ideal can also be used as standards of good deliberation. According to 
second generation theorists of deliberative democracy, standards of good deliberation 
include mutual respect, absence of power, inclusion, aim at consensus, publicity and 
accountability (Bächtinger et al. 2018, p. 4). 
Theorists of deliberative democracy highlight how democratic deliberation can 
occur in many distinct sites. For example, formal institutions of government and civil 
society are often mentioned as sites for democratic deliberation (Bächtiger et al. 2018, 
p. 11). The Internet can also be seen as a site for democratic deliberation, because of its 
rapid rise as an important part of today’s public sphere. When considering Jürgen 
Habermas’ definition of the public sphere (Habermas 1991, p. 30), I locate the 
Internet’s existence between the private realm and the sphere of public authority, much 
like the pre-Intenet public sphere in the political realm which existed between private 
households and state authority. 
Democratic deliberation can occur on the Internet in many forms. Blogs, open-
access websites and comment sections are places where everyone can easily discuss 
and deliberate about current issues. Popular social media platforms such as Facebook, 
Twitter and Instagram also offer many opportunities for democratic deliberation 
between citizens, without limitations of time or space. 
Problems of democratic deliberation on the Internet 
I measure the quality of democratic deliberation on the Internet by using standards of 
good deliberation described earlier. The Internet differs from other sites of democratic 
deliberation in many ways. These features complicate the fulfillment of the standards 
for good deliberation. 
One of the most striking qualities of the Internet is the absence of editors on 
many communication platforms. Traditional newspapers and magazines have editors 
who control what opinions and comments are published in the paper. However, many 
websites do not have any editors controlling the flow of messages and comments 
between individuals. This absence of moderation threatens the standards of good 
deliberation, because no one monitors or controls these discussions in order to ensure 
the quality of their content. 
Absence of moderation can lead to a proliferation of hate-speech and 
disrespectful debate. There is a lot of evidence about this dark side of communication 
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on the Internet. Recently it has been found that more than half of Americans have 
experienced harassment, hateful speech, physical threats and bigotry when using the 
Internet (USA Today, 2019). Hate-speech violates many standards of good 
deliberation, for example mutual respect, inclusion and the absence of coercive power. 
It has also been found that the growing use of new social media platforms (such 
as Facebook, Instagram and Twitter) has increased the amount of fake news and 
disinformation (Martens et al. 2018, p. 8-10). Fake news poses a clear threat to good 
standards of deliberation. 
Another distinct quality of Internet-based deliberation is anonymity. Many 
communication platforms like 4chan and reddit offer posters possibilities for 
deliberation without revealing their real name. Fake accounts are also easy to create on 
Facebook and Twitter. When compared to traditional media, there is usually some kind 
of restriction on anonymity (although nicknames can be used after a binding 
registration, for example in comment sections for newspaper articles on the Internet). 
The Internet, and especially social media, can also create social bubbles, 
filtering of information and group polarization, which endanger good deliberation 
(Sunstein 2017, p. 59-97). Previous research on Internet-based communication supports 
the conclusion of the Internet fostering communication with already like-minded 
people (Sunstein 2017, p. 76-77). Thus, large online groups can spend years 
communicating with like-minded citizens without ever hearing or reading contrary 
views. 
This phenomenon increases the risk of group polarization in society. Citizens 
communicating mainly inside their own social bubble become increasingly isolated 
from other groups. This is troubling because when various cross sections of groups are 
communicating “society will hear a far wider range of views” (Sunstein 2017, 86). 
Polarization between groups can also increase anxiety and suspicions about people 
communicating in a different social bubble or group. 
How to make the Internet more friendly for democratic deliberation?  
After discussing problems of Internet-based communication, I will now move forward 
to offer solutions for making the Internet friendlier for democratic deliberation. First, I 
will underline some basic elements of the Internet that help advance democratic 
deliberation. 
The Internet is clearly more accessible for citizens than traditional media 
platforms. Not everyone can get their response published on the pages of Newsweek or 
the New York Times, for example. The Internet provides a platform of publication for 
almost any author with any kind of content imaginable.  
The Internet is also a highly visible site for deliberation. Comment sections and 
open Facebook groups are good examples of highly public sites for democratic 
deliberation. Anyone can read discussions taking place in open Facebook groups. 
Usually only registration is required before you can post your own comment or 
response to a news article on a newspaper’s public discussion forum. 
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Despite these advantages, I cited some problems relating to Internet-based 
communication above. These problems underline the need for more inclusive, open and 
moderated discussions. Cass R. Sunstein has proposed seven solutions for making the 
Internet more friendly for democratic deliberation: deliberative domains, disclosure of 
relevant conduct, voluntary self-regulation, economic subsidies for public networks, 
must-carry policies for media, creative use of links to draw people’s attention to 
multiple views and opposing viewpoints (or serendipity) buttons (Sunstein 2017, p. 
215; Economist 2017). Sunstein’s proposals are presented and further described in the 
table below. 
   
Cass R. Sunstein’s proposal for increasing democratic deliberation on the Internet  
(Sunstein 2017) 
Proposal Description of the proposal 
Deliberative domains Moderated (or edited) platforms for democratic 
deliberation between individual citizens. 
Disclosure of relevant conduct Policies aimed to encourage media to disclose relevant 
information about their content (for example, giving 
information about the suitability of programming on 
television). 
Voluntary self-regulation Voluntary self-regulation is about media companies 
regulating themselves, for example by providing a wide 
range of views for the public. 
Economic subsidies for public 
networks 
Public funding for media companies which aims to avoid 
polarization and consumerism of the news media.  
Must-carry policies for media Legislation, which requires media companies to provide 
the public with specific relevant information, news and 
programs (for example, about political debates, elections 
and democratic principles). 
Creative use of links  Offering readers opposing viewpoints via links to 
different articles. 
Opposing viewpoint buttons Buttons that provide opposing viewpoints for users who 
are interested in them (for example, after reading a news 
article about a specific topic). 
  
Sunstein’s deliberative domains are platforms where discussion is moderated. 
These platforms offer spaces where citizens can meet and deliberate about different 
topics. The aim of these platforms is to foster better understanding, learning and citizen 
engagement (Sunstein 2017, p. 216-217). Deliberative domains can be seen as 
somewhat naïve because, for example, citizens do not have any incentive to switch 
from Facebook to deliberative domains if they are satisfied and familiar with 
communication on Facebook.  
A creative use of links and opposing viewpoint buttons can be seen as a more 
realistic solutions for problems relating to deliberation on the Internet. According to 
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Sunstein, newspapers and digital platforms should also offer readers articles that 
contain different viewpoints on the topic they have previously read about (Sunstein 
2017, p. 229). This creative use of links could expose readers to a diverse range of 
information through other readers’ stances and beliefs. Sunstein also proposes the 
introduction of opposing viewpoint buttons, which would offer readers “opposing 
viewpoints by default, subject to the right to opt out” (Sunstein 2017, p. 232-233). For 
example, these buttons could be included in web-based articles of a specific 
newspaper’s digital edition or all of a newspaper’s website articles. 
Concluding thoughts 
As I have stated above, the Internet has both advantages and disadvantages for 
democratic deliberation. I have listed a few proposals from existing research for 
making the Internet friendlier for democratic deliberation. I view these proposals with 
skepticism because they would require a complete reform of the Internet. Since no one 
owns or controls the Internet, these proposals would be extremely difficult to 
implement. Thus, it is up to governments, organizations, companies and individuals to 
come together and try to carry out solutions that fulfill standards of good deliberation 
on Internet-based platforms. These solutions do not come easily and require extensive 
co-operation between different actors. 
4. Electronic voting in Finland – many attempts, little success 
Moving on from the process of deliberation to finding ways to organize society in 
accordance with the results of deliberation, voting and elections are the focus of this 
chapter.  A manifestation of “something approaching public opinion” (Habermas 1962; 
p. 1974) created in the public sphere is the goal of organizing elections. Democracy 
requires a way of getting to know how people think and what they want. In 
representative democracies such as Finland, elections aim at selecting a group of people 
that would share the thoughts of those who voted for them and—at least ideally—
represent the citizens as accurately as possible. In the Habermasian sense, the formation 
of public opinion happens in the deliberation prior to the actual election, and the 
election result provides a concrete outline of it.  
Voting is an encounter between the private and the public spheres. It is an act of 
an individual, as each citizen enters the voting booth alone. The secrecy of the ballot is 
an institutionalized principle to guarantee that all citizens can indeed decide for 
themselves without having to worry about social consequences or their vote going 
public. In Finland this principle is secured in the constitution (731/1999, 25 §). On the 
other hand, much of what happens prior to and after the casting of the vote is very 
much public. In elections the governance and the citizen come together in a concrete 
way.   
14
E-GOVERNANCE IN THE FINNISH CONTEXT 
Could electronic voting bring people to the ballots?  
Turnout in Finnish elections has been decreasing since the 1970s. This has been seen as 
a signal of growing political disinterestedness, and even the proverbial “crisis of 
democracy”. In the 2019 parliamentary elections the turnout was 72,1 % (Statistics 
Finland). Research shows that the level of political participation varies across Finland, 
and turnout percentages are the lowest among groups that are in socio-economically 
weaker positions in society (Wass & Borg, 2016). An often-proposed solution for this 
participation challenge is electronic voting: maybe if those who do not go and vote at 
their designated voting place would cast their vote if they could do it where they wish 
to, using their computers or smartphones.  
In recent decades electronic voting has been considered by working committees 
under several different cabinets. The most recent case was a working group requested 
in 2016 when Juha Sipilä, prime minister and the head of the cabinet bearing his name, 
claimed that Finland would be moving to electronic voting in the future, with the 
traditional paper method of voting still continuing to exist as an option. However, the 
working group came to the conclusion that the risks of online voting outweigh its 
benefits. Several issues were identified, namely the reconciliation of verifiability and 
election secrecy (the data of the voter would have to be stored alongside with the vote 
so that it could be later verified, but this would be illegal and compromise the secrecy 
of the ballot), manipulation of election results, breaching of election secrecy, and 
external interference through denial-of-service attacks. The biggest concern named by 
the working group was the loss of public confidence, which could easily be caused by 
spreading disinformation and rumors.  
Another counterargument to an electronic voting system that the working group 
identifies is that it does not seem to solve the problem of decreasing voter turnout. It 
refers to several Nordic and Canadian research projects which have found that 
electronic voting does not increase turnout (Bergh & Christensen 2012; Segaard, Bock, 
Baldersheim & Saglie 2012; Bochsler 2010) and that the people who do vote 
electronically are ones that would vote anyway, regardless of the method (Goodman 
2014). The only research this report refers to that gives a positive estimation of 
potential increase in turnout assesses this increase to be a rather modest percentage, 
around 2-3% (Vassil, Kristjan, Weber, Till 2011). 
Finnish citizens’ attitudes towards electronic voting have not been 
representatively surveyed. The closest things to such a survey are two municipal level 
democracy ARTTU surveys conducted in 2008 and 2011, where people living in a 
cluster of Finnish municipalities were asked to agree or disagree with the claim, 
“People should be allowed to vote via the Internet in municipal elections”. A more 
recent Special Eurobarometer Survey requested by the European Commission (2018) 
mapped European Union citizens’ thoughts on new voting methods, and their concerns 
are in line with these challenges identified by the Finnish working group.   
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Citizens were asked to imagine that they were able to vote electronically, online 
or by post, and then to name their possible concerns about voting using these methods. 
The most cited concern in the survey was the potential for fraud or cyberattack: 68% 
said they were concerned, one third (33%) were very concerned. The idea that these 
systems posed difficulties to some segments of the population, such as people with 
disabilities or older people, was a concern for almost two thirds (65%) of the 
respondents. More than half were also concerned about voters being influenced by third 
parties (56%), and about the secrecy of the ballot (55%), with 23% and 24% very 
concerned, respectively.  
In the 2008 municipal elections, electronic voting was tested in three 
municipalities. The system did not work correctly, and in 2009 the Supreme 
Administrative Court of Finland decided that voting was to be reorganized in these 
three municipalities. In addition to technical issues, the instructions provided were 
unclear and insufficient. No tests have been conducted since. However, the results of 
the 2008 test are valuable and point out that a functional electronic voting system 
requires more than just reliable technology—the voter needs to be well instructed and 
there cannot be any ambiguity in the communication.   
Electoral term 2019-2023: no plans for e-voting  
In 2019, the recently appointed Ministers of the Interior (Maria Ohisalo, Green League) 
and Justice (Anna-Maja Henriksson, Swedish People’s Party) both stated that for now, 
there is no need to consider updating the Finnish voting system. In a news article by 
Yle their opinions on the issue were very like-minded: the present system may be a bit 
“old-fashioned”, but it is both secure and functional, and alternative methods presented 
to this day are too risky. With these statements and the pessimistic conclusions in the 
report requested by the Juha Sipilä cabinet, it seems unlikely that Finland would be 
taking any steps towards an electronic voting system in the upcoming years.  
The Nordic countries would have many advantages if they wanted to be e-
voting frontrunners. These countries are known to be some of the most stable 
democracies in the world, with little corruption and next to no past cases of electoral 
fraud. They are countries of high educational level, and the welfare state model allows 
willing states to invest in completely tax-paid development and research projects. One 
can think that another advantage are the relatively small populations in the Nordic 
countries, with a population of 4-6 million in most of them, and only 10 million in 
Sweden. Adopting a new large-scale system on the state level seems intuitively easier 
and more flexible in less populated countries. However, whether electronic voting will 
be advanced in the future is as much a question of trust as it is of technological 
development.  
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5. Civic initiatives – do they really matter, especially in the digital era?  
In addition to e-voting, there are also other prominent ways to increase citizens’ role in 
a deliberative democracy. Democracy researcher Rolf Büchi has said that direct 
democracy is a subtle process and its relevant elements are start, public conversation, 
decision-making and implementation (Büchi 2011, 107). Perhaps one of the biggest 
phenomena in recent years for that “starting point” has been the civic initiative. When 
we talk about civic initiatives, we mean procedures that “allow citizens to bring new 
issues to the political agenda through collective action, that is, through collecting a 
certain number of signatures in support of a policy proposal” (Schiller & Setälä 2012, 
p. 1).  
Kansalaisaloite.fi 
In Finland, citizens’ initiative is a tool for direct democracy which enables a minimum 
of 50,000 Finnish citizens of voting age to submit an initiative to the Parliament of 
Finland to enact an act (Väestörekisterikeskus). The initiative must include a bill or a 
proposal to start drafting legislation and the reasons for the proposal, and it must also 
apply to a matter that can be enacted by law. The development of digital technology, 
the Internet and social media has really speeded up the meaning of civic initiatives. The 
Ministry of Justice in Finland has set up an online system to collect statements of 
support; namely, Kansalaisaloite.fi where anyone can open an initiative and collect 
signatures. It is also possible for citizens to organize a municipal citizens’ initiative 
(Kuntalaisaloite.fi) or simply editorialize some societal or political question 
(Otakantaa.fi). 
It is obvious that when collecting civic initiatives online, space does not matter 
anymore, and time becomes more flexible, as well. People can sign civic initiatives 
anywhere and anytime; and by using social media channels such as Facebook, civic 
initiatives can spread rapidly and far. It is possible to speak about “mediated relations” 
(Grossi 2011, p. 4), which are unbound by time and space and which concern both 
people and their relations with organisations, institutions, places, goods, and objects. 
So, we can also see such a small concept, online initiatives, as a notable means to 
building and maintaining a lively public sphere where people and their civic society 
engage politicians and the state, in other words, governance. When assembling virtually 
for some topic, initiatives require direct deliberation of the Finnish Parliament. I 
interpret this as a converging relationship between private sorrows or hopes and public 
authority and formal politics. Initiatives create a picture of citizens’ lives when they 
handle such themes as maternity law, free second-degree education or euthanasia 
(Kansalaisaloite.fi 2019). Browsing the website provides a remarkable insight into what 
citizens are worried about, as all civic initiatives are displayed in the same place. 
But the whole picture is not that simple. We cannot claim that signing civic 
initiatives is an unequivocal solution for challenges of today’s public sphere and 
deliberative democracy. Even though it could be claimed that civic initiatives aggregate 
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citizens together and create a temporary community which forms at least a part of 
public opinion or public thoughts, initiatives could be claimed to emphasize only 
“liberal-individualist digital democracy” (Dahlberg, 2011). Digital media is understood 
here as “enabling individuals to gain the information they need to examine competing 
political positions and problems” and also providing them with the means for the 
registration, and subsequent aggregation (Dahlberg 2011, p. 861). Instead, civic 
initiatives do not formulate deliberatively constituted consensus, that is to say, rational 
public opinion, or make people argue, inform, reflect or publicize (Dahlberg 2011, p. 
11).  
So, civic initiatives still keep people and their opinions somewhat apart from 
each other, and they are purely individual choices and not vehicles for deliberation. We 
are not so communicative when we sign initiatives. We are able to surf the Internet and 
skip all the initiatives or just choose one which appeals to us. The facility to sign or not 
to sign concerns also the launching of civic initiatives. But launching or signing does 
not mean that something will happen. At the moment there are 69 ongoing and 955 
completed civic initiatives on Kansalaisaloite.fi, but only 28 civic initiatives have been 
delivered to the Finnish Parliament. Also, we must remember that when an initiative is 
referred to parliament, representatives still have a right to do whatever they decide to 
do with it. It is conventional that civic initiatives do not pass as such, which will 
probably be the case of Suostumus2018 which demands a new rape law with a clear 
mention of consent (Yle 2019). 
Such a marginal vehicle? 
It could be claimed that the number of initiatives reflects the notion of a consumer-
citizen. This kind of a citizen has so many choices that it is not important to even think 
deeply about them; so, you can sign civic initiatives even if you are not sufficiently 
informed about it, simply because you can. Giorgio Grossi uses the term “audience 
democracy” as a central concept. According to Grossi, we have moved from the space 
for discussion and formation of public opinion to a mere area of projective and 
symbolic identification typical of the ”society of the spectacle” and a new social 
environment which only favors the personalisation of choices and walks of life (Grossi 
2011, p. 7). 
This also causes the loosening of unsatisfactory cooperative and solidaristic ties 
(Grossi 2011, p. 6). This change in society and political life will deepen even more as 
the ongoing digital revolution continues. It is natural to differentiate one from the other 
and construct our own social, political and cultural bubbles when the Internet and 
especially social media are so broad, even boundless. The website Kansalaisaloite.fi 
might be precisely defined because the Ministry of Justice in Finland manages it, but 
there are many more areas and ways of trying to connect citizens, for instance the 
website Adressit.fi. 
On the other hand, we need to remember that civic initiatives are a marginal 
vehicle for change, and people often do not give them much weight. And, as we have 
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noted before, the possibilities inherent in online devices do not guarantee that people 
who have never participated in politics and deliberation would suddenly change their 
attitudes. So, it is worth mentioning that the digital revolution does not automatically 
cause any kind of revolution of citizen-thinking; those who were and had been active 
and committed will continue to do so in the digital era. People have tools, but also free 
will to decide whether to use them or not. 
Hence, civic initiatives online cannot be scrutinized from one perspective. We 
do claim that they serve as a significant connection between citizens and governance, 
and a possibility to participate and reflect on a plurality of opinions. Kansalaisaloite.fi 
is a channel for citizens to have an effect on governmental decisions and debates, and 
they bring private and public questions much closer together. The future will show if 
civic initiatives somehow extend and get a bigger value both among administrations 
and citizens, and if they lead to a different and more solid kind of citizen-governance-
relationship. Grossi (2011) also uses the terms “transnational individualised societies” 
and “global village” in considering today’s public sphere. The public sphere and public 
opinion can indeed be universal by means of global civic initiatives, but first they need 
to get their established place in a national social sphere. 
6. Can crowdsourcing in policymaking foster democratic deliberation?  
The digital revolution, especially networked online technology has made it possible for 
organisations and individuals to turn to a wider community of people to resolve 
problems and create new products. Initially a business concept, in recent years, the 
practice of crowdsourcing has been gaining ground also as a valuable tool in 
policymaking processes.  
Definitions and different contexts of use 
The concept and definition of crowdsourcing was first presented by the editor of Wired 
Magazine, Jeff Howe, in 2006: "Simply defined, crowdsourcing represents the act of a 
company or institution taking a function once performed by employees and outsourcing 
it to an undefined (and generally large) network of people in the form of an open call. 
This can take the form of peer-production (when the job is performed collaboratively), 
but is also often undertaken by sole individuals. The crucial prerequisite is the use of 
the open call format and the large network of potential laborers." The new business 
model had early successes in creative and design industries as well as in corporate 
scientific research and development. (Brabham 2008, p. 76-79) 
Brabham (2008) defines crowdsourcing as "a strategic model to attract an 
interested, motivated crowd of individuals capable of providing solutions superior in 
quality and quantity to those that even traditional forms of business can." He quotes 
Surowiecki who argues that "under the right circumstances, groups are remarkably 
intelligent, and are often smarter than the smartest people in them" (Brabham 2008, p. 
79.). According to Aitamurto and Chen (2017), crowdsourcing "means an open call for 
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anybody to participate in an online task". Outside business, crowdsourcing is used in 
very different fields like journalism, citizen science and crisis management (Aitamurto 
and Chen 2017, p. 3). 
Crowdsourcing has been used in several countries in processes related to 
legislation or policy strategies: in constitutional processes in Iceland and Chile, in 
legislative or legal reforms in Finland and in Brazil, in strategy reforms by various US 
federal agencies, and on the municipal level in numerous urban planning projects. In 
policymaking, crowdsourcing can be used in different phases from problem 
identification and data gathering to developing proposals and consultation and to 
drafting policies, as well as implementing and evaluating decisions. In decision-making 
it is not applied very often, because in representative democracies decisions are made 
by elected bodies (Aitamurto & Chen 2017, p. 1-4). 
The Finnish case 
The Finnish Ministry of Environment and the Committee for the future of the Finnish 
Parliament decided for the first time to use crowdsourcing in a law reform in 2013. The 
law in question was the off-road traffic law. Off-road traffic in Finland consists mostly 
of snowmobiles and all-terrain.  Off-road traffic had increased substantially and this 
created various controversies. Crowdsourcing was used in the research and drafting 
phase of the new legislation. Usually when laws are prepared, civil servants have direct 
contacts with different interest groups and with an expert committee with different 
stakeholders. This time, the Ministry also wanted to use crowdsourcing, aiming in its 
own words to “search for knowledge and ideas from the crowd, enhance people’s 
understanding of the law, and attempt to increase the perception of the policy’s 
legitimacy” (Aitamurto & Landemore 2016, p. 177-178). 
In 2013, an online platform was opened where citizens could propose ideas, 
vote others´ ideas up or down, and comment. There were two crowdsourcing phases 
that generated about 500 ideas and 4,000 comments as well as 24,000 up or down votes 
from about 700 users altogether. The first phase was dedicated to problem mapping and 
the second phase aimed to generate and evaluate problem solving ideas.  The authors of 
the research article were active in designing the crowdsourcing platform. The platform 
was open to everybody, but to participate actively, one had to register with a verifiable 
e-mail address. (Aitamurto & Landemore 2016, p. 178-179) 
As a practice, crowdsourcing enhances democratic value in several ways. It 
increases transparency both among peers and between the crowd and crowdsourcers, 
who are often policymakers. It informs citizens when the projects are still in their 
planning phases. It also increases inclusiveness, as it invites a large number of citizens 
to participate in policymaking. (Aitamurto and Chen 2017, p. 1-12) 
Amoretti distinguishes between four types of e-democracy: consultative, 
participative, deliberative and administrative e-democracies (Amoretti 2006, p. 11-13). 
Crowdsourcing can be either consultative, participative or deliberative. In the Finnish 
case, the process was designed to be participatory, and that goal was reached, as 700 
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citizens participated actively. The question is whether it was also a deliberative process. 
Was the quality of discursive process emphasized, as well as rational reasoning?  
The classical standards of good deliberation are: respect, absence of power, 
equality, reasons, aim at consensus, common good orientation, publicity, accountability 
and sincerity (Bächtiger & al. 2018, p. 4). In the Finnish case, many of these standards 
were well actualized and some others to a certain degree, even if the process was not 
designed to be a deliberative process. 
Aitamurto and Landemore argue that the participants could act freely and that 
they were equal. On the other hand, they admit that the tone was not always respectful 
(Aitamurto & Landemore 2016, p. 186-188). Participants exchanged arguments in a 
dialogical manner. It was possible to distinguish arguments, counter-arguments, 
examples, counter-examples, conceptual distinctions, new propositions and use of 
evaluative criteria (Aitamurto & Landemore 2016, p. 182-186). These observations 
indicate that reasoning did happen, that there was a common good orientation and that 
at least many participants aimed at common understanding, if not at perfect consensus. 
On the other hand, the common goal was not to find a consensus but to communicate a 
plurality of aspects and experiences related to off-road traffic to policy-makers. The 
criterion of publicity was fulfilled, as the debate happened openly on a public platform. 
When it comes to participants, a minimum standard of accountability was achieved by 
the use of e-mail addresses. As for policy-makers, the crowdsourcing process increased 
their accountability, since the process of lawmaking was made transparent and because 
it is more difficult to ignore citizens´ views once they have been asked for and 
published. 
It is important to remember that the crowdsourcing process cannot be seen as 
conveying “public opinion”. Technically, the material is a self-selected sample and it is 
not representative (Aitamurto and Chen 2017, p. 5-6; Brabham, p. 86). Brabham sees a 
risk of strengthening already extant hegemonies and suggests that we should keep a 
“constant eye on who is missing from the crowd” (Brabham, p. 86-87). Compared to 
traditional administrative and political approaches, crowdsourcing adds inclusiveness to 
the process. Still, the ideal of inclusiveness could probably be pursued even better than 
was done in the Finnish case. 
Concluding thoughts 
To conclude this section, it can be said that an analysis of the Finnish crowdsourced 
law reform proves that crowdsourcing can include a relatively high degree of 
democratic deliberation. This seemed to be the case even though the process was not 
designed with that goal in mind. An important factor was certainly the deliberative 
domain (platform) skillfully founded and moderated by civil servants and media 
specialists. The process clearly increased both communication and participation on the 
citizen level and favored the expression of a plurality of views. It also increased 
inclusiveness, but did not resolve all the problems related to it.   
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7. Has participatory budgeting empowered citizens? 
It can be said that democracy cannot only be taught to citizens on a theoretical level, 
but that the political and economic skills it requires can be learned by taking different 
actions in different arenas. Participatory budgeting (PB) is an example of one such 
trend. Participatory budgeting represents citizen involvement in public decision-
making. This encompasses both democratic and economic innovation at the same time: 
PB can be said to give people “real power over real money” (Shah 2007, p. 45-47). The 
basic idea behind PB is to enable citizens to influence the use of public money in their 
own region when deciding on a budget and voting on viable ideas. Hence PB is meant 
to lead citizen participation and pluralism of economic power. The concept behind PB 
is the concept of participatory democracy and can be theoretically seen to follow the 
ideal of a deliberative concept of democracy: enabling citizens to debate ideas to be 
implemented: the best and most feasible idea is selected through social debate (Godwin 
2018, p. 5-6). In public debate, citizens have the opportunity to define and prioritize the 
use of public wealth.  As a complementary means of citizens’ participation, PB 
represents the decentralization of power, which is associated with citizens' ability to 
make decisions. 
Participatory budgeting can be characterized as a process of democratic 
decision-making and societal debate that offers the public sector the opportunity to 
encourage citizens to participate in political decision-making by accelerating 
democracy projects. The starting point for PB is therefore very grassroots, as citizens 
are the best experts on their needs in their daily lives, which can be seen to enhance the 
use of public funds and direct them to their most beneficial purposes (Godwin 2018, p. 
12). Public sector funds consist of taxes at both the state and municipal levels, so it is 
reasonable to argue that it is financially fair to give citizens the opportunity to decide 
on the allocation of budgeted expenditure, which requires coherent communication 
between individuals and the public sector.  
PB can be implemented by allocating part of the municipal budget for 
participatory budgeting. This will bring economic decision-making closer to the people 
and make it more likely that they will become more actively involved in the 
implementation of new ideas, which can be seen as reducing political inactivity and 
reticence. The idea of participatory budgeting also includes the concept of the budget 
being open, which means that it must be accessible to everyone, as well as easily 
understood. The budget can be visualized to improve comprehensibility which at the 
same time lowers the threshold for citizens to become familiar with the various stages 
of participatory budgeting (Shah 2007, p. 39). 
In practice, PB goes through five stages: process design, brainstorming ideas, 
develop proposals, voting and project funding. Through its phases, PB seems, at the 
theoretical level, to be a complete means of controlling public funds and a stepping 
stone towards political inclusion and social justice. On the other hand, there are also 
problems that can be identified, especially at the voting stage: to represent a workable 
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fund allocation tool and to be legitimate, it should involve enough citizens with 
sufficient political knowledge (Godwin 2018, p. 10-11). 
Participatory budgeting in Helsinki  
In the autumn of 2019, participatory budgeting is a politically relevant topic in 
Helsinki, as it is in the process of being implemented. In Helsinki, PB is practiced on 
two different levels: “OmaStadi” service and the “RuutiBudjetti” (Omastadi 2019), 
which is aimed specifically at young people. Implementing participatory budgeting in 
Helsinki is a relatively new social innovation, implemented in two phases. First, 
citizens—regardless of age or place of residence—were allowed to make proposals for 
the use of public funds. In the second phase, feasible proposals are voted on (Hel.fi 
2019).   
The implementation of PB represents the deliberative aspect of digital 
democracy, offering citizens the ability to decide on the resources to be allocated 
through electronic means in an online environment. On the other hand, participatory 
budgeting also approaches autonomous Marxism as it provides citizens with a path of 
political participation through cooperation between the individual and the public sector 
in the context of resource allocation. According to Dahlberg (2011), autonomous 
Marxism seeks a radical change that enables individuals to increase their influence 
through decentralization. In other words, Helsinki can be seen as contributing to the 
realization of local democracy through a participatory budgeting project that gives 
citizens budgetary authority while narrowing the gap between political decision-makers 
and citizens through the use of the online environment. It is this online environment 
that creates a space for public decision-making in which decentralized decision-making 
can take place, with the participation of people other than those who have obtained a 
political mandate. 
In the second phase of participatory budgeting, Helsinki residents were allowed 
to vote on plans for using the budget in the Omastadi.hel.fi e-service from 1 to 31 
October 2019, and the city is expected to implement the ideas with the most votes. The 
realization of deliberative democracy in the context of the Internet requires that the 
platform utilized in the e-environment is sufficiently clear and easy to use so that 
citizens have an equal opportunity to participate (Dahlberg 2011, p. 6). The money 
allocated to Helsinki budgeting is distributed by population of a district. The Helsinki 
city council has granted a total of EUR 4.4 million annually through PB for 
implementing citizens' ideas (Hel.fi 2019). The projects to be voted on are very 
pragmatic and are very much linked to the grassroots level of citizens’ everyday life, 
such as building landscapes, renovating parks and creating new meeting places for 
everyone. Appropriations for basic municipal activities, such as social and health 
services and education, are still decided by the city council. 
While the amount set aside for participatory budgeting can be considered a lot 
in absolute terms, public investment—for example in infrastructure or public 
services—often proves to be expensive and, in relation to the city's total expenditure, 
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expenditure for participatory budgeting remains relatively low. In relation to Helsinki's 
total budgeted expenditure on investments (2019, 774M. €), only 0,5% of the total 
investment budget is earmarked for participatory budgeting. In this respect, much of 
Helsinki's overall budget is decided by city counsellors, which in turn undermines 
citizens’ political involvement. 
However, the low budget for PB is not the only problem that arises in Helsinki. 
The challenge of deliberative democracy is precisely the involvement of citizens in 
public debate, so that a common consensus can be reached at all. On the one hand, the 
problem may be citizens’ indifference to “common issues”. However, on the other 
hand, if citizens are viewed as political consumers, the city of Helsinki can be accused 
of poorly executed marketing that does not reach enough people to be interested in 
public economy. The basic idea behind PB is that it can also activate previously 
politically inactive citizens to participate in decision-making (Godwin 2018, p. 10-14), 
where Helsinki has been only moderately successful. According to the OmaStadi 
service, 10 435 members are involved in PB (Omastadi 2019). The distinction between 
active and inactive citizens is not available, but it is reasonable to assume that not all 
the slightly over 10,000 citizens are actively involved. Relative to the population of 
Helsinki (2018, 650,033), roughly 1.6% of Helsinki residents have taken advantage of 
their opportunity to participate in decision-making on the allocation of public funds, 
which, on reflection, can be considered to be a worryingly low percentage. However, 
participatory budgeting is still in the early stages of implementation in Helsinki, so 
there is reason to be optimistic about it. Budgeting as a new type of democratic 
innovation represents an important tool for democratizing society and involving 
citizens. 
8. Conclusion 
In this paper we have discussed how technology can impact citizen-governance 
interaction in Finland. There are many technological ways, both on the national and 
municipal levels, to bring governance and citizens closer to each other and to improve 
their relationship with each other. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the digital 
revolution and new technological applications have created solid solutions for the core 
problems of democratic deliberation or decision-making in the Finnish context. 
As we first noted, it is obvious that the Internet as a whole allows a fruitful 
place for deliberation between citizens and governance. There are many examples, such 
as electronic voting, civic initiatives, crowdsourcing and participatory budgeting, which 
have or will have significant effects on our political and deliberative environment. 
These applications have, in our opinion, at least a possibility to enhance participation, 
communication, pluralism and accountability in governance for citizens. 
It is apparent that when everyone is able to vote at home, sign civic initiatives 
online, or participate in crowdsourcing or municipal budgeting, deliberation and 
decision-making are much more transparent and also faster than they would be offline. 
In this situation, being an active citizen does not demand citizens’ presence at any 
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given place, at any precise time; it is flexible for both parties, all of the possibilities lie 
“in the same place”, and they are easier to utilise. 
However, we cannot forget problems concerning anonymity, hate speech and 
different social bubbles which are hard to control or manage. We claim that making the 
Internet more friendly for citizen-governance interaction is an unfinished task that will 
likely continue to evolve. Technology cannot solve everything or suddenly change 
people or their thinking. We can further say that in Finland we are struggling with the 
same problems we have struggled with before. Active citizens are active online and 
offline, and the Internet does not automatically make passive citizens active. Second, 
the Internet is not a very open system, and we cannot trust technology to always work 
properly and solidly. There are many instances of hacking, data leakages and other 
similar dangers which we cannot prevent. The digital revolution is not complete. 
That is why we have approached our subject in a clearly critical manner and we 
all claim that there are many challenges to solve before it can be even considered that 
technology can somehow save or enhance citizens’ ability to participate and 
communicate with governance. What is apparent is that technology can greatly help us 
in creating a better citizen-governance relationship in Finland. Time will show if 
participatory budgeting and civic initiatives, among other things , have an effect on 
decision-making and politicians’ thinking. At the very least it seems that informed 
citizens are likely to be more motivated to participate in issues of general interest. 
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Abstract 
The securitization of cyberspace is the process through which actors declare elements 
of cyberspace as fundamentally security issues, often coming into conflict with 
fundamental values of deliberative democracy, such as freedom of expression and the 
right to privacy. This paper will examine the securitization of cyberspace in the 
Finnish context, using Thierry Balzacq’s framework (2011) of securitization, in the 
context of the newly released Finnish Cyber Security Strategy (FCSS) of 2019, and 
address the discourse on threats surrounding the creation of the strategy, as well as 
contextualizing it in the EU’s collective securitization while paying particular 
attention to how actors with limited technological autonomy, such as Finland and 
Estonia, formulate their strategies. The paper will make policy recommendations for 
finding the right balance between security and consideration for privacy and human 
rights that allow deliberative democracy to flourish. 
 
Keywords:  Securitization, cybersecurity, Finland, Balzacq, Copenhagen School, 
Finnish Cyber Security Strategy, FCSS, Estonia 
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This research paper aims to study the securitization of cyberspace in the context of 
Finnish cyber security. Our paper seeks to explore how cyberspace has been 
securitized, what threats have emerged through the process, and what policy options 
have been or should be implemented to combat the threat in a Finnish context. Cyber 
security is a current phenomenon in Finland and, as we show below, has been the 
subject of concrete political actions and public strategies that aim to address the 
challenges related to the domain. Our case study approach aims to provide new 
comparative insights on the subject and highlight the topicality of the issue. 
Furthermore, a case study approach allows us to provide more detailed information on 
different timelines, actors, and possible policy actions to combat issues arising 
through the unfriendly use of cyberspace and account for the different interests of the 
writers. 
Section One begins with situating the research framework within 
securitization theory and cyber domain literature. The theoretical framework consists 
of Balzacq’s securitization theory and the sociological view of securitization which 
allow us to identify the processes through which threats become a politicized issue 
while a brief discussion of the concepts of cyberspace and cyber domain help to 
understand the strategic processes of securitization in the given domain. 
Section two analyses the Finnish Cyber Security Strategy (FCSS) and its 
socio-historical context while section three applies Balzacq’s case study framework to 
the FCSS. Section two’s timeline encompasses past, present and future, which 
provides insight into the development of cyber security in the Finnish context. The 
focus on agents and practices in section three serves to highlight the relationship 
between co-optation and regulative practices in Finnish strategy.  
Section four contextualizes the development of the securitization of the cyber 
security strategies of Finland and Estonia in the 2007 Estonia cyberattacks. Section 
Five ties the use of cyberspace to hybrid interference, an element of threat to the 
tenets of deliberative democracy, and briefly discusses possible responses and their 
limitations. The aim is to recognize policy recommendations varying from resilience 
to democratic deterrence. Finally, the conclusion summarizes the research and lays 
the groundwork for further and more in-depth investigation of this multi-faceted 
issue. 
Situating the framework in securitization and cyber domain 
literature — Eetu Kukila 
This research paper takes the theoretical framework laid out in Thierry Balzacq’s 
theory on securitization as its starting point. This section outlines the theoretical basis 
for understanding the cyber domain to facilitate an understanding of the role of cyber 
security and the merits of its study in general. We begin with a brief overview of 
securitization theory before focusing more closely on the sociological view of 
securitization. Lastly, the section reviews scholarship on the cyber domain with a 
focus on how it is understood in the security context. 
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Securitization theory and its value 
The securitization of cyberspace is a process by which actors declare elements of 
cyberspace as a fundamental security issue. Balzacq offers a framework for 
securitization, i.e. something becoming a security issue through discursive politics. 
Moreover, securitization is an especially intersubjective process, which transforms an 
abstract threat into a concrete being. Furthermore, security problems can emerge from 
different practices, including sociological and philosophical, but their original 
intention was not to create a security problem. (Balzacq 2011, 1-3). 
Securitization processes are initiated through speech act expressions, which 
are more than statements. Rather these representations are performatives; they can 
take actual actions and result in concrete effects on the environment. Put it another 
way, they are not “constatives that simply report state of affairs and are thus subject to 
truth and falsity tests” (Balzacq 2011, 1, 15).  The Copenhagen School has laid the 
foundation for speech act on which Balzacq has continued to develop it, expanding 
the scope of the study to policy tools. In speech acts, there are always two actors: the 
speaker and the audience. In order to be successful in securitization, it is required that 
the audience accepts the reality of the threat (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2010, 78). 
Securitization theory contains three assumptions:  the centrality of audience, 
the dependency between context and agency, and forming practices (Balzacq 2011, 
3). When trying to widen the security agenda there lies a political danger in tacking 
the word “security” on to a wide range of issues. Therefore, the main concern is to 
define what is part of security, and what is not in the context of a broadened 
understanding. (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2010, 76). Similarly, security has been 
expanded to include a variety of issues in the cyber domain. Crucially, when the issue 
comes to be treated as a security matter, it is justifiable to use exceptional political 
measures to deal with it. Thereby an issue becomes securitized when it morphs from 
non-politicized through politicized process to become securitized (Peoples & 
Vaughan-Williams 2010, 77). 
 Securitization theory offers us a research framework for how to identify and 
understand threats. Public attention on the issue and the requirement for legal and 
political action are the key criteria when operating on security matters. As Balzacq 
aptly puts it: “the shared salience of an issue marked by the imperative of acting now, 
constitute necessary and sufficient conditions for securitization” (Balzacq 2011, 32). 
Also, as in our research, securitization theory takes the form of case studies 
constituting the primary research strategy. Hence, empirical inquiry investigates real-
life context wherein the audience has a direct connection with the security issue and 
an ability to take actions to counter the threats (Balzacq 2011, 32-34). 
A sociological view of securitization 
When doing a case study through the framework of securitization there must be 
scrutiny on the practices of how policies are created, and which kind of tools have 
been deployed. Additionally, context should not be ignored, as it poses a threat to the 
historical and social environment. (Balzacq 2011, 35-36). Balzacq thus offers two 
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different approaches to securitization: sociological and philosophical. In our research, 
the sociological view is more useful and thus will be presented more broadly. 
 Accordingly, the sociological model relies primarily on practice and context. 
It views securitization as a strategic process affected by context and the disposition of 
the audience. The strategic action of a speech act works through interaction while 
trying to make security issues more open to universal communication. In other words, 
persuasion transfers the security issue from the non-political area to the political 
through a securitizing process. The sociological model stresses the actors’ habitus, 
which can be understood as their engrained historical characteristics that inform 
others about their behaviour. Habitus may vary depending on context and therefore on 
changing historical situations. In addition, the audience and actors have an equal role 
in constituting securitization. (Balzacq 2011, 1-2). 
An overview and basis for the framework of securitization theory has been 
given above. Securitization theory offers an analysis of the cyber domain and its 
relation to security problems. Cyberspace contains a variety of different security 
issues that may provide new insights when combined with securitization theory. Next, 
I will focus on theorizing cyberspace and the security issues related to it. 
Cyberspace and security 
The reviewed cyber domain literature is oriented to the study of cyber security in a 
defensive context. The literature often surveys different policies of a variety of 
sovereign states on how to respond to cyberattacks. For example, Finland’s National 
Defence University provides researched information on the security aspects and 
sovereignty of a cyber domain in their research called The Fog of Cyber Defence 
(2013). Different studies are concerned with what steps states must take to protect 
their cyber domain.  
To study the cyber domain, one first needs to understand what cyberspace is. When 
theorizing cyberspace, it can be called “cyber-space-time”, because it allows 
information to travel instantly at great distances causing a compression of time and 
space. In other words, cyber-space-time manipulates time with cyber technology. 
According to complexity theory, cyberspace is complex since individual actors 
spontaneously interact with themselves, making outcomes unpredictable. Cyberspace 
is basically accessible to everyone, because no actor has a natural advantage in the 
cyber domain, and it is separate from other domains. However, the performative 
action in cyberspace can amplify different capabilities in other domains (Russell 
2014, 12-13). Thus, cyberspace is an important tool for other domain functions as 
well.  
Like any other domain, cyberspace also needs security, and securing 
sophisticated technology by relying on similarly sophisticated technology is regarded 
as a challenge. Thus, ensuring the adequacy of cyber security technology has become 
problematic. There is a risk, however, of reducing the human factor excessively. 
When considering cyber security, it requires human beings and their ability to use 
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cyber domain for their own benefit. (Rantapelkonen & Kantola 2013, 31-32). So real 
human actors must be kept in mind as the end-users of cyberspace. 
Cyberspace is not a neutral environment and it is divided among many 
different actors who can be strong or weak in relation to one another. In addition, 
cyberspace contains a complex web of interdependent actors that reflect world politics 
(Rantapelkonen & Kantola 2013, 32). Therefore, cyberspace is a problematic area 
when considering legislation. Existing laws and norms are not yet developed as 
workable and credible enough to deal, for example, with warfare related issues in 
cyberspace (Russell 2014, 13). Scholars have agreed that without specific rules of 
international law, the cyber domain located in the jurisdiction of a state is subjected to 
administration by the respective state (Tuukkanen 2013, 42). This can lead to serious 
security dilemmas when traditional deterrence strategies from other domains are 
adapted to the cyber domain (Russell 2014, 14). 
The past, present and future of the Finnish Cyber Security 
Strategy (FCSS) — Riikka Pasanen 
This section will examine the development of policymaking on cyber security in 
Finland. Finland is an advanced information society whose activities in both the 
private and public spheres depend on various electronic networks and the services 
they provide. This vulnerability to external threats rises from the dependant 
relationship with information technology (IT). As defined in Section 1, cyberspace is 
a contested territory and an arena for political maneuvers, including power plays and 
acts of war. Potential threats posed by cyberattacks to modern information society 
include computer hardware and systems failure and collapse of information 
infrastructure, which have a negative impact on public services, business and 
administration and therefore on the basic functioning of society (Lehto et al. 2017). 
Many of the interconnected societies of today are increasing their cooperation as these 
vulnerabilities are shared by most, if not all information societies. This development 
of increasing internationality is visible in the evolution of the Finnish Cyber Security 
Strategy even if its history spans only little more than a decade, and is foreseen to 
continue. In this section, the roots and context of the FCSS are explained, taking into 
account the socio-historical context, and a brief summary of recent developments, as 
well as a look to the future, are provided.  
Emergence and historical context of the Finnish Cyber Security Strategy  
When it comes to nations grappling with the need to protect their borders, the years 
2007 and 2010 can be seen as major turning points with the Estonian cyberattacks and 
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the discovery of the Stuxnet 
worm, respectively. In the FCSS, 
only the latter is mentioned, 
nevertheless, it would be 
imperceptive to suggest that the 
Estonian case and the following 
process of ‘hypersecurization’ 
(see section 4) would not have 
been extremely closely followed 
in neighboring Finland. The 
discovery of Stuxnet, an 
incredibly effective malware 
program, is referred to as “the 
beginning of a new era in cyber 
security” in the first FCSS (the 
Security Committee 2013, 18). 
Stuxnet is infamous for enabling 
an attack on Iran’s nuclear 
facilities and physically damaging centrifuges for uranium enrichment. The code was 
developed secretly, but experts agree that developing it must have required incredible 
expertise and likely more than one nation pooling their resources. The damage caused 
by this single, powerful cyber worm delayed Iran’s nuclear development for years and 
showed the international audience that cyber tools are able to cause physical damage 
to electronic devices and systems. 
The beginnings of the FCSS could be argued to be found in 1995 when the 
government of Finland first published a national guideline, “the Finnish Information 
Society Strategy”. However, the ramifications of a cyber influenced reality were 
likely not foreseen very clearly at this early stage of the Internet. For the purpose of 
this project, the 2003 Government Resolution on the Strategy for the Protection of 
Critical Activities in Society (YETT) is a more reliable starting point for tracking the 
predecessor strategies of the FCSS. YETT, which focused on securing vital functions 
of society, was last updated in 2006. During the 2010 update, the name was changed 
to better reflect the contents of the document. By the time of publication of the 
Security Strategy for Society in 2010, cyber security had been noted to be an integral 
part of national security (Ministry of Defence 2010). Finland had already been the 
target of cyber operations, with a focus on cyber-activism, crime and espionage (the 
Security Committee 2013), which has continued since, and is now an inherent feature 
of an information society. In the Security Strategy for Society, it was noted that 
Finland is lacking in cyber security, especially in the area of coordination of response 
(Ministry of Defence 2010). Less than a year later, in March 2011, the decision was 
taken to begin the preparation of the FCSS as a direct outcome of the Security 
Strategy for Society (the Security Committee 2019). 
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The first Finnish Cyber Security Strategy is an ambitious document, outlining 
its vision for the future as “By 2016, Finland will be a global forerunner in cyber 
threat preparedness and in managing the disturbances caused by these threats” 
(2013, p.3). The publication of the first Finnish Cyber Security Strategy provided a 
road map for developing Finland’s competencies further and further securing the 
“national” cyberspace, leading up to the launch of the National Cyber Security 
Centre, the first new program implemented in the scope of the FCSS and the 
subsequent Cyber Security Strategy Implementation Program that formatted the goals 
outlined in the strategy into a set of concrete steps and policy actions.  The key tools 
for managing cyber security listed in the first Finnish Cyber Security Strategy (2013) 
are prevention, detection and capacitation.  
A review was commissioned by the Government to assess the impact of the 
FCSS in anticipation of the upcoming revision of the FCSS.  The researchers found 
advances in the field of cyber security, but also that significant measures were needed 
for Finland to “establish a global forerunner position in cyber security” as that had 
originally been set as a target by 2016. However, the review did find that Finland is 
consistently in the top of indexes comparing cyber security preparedness and also 
noted that each of the other nations compared in the study, including Estonia, the 
Netherlands, and Singapore were likewise positioning themselves for positions of 
global or regional forerunner in the field of cyber security (Lehto et al. 2017, 62). 
 A renewed focus for a new decade: streamlining leadership and increasing 
international cooperation 
The program outlined in the Cyber Security Strategy Implementation Program 
contains 74 actions such as policy changes and new internal steering mechanisms, 
providing a framework for the development of national cyber security with concrete 
measures. Perhaps the most known implemented action from the program was the 
launch of the National Cyber Security Centre in 2014.  
A key part of concrete FCSS implementation has been “deciding who gets to 
decide”. One of the observations of the 2010 Security Strategy for Society was the 
division of jurisdiction between government departments and other entities, which 
was counterproductive to the perceived need of clear, expert consultancy and even co-
ordination in future crisis situations. In the midst of governmental pressures to 
streamline, reformation of jurisdictional borders between agencies has also been 
employed. This was likely partly in response to the budgetary pressures to streamline 
government operations but also due to the unpredictable development of cyber threats 
such as hybrid interference (see Section 5). A result of this process is the Security 
Committee, an interdepartmental coordinating body within the Ministry of Defence, 
tasked with assisting all the Ministries. (the Security Committee, n.d.) Compared to 
its formal predecessor, the Committee for Security and Defence, the new Security 
Committee is broader in its scope and the membership of the committee has been 
consequently amended to reflect the expanded purpose of the Committee.   
The brand new FCSS 2019 sums up its three core areas as leadership, 
capacitation and international cooperation. Whereas the FCSS 2013 outlined an 
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incredibly ambitious vision of Finland as a global forerunner in cyber threat 
preparedness and in managing the disturbances caused by these threats, the revised 
edition places a greater emphasis on the international cooperation aspect, also owing 
to the 2019 EU regulation, the Cybersecurity Act and the consequent pooling of 
resources in the form of the European Cybersecurity Industrial, Technology and 
Research Centre and setting up a network of National Coordination Centres 
(European Union 2019). On the national level, the topic of cyber security in the 
government will gain more visibility with the upcoming new appointment of a 
Cybersecurity Director. This position was decided to be established within the 
Ministry of Transport and Communications to coordinate the national development of 
cyber security (the Security Committee 2019).  
Co-optation of economic interest for securitizing purposes — 
Agents and practices in the Finnish Cyber Security Strategy 2019 
  — Juho Mölsä 
This section will apply Balzacq’s case study framework (2011, 32–38) to the Finnish 
Cyber Security Strategy (Government of Finland 2019). As the context has been 
presented in the second section, I direct my attention to agents and practices. Since 
our case study is a strategy including policies and practices, I am using what can be 
called a sociological (Balzacq 2011, 22) or a practice-oriented approach (Balzacq, 
Léonard, & Ruzicka 2016, 504–507).  
Co-optation of economic interest and national competitiveness 
In line with Avant and Haufler’s (2018) findings, the Finnish Cyber Security strategy 
challenges classical state-centered views of security, at least partially. Private actors 
are seen not only as referent objectives but also functional actors (Balzacq 2011, 7), 
as those who protect against the threats (Government of Finland 2019, 7, 9). The 
securitization of cyberspace is even framed as advantageous to “national 
competitiveness” (Government of Finland 2019, 8). This linkage of economic and 
political interests raises questions on whether we should classify some private actors 
as securitizing actors, which I will return to below. It also offers one hypothetical 
motivation for the securitization of Finnish Cyberspace: national competitiveness.   
Although the securitization literature has reserved a central role for states or 
public actors (Avant & Haufler 2018, 3) Hansen & Nissenbaum (2009, 1161–1162) 
find that in the cyber sector, private actors have been vested with responsibility due to 
the networked nature of the cyber domain. Hansen and Nisselbaum (2009, 1162) 
argue that discourses in cyber-related securitization can be analysed as constellations 
of multiple referent objectives that can include both private and public, economic, and 
political referent objectives. In our analysis, we make similar observations using our 
practice-oriented approach and recognize different elements as part of a common 
dispositif (Balzacq et al. 2016, 505).   
In the Finnish Cyber Security Strategy there is a “co-responsibility” (Hansen 
& Nissenbaum 2009, 1162) on cyber security between private and public actors where 
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some of the responsibilities are given to private actors (Government of Finland 2019, 
7–9). The private responsibilities include, for instance, maintaining vital infrastructure 
and offering security services for businesses (Government of Finland 2019, 7–9). This 
can be interpreted as a co-optation tactic in light of the regulative instruments and 
capacity tools that I describe in more detail below. In addition, the above-mentioned 
linkage with national competitiveness can also be interpreted as a tool for co-opting 
economic interest groups for securitization purposes. The use of co-optation tactics 
supports a key finding in practice-oriented securitization studies, the intersubjectivity 
of securitization (Balzacq et al. 2016, 469, 499), as it makes it difficult to separate the 
audience from the agent.   
Epistemic community, capacity building, and regulative powers 
Despite some of the functional, securing, actors being private, it is still true that state 
authorities are identified as the key security actors (Government of Finland 2019, 5–
6). Avant and Haufler (2018, 9–10) argue that states have reserved the role of 
commissioning and legitimizing private actors in the security field. Thus, they can be 
classified as the securitizing agent. In the case of the Finnish Cyber Security Strategy, 
this can be seen most clearly in the obvious fact that the strategy is a government-
issued document (Government of Finland 2019, 1). Furthermore, the division of labor 
is implicitly noted as the partnerships and modes of action are to be bound by 
regulation (Government of Finland 2019, 4).  
Critical securitization literature has identified a “military-industrial-
bureaucratic-scientific complex” (Eriksson 2001, 213) or in Haas’ words an 
“epistemic community” (Eriksson 2001, 215) as securitization agents. The Finnish 
context appears similar, as the Finnish Cyber security strategy has been produced by a 
constellation of state bureaucrats, military personnel, and experts from the field 
(Security Committee 2019). This complex appears as the key agent in the 
implementation as the practices in the strategy propose resources towards research 
and development (Government of Finland 2019, 9), government coordination 
exercises (Government of Finland 2019, 5) and security authorities (Government of 
Finland 2019, 6). The choice of a practice-oriented securitization approach allows us 
to take the production of the report itself into account as an example of practice.  
Eriksson (2001, 219) in his study of cyberspace securitization in Sweden, 
notes that the Swedish case framed the threat as “cyberwar” (Eriksson 2001, 219). 
Thus, the role of the private sector was “restricted” although private actors such as 
business associations were involved in cyber security discussions (Eriksson 2001, 
219). The Finnish Cyber Security Strategy has a whole-of-society resilience and 
business orientation approach (Government of Finland 2019, 4, 9) and thus, private 
interests are naturally more involved. For instance, the group that participated in the 
preparation of the Finnish Cyber Security Strategy by submitting official statements 
included business associations (e.g. the Confederation of the Finnish Industries) and 
some private cyber security companies (e.g. F-Secure) (“Lausuntopalvelu.fi” 2019). 
As noted above, businesses are also heavily involved in the practices proposed in the 
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strategy. Thus, representatives of private economic interests are active members of the 
epistemic community in the Finnish context. 
In light of the constellation of the epistemic community, it is worth noting that 
there are objectives concerning public actors that are “regulatory instruments” 
(Balzacq 2011, 17) but the objectives concerning private actors are mainly “capacity 
tools” (Balzacq 2011, 17). Regulative instruments include having up-to-date 
capabilities and toolboxes for authorities which includes proposed new legislation 
empowering authorities (Government of Finland 2019, 7). Capacity building, on the 
other hand, includes tools such as conducting knowledge sharing exercises 
(Government of Finland 2019, 9) and financial support, including private, training, 
research and technological development (Government of Finland 2019, 9).   
The last point on the capacity-based approach returns us back to the co-
optation tactics. In sum, a slightly paradoxical approach appears in the effort to create 
a culture of cyber security together with the whole-of-society, but at the same time 
empowering authorities with new resources and capabilities.   
Conclusions  
To conclude, I would like to critically assess the chosen securitization approach. In 
this section I have used securitization in a broad sense, meaning that the utterance of 
security or identifying disastrous threats in certain fields is classified as securitization 
(Balzacq et al. 2016, 503). This clearly applies to the Finnish Cyber Security Strategy. 
The agents and practices analysed in this section would also support, at least partially, 
another sufficient condition that cyberspace is seen as a field of security authorities, 
such as military and security police (Eriksson 2001, 219). Of course, it is a legitimate 
question to ask to what extent economic agents and rhetoric affect the interpretation 
of the correct sector of the strategy. However, there is at least one, more narrow 
condition for securitization regarding practices that the Finnish Cyber Security 
Strategy does not fully support. The condition is that the practices should be 
extraordinary and not fully comply with normal democratic procedures (Eriksson 
2001, 220). This is not the case with the strategy since all the proposed new powers 
for authorities are meant to be formally adopted following normal framework 
development and legislative procedures (Government of Finland 2019, 4).   
Comparison: How actors with limited technological autonomy 
operate; the Finnish and Estonian Cyber Security Strategies  
 — Sami Husa 
Introduction   
The denial-of-service cyber-attacks against Estonian government institutions, 
telecommunications, banking and infrastructure in April and May of 2007 are 
described as “the first real war in cyberspace” by Hansen and Nissenbaum (2009).  
The upshot of the attacks was the drafting of Estonia’s first Cyber Security Strategy 
(ECSS), now in its third iteration. The attacks similarly jolted Finland into action as 
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discussed previously, leading to an urgency in drafting policy and setting and 
providing a plausible threat scenario for it.  
When Estonia launched the ECSS in 2008, it was one of the pioneers of the 
domain, with only three other countries having produced a cyber security strategy at 
the time (Pernik & Tuohy 2013). The development of Finland’s first Cyber Security 
Strategy (2013) reflects the same strategic priorities as those of Estonia; how a state 
with limited technological autonomy can respond to cyberattacks, the development of 
a horizontal model of resilience, and the fusion of private, technical and national 
interests. Securitization theory can help conceptualize the politics surrounding the 
development of cyber security policy and how interactions between the securitizing 
actors and the audience legitimize these policies.  
Hansen and Nissenbaum’s theoretical framework of cyber security  
Hansen and Nissenbaum’s seminal 2009 paper on cyber security proposes three 
security modalities in the practice of cyber-security; hypersecuritization, everyday 
security practices and technifications (Hansen & Nissenbaum 2009). 
Hypersecuritization is presented as the process of distorting and exaggerating the 
enormity of security threats; everyday security practices as the creation of individual 
and business ‘compliance in protecting network security’ and familiarization with 
threats, and technification as the creation of a privileged space and authority for 
experts with technical knowledge, outside of the realm of politics (Hansen & 
Nissenbaum 2009).  In their reading, hypersecuritizations always “mobilize the 
spectre of the future” while also using “the past as a legitimating reference” (2009). 
This is demonstrated in the third Estonian Cyber Security Strategy 2019 - 2022 
(ECSS), which invokes the 2007 attacks repeatedly from the introduction onwards. 
The Finnish Cyber Security Strategy 2019 (FCSS) is also broadly security and threat-
focused; indeed, the FCSS 2019 is entirely devoid of references to protecting privacy 
or the cyber realm from militarization, and only very briefly mentions the 
opportunities of digital technology to society (FCSS 2019).     
The 2007 Estonia attacks and the creation of cyber war  
As outlined by Robert Kaiser (2015), the 2007 Estonia cyberattack, precipitated by 
the removal of the Bronze Soldier in Tallinn, catapulted Estonia from a position on 
the margins to the epicenter of Western cyber security discourse. NATO’s Cyber 
Defence Center of Excellence was established in the city the very next year, and the 
Estonians continue to provide an outsized influence on EU policy on cyber security 
(Pernik & Tuohy 2013). Kaiser argues that the ensuing militarization of Estonian 
cyber security discourse led to an enclosed circle of knowledge among officials, and a 
“depoliticized discourse of unquestionable truth”, or techinification in Hansen and 
Nissenbaum’s framework (Kaiser 2015).  
As Arquilla points out, the ensuing hypersecuritization of Estonian cyberspace 
was excessive compared to the reality of the threat (2012). While Estonian Prime 
Minister Andrus Ansip likened the attacks to a blockade, and publicly discussed 
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invoking NATO’s mutual defense clause, Arquilla argues that the attacks were 
ultimately little more than a nuisance; the attack was non-violent, it carried no explicit 
demands for Estonia to change its political behavior, and no state actor or political 
entity took credit for them (Arquilla 2012).   
The 2007 cyberattacks and ensuing securitization can be understood as a 
speech act exposing the ways in which “Russianness” performatively materialized as 
the outside of “Estonianness” (Kaiser 2015).  In this reading, the denial of service 
attacks was presented as an act of war threatening Estonian sovereignty by Russia, 
aided by a fifth column of Estonian-Russians. This made it possible to project the 
“spectre of the past” on current events, by imposing the familiar Cold War narrative 
into the cyber domain. This threat also afforded an opportunity; as Kaiser argues, the 
frame of cyber war allowed the state to recast the troubled relationship between 
Estonian nationalists and the state’s Russian minority, to present Russia as a renewed 
threat to US and EU allies, and to establish its own role as a “transactor” in cyber 
security (Kaiser 2015).     
Determining audience assent  
The securitization of an issue does not depend on objective events but rather stems 
from the interactions between the securitizing actor (the agent who presents the 
threat) and the audience (Balzacq et al. 2015). For a concept so central to security 
theory (ST), determining what constitutes an audience and how its assent is 
determined has been one of the least developed concepts in ST (Balzacq et al. 2015). 
The Finnish and Estonian Cyber Security Strategies (CSSS) articulate a threat and a 
response, and are therefore securitized, but how is audience acceptance quantified? 
Roe (2008) points out that there is not a single audience, but a multitude. Using the 
example of the decision of the UK government to join the Iraq war, Roe argues that 
while the formal agreement of one audience (Parliament) was received, wider public 
opinion was against the war. Similarly, the creation of the Finnish and Estonian CSSS 
demonstrates the acceptance of securitization on a political-bureaucratic level, as 
discussed previously, but does not as such consider audience assent, outside of 
stressing social resilience as a defense against threats. 
According to the Estonian Ministry Defence annual public opinion survey, 
75% of Estonians rate cyberattacks as the most likely threat to their country, marking 
it as the threat Estonians are most concerned with (Estonian Ministry of Defence 
2019). This is consistent with the results of public opinion surveys since 2006, with 
cyberattacks coming in either as the first or second highest rated area of concern 
(Veber & Bloom 2016). The Finnish Ministry of Defence’s most recent public polling 
quantifies cyber-threats as the 5th largest area of concern for Finns, with 79% 
perceiving cyber security attacks as very concerning or concerning, a steady growth 
from 2009 (Finnish Ministry of Defence 2018). While the opinion polls serve 
imperfect measures of audience assent, they indicate a successful securitization of 
cyberspace, particularly in the case of Estonia.  
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Conclusion  
As the Finnish and Estonian cases of securitization demonstrate, securitization is 
essentially a political process, and politics cannot be removed from theory by deriving 
it from objective threats (Wæver 2011). At the same time, the theory has an implicit 
preference for desecuritization, by fostering critical analysis of the potential of 
securitization in itself to distort or generate representations of threats (Wæver 2011).  
Concurrently, the reality of the risks outlined in the strategies can be underplayed 
when viewed through securitization theory. Heikki Patomäki (2015) offers a criticism 
of using speech act theory to explain security threats, and the ambivalence the theory 
has towards being able to predict future risks meaningfully. While the future is 
unknown, he argues that there is a rational method for assessing the probability of 
possible futures. Therefore, the dramatization of threats to democracy, infrastructure 
and systems integrity presented in the strategies may be considered sensible 
(Patomäki 2015). When a particular future threat is not only objectively real but also 
probable, the best policy response to the danger is a political question of great 
importance. The next section will consider some of these scenarios, and offer policy 
recommendations.  
Hybrid interference through cyberspace — Threat and action  
 — Noora Magd 
Following the securitization of cyberspace mapped out in the previous sections this 
part of the research paper focuses on the role of cyberspace as a vector through which 
to conduct hybrid interference. Actions taken by governments against hybrid 
interference, whose effect is dependent on its subtle nature, and especially its 
application through cyberspace run the risk of over-securitizing society and acting 
against democratic states’ aims of upholding liberal values. At the same time not 
responding to attempts aiming to erode the basis of democratic societies run the risk 
of allowing deliberative democracies to crumble. 
Responses to this dilemma have been offered in terms of resilience and a 
whole-of-society approach tied to the notion of democratic deterrence (Wigell 2019). 
More pessimistic approaches, however, regard the West and Finland as having 
already lost the game in regard to an open cyberspace due to Russia’s process of 
constructing a closed Internet (known as RuNet) and the inherent asymmetry it 
presents (Kukkola et al. 2017). 
Hybrid interference – the threat 
Defined as the application of non-military tools to clandestinely influence a state and 
its society, hybrid interference is a tactic tied to a strategy of wedging, where the 
synchronized use of different methods of disruption is applied in an attempt to bring 
about deep divisions within the target state’s society (Mikkola et al. 2018). This 
strategy of wedging aims to disrupt political processes within countries, undermine 
trust in public institutions and sabotage the social cohesion of liberal democracies 
through division (Wigell 2019). It can be argued that the same tenets that uphold 
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liberal democracies (limited public state power, pluralism, freedom of press and 
information, as well as an open financial market with a limited ability to monitor civil 
society) are its inherent weaknesses allowing for hybrid interference to occur and 
making it harder to detect (Mikkola et al. 2018). 
It is essentially this pluralism and freedom of press inherent to liberal 
democracies and deliberative democracy that is threatened by hybrid interference 
tactics applied through cyberspace. The proliferation of social media and the 
widespread use of the Internet has widened the area of public deliberation and enabled 
previously marginalized positions to come forward. This has enhanced the 
participation in public deliberation and activism in the form of citizens’ initiative, for 
example. At the same time, the expanse of social media has also been exploited by 
state and non-state actors, such as Russia, to skew public discussion through the use 
of trolls and bots, using algorithms to influence opinions and financing right-wing and 
other extreme groups to strengthen already existing divisions within society. (Mikkola 
et al. 2018). 
The public sphere, so critical to deliberative democracy according to Jürgen 
Habermas (1991) and its champions, e.g. journalists, have increasingly become 
targets of hybrid interference. For example, Jessika Aro from the Finnish Public 
Broadcasting Company YLE has become a target due to her investigation of Russian 
trolls and bots. To the date, a Finnish docent and the editor in chief of MV-magazine, 
both known as pushing a Pro-Russian agenda, have been tried in cases related to 
intimidating Aro (BBC 2018). MV-magazine has also been a large contributor of anti-
immigration views, bringing about a polarization of politics and strengthening 
divisions within Finnish society while receiving funding from Russian sources. Most 
recently Russian linked sources have been connected to actions aiming to influence 
the European elections (European Commission 2019). As in the case of Aro, Russian 
approved, conducted or facilitated actions to silence critics through cyberspace can 
take many forms, including, but not limited to cyber espionage, the use of trolls, fake 
news and smear campaigns as well as threats (Aro 2019). 
The erosion of a civic culture that includes deliberation due to the polarisation 
and restriction of freedom of press through intimidation and flooding social media 
with fake news is a risk to democratic governance that rests on such conditions to 
prevail and reach consensus (Mikkola et al. 2018). Thus, the use of cyberspace as a 
tool of hybrid interference presents a challenge to open liberal democratic societies. 
Democratic deterrence and resilience – the response 
The main challenge lies in how to respond to these actions conducted in cyberspace. 
Western states can be said to have been forced into acting reactively when engaging 
with these threats thus far. Newer policies such as the EU joint communication on 
fighting disinformation, the new Finnish cyber security strategy and the new Finnish 
intelligence laws (European Commission 2019; the Security Committee 2019) aim to 
combat these challenges more proactively.  
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A framework of democratic deterrence proposed by Wigell includes notions 
that any response action must rest on the liberal values associated with democratic 
states. Democratic deterrence thus includes a whole-of-society, soft power approach 
to cyber and hybrid threats that includes non-military asymmetrical means of response 
that serve a restricted security aim (Wigell 2019). Democratic deterrence is based on 
the notions of the attractiveness of democratic values, the commitment of democratic 
states to liberal values and the instrumentalization of non-state actors within society 
and instruments such as transparency, rule of law and citizen activism to reveal acts of 
hybrid interference and deter illegal actions (Wigell 2019). 
Looking at the European Union’s inability to respond to the crisis in Syria and 
Ukraine casts doubt on the inherent attractiveness of democratic values, the use of 
soft power and thus “democratic compellence” (Wigell 2019). At the same time, 
democratic deterrence’s incorporation of civil society into a strategic action plan and 
the capability to respond in a different domain, from where the attacks occur do offer 
avenues of exploring possibilities to combat threats and attacks emerging through 
cyberspace.  
A key element raised in strategies, such as the whole-of-society approach, the 
FCSS (2019) and the European Union’s Global Strategy (European Commission 
2016) is promoting resilience within critical infrastructure, services, states and the 
union. Resilience-based strategies can be divided into three categories: 1) 
defensive/gaming to keep up the status quo, 2) marginalizing/cordoning off the threat, 
and 3) open/rejuvenating strategy (Mikkola et al. 2018). The FCSS thus far seems to 
incorporate a combination of the first and second strategies while tying into a larger 
notion of a whole-of-society approach to security championed by Finnish actors as a 
whole (see for example the Finnish Security Strategy for Society 2017). What strategy 
is chosen decides the framework of action and how the threats represented in 
cyberspace or through hybrid interference at large are conceptualized. In the words of 
Romeo Dallaire, the question is whether “we want to survive or thrive?”. 
Kukkola et al. (2017) explore the possibilities of a closed Russian Internet and 
its effect on Western states. The result is an inherent asymmetry in cyberspace that is 
difficult to overcome. Closing our own networks to respond to the challenge of closed 
Internets would result in a win for autocratic regimes due to the end of an open public 
Internet embodying western liberal ideals. Keeping our networks open, on the other 
hand, leaves us vulnerable to continued cyberattacks and hybrid interference, 
resulting in a possible victory for autocratic regimes. (Kukkola et at 2017). 
Previous studies on Russian interference in the US and French elections seem 
to point towards a decreasing effectiveness of tools of hybrid interference in 
successive applications and the role of media literacy in the population. This would 
suggest that policies incorporating resilience enhancing measures and the whole-of-
society approach may be the best approach to combating cyber operations and acts of 
hybrid interference through cyberspace without closing down an open Internet and 
thus compromising on democratic values. 
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Conclusion 
This paper considered the securitization of cyberspace in the Finnish context from a 
wide variety of perspectives and drew conclusions from them. In Section 1, we 
provided an overview of Balzacq’s securitization theory, which posits securitization 
primarily as a speech act that sees securitization as essentially the process of posing 
an exceptional threat and persuading an audience of the reality of this threat. The 
section also considers how to define cyberspace and the unique challenges of securing 
a complex web of interdependent actors lacking in international norms. In Section 2, 
the development of the Finnish Cyber Security Strategy is presented in its historical 
context, outlining the evolution of Finnish policy towards cyber security from 1995 
up to the FCSS 2019. The section outlines how Finland’s ambitious policy documents 
have belied the lack of budgetary and political support actually received. Section 3 
considers the constellation of public and private actors in the formulation of the FCSS 
while arguing that agents and practices in the Finnish context support a broad 
definition of securitization not fully aligned with some of the narrower theoretical 
conditions. Section 4 traces the genesis of both the Finnish and Estonian cyber 
security strategies in the founding myth of the first “cyberwar” of 2007. The section 
critically examines the speech act that led to securitization, and how it is used to 
justify policy hypersecuritization. Section 5 offers another viewpoint, moving from 
the conceptualization of securitization as not only a reaction to an outside threat but as 
the goal of hostile actors. The section argues that hybrid interference is best countered 
with a whole-of-society approach, balancing the need for security with respect for 
liberal democratic values. 
Examining the Finnish Cyber Security Strategy through the framework of 
securitization theory calls for further development of the theory beyond a focus on 
exceptional measures.  As we have argued, the securitization of cyberspace has led to 
a logic of security that relies on resilience and a fusion of technical and national 
security.  In this context employing exceptional measures would be a sign of strategic 
failure. We believe this paper has identified several promising leads for research;  
• Can there be a normative theory for cyberspace securitization that sets out 
the criteria for when a threat is genuine?  
• To what extent can the decreasing efficacy of hybrid warfare actions be 
attributed to cyber security strategy?  
• How does the establishment of a national version of the Internet by 
authoritarian regimes affect it as a global platform for exchanging ideas 
and a global deliberative space? 
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Abstract 
Referenda and digital communications platforms both offer an inherent promise of 
enhanced democratic participation. This paper will argue that the 2014 Scottish 
Independence Referendum illustrates how the relationship between digital 
communications and direct democracy can yield positive outcomes, whilst the 
subsequent “Brexit” referendum two years later suggests that such outcomes are no 
longer attainable, owing to shifts within the digital environment in which we all 
inhabit. It will conclude that, pending significant legal, social, and cultural changes 
regarding how we communicate online, it is no longer possible to conduct a 
referendum that meets normative standards for a deliberative democratic 
environment.  
 
Keywords: Referenda, direct democracy, deliberative democracy, data-driven 
campaigning, public sphere, social media, propaganda, UK, United Kingdom, Brexit, 
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Introduction  
Whilst referenda in some form or another have always been a component of 
deliberative democracies, the use of them to put political issues to national electorates 
has intensified since the second half of the Twentieth Century, reaching an all-time 
high this decade (Mendez & German, 2016). However, recent prominent examples of 
referenda have been tainted with claims of illegality, unfairness, and undemocratic 
conduct. In the UK, which has held two prominent national referenda in the past five 
years, such claims were intrinsically linked to the use of digital technologies and 
communications. Namely, the use of personal data by public and private actors, the 
use of algorithms to “micro-target” voters with often misleading or false information, 
the role played by social media platforms, and the ability of campaigners to use 
technology to circumvent electoral law have all been highlighted to suggest that the 
2016 “Brexit” referendum was illegitimate.  
In this paper, we will compare and contrast two referenda held within the UK: 
the 2014 Referendum for Scottish Independence (“IndyRef”) and the 2016 
Referendum on the United Kingdom’s Membership of the European Union 
(“Brexit”). These two referenda took place according to near-identical laws and 
regulations, and within a small timeframe. 
There are a number of reasons why this paper focuses on direct democracy, as 
opposed to representative democratic exercises. For one, the promises that digital 
technology will widen participation are “the same promises made by the referendum 
instrument…in each case, voters are asked directly what should be done” (Floridi, 
2016, p.189). In addition, referenda and digital communications tend to be framed as 
egalitarian, promising an unfiltered form of democratic and social participation that 
empowers everyone to participate in the public sphere. This paper will therefore 
examine the use of digital technology in both referenda to argue that, while the 2014 
referendum represents the promise of direct democracy and digital communications, 
the 2016 referendum illustrates that a sea change in the way that digital 
communications are utilised for campaigning. This suggests that such ideals can no 
longer be realized, pending significant social and legal changes.  
This paper consults a number of philosophical and sociological thinkers with 
regards to direct democracy and communications, namely John Rawls, Jürgen 
Habermas, John Searle, Luciano Floridi, and Plato. We also interviewed Adam 
Ramsay, the co-editor of Open Democracy, an investigative journalism organisation 
that has covered both referenda extensively, who played an instrumental role in 
guiding our research.  
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A “fair” referendum — Anna Elina Hattunen 
This section aims to provide a comprehensive definition of what may be considered a 
‘fair’ and “good” referendum. In other words, the chapter discusses the key concepts 
surrounding referenda and whether they are a useful tool for measuring public opinion 
in a deliberative democracy. The aim is to provide an explanation of a “valid” and 
“fair” referendum which is at the same time the fundamental basis for this paper. Our 
main aim is to gain an understanding of whether Brexit and the Scottish independence 
referendum were “fair” and how the impact of digital technologies affects the 
implementation of a referendum in general, and in these two cases in particular.  
A referendum has been a tool for governments and other institutions to solve 
problems and disagreements that governments, political parties and parliaments are, 
for several different reasons, unable or unwilling to solve (Gallagher et Al., 1996 p.1). 
In general, a referendum can give legitimacy for rather far-reaching changes (Henley 
et Al., 2019). A referendum refers to a mass electorate votes concerning a specific 
public issue, such as independence movements as well as other constitutional matters. 
It is worth mentioning that we are discussing referenda that are evolving around more 
complex topics such as independence, as is the case with Scotland, and the resignation 
of the United Kingdom from the European Union (Brexit). In western Europe, 
referenda are often seen as a tool for people to mobilise and participate actively in the 
decision-making process. They have been said to represent a legitimate decision 
straight from the people. In most cases, referenda have also increased political 
participation in general. First and foremost, it is a decision-making process that 
democracies more or less all around the world have used over the decades (Gallagher 
et Al, 1996 p.2).   
Referenda have gained popularity within the past few decades, and since 1973 
over 600 of them have been conducted around the world (Henley et Al., 2019). In the 
United Kingdom, referenda have particularly been a prominent part of political 
decision-making and political processes for more than 40 years now (Atkinson et Al, 
2017 p.5). This is despite the fact that the UK has no constitutional requirement to 
hold a referendum when instigating constitutional change. Some authors and 
academics have discussed referenda as a tool to gain a wider perspective on a certain 
public opinion or issue. In other words, they have been used to perceive rather 
directly what public opinion on a certain issue or change is; they discern an answer or 
opinion from the people (Henley et Al., 2019). Referenda are often put forward to 
allow people to participate in a more detailed and determined way within the political 
decision-making process. This aims to foster greater levels of political participation 
among citizens (Gallagher et Al, 1996 p.2).   
It has been claimed that referenda have been a great tool to engage people 
from marginalized and minority groups to participate in decision-making processes. 
These groups are in danger of being left out of the decision-making process due to 
their unwillingness, for whatever reason, to participate in the democratic process. This 
has been an alarming phenomenon for many policy makers in Western European 
countries.  
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John Rawls also emphasized the importance of the equal accessibility of 
information to everyone. This is a core requirement for a ‘fair’ society (Fallis, 2007 
pp.23-36). As said, referenda are an attempt to shape and construct an understanding 
of the common or public will of the people. Therefore, one great feature for the 
definition of a “fair” referendum is to engage as many people as possible, in order to 
gain a credible view of a certain public opinion that is representative of the majority. 
Many theorists view referenda as a valuable part of democratic systems and 
governments. They are, indeed, part of a deliberative democratic system (Atkinson et 
Al, 2017 p.5) 
The key principle and criterion for referenda in the United Kingdom is to try 
to clarify the public’s views and ensure that major constitutional changes take place 
with relatively broad consent. Another criterion for a “valid” and “fair” referendum is 
the fact that it is not desirable to create a circumstance in which the government of the 
United Kingdom feels forced to implement a policy that is actually against the will of 
the British Parliament (Ibid., p.8). Referenda, in the United Kingdom, are also not 
used in order to solve intra-governmental problems. There is an ongoing debate and 
discussion about whether there should be broader options and multi-option referenda 
(Ibid., p.9). In our case studies, however, this is not a valid question since we are 
looking at two rather similar referenda that did not have a multi-option agenda. When 
it comes to referenda, there are usually two types of results: referenda can be either 
legally binding and formally indicative, or serve as guidelines for the parliaments and 
different decision-making bodies and institutions (Gallagher et Al, 1996 p.12). 
Referenda are technically not binding in the United Kingdom since parliament is 
sovereign. As a criterion for a legitimate referendum in the United Kingdom, it is also 
important that the government or other actors are not able to manipulate the result of 
the voting (Atkinson et Al, 2017 p.9). Crucially, “[r]eferendums should never be 
regarded as producing mandates that override regular principles of representative 
democracy and the rule of law” (Ibid., p.9).  
The most crucial point in defining a “fair” referendum is the engagement of 
people without falsifying and manipulating information through different channels. 
As mentioned previously, referenda can be a way to engage people, especially those 
from marginalized groups. Adam Quinn, from the University of Birmingham, has also 
stated the following: “The referendum campaigns themselves can be savagely 
divisive, especially when the prospect of a narrow victory tempts campaigners to use 
every argument at their disposal” (Birmingham.ca.uk, 2019). Although Quinn’s 
statement could hypothetically be applied to either IndyRef or Brexit, the later 
campaign was marked with particular hostility, such as the murder of an MP (BBC 
News, 2016). Namely, the use of personal data to affect people’s opinion and micro-
targeting voters with misleading or outright false information are major concerns in 
terms of the referendum’s legitimacy. The data indicates that the Brexit referendum 
failed to meet the criteria for a “legitimate” and “fair” referendum.   
One could argue that there are some criteria that need to be met for a 
referendum to be considered “valid” and “fair”. As mentioned, there are also 
53
A TALE OF TWO REFERENDA 
 
differences between referenda and how they are conducted. In the United Kingdom, a 
“fair” referendum is an attempt to mobilise a large group of the population to vote and 
participate. However, the use of false and misleading information, as an example, 
could be argued to lead to the Brexit vote being considered unfair and possibly even 
illegitimate. Further on, we introduce our two case studies as well as discussion on the 
negative and positive aspects of a referendum. Our aim is to provide an understanding 
of the possibilities of the referenda in a fair context. Therefore, our aim is to gain a 
broad perception of the impact of digital technologies on liberal deliberative 
democracies by examining two different case studies.  
Case study I: The Scottish independence campaign, a model or a 
different age? — Dominic O’Hagan 
The result of the 2014 Scottish Independence referendum was the rejection of 
independence, or the ‘No’ campaign, winning 55.3% of the vote compared to the Yes 
campaign’s 44.7% of the vote. With a turnout of 84.6%, the referendum represented 
the highest voter participation in any UK election or referendum since the 
introduction of universal suffrage (BBC, 2014). Although there have been some 
complaints the referendum was unnecessarily “divisive”, there has been general 
agreement that the referendum represents a good example of how a mass participatory 
referendum can re-vitalize democracy and can lead to a flourishing of debate 
(McWhirter, 2015 p.4). 
 The Scottish independence referendum’s regulatory framework was 
established by the Scottish Independence Referendum Act 2013 (Tickell, 2014 p.407). 
However, as Tickell points out much of the Act “drew heavily” from UK legislation, 
namely the Political Parties, Elections, and Referendums Act 2000 (PPERA). Because 
of this it can fairly be stated that both IndyRef and the Brexit vote were conducted in 
a near identical legal and regulatory environment. 
 However, even prior to IndyRef, some had pointed out that PPERA was 
already out of date, especially with regards to online communications and social 
media (Tickell, 2014 pp.407–408). In particular, the rules over the restriction of the 
publication during purdah (pre-election/referendum period) were outdated. Tickell 
points out that “publishers and promoters” includes social media users. At the same 
time, failure to follow strict electoral laws surrounding publishing could be 
considered a criminal offence (Ibid., pp.408–409).  
 Prior to the vote, the Electoral Commission pointed out that they would have a 
commonsense approach to what would be considered publication (Ibid., p.409). 
However, due to the fact that legislators and regulators had not taken into 
consideration developments in communication technology since the early 2000s, 
regulation was at best ad hoc and at worst totally unenforceable. Although this is a 
small example, it highlights the lack of forward planning and gaps that already existed 
in 2014. 
 This lack of foresight was particularly glaring due to the vibrant social media 
environment that IndyRef took place in. In 2012 British Telecom found that Scottish 
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households used social media more than another part of the UK, with 48.2% making 
use of these platforms (Ibid., p.406). IndyRef brought social media engagement into 
the political process like never before. In the 24-hour period during polling day there 
were 2.6 million tweets relating to Indyref. In the five weeks prior, there were ten 
million Facebook interactions (McNair, 2015).  
 Despite social media being utilized widely, its use was not uniform across the 
debate. Many studies have shown that Yes Scotland far outperformed the Better 
Together campaign in terms of engagement and driving the online debate (Shephard, 
Quinlan 2015 p.481; Langer, Comerford, McNulty 2019, p.846). This is explained via 
a number of factors, including: the average Yes supporter was younger, the lack of 
mainstream media support for independence driving Yes supporters online, and the 
structure of the campaigns themselves (Ibid, p.847). 
 During the IndyRef campaign, not a single daily newspaper in Scotland came 
out in support of Yes. Only one mainstream media outlet, the Sunday Herald declared 
for Yes (Press Association, 2014). McNair (2015), points out that due to the lop-sided 
nature of the debate within traditional media outlets, “social media provided space for 
subjectivity, opinion and overt ideological bias to be expressed”. While it could be 
contested that the same “ideological bias” exists within the mainstream media, it is 
clear that social media was seen as a way at redressing the imbalance. 
 A study looking into the internet usage of people searching for information on 
the IndyRef found that people valued “facts” more than opinion (Baxter, Marcella 
2017 p.8). Despite this, the study also found that, “… social media messages (not 
necessarily from official campaign groups and parties) were more powerful than fairly 
static websites in dominating political discourse and reaching a wider swathe of the 
voting public” (Ibid., p.15). This would seem to indicate a level of trust in social 
media, at least in 2014, compared to official sources. 
 The differences between Yes Scotland and Better Together, the two official 
campaign groups, also played a significant role in how social media was used. Better 
Together very much carried out a “top-down centralized command and control” 
campaign (Langer et Al., 2019 p.836). On the other hand, Yes Scotland committed 
itself to a more “hybrid model” that, “… had elements of a more decentralized 
structure and some movement-like dynamics blended with traditional party 
campaigning characteristics, enabling—or at least not discouraging—more 
autonomous bottom-up participation and entrepreneurial modes of engagement” 
(Ibid., p.846). It has been argued that this de-centralised strategy not only allowed for 
free-flowing debate, but actually enabled more grassroots campaigning. 
 Some within Yes Scotland’s campaign team have stated their belief that “… 
social media played an important, and often crucial, role in the formation of many of 
the grassroots groups that emerged during the campaign”, citing National Collective 
as an example (Ibid., p.848). These groups followed a pattern of online discussion: 
online organising, and offline activity. This indicates that social media had an 
overwhelmingly positive effect in engaging people in the democratic process, beyond 
being mere consumers of information. 
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 The social media-engaged Yes supporters were far more likely to form 
independent groups. Yes Scotland had 350 affiliated local groups compared to Better 
Together’s 80. Yes Scotland were also able to lean on groups and individual bloggers, 
or ‘online allies’, creating content that more or less did not exist for Better Together 
(Ibid., p.847). In an interview for this research paper Adam Ramsay, Editor of 
OpenDemocracy, made the suggestion that the grassroots nature of IndyRef may have 
protected it from some of the negative interference and allegations of illegality that 
have plagued the Brexit campaign: “Grassroots campaigns tend to be better than the 
‘astroturf’ campaigns run by distant campaign offices” (Ramsay, 2019). 
 Although there may be some validity to that argument, it does not address the 
fact that the IndyRef campaign was also conducted in a radically different digital 
environment compared to Brexit or even in the elections in the following years. Some 
of the reporting of social media’s influence in IndyRef can at times seem quaint 
compared to 2019. Rather than debates surrounding micro-targeting, data harvesting, 
and so called “dark money”, the discussion in 2014 focused instead on ‘likes’ and 
‘Facebook engagement’ (Riddell, 2014). 
 The growth in microtargeting can be seen when evaluating how much political 
parties spent on Facebook ads. In the 2015 UK-wide general election the three biggest 
parties in Scotland (SNP, Conservatives, and Labour) combined spent £42,121 on 
Facebook ads. However, just one year later in the 2016 Scottish Holyrood election ‘… 
overall spending on Facebook ads increased by a third in Scotland with Labour alone 
nearly trebling their outlay’ (Ellison, 2017). 
 It should be noted that although IndyRef is seen as a model in how referenda 
can increase democratic participation and how they can be used to negotiate complex 
problems, it has to be seen in the appropriate context. The Scottish referendum 
resulted in a status quo outcome, whereas, Brexit is a radical departure from the status 
quo. Due to this, allegations of deception and misleading “facts” may be more in-
focus because of the dramatic changes that Brexit will bring about.  
Case study II: The Brexit referendum campaign, social media & 
divergent realities — Adam Oliver Smith 
The 2016 ‘Brexit’ referendum, the result of which was a “leave” vote that is currently 
causing convulsions in the British body politic, is an illustrative example of how the 
digital revolution is testing the limits of deliberative democracy. As explained earlier, 
the 2016 referendum took place in a broadly similar social and legal environment to 
the 2014 referendum on Scottish Independence. However, the Scottish Referendum 
has not been subject to the level debate, analysis, and scrutiny regarding the role of 
digital misinformation that the Brexit campaign has been subjected to. This is because 
the two referenda occurred in separate and distinct digital environments. 
         The use of automated social media bots to spread misinformation, the 
deployment of psychometric-driven propaganda by the Leave campaign, and the use 
of big data processes to curate and deploy “microtargeted” messages to swing voters 
are activities that have been afforded ample attention within the rich outpouring of 
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academic research on the 2016 referendum. To draw on just one example, 
computational analysis of social media networks that began hours after the result was 
announced revealed that 14,000 Twitter bots published 1.5 million tweets (75% of 
which were identified as pro-Leave messages) in the week before polling day, before 
promptly disappearing from the platform altogether (Bastos and Mercea, 2018 pp.1-
2). In addition, data-driven campaigning firms in the employ of Vote Leave, including 
the now-defunct Cambridge Analytica, utilized the personal data of hundreds of 
thousands of British voters to send millions of microtargeted, sometimes 
contradictory political advertisements to different segments of the electorate in their 
efforts to produce a Leave majority at the polls (Bay, 2018, pp.1-14). While the 
effectiveness of these tactics in influencing the result are debatable, it is evident that 
the UK electorate was subjected to an intensive, population-scale misinformation 
campaign that was enabled and facilitated by the digital communications platforms 
that are now an implacable part of our daily lives. 
 Before diving into the philosophical concerns surrounding the Brexit 
campaign and its implications for deliberative democracy, it is important to clarify 
what makes this case study distinct from the Scottish Independence referendum. 
There is a general consensus that the scale and nature of digital misinformation 
deployed in the Brexit campaign was, at the time, unparalleled in British political 
history. The use of psychometrics and data-driven microtargeting first came to the 
attention of strategists in the UK following the publication of a 2014 research paper 
outlining the effectiveness of “behavioural targeting” in influencing the real-world 
behaviour of social media users (Chen and Stallaert, 2014 pp.429-449). It was this 
research, published after the 2014 Scottish Referendum had concluded, which was 
cited by Vote Leave front man Dominic Cummings as playing a central role when 
informing the Leave campaign’s digital strategy (Cummings, 2017). Taken in 
conjunction with the scant amount of evidence suggesting that campaign groups on 
either side of the Scottish referendum utilized such tactics, we can reasonably assume 
that the two referenda took place in wholly separate digital environments. 
 The goal here is not to debate the effectiveness of social media bots and 
microtargeting in referendum results. As has already been observed, it “strains 
credulity that… [the success of] the Leave campaign was entirely the product of 
manipulation… rather than the surprising success of a political campaign that tapped 
into the attitudes and beliefs held by millions of people in the United Kingdom” 
(Benkler et al, 2018 p.341). Rather, the goal is to outline the ways in which the 
pervasiveness of such tactics has shown that the Brexit referendum failed to meet the 
standards for a functional public sphere and healthy democratic environment. The 
purpose is to impress upon the reader the seriousness of the challenge that lies before 
us. If measures are not taken to curtail, regulate, and provide accountability, then 
deliberative democracy will cease to be a viable system. 
 As Benkler et al. set out in their landmark analysis of “network propaganda”, a 
population with vastly divergent, competing conceptions of reality can never be 
stable, nor can it sustain a functional democracy (Ibid. p.5). A healthy public sphere 
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requires the participants to at least share the same social and moral universe as each 
other, albeit one where viewpoints may diverge considerably (Habermas, 1984). 
However, when uninhibited, aggressively targeted misinformation campaigns can be 
conducted on a population-wide scale, obstacles begin to appear that inhibit the ability 
of a society to construct and exist within a consistent shared social reality. Take for 
example the use of social media psychometrics to deliver tailor-made misinformation 
to individual users, a strategy which Vote Leave campaigners continue to publicly cite 
as critical to their success (Conoscenti, 2018 p.71). In the weeks before the 2016 
referendum, millions of people received contradictory messages about the EU which 
were sent to them based on what the data said would trigger the desired response. The 
result is that different segments of the population have disparate and disconnected 
conceptions of what reality in the UK and EU actually looks like. This is a dangerous 
situation for an already polarized society to be in. 
 As Habermas points out, any sort of discourse in the public sphere must be 
held to certain norms of truthfulness in order for it to benefit democracy (Habermas, 
1990, p.35). In addition, he illustrates the need for a shared language, context, and 
morality system in order to test validity claims and deliberate collectively (Habermas, 
1984, p.10). The ability (and intention) of psychometric-driven campaigning to 
effectively “crowd out” alternative sources of information is an inherent threat to 
these ideals and structures. Furthermore, if we are to take the position that metaphors, 
and the speech acts of which they constitute a central component “have a massive 
influence on the construction of reality” (Walter and Helmig, 2008 p.119), then the 
threat posed by psychometrics and microtargeting by the Leave campaign takes on 
another dimension.  
 The success of the Leave campaign was largely built on its ability to use 
technology to construct the EU as a metaphor for public anxieties around immigration 
and inequality, as countless frame analyses of their political advertisements have 
concluded (Conoscenti, 2018 pp.65-82). Their success suggests that the emergent 
digital technologies used in the Brexit campaign have the capacity to fuel different 
constructions of social reality within a single electorate. To take this point further, one 
should also take Rawlsian ethics into account, particularly with regards to equity of 
information access to inform rational decision-making in a democracy. Previous 
analyses of Rawls in relation to data ethics have concluded that the construction of the 
“fair society” requires the public to have equal access to information, particularly 
when making democratic decisions (Fallis, 2007 pp.23-36). One would struggle to 
describe a public that is consistently bombarded with personalised misinformation as 
enjoying sufficient, equal access to the information needed to make direct democratic 
decisions. 
 Although it is doubtful that the digital strategies deployed by the Leave 
campaign were the primary cause of the referendum result, their undeniable efficacy 
raises broader concerns about the sustainability of both direct and deliberative 
democracy. The analyses provided here should highlight the urgency with which 
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psychometrics and data-driven misinformation campaigns must be tacked, regulated, 
and held to account if we ever wish to conduct a ‘fair’ referendum in the future. 
The threat — Juhani Mäntyranta 
This chapter will look at arguments against the use of referenda in complex, multi-
issue topics. First, representational democracy is examined as the main democratic 
alternative to referendum, after which Platonic and Habermasian views on how a 
functional democracy operates are examined. These two topics also constitute the 
main argument as to why a referendum is not necessarily the best choice for deciding 
complex issues. Further, the ongoing digital revolution and its effects on political 
deliberation are examined with regards to referenda. The topics examined are the 
changing habits in news consumption, the spreading of misinformation, and the 
spreading of disinformation.  
 Most Western democracies are representative in nature. What that means is 
that the public will vote for their selected candidate in an election, to represent them 
in parliament, congress, or executive office. The reason for the representational nature 
of the political system, in essence, is because “direct deliberation among all citizens is 
widely assumed to be impossible on the scale of the modern nation state” 
(Landemore, 2017, p. 2). Because of the complex nature of the issues debated, it 
makes sense that career politicians, ones that are able to examine the issues from 
multiple angles and through different lenses, are in charge of the decision-making 
process. Most non-politicians will not be able to make the effort of examining said 
issues as extensively as elected members of parliament can. Thus, the ability of most 
non-politicians to form a well-rounded understanding of issues can be limited. 
 The previous chapter also ties in with both the Platonic, as well as the 
Habemasian theories of democracy. Plato, speaking at a time of direct democracy, 
argued that (direct) democracy can only work if the public is educated and well 
informed on the topics they are voting on. He also argued that most people are not 
educated enough to be able to partake in the democratic process and thus proposed a 
system of technocratic governance, in which the ruling class has been educated in the 
realm of governance from a young age (Plato, 380 B.C./1965, Republic VI). 
Habermas’ ideas on deliberative democracy echo some of the same sentiments. 
According to Habermas, the public sphere is a place where people should be free to 
discuss and debate all things related to politics (Habermas, 1984). A well-functioning 
public sphere is a prerequisite of deliberative democracy. However, when the public 
sphere is filled with polarisation, it is much more difficult for the public to be able to 
debate issues. Because it is more difficult to debate issues, direct democracy, in all its 
forms, becomes a less than ideal way of making decisions, especially on complex 
issues. 
One of the vexing issues of modern democracy, as mentioned above, has to do 
with polarisation. As debate on political issues has shifted more and more towards the 
online sphere, one issue that has arisen is the increased amount of polarisation and 
partisanship (Pattie & Johnston, 2016, p. 484). This is a huge problem for deliberative 
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democracy, as people will have lower levels of engagement with people of alternative 
views and opinions and thus, will only be partially informed on matters. In a 
representative democracy, the situation explained above would be a problem, but not 
as much as in a direct democracy, or one with referenda on complex issues. The 
reasoning is that in a representative democracy, politicians will be more informed, 
and there is an expectation that they will at least try to supply the required information 
on any given topic, as well as debate topics within parliament. In a direct democracy, 
if issues between people of opposing views are not debated, then deliberation is taken 
out of the equation. Without deliberation, direct democracy will not be effective 
enough to bring about decisions that are based on reason and deliberation. 
Another issue that creates problems has to do with new ways in which the 
news is consumed. Traditionally, people would get their news from newspapers or 
television. There were variances between individuals on how much exposure they got, 
especially with changes in the media landscape (Shehata & Strömbäck, 2011, pp. 
111). What can be argued is that those individuals who opted to watch the news on 
TV, as an example, were more likely to watch the news from start to finish. 
Revealingly, a recent study suggests that in the modern social media ecosystem, news 
is not read in full, but rather only the headlines and previews of articles are taken in 
(Anspach, Jennings, and Arceneaux, 2019, pp.1-2). Indeed, the authors claim that 
even though 68% of Facebook users use the site for news, an average user only clicks 
on 7% of the political news stories in their feed, which in turn leads to audiences’ 
overconfidence in their knowledge of the issues (Ibid. p.2). The results of the study 
found that people who only read the preview were less informed on issues and were 
less likely to answer questions on the topic correctly, when compared to those who 
read the entire article. The findings suggest that people might be overconfident about 
their understanding of different topics and possibly vote on issues with limited or 
incorrect knowledge. 
One major issue with holding referenda on complex issues has to do with the 
internet at large. The amount of fake news, disinformation and inaccurate information 
has grown in recent times. In a study by Vargo, Guo & Amazeen, (2018) the authors 
find that the amount of fake news increased in the United States between the years 
2014 and 2016 and it is very likely to have increased even further in the subsequent 
years. We can all remember how one of the Brexit leaders was posing next to a bus 
with an advert stating that the £350M the United Kingdom (UK) pays the European 
Union (EU) on a weekly basis could be used to fund the UK’s healthcare system. 
Boris Johnson later backtracked on this claim, but the message had already been sent 
and the correction of the disinformation cannot change the result of the referendum 
(Read, 2019). Claims such as the promise of £350M can spread like wildfire within 
the current social media ecosystem, giving voters misinformation on different 
subjects. Indeed, the same can be seen to be the case with normal elections as well, 
but the members of the parliament will be more informed on issues and are thus less 
likely to believe false claims. 
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It can also be argued that non-politicians are more easily swayed, not only by 
public influencers, such as politicians, but also by automated social media accounts 
that spread disinformation, also known as bots. These bots function by automatically 
spreading misinformation, as soon as an article has been released, in order for the 
article to gain exposure, as well as to gain online legitimacy, by having a large 
amount of shares (Shao et.al., 2017, pp.1-3). By spreading said articles, it is easy to 
manipulate ill-informed members of the public into believing untrue statements, as 
well as to then base their vote on said statements. Indeed, the Leave side of the Brexit 
referendum utilised such tactics to great success (Bastos and Mercea, 2018, pp.1-2). It 
is easy to argue that the usage of bots can be utilised in a negative way, in democratic 
societies in general, but especially with regards to referenda. 
The opportunity — Jooel Jacob Heinonen 
Even though the fourth digital revolution may have weakened the ability of liberal 
democracies to hold fair and genuinely democratic referenda, new methods of digital 
communications also have the potential to enhance and increase democratic 
engagement by citizens and facilitate greater direct participation. This section 
discusses the positive effects digital communications can have on the ability to 
strengthen deliberative democracy through direct participation and identifies the 
major opportunities granted by the digital era to create a more vibrant, inclusionary 
and participatory democracy.   
 Deliberative democracy is a form of direct democracy that is based on rational 
debate and collective decision-making. The ideal of deliberative democracy is to 
reach rational, consensual decisions while being a more inclusionary and participatory 
model of democracy. Deliberative democracy would ideally facilitate greater direct 
participation by citizens. The core of deliberative democracy is the idea that authentic 
deliberation would vest policies with greater legitimacy, acceptance and quality than 
would the strictly representative modes of decision-making (Friess and Eilders, 2015, 
p. 319). The dawn of the digital era can be seen as an opportunity to create and foster 
a truly inclusionary and participatory arena of debate and discussion in which the 
ideals of deliberative democracy can truly be realized. The virtual space created by 
the internet provides, for the first time, the ideal conditions for deliberative 
democracy by offering an infrastructure for the public sphere that the theorists of 
deliberative democracy have only been able to dream about so far (Ibid., p.320). The 
internet and new digital communications have the potential, therefore, to contribute to 
the creation of a stronger deliberative democracy.  
 The internet provides new venues for debate and discussion and offers ways to 
create a more inclusionary and participatory public sphere, where deliberation takes 
place. The digital public sphere and the new media (social media, online forums, 
online news sites) are created through the participation of the many, while still 
exhibiting the features of an enlightened public: free access, no restrictions, no limit 
on the number of participants, and equality of access among the participants (Kreide, 
2016, p.481). Unlike the old mass media, the new media does not distinguish between 
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an audience and the public, and the usage of the media is designed through the users, 
not just for them (Ibid., p.481). Ideals of a well-functioning public sphere can be 
realized through interactive internet communities that are based on forms of joint 
participation by members (Ibid., p.481). The internet also has the potential to bring 
new voices into the public sphere. People who feel disinclined to engage in face-to-
face political conversations may be more willing to do so in online spaces. Indeed, 
according to a study by Jennifer Stromer-Galley (2014), political conversation with 
strangers and acquaintances is considered by many people a taboo activity, and the 
internet may offer a new context for political conversations for those that are 
unwilling to engage in face-to-face political conversations. This would introduce 
more people to the public sphere, where they can engage in deliberation on societally 
significant issues (Stromer-Galley, 2014). A more participatory and inclusionary 
public sphere, enabled by technological progress and digital communications, can 
increase the voice of the public in decision-making and therefore, since authentic 
deliberation is the source of the legitimacy of the law in deliberative democratic 
theory, strengthen the legitimacy of major political decisions.   
 In addition to contributing to the creation of a more participatory and 
inclusionary model of deliberative democracy, the digital revolution and the internet 
also have the potential to positively influence the quality of political debates and 
discussion through an equal access to information, as Antje Gimmler (2001) shows in 
her study on the impact of the internet on the public sphere and deliberative 
democracy. Equality of access to information, as well as the access being unrestricted, 
are fundamental preconditions for the creation of a more ambitious practice of 
discourse (Gimmler, 2001, p.31). The internet can be used to support these aims, 
since the internet encourages the exchange of information by making it easily 
obtainable to users at a very low cost (Ibid., p.32). As a result, the ideal of the 
deliberative model of democracy, where well-informed and rational citizens make 
decisions through careful deliberation, could be realized through the possibilities 
offered by the internet and equal access to information. However, recent 
developments have illustrated that equal access to the internet for all citizens is not 
guaranteed, as the Brexit experience demonstrates. Nevertheless, the internet has the 
potential to create a more informed citizenry through the availability of information 
online, and thus increase the quality of deliberation, which is essential for the creation 
of a more meaningful model of deliberative democracy that is based on rational 
discussion. 
 Typically, the deliberative model of democracy would involve citizen 
participation at every stage of the political process, whereas a referendum only brings 
citizens to the decision-making process at the very end. Referenda and the 
deliberative model of democracy seem to be somewhat at odds with each other, since 
a referendum takes place to settle a particular question at the ballot box, whereas the 
deliberative model is more interested in the process of reaching a decision through 
rational and well-informed discussion and debate. However, Lawrence LeDuc (2015) 
argues that there are ways to revise the familiar institutions of initiatives and 
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referenda to approximate a more deliberative form of direct democracy. LeDuc 
concludes that direct democracy can become more deliberative in practice if the 
overtly partisan motives behind several referendum campaigns can be controlled, if 
better question wording and improved availability of information can lead to greater 
clarity on the issue of the referendum, and if citizens can be more engaged, resulting 
in more inclusive rates of participation (LeDuc, 2015). The participation and the 
engagement of the public in decision-making are essential requirements for the 
creation of a truly deliberative model of direct democracy. However, a high turnout in 
a referendum should not be confused with engagement and participation in a truly 
deliberative process (Ibid., p.146). In addition, the Brexit referendum demonstrates 
that engagement can be problematic in itself when fueled by disinformation. As an 
analysis of the online deliberation on the issue of the Scottish independence shows, 
the deliberative process can be quite narrow, even though the turnout in the Scottish 
independence referendum was very high (Ibid., p.146).  
  As discussed above, technological development and the opportunities offered 
by the internet can facilitate the creation of a more inclusionary and participatory 
model of deliberative democracy. As noted by LeDuc, a direct democracy requires a 
well-informed public and a high degree of participation by the public to become more 
deliberative in practice. As mentioned earlier, the internet and new digital 
communications have the potential to create a more participatory and inclusionary 
public sphere, where deliberation would take place. This could potentially realize the 
ideals of deliberative democracy; of citizens coming together to make decisions 
through rational discussion. New, emerging digital communications (social media, 
online forums, online news sites) enable the creation of a more participatory public 
sphere, where the measures of direct democracy, such as referenda, can be made more 
deliberative, instead of just being processes where the public’s participation is limited 
to simply voting.   
Conclusion 
This paper has attempted to look at the issues that surround referenda in the age of 
mass online communication and social media. To highlight some of the opportunities 
and dangers this paper has focused on the Scottish Independence referendum of 2014 
and the UK’s EU referendum of 2016. 
 Within the UK, referenda have only ever been utilized to gauge public opinion 
on complex constitutional issues. There have been 13 referendums in the UK since 
the first one in 1973, however, only three of these were UK-wide referendums (UK 
Parliament Website, Accessed November 2019). It is perhaps indicative of the current 
problems that surround Brexit that of those three UK-wide referendums, two have 
been on the issue of the UK’s membership of the European Communities and later the 
European Union. 
In one chapter of this paper the argument was made that referenda, as they are 
held in the UK, are too complex for ordinary people to fully grasp. However, many 
successful referenda in the UK dealt with equally complex issues to Brexit, not least 
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IndyRef. It is pointed out in the following chapter that referenda as a form of 
deliberative democracy can infer legitimacy on a complex topic. This paper takes the 
position that although referenda are messy and imperfect, the alternative of a quasi-
technocratic and purely representative democracy is at least as problematic. This 
paper therefore does not take the position that ‘fair’ referenda are not possible in the 
era of online communication. 
However, this position is not without caveats. As has been pointed out 
throughout this paper a referendum must be carried out within a regulatory structure 
that reflects the age and environment in which the vote takes place. These regulatory 
structures should encourage the development of a public sphere based on updated 
Habermasian ideals (see e.g. Dryzek 2008) and should promote the equality and 
parity of information in the model of Rawlsian theory. This paper has taken the 
position that due to the reasons outlined, the Brexit vote did not meet these criteria. 
That is not to say that in our contemporary age referenda must always be 
viewed through a purely critical lens. The use of social media and online 
communication generally led to a flourishing of debate during the Scottish 
independence referendum. However, legislation and regulation, such as PPERA, have 
not kept apace to the changing face of online communication and campaigning. 
Despite this, political parties and the government have shown little willingness 
in updating or replacing PPERA or introducing new additional legislation and 
projection. This is evidenced by the fact that the Electoral Commission’s reports have 
not made any mention of the effect social media, online misinformation, and 
microtargeting had on the EU referendum (Electoral Commission 2019). It would not 
be an exaggeration to say that the government has largely stepped out of the debate 
surrounding the regulation of referenda. 
            We find that referenda are neither inherently good or inherently bad. The same 
can be said for social media. However, if a flourishing public sphere is to be created, 
the rules that govern our modern body politic must be updated to meet the challenges 
posed by twenty-first century communication and campaign strategies. 
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Abstract 
Social media has changed the field of media and communications by providing 
ordinary citizens unlimited access to, and an ability to produce, circle and consume 
media content effortlessly. At the same time, it has become one of the central 
concepts of the communication research field and the arena of public debate. By using 
social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter, users provide details of their 
personal life and interests to social media companies. Many of these companies use 
the provided data to provide advertisers a direct means to reach their target audiences. 
This has provided marketers with an opportunity to generate content to narrowly 
targeted interest groups, and this practice has been used widely by companies as well 
as political organizations and officials. Social media has also changed the logic of 
media and how the revenue in the media business is generated. This study discusses 
how social media and its algorithms have changed the public sphere by looking at the 
2016 US presidential election, which has been called a “social media election”. We 
also examine the impact new media logic has had on the public sphere by explaining 
how it affected the 2016 election. The key argument of this study is that through 
curated and targeted content, social media and the new media logics have changed the 
public sphere, and the effects were particularly well seen in the U.S. 2016 presidential 
election. 
 
Keywords:  Public sphere, social media, election, algorithms, targeted marketing, fake 
news, US presidential election 2016, Facebook, Twitter 
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1. The Age of Social Media 
Social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter provide a new communication 
forum where public figures can communicate widely to their audiences. This was 
particularly clear in the 2016 US presidential election, where both Donald Trump and 
Hillary Clinton made extensive use of social media in their election campaigns. For 
this reason, we have chosen to explore how social media has changed the public 
sphere through a case study of the US 2016 presidential election. 
Social media has changed the field of media and communications by 
providing ordinary citizens unlimited access, and an ability to produce, circulate and 
consume media content effortlessly. At the same time, it has become one of the 
central concepts of the communication research field and the arena of public debate. 
By using social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter, users provide 
details of their personal life and interests to social media companies. Many of these 
companies use this data to provide advertisers with a direct passage to reach their 
target audiences. This has provided marketers an opportunity to generate content to 
narrowly targeted interest groups, and this practice has been used widely by 
companies as well as political organizations and officials. Social media has also 
changed the logic of media and how the revenue in the media business is generated. 
This study examines how social media has challenged the position of 
traditional media, as publications of individual publishers can achieve much wider 
visibility than most popular traditional media outlets. How has this affected the public 
sphere, and what are the things that have contributed to this? The case study of the 
2016 presidential elections shows how Donald Trump's tweets and fake news 
garnered more visibility during the election than social media publications of the most 
popular newspapers.  
This study also discusses how social media algorithms have changed the 
public sphere. In addition, it examines the impact that new media logic has had on the 
public sphere by explaining how it affected the 2016 election. The key argument of 
this study is that through curated and targeted content, social media and the new 
media logics have changed the public sphere, and the effects were particularly clear in 
the U.S. 2016 presidential election. 
Section two opens the case of the 2016 presidential election and explains why 
social media mattered in that election. Section three describes the concept of the 
public sphere and shows how it has changed with the development of media.  
Section four explains how social media algorithms work and what effect they 
have had on the public sphere. Section five analyzes how targeted marketing can 
shape the public sphere and discussions. Section six explains the new media logic in 
the era of social media and describes how that affected the 2016 election and the 
public sphere.
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Social media refers to online community services such as Twitter, Facebook, 
YouTube, and various blogs where users mostly produce their content on a non-
commercial basis (Seppänen & Väliverronen, 2013, 36). This study discusses how 
social media has changed the public sphere and the role of social media in the 2016 
US presidential election. 
Although social media can be seen as a relatively recent phenomenon, already 
in 1993 Howard Rheingold popularized the idea of virtual communities, as he saw 
there an opportunity to create new communities that could reinvigorate public 
conversation and debate. For example, online social communities were seen as an 
opportunity to create a new space for social interaction and democratic participation 
(Hjorth & Hinton, 2019, 16). The rise of social media has raised questions about the 
nature of virtual communities again, because networked publics can emerge 
organically wherever people can connect and share messages, for example, on social 
media platforms (Hjorth & Hinton, 2019, 19). 
The nature of social media has changed significantly over the years, even 
though it still focuses on user-generated content. Social media is significantly 
modified by algorithms that seek to identify and predict user actions and behavior, 
and to guide appropriate information and content to users based on this information. 
For example, Facebook and Google largely operate by the use of algorithms. The 
purpose of the algorithms is to profile users and filter the content that is best suited for 
them while excluding some content from them (Silvola, 2016). Algorithms are 
explored in more detail in Section 4. 
Social media channels also create filter bubbles that isolate like-minded users 
(Seppänen & Väliverronen, 2013, 212). Indeed, social media filter bubbles are 
precisely based on the fact that algorithms produce content that is relevant to the 
user's interests. And since social media has also become a major marketplace, one of 
the purposes of these filter bubbles is to entice users to spend as much time on the 
page as possible, because of the advertising revenues (Elo, 2018). It is also important 
to note that when using social media channels, users provide a lot of information 
about themselves to social media companies, which then resell this information to 
advertisers. 
Social media channels have also raised concerns when compared to traditional 
media. On Facebook or Twitter, for example, content can be relayed among users 
without any third-party filtering or checking the facts. Publications of individual 
publishers can also reach as many readers as the most popular newspapers, such as the 
New York Times. (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017, 211). 
In order to better understand how social media has changed the public sphere, 
we will look at the concepts of the public sphere, algorithms, targeted marketing, 
social curation and fake news. To get a better picture of the impact of social media on 
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the public sphere, we use the 2016 US presidential election as a case study. Next, we 
will take a brief look at why the US 2016 election was called a social media election. 
2.1. Why did social media matter in the 2016 election? 
The Internet, social media and mobile apps have become a significant part of 
people's daily lives. In the US, for example, up to 87% of adults and almost 100% of 
students use social media and other digital communication technologies daily. In 
addition, the time spent on social media is also significantly increasing. (Stephen, 
2015, 3.) 
The interactive nature of social media has also changed the way political 
campaigns are arranged and organized. Various social media channels such as Twitter 
and Facebook offer political candidates an excellent way to communicate strategically 
with potential voters and target audiences. Social media has become the new norm in 
the US presidential election after President Barack Obama succeeded with the help of 
social media in the 2008 and 2012 elections (Abdulsamad et. al. 2019, 1). 
From the perspective of political campaigning social media channels, such as 
Twitter, offer a more empowered form of communication. This is particularly seen in 
the ability of social media to engage and reach a much wider audience than traditional 
media is able to. Secondly, publications can be easily forwarded. For example, on 
Twitter, this can be done by retweeting a post. Additionally, campaign staffers can 
also take advantage of social media to bring more visibility to the campaign and the 
candidate (Ross & Rivers, 2018, 1-2). 
Social media also offers candidates a way to bypass news media gatekeepers 
and communicate directly with voters (Abdulsamad et. al. 2019, 2). During the 2016 
US presidential election Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton showed how social media 
can be used as a news source for the public. 
In that election, social media, especially Twitter, proved to be an important 
channel for both candidates. However, Trump's use of Twitter was particularly on the 
agenda of the debate as it was highly unusual in a political context due to the fact that 
tweets came directly from him. This unconventional approach has continued after his 
election and has sparked widespread debate about the motives and expediency of his 
tweets (Ross & Rivers, 2018, 2). 
One of the central themes of Trump's tweets during the election was his 
attacks and derogatory comments about the mainstream media. He used the terms 
"fake news" and "fake media" to make the public question the reliability of media 
reporters, especially those who criticized him. At the same time, Trump emphasized 
his position as the only reliable and truthful source of information. During the 
election, Trump's use of social media was also analyzed as a source of disinformation 
and fake news, as his own agenda and goals were best achieved by spreading false 
information (Ross & Rivers, 2018, 2). 
In the 2016 election, the spread of news via social media, and in particular the 
circulation of false stories, i.e. fake news received special attention. Recent surveys 
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show that 62 percent of US adults receive their news via social media and that in the 
2016 election, the most popular fake news were distributed much more on social 
media than the most popular mainstream news stories. In addition, studies show that 
many people detect and report fake news but still believe them. These recent findings 
have led many to question whether Donald Trump would have won the 2016 
presidential election if the distribution of fake news on social media had not been so 
widespread and significant (Allcott, 2017, 212). 
Next, we will take a look at the public sphere, and its new forms in the era of 
social media. Then we will take a closer look at targeted marketing, algorithms and 
the social curation and popularity of news media outlets on social media, in the light 
of the 2016 US presidential election. 
3. Social Media and the Public Sphere – C. Korhonen 
In the last decade, after social media gained popularity, there has been a discussion 
about its ability to revitalize the concept of the Habermasian public (Dahlgren & 
Olsson, 2007). The traditional Habermasian concept of the national public sphere 
created by the mass media is said to have evolved into a multi-layered network of 
social networks that are more important in engaging and activating citizenship. This 
section discusses how the Internet and, especially social media, have changed 
Habermas’ concept of the public sphere.  
3.1. A Brief Introduction to Habermas’ Public Sphere 
According to German philosopher and social theorist Jürgen Habermas, who outlined 
the historical stages of publicity, public life and democracy require publicity. In his 
book, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1989), Habermas describes 
how publicity as its own social sphere was formed at the turn of the 17th and 18th 
centuries in England. This happened as part of the rationalization process that gave 
birth to the whole of civil or bourgeoisie society. In feudal society, publicity did not 
form its own independent domain but existed as so-called representative publicity. 
The monarch represented its own power over the people, just as the church 
represented divine authority.  
Starting in the 17th century, European society began to change from feudalism 
to capitalism or bourgeois society, with a bourgeoisie appearing among the monarchs 
and noblemen (Habermas, 1989, 22-23). In Habermas' analysis, the idea of publicity 
flourished as a rising bourgeoisie in Europe in the 18th century began to oppose the 
absolute right of monarchs and nobles by invoking public debate and the power of the 
best argument (Seppänen & Väliverronen, 2012, 72). The new bourgeoisie consisted 
of individuals who emerged from the private sphere of their family and their economy 
to the political public sphere by engaging in public debate. Publicity forums include 
cafes, salons, newspapers, and magazines. (Habermas, 1989, 28-30). 
However, according to Habermas, the critical form of publicity began to 
degenerate and took on characteristics of feudal publicity in the late 19th century as 
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leading European states evolved into mass societies with public discourse channeled 
into consumer capitalism. Magazines engaged in one-way communication, and the 
proper conversation was replaced by mass entertainment. According to Habermas, 
new rulers began to dominate their subordinates with propaganda, and the debating 
public had become a media-consuming audience.  
3.2. Social Media as a Revival of the Public Sphere? 
During the era of digitalization, various social networking sites and platforms have 
become to form a central part of the public sphere. The Internet and social media have 
been said to revive Habermas’ democratic publicity on a global scale. This idea is 
based on the view that social media emphasizes interaction, openness, and community 
(Seppänen & Väliverronen, 2012, 75). 
The rise of social media has not only created a new public sphere but also 
shifted the arena in which political debate happens. Habermas places publicity 
between the private sphere and the public authorities, an area of civil society where 
citizens can form opinions and engage in political activities (Habermas, 1962, 30). 
Open publicity provides an opportunity for the political organization of society. Social 
media makes this easier than ever. According to Iosifidis (2011, 5) “in theory, this 
open, free and decentralized space could create the conditions for ideal speech and 
enhance the ability to voice one’s opinion and organize action (the very notion of 
democracy).” 
The Internet and social media can be seen to expand Habermas’ view of civil 
society, because in social media “the formation of public opinion takes place in a 
transnational context that crosses national boundaries” (Iosifidis, 2011, 5).  This 
means, for example, that people around the world can follow and participate in the 
country’s internal political debate. The presidential elections in the US were also 
monitored closely in Finland. Speculation about the election and its twists and turns 
were discussed both in traditional and social media. 
Social media has the power to influence public opinion and what is being 
discussed outside of the Internet. In the 2016 presidential election, Twitter played a 
significant role in Donald Trump's victory. Twitter was at the center of Trump’s 
campaign and through it, Trump got a lot of free media visibility. Trump’s constant 
posting on Twitter and his provocative comments attracted a lot of media attention 
and increased conversation around him, which added to his visibility even more 
(Francia, 2018). According to Francia (2018) “Trump was more often the topic of 
personal conversations than Clinton.”  
However, open participation in social media can lead to chaos because there is 
no structured conversation (Iosifidis, 2011, 6). The social media debate may give rise 
to more anarchy than democracy (Iosifidis, 2011, 6) because in social media the 
argumentation is polarized (Dahlberg, 2007). Social media algorithms limit the 
content that people are exposed to and often displays content that favors an 
individual's social world. This creates social bubbles which lead to a homogenous 
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atmosphere. Social media does not necessarily promote rational, critical and political 
debate between citizens. (Dahlberg 2007; Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017.) 
In addition, a lot of propaganda and fake news also circulates on social media. 
During and after the 2016 election, Trump deliberately attacked journalists and 
scientists by claiming that their studies and news were fake. Francia (2018) cites 
research in his article that suggests that Trump’s tweets made his followers less likely 
to believe any negative or criticizing news coverage about Trump. Making and 
spreading false claims could prevent educated political decision-making and reduce 
voter’s selection based on genuine information. (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017.) 
Although it is generally said that the Internet offers everyone the same 
opportunity to participate in public debate, this is not actually the case. Like 
Habermas’ publicity, the Internet and social media are not open to everyone. In 
Habermas' view, only men in the upper class were allowed to take part in the debate 
during its Enlightenment era incarnation. This exercise of debate and discussion 
excluded women and members of the lower classes. Nowadays the challenge is the 
limited access to the Internet and its platforms. Not everyone around the world has the 
same access to the Internet because of censorship or network performance (Iosifidis, 
2011, 6-7). 
According to Habermas’ theory (Habermas 1989), we can say that social 
media has the potential to serve as a public sphere. As stated earlier, Habermas placed 
publicity between private and public power, existing in its own public and social 
sphere. It has also been stated that social media has blurred these boundaries.  We can 
often see in social media how private and public life, leisure, and work merge together 
(Fuch, 2014), and this does not fully fit with Habermas’ idea of a clear distinction 
between private and public spheres characteristic of the eighteenth century. Also, 
according to Fuch (2014), social media does not currently form the public sphere 
because it is not free from political or economic power.  
Economic interests and advertising shape social media in many ways 
(Seppänen & Väliverronen, 2012, 75). The most popular social media sites sell their 
users’ information to advertisers and those in power who use the information to, for 
example, deliver political campaign messages. Google, Facebook, Twitter, and 
YouTube all sell their users’ public and private information to advertisers (Fuch, 
2014). Social media sites make a profit from user-generated content. Also, through 
social media and its algorithms users can be monitored more easily, taking 
surveillance to a new level (Fuch, 2014). 
In the next section, we will discuss social media algorithms in-depth and explain how 
they have affected the public sphere.  
Social Media Algorithms – L. Trémouille 
In the era of the Internet and social media, algorithms have had a significant effect on 
the content we see and consume. In this section, we will explain how social media 
algorithms work and how they shape the public sphere. 
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4.1. What are algorithms? 
We now exist in these curated environments, where we never see 
anything outside our own bubble … and we don’t realize how curated 
they are. 
—Emily Taylor, a chief executive of Oxford Information Labs and 
editor of the Journal of Cyber Policy (Hern, 2017). 
 
Algorithms are often described as a set of instructions or as a recipe. Basically, a 
programmer tells the algorithm how to operate if a specific set of conditions is met. 
This process is described as “IFTTT”, which stands for “if this then that” 
(Hildebrandt, 2016, 1). With social media algorithms, the process could be for 
example, “if a user likes this, comments on that, and opens this article, then show 
more of this kind of content”. 
Lately, as artificial intelligence has developed significantly, machine learning 
has gained a lot of popularity among programmers. Machine learning is a sub-
discipline of AI, in which AI is programmed to reconfigure its own behavior to 
improve its performance based on the data it processes (Hildenbrandt, 2016, 1). With 
this development AIs move from following strictly given IFTTT-rules to develop their 
own algorithms autonomously. Therefore, the programmer of an AI that is based on 
machine learning cannot be in full control of how the algorithm will eventually work. 
These two types of algorithms are also called automatic (IFTTT) and autonomous 
(machine learning) (Boulanin, 2019, 20). 
4.2. How do social media algorithms work? 
Social media has become an inseparable part of everyday life for many modern-day 
people. It has changed the way we communicate and form communities by providing 
access to ideas online without limitations of time or space (Delacruz, 2009). As stated 
in Section 2, 62 percent of US adults receive their news via social media. However, 
what seems to be unclear to many is how the algorithms work and, therefore, how the 
content received through social media is curated to each user, based on the 
algorithmic analysis of that user (Association for Computing Machinery US Public 
Policy Council (USACM), 2017). 
As social media platforms have gained popularity among users, the content 
and information on the platforms have overflowed. To overcome this issue, social 
media companies use recommender systems to suggest useful content for each user. 
Recommender systems analyze users’ behavior and compare it to the data of other 
users. They create a profile of the user and then recommend content based on what 
neighbor users (users with similar profiles) have shared or liked (Anandhan et al., 
2018). There are several different types of recommender systems such as filtering, 
collaborative filtering, and hybrid-based filtering, but what all of these have in 
common, and what is important in the light of this article, is that all of these systems 
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somehow limit the content and information the user receives when using social media 
services. 
Algorithms function between the user and the information and they can be 
perceived as both the interpreter and the gatekeeper. From a positive perspective, 
algorithms know and understand the user’s preferences, sometimes better than the 
user themselves. From this point of view, algorithms are to some extent reading the 
user’s mind and acting based on that; when a user types “Donald” to Google’s search 
engine, it automatically suggests “Donald Trump” and if that is what the user is 
searching for, the algorithm can be seen as guessing the user’s intention. Although for 
many this is a positive functionality, it also filters out some of the content, and 
therefore algorithms can be seen as the new gatekeepers of information (Roth, 2019, 
3). This functionality of the algorithms also creates filter bubbles or echo chambers, 
where the existing ideas and values of the user are strengthened without providing any 
new or contradicting information. 
As stated earlier, everything a user sees on social media is curated by 
algorithms. This curation is done based on the users’ explicit declaration about their 
preferences, for example, joining a certain group or liking a certain page, but also 
their implicit behavior by analyzing the user and comparing their profile to other users 
(Roth, 2019, 4). One major factor that determines what the user sees is money, as 
most of the social media platforms are funded by displaying ads (Hern, 2017). What is 
also important to keep in mind when discussing social media algorithms is that the 
revenue of social media companies is based on the time that the user spends on their 
websites, viewing the displayed ads. 
Social media is often portrayed and viewed as an enabler of communication or 
as a platform for user-based content. What is often overlooked is that behind every 
social media service there is a company that is trying to make money. The core 
business of the companies such as Facebook is to collect data on its users and then use 
that data to provide advertisers direct passage to reach their target groups (Benkler et 
al., 2018, 269). As the 2016 presidential election proved to a large audience, this also 
provides a way for political candidates to reach their possible voters with targeted 
messages. 
4.3. How can social media algorithms shape the public sphere? 
Many recent studies have shown that the recommendations made by algorithms have 
a significant influence on what we consume, purchase or believe. They affect the 
music we listen to on Spotify, movies we watch on Netflix or products we purchase 
from Amazon, as all of these services give us recommendations (e.g. Hosanagar, 
2019). 
After the 2016 election, the influence of algorithms has been tested on several 
occasions. For example, Epstein and Robertson (2015) tested how the order of the 
results on a Google search results page influences the popularity of Australian 
political candidates among US citizens who were unfamiliar with the candidates 
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before the experiment. They found that people tended to trust the results that were 
displayed first more, and that they formed their opinions based on these results. 
Facebook researchers have also found that by providing users a way to inform 
their friends they have voted by adding functionalities such as an “I voted” button, 
they could potentially urge other users to vote as well. Although this can be seen as a 
positive development, it also has the potential to favor certain candidates or parties 
depending on which users receive this “nudge” (Caplan & Boyd, 2018, 1). 
Gillespie (2010, 347) has described algorithms as “curators of public discourse” as 
they have such a significant impact on how the public discourse appears to each user.  
Algorithms can, therefore, have a major impact on politics and the public 
sphere. Thus, social media companies and other online platform providers have a 
great responsibility when developing these algorithms and services. If the algorithms 
or the data provided to the algorithms is biased, it has the potential to change public 
life and possibly a society, as we have seen in the US. However, as Caplan and Boyd 
(2016) point out, biased algorithms are not the only concern when it comes to 
algorithmic influencing of the public sphere, because algorithms can also be 
manipulated by those who find ways to manipulate the information flow. 
5. Targeted Marketing – S. Siirtola 
Social media has brought new forms of marketing and advertising into our daily lives. 
Digital marketing provides new ways to advertise goods and services online and on 
different social platforms. One of the key factors in digital marketing has been 
personalized ads that are tailored for each specific user. This means that every user 
online has ads showing up specifically targeted for them. This kind of targeting is 
based on information and data gathered from users. The data includes information on 
which sites you visit, what links you click on and what kinds of purchases you make 
online, among other things. 
The basic idea of targeted marketing is to identify groups that an organization 
could target (Lancaster, 1988, 79). This is based on a practice wherein marketing 
companies buy consumer information and data that is collected on sites such as 
Facebook. People enter their personal information on their Facebook profile which 
then Facebook harnesses and sells to advertisers. The problem here is that the 
consumers do not always know how their information is being used, which is a source 
of privacy concerns. 
Targeted marketing is seen as more effective than so-called offline marketing 
because it allows companies to focus on their target groups. In the book Digital 
Marketing Playbook, Ian Dodson talks about using digital marketing to engage in a 
dialog with the consumers and thus help them communicate with the company. 
Dodson mentions a term called DDA which stands for digital display advertising 
(Dodson, 2016, 91). It is a form of digital marketing that displays ads online as a 
means of communicating relevant commercial messages to a specific audience based 
on their profile (Dodson, 2016, 91). 
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Dodson talks about the trail users leave online while using social media 
platforms and generally browsing online (Dodson, 2016, 99). The users’ clicks give 
you information on who they are, where they live and what they are interested in. He 
uses an example of a woman called Debbie to show what kind of information can be 
collected. Debbie can be identified according to her age, marital status, hobbies, and 
income. It becomes easier to target ads for the person when you know all this basic 
information about her, her interests and her consumer behavior (Dodson, 2016, 99). 
There is also another issue with targeted content: the previously mentioned 
social bubbles. Creating targeted content restricts the content users view and receive. 
When people search for something online, everyone gets different kinds of results and 
this affects the content we see online. The same happens for example on Facebook: 
we mostly see the posts of the people with whom we are most connected. This can 
also shape our ideologies or make them stronger. 
In the article “Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election,” Allcott and 
Gentzkow mention a study conducted in 2015 which shows that Facebook friend 
networks are ideologically segregated (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017, 221). Because 
users are mainly seeing the posts of the people with whom they are the closest with 
and share the same ideologies with, they get fewer posts about opposing ideologies 
(Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017, 221). People are thus more likely to read and share news 
articles that are aligned with their own ideologies. According to the article, this kind 
of segregation suggests that “people who get news from Facebook (or other social 
media) are less likely to receive evidence about the true state of the world that would 
counter an ideologically aligned but false story” (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017, 221). 
This was also an important factor in the presidential election in 2016. 
5.1. Targeted Marketing in the Election of 2016 - Cambridge Analytica 
In the US presidential election of 2016, social media played a big role in the 
campaigning of the candidates. As mentioned earlier, the key element in Trump’s 
campaign seemed to be Twitter and other social media channels. Trump managed to 
target his campaign to the right groups even though his methods were questionable. 
This included talking about Clinton offensively on public platforms, trying to make 
her look bad. 
One thing, in particular, raised a lot of conversation in the media and among 
the public. It was the way Trump’s campaign had collected data on millions of people 
on Facebook which was then used in his campaign. The data the Trump team 
collected allowed them to tailor digital ads and online fundraising efforts to specific 
users (Prokop, 2018).  
Trump used a company called Cambridge Analytica to collect data on possible 
voters. The CEO of the company commented on the case saying, “we did all the 
research, all the data, all the analytics, all the targeting, we ran all the digital 
campaign, the television campaign, and our data informed all the strategy” (Prokop, 
2018). An academic at Cambridge University, called Aleksandr Kogan, created an app 
79
PUBLIC SPHERE IN THE AGE OF SOCIAL MEDIA 
 
 
for Facebook to collect the data. The app was called “thisismydigitallife” and it was a 
personality quiz which users could take on Facebook. To take the quiz, users had to 
consent to give the app access to all of their and their friends’ Facebook profiles. In 
the end, more than 270 000 people took the quiz in the app which lead to over 50 
million profiles to be collected and over 30 million people were identified on the 
electoral rolls (Prokop, 2018). 
The company used the data to build an algorithm that could analyze individual 
Facebook profiles and determine personality traits linked to voting behavior. The 
algorithm and database formed a powerful political tool together. This allowed the 
campaign to identify possible swing voters and craft messages that were more likely 
to resonate. This managed to create profiles that were identifiable and tied to electoral 
registers, across 11 states, with the possibility to expand even further. The 50 million 
profiles gathered represented around a third of active North American Facebook users, 
and nearly a quarter of potential US voters (Cadwalladr & Graham, 2018). 
Facebook as a company played a crucial role in the campaign, as well. 
Facebook provided an interface that allowed campaigns to target specific voters, 
geographic regions, or demographics, as well as to send ads to the users based on their 
personal data (Benkler, 2018). 
The main goal of the data used in the campaign was to predict and influence 
choices at the ballot box by targeting potential voters with personalized political 
advertisements. This raises serious questions about Facebook’s role in targeting voters 
in the US presidential election (Cadwallader & Graham, 2018). According to Benkler, 
the fundamental problem is that Facebook’s core business is to collect highly refined 
data about its users and convert that data into “microtargeted manipulations” such as 
advertisements and newsfeed adjustments (Benkler, 2018). The purpose of this is to 
get its users to want, believe, or do things. Benkler says that “that same platform-
based, microtargeted manipulation used on voters threatens to undermine the very 
possibility of a democratic polity” (Benkler, 2018, 269). Cambridge Analytica took 
advantage of the intentional design of the basic business of Facebook and turned it 
into a political tool. According to Benkler, when this is applied to political 
communication, it presents a long-term threat to democracy (Benkler, 2018).   
6. Social Curation: Popularity of News Media Outlets on Social 
Media – M. Liukkonen 
When talking about the 2016 election and the powers of social media, we need to 
understand how Americans receive their political information and how these ways 
have been changing before and during the election.  
When observing the election, attention needs to be paid to the architecture of 
discontent and how “bubbles” are formed in the media. The digitalization of news 
media cannot be ignored, either. Even though “fake news” is not a new term, it gained 
widespread publicity during Trump’s and Clinton’s presidential campaigns. As cited 
before, it has been wondered whether if the distribution of fake news on social media 
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had not been so widespread, Donald Trump would have won the 2016 presidential 
election (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017, 212)? 
6.1. The architecture of our discontent 
In America, people get their information about politics from a very diverse set of 
sources. Even though more and more Americans use social media as their primary 
source of news, a large portion still relies on broadcast television and cable news. 
That is why in order to understand media, especially in the context of American 
politics, we need to understand the entire ecosystem (Benkler, Faris & Roberts, 2018, 
45).  
It has been observed that there is no left-right division in American media, but 
rather a division between the right and the rest: the American media ecosystem is 
divided into two distinct and structurally different ecosystems. Besides the right-wing 
media, the rest of the spectrum includes outlets from the left and center-right 
publications. This ecosystem is often seen to adhere to professional standards of 
journalism (Benkler, Faris & Roberts, 2018, 73-74). 
Because of the strict division, the way people receive their media content is 
asymmetric—even when we talk about traditional mass media such as television and 
cable news. For example, according to surveys, respondents who identified as 
“consistently conservative” politically, also reported that their most trusted source of 
news was Fox News, Sean Hannity, and Rush Limbaugh. “Consistently liberal” 
people responded that their most trusted media were NPR, PBS, and the BBC. Even 
though these patterns were observed about television and radio sources, the same 
pattern was also congruent online (Benkler, Faris & Roberts, 2018, 73).  
Because of this asymmetry, social bubbles are strong, and people are receiving 
messages only from similarly-minded people. Adding social media to these already 
visible patterns in the traditional mass-media, people can curate what they read and 
see. This leads to a situation where people seek out evidence that is in alignment with 
their preconceptions, interact only with like-minded people, and avoid information 
that does not fit with what they believe and like to hear confirmed (Benkler, Faris & 
Roberts, 2018, 289-290). The problems presented by this asymmetry increase when 
the political polarization rises and there are more and more negative feelings on each 
side of the political spectrum towards each other (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017, 214). 
Therefore, like-minded messages are exchanged even more widely without regard for 
the facts.  
6.2. The digital transformation of news media and the rise of disinformation and 
fake news 
Besides traditional media and the asymmetries therein, digitalization of the news 
media has also changed the way Americans received political information during the 
2016 election. Even though a large portion of Americans used television and radio as 
their main source of news, social media use has risen sharply. In 2016, Facebook had 
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1.8 billion active users per month and Twitter had almost 400 million active users 
each month (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017, 214).  
In the digital age anyone, anywhere, can produce content. Agendas are 
diverse, signals are mixed, and messages manipulated. Barriers of entering the media 
industry have almost disappeared because it is easy to create media outlets (for 
example websites), as well as to monetize content through advertising (Allcott & 
Gentzkow, 2017, 214-215). The increasing amount of different online news providers 
has shaken the media ecosystem and raises quality concerns about news channels.  
Technological changes such as algorithms and changed media logics have had 
a strong impact on the news media industry. Instead of direct access to newspapers, 
people tend to have algorithm-driven access to unbundled articles. Therefore, 
journalists and newspaper editors lose control of the curation of the content (Martens, 
Aguiar, Gomez-Herrera & Mueller-Langer, 2018, 12-16). Wider access can be seen as 
a good aspect, but it also might affect the perceived quality of news. Because of the 
shape of the online news production and very short production cycles, there is no time 
for constant fact-checking and unchecked news is more common even in high-quality 
newspapers (Martens, et al., 2018, 18). 
This so-called digital transformation can be seen as a reason why especially 
social media platforms are conducive to fake news. First, entering the new media 
market and producing content is cheap. Also, it is difficult to judge the messages’ 
veracity because of the format: thin slices of information viewed on phones. Thirdly, 
social networks are ideologically segregated, and people are more likely to read and 
share the news that is aligned with their ideology (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017, 221). 
The digitalization and new production cycles can be seen as one of the aspects 
that affect the quality of news, but changed media logic cannot be blamed alone. 
Social media has created a platform for fake news, for sure. However, social media do 
not create fake news. The motivations behind the creation of fake news can be divided 
into two categories: pecuniary and ideological. Content that is popular, or even viral, 
on social media can draw advertising revenue when linking to the original site. The 
other side is ideological and can be seen best in politics: some fake news providers 
seek to advance their candidates (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017, 217.) The Internet and 
social media have destabilized traditional institutions, including television and print 
news outlets. Hence, marginalized voices and messages are allowed to reach out 
directly to audiences. The downside is, that the same phenomena allow actors to 
distribute propaganda and fake news (Benkler, Faris & Roberts, 2018, 289). 
Digital transformation and political polarization created a platform for the 
2016 election in which Trump was able to use social media to achieve his own goals 
by spreading false information. During the election, Trump’s use of social media was 
also analyzed as a source of disinformation and fake news, as his agenda and goals 
were best achieved by spreading false information (Ross & Rivers, 2018, 2). 
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7. Conclusion   
Social media’s ability to provide opportunities for content production without any 
third-party filtering or verification of facts has sparked concerns. For example, 
publications of individual publishers can gain more visibility than posts by the most 
popular traditional media outlets. This is a very good example of why and how social 
media has changed the public sphere, and this was clearly visible in the 2016 US 
presidential election. 
In that election, both candidates, Trump and Clinton, took advantage of social 
media in their campaigns, as they were aware of its ability to bypass news media 
gatekeepers and communicate directly with voters. 
Donald Trump's Twitter behavior during and after the election sparked debate 
and it has been analyzed as a source of disinformation and fake news, since Trump's 
tweets focused on his attacks and his derogatory comments on the mainstream media 
and his opponents. 
Many have questioned whether Donald Trump would have won the US 2016 
presidential election if he had not been so active on social media during the election. 
For these reasons, it is important to note that social media may have had a major 
impact on the results of the US presidential election and the contemporary public 
sphere more generally.  
As shown, the public sphere has changed and expanded much since social 
media gained popularity. Through social media, almost everyone has the opportunity 
to engage in public and social debate, regardless of the country's borders. This idea 
broadens the views of Habermas’ public sphere because social media can increase 
people's political participation.   
During the 2016 American presidential election, the role of social media in the 
arena of political debate became central. Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter were a key 
part of the public debate. However, deciding whether social media represents a revival 
of Habermas’ public sphere is not easy. Social media is shaped by a wide variety of 
economic and political agendas. Not everyone around the world has the same access 
to the Internet and social media services. In addition, social media exercises a lot of 
control and censorship over its users. It is used not only for safety but also for 
marketing purposes. 
Targeted marketing has become an effective tool for finding the right 
audiences online. It can be used to create personalized ads and promote sales targeted 
to a certain group. It can also make it easier for people to browse online and find the 
things that they are the most interested in. However, when applied to public debate, 
targeted marketing can reduce rational political debate and decision-making as users 
mostly encounter like-minded views. 
Additionally, targeted marketing is mostly based on collecting information of 
online users, and people cannot always be sure what their data is used for. As we can 
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see in the Cambridge Analytica case, the data collected can be misused for political 
purposes, and this makes the use of targeted marketing somewhat questionable. 
The mainstream American media ecosystem is divided into two polarised 
ecosystems: right-wing media represented by Fox News, and left-wing media 
exemplified by MSNBC and sometimes interpreted to include CNN. Because of this 
division, the way people receive their media content is asymmetrical, meaning that a 
big portion of the population receives their political information from like-minded 
media channels. Of course, media exposure and viewing habits vary by generation, so 
more research is needed to address various segments of the public. 
In addition, the digitalization of news media has changed the ways in which 
actors can deliver news content, giving more space to marginalized voices. Almost 
anyone can produce content anywhere at no cost, but without fact-checking. This 
change has also made it easier to produce disinformation and fake news.
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Abstract 
The paper will examine the digital public sphere applied to the case study of the 
recent Ukrainian presidential elections of April 2019. In the first section, it will reflect 
on what Jürgen Habermas considers as the public sphere in order to establish the basis 
of the investigation. The second section will define the current role of the public 
sphere in the digital age. In the third section, we will move to the case, focusing on 
the campaign of the elected president Volodymyr Zelensky, and describe the 
fragmentation of the public sphere in relation to the messages addressed to different 
audiences during the campaign. In the fourth section, we will further reflect on the 
manifestation of the digital public sphere in Zelensky’s entirely digital campaign, as 
well as in the seeping of fiction into reality, as Zelensky became renowned for playing 
the lead in the tv series "Servant of the People”, about a normal man who 
inadvertently becomes president of Ukraine. Finally, we will examine how the digital 
public sphere influenced the Ukrainian presidential election and the effects it has had. 
 
Keywords:  Public sphere, democracy, deliberative democracy, elections, campaign, 
digital public sphere, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, Zelensky, social media 
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This essay will analyse the 2019 Ukrainian presidential election applying the concept 
of the public sphere. With the impact of the digital era the concept of the public 
sphere should be analysed in a new context. The 2019 Ukrainian presidential election 
showed how the new public sphere in the digital era functions and what kind of 
implications it has on deliberative democracy. 
First, the essay will look at the extension of the concept of the public sphere in 
Jürgen Habermas’ theoretical works. This section attempts to reveal the extent to 
which the concept of the public sphere is intended to recommend aspirational norms, 
and thus assess how applicable it is to the digital age and to the concrete case of 
Ukraine. 
In the next section the essay investigates the concept of the digital public 
sphere and the special features of the Ukrainian public sphere in the digital era. This 
section tries to answer the questions of what the concept of the digital public sphere 
signifies and why it is important, as well as what the features of Ukrainian digital 
public sphere are. 
In the third section, the essay will delve into the Ukrainian election and the 
reasons for Volodymyr Zelensky’s victory through the theoretical framework of the 
fragmentation of the public sphere. In addition to Habermas’ theory, this essay will 
present different views on this fragmentation by relevant scholars. This section will 
also investigate how Zelensky possibly used a divided public society to his advantage, 
whether the fragmentation of the public sphere explains the events in Ukraine 
sufficiently, and whether Zelensky added to the fragmentation. 
Fourth, the essay will concentrate specifically on the digital aspect of 
Zelensky’s presidential campaign, which was largely based on his fictional television 
persona and was conducted in an entirely virtual manner, and therefore works as a 
prime example of the manifestation of the digital public sphere in contemporary 
political reality. Zelensky’s campaign, which fostered emancipatory potentials of the 
digital public sphere, but less so deliberative ones, is also an illustrative example of 
both the participatory potentials and shortcomings of the digital media environment as 
a contemporary public sphere. 
Finally, the essay describes the influence of the digital public sphere in the 
Ukrainian presidential election and its effects during the campaign. It analyses the 
digital strategies used by Servant of the People Party and current President Volodymyr 
Zelensky. In addition, it addresses the impact of social networks platforms to express 
ideas and opinions to electors and citizens. A clear comparison between Zelensky’s 
campaign and other similar cases, like American presidential elections held in 2008 
and 2016, are also presented. 
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1. The extension of the concept of the public sphere by Habermas 
This section will investigate how the concept has been extended in Jürgen Habermas’ 
own theoretical works. This question attempts to serve as the basis for the following 
sections by showing the extent to which the concept of the public sphere is intended 
to be normative and thus how applicable it is to the digital age and to the concrete 
case of Ukraine. 
Nearly half a century has passed since Habermas’ concept of the public sphere 
(Öffentlichkeit) was introduced in Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere 
(1962, 1989), and it has now become a common reference across different disciplines. 
While the German term Öffentlichkeit is also used in ordinary language, in English 
the translated concept “public sphere” is used in politics, history, and sociology to 
carry a derivative meaning. Habermas himself also modified the usage of the word 
following this expansive trend. In these circumstances, researchers using the concept 
of the public sphere are free to use it as a general term, often without a particular 
reference to Habermas (Calhoun, 1992). 
In his Structural Transformation, Habermas gives no clear definition of the 
concept of the public sphere. Rather, he focuses on the etymological explanation as 
follows. Öffentlichkeit is a noun made from the older adjective modeled after French 
publicité and English publicity in the 18th century (Habermas, 1989, p. 2). The 
concept of “public life” (bios politikos) originated in ancient Greece, was taken into 
Roman law and succeeded as a definition to distinguish the public from the private 
and to define the region of res publica. Habermas cites these conceptions from 
Hannah Arendt’s The Human Condition (Habermas,1989, pp. 19-21). However, there 
seems to be a conceptual transition in addressing the bourgeois revolution period of 
Britain, the United States, and France as an era of the establishment of the public 
sphere, and referring to Arendt. 
Analyzing the distinction between the public and private realms in political 
life in the ancient Greek polis, Arendt (1958) claims the re-establishment of a domain 
as the public realm. She argues that responsible individuals, as equal participants in 
the political life of the polis, were able to form direct participatory political 
discussions in which they openly expressed their political opinions and argued on an 
equal footing. However, according to her, given the increasing numbers of individuals 
with social status in the 18th and 19th centuries, the realm of the social in the modern 
world finally reached the point where “it embraces and controls all members of a 
given community equally and with equal strength” (Arendt, 1958, p. 41). Here the 
public is only ruled by interest, and the subject of this interest is calculated not as 
individuals nor as their will and opinions, but as a totaled and quantified homogenic 
subject under bureaucratic administration. For Arendt, this transformation means 
degeneration and alienation of mankind, all of whom aspire to solemnly express their 
opinions in public life (Arendt, 1958, pp. 320-5). 
According to Habermas’ articulation, in contrast, the public sphere, which was 
established during the bourgeois revolutions of Britain, the United States, and France, 
has degenerated since the 19th century along with the progress of the industrial 
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revolution (Habermas, 1989, pp. 73-9). In other words, as the system was divided into 
politics led by political parties that worked to achieve universal suffrage and women's 
suffrage, in the process of industrialization, the public sphere became a place for 
advertisements for consumer goods (merchandise) and cultural products retailed by 
companies, and a site dominated by mass communication as an institution of political 
propaganda by parties. This theoretical line is derived from the Frankfurt school, to 
which Habermas belonged, and was nurtured in the context of the criticism of 
instrumental reason in the mass society and modern communications (Horkheimer & 
Adorno, 1947). 
Therefore, the bourgeois revolutions in Britain, the United States, and France, 
which Habermas takes up as the establishment of the public sphere, was for Arendt an 
era of the rise of the social and an era of the degeneration of the public sphere. For 
Arendt, the structural transformation of the public sphere had already ended at the 
time of the emergence of the public sphere in Habermas’ sense. Hence it can be 
thought that this earlier decay of the public sphere diagnosed by Arendt was built into 
his argument from the beginning as a way of introducing the idea of the civil society 
and further developing the usage of the term “public sphere”. 
If one sets aside the distinction above and accepts Habermas’ understanding of 
history, the public sphere established during the bourgeois revolution period 
subsequently disappeared because it is necessarily a phenomenon of historical non-
reproducibility. Taking that into account, the public sphere cannot be discussed any 
longer in terms of its implementation at the present time, which has undergone 
structural transformation. Nevertheless, it should be noted that, according to Calhoun, 
Habermas analyses “the historical category of the public sphere and attempts to draw 
from it a normative ideal” (Calhoun 1992, p. 39). Since it was proposed in 1962, his 
concept has equivocated between historical actualities and theoretical ideals. The 
latter, universal and normative aspects can be detected by positioning the modified 
concept of the public sphere in his theoretical works after his influential text was 
published. 
From Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, through Theory of 
Communicative Action volumes I and II (1984, 1987) to Between Facts and Norms 
(1992), Habermas’ understanding of the public sphere has shifted from the view laid 
out in Structural Transformation based on the negative evaluation of the mass media 
influenced by the Frankfurt School's criticism of instrumental reason. First of all, in 
The Theory of Communicative Action, following Durkheim, Mead and Weber’s 
examinations, the media is portrayed in a negative way as a cultural industry, but with 
ambivalent expectations for it as a medium of citizen discussion (Habermas 1984, pp. 
389-90). The preface to the second edition of Structural Transformation expands the 
concept by referring to Adam Ferguson's idea of civil society, considering that the 
public sphere of the first edition was the bourgeois public sphere which was realized 
by the bourgeois revolution (Habermas, 1991, pp. xviii-xix). Furthermore, in Between 
Facts and Norms (1992) Habermas lays out expectations for the public sphere as a 
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forum for discussion on common good and social justice, and the form was taken to 
match the examples observed in modern society: 
 
Moreover, the public sphere is differentiated into levels according to the 
density of communication, organizational complexity, and range—from the 
episodic publics found in taverns, coffee houses, or on the streets; through 
the occasional or “arranged” publics of particular presentations and events, 
such as theater performances, rock concerts, party assemblies, or church 
congress; up to the abstract public sphere of isolated readers, listeners, and 
viewers scattered across large geographic areas, or even around the globe, 
and brought together only through the mass media. (Habermas, 1996, p. 374) 
 
At this theoretical point, the concept of the public sphere has explicitly become 
applicable to an analysis of a wide range of arenas of public debate that discuss public 
issues related to people’s lives. Hence, as Habermas’ own theoretical development 
suggests, the historical particularity seen in the original conceptualization can be set 
aside and the universality and normativity of the concept can be utilized to apply to 
analysis irrespective of time and space.  
2. The digital public sphere in Ukraine 
After exploring Habermas’ theory on the public sphere, we next shift to the idea of the 
public sphere in the digital age. According to Hacker and van Dick (2000), digital 
democracy is defined as “a collection of attempts to practice democracy without the 
limits of time, space and other physical conditions, using…[new] ICT [Information & 
Communications Technology]…as an addition, not replacement, for traditional 
analogue practices” (cited in Royston & Creeber, 2009, p. 139). The Internet is 
usually considered as an open platform and hyper-interactive medium; it can be 
argued that the Internet is generally a relatively open and accessible public sphere 
(Royston & Creeber, 2009, p. 141). On the other hand, some countries have heavily 
controlled the Internet and it could be argued that Internet freedom or democracy of 
the digital world is not actualized because of the restrictions on its openness. 
However, the Internet has been used as an emancipator even by controlling political 
regimes, since the growth of access and the use of ICT in the Middle Eastern and 
African region “provided resources for protesters and governments to influence 
political and social events”, which played a role in the Arab spring in the early 2010s 
(Wilson & Corey, 2012, p. 343). 
What are the characteristics of a digital public sphere, when we look beyond 
the traditional public sphere? What characterizes the Internet is its interactivity, which 
could be argued as going beyond the traditional public sphere. The “Internet is 
characterized as a lateral, interactive and discursive model of communication” in 
opposition to for example radio and television, which are top-down and linear 
(Royston & Creeber, 2009, p. 142). The Habermasian public sphere calls for dialogic, 
deliberative, communicative and democratic ideals (Royston & Creeber, 2009, p. 
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142), and the interactivity has the potential to reach these ideals. Online 
communication can approximate real-life verbal exchanges that serve as the basis for 
the Habermasian public sphere (Royston & Creeber 2009, p. 142). Paschal Preston 
(2001) argues that there are problems with the democratic ideals of the digital public 
sphere, as Internet applications can “only provide an opportunity for an open and 
interactive public sphere” (cited in Royston & Creeber, 2009, p. 142). There is also a 
possibility for people taking advantage of digital media. Also, the dominant 
commercial and political interests in society can take advantage of the new media. 
Last, he points out the problem of technological literacy (Royston & Creeber, 2009, p. 
142), meaning that all of the population should be equally able to use the Internet and 
digital applications in order for its members to reach these communicative ideals. 
Next, we would like to look into the special characteristics of the Ukrainian 
public sphere. According to Freedom House’s analysis of Freedom on the Net (2018), 
the Ukrainian Internet is partly free after a sharp decline in Internet freedom in 2017, 
when Ukrainian authorities blocked pro-Russian or pro-Separatist webpages. Also, in 
June 2017 there were cyber-attacks on the country. Internet penetration in the country 
is 52.2% of the population of 44,831,159 (Freedom House, 2018). To understand the 
scale, it could be compared to, for example Finland, where the Internet penetration of 
the population is 75% (Tilastokeskus, 2018). 
The relationship with Russia is an important aspect in the digital public sphere 
of Ukraine. The conflict in Crimea and the information war with Russia pose 
challenges to Internet freedom in Ukraine: it is vulnerable to cyber-attacks and 
misinformation campaigns, which leads to a debate on Internet regulation. There has 
been a demand for more regulation (Albrecht, 2019). In addition to Russian influence, 
oligarchs dominate the political scene. Oligarchs are powerful, well-connected 
businessmen who have divided up the country’s economic assets among themselves 
and use government funds for their own profit (Oldhauser, 2014, p. 92). However, 
Ukrainian civil society has a strong presence online and activists have used social 
media to reach several goals, for example, to organise volunteer support for military 
functions, stay current with developments in the east of Ukraine, and promote human 
rights; and additionally, they have revealed biased and manipulated information 
online. There has been a proposal to tighten Internet freedom by the means of laws to 
control the digital public sphere, but until now such laws have not passed because of 
the pressure from local civil society (Freedom House 2018). Despite the pressure, 
debate on digital rights is minimal and the protection of personal data is weak 
(Albrecht, 2019). 
If we look into the ideals of a public sphere that according to Habermas are 
dialogic, deliberative, communicative and democratic, and look into the digital public 
sphere that would be an interactive, lateral and discursive public sphere, how would 
we characterize the Ukrainian public sphere on this scale of ideal – non-ideal? First, 
the interactivity of the Internet is a factor that no amount of regulation can take away, 
unless the whole Internet system is shut down, since interactivity is essential to the 
Internet and the era of the digital public sphere. This makes it possible to have 
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deliberation in the public sphere not only in a “top-down” way but also through 
interaction between the “top” and the “bottom”, as in the case of presidential election 
between politicians and the citizens. This interaction is making the digital public 
sphere more ideal by letting voices at the grassroots be heard. 
On the other hand, Internet regulation, the power of the organizations, people 
or the government, can make it harder for those voices to be heard. As noted earlier 
by Preston, the ideal is only an ideal and an opportunity, but there are several aspects 
that can make it harder for the public sphere to reach its ideals. One aspect that he 
mentions is the possibility of people taking advantage of the digital public sphere, as 
commercial and political interests in society can have an effect on it (Royston & 
Creeber, 2009, p. 142). Here we can see that these kinds of challenges for the public 
sphere could be, for example, the two characteristics of Ukrainian society we 
mentioned earlier: Russian influence and oligarchs. Russian influence (political 
interest) disturbs information flow itself by the way of cyber-attacks and 
misinformation campaigns for its own benefit. Oligarchs could be seen as the 
economic power holders, who interfere in the flow of information by gaining benefit 
for themselves through politics, and therefore naturally through media, also in the 
digital public sphere. 
Finally, we would like to point out the effect of Internet penetration in 
Ukraine. We have already stepped into the era of the digital public sphere, since the 
digital media of the current era, such as television and the Internet, play an important 
role in public discussion. Even though the Internet and social media are important, 
television still has its place in the digital public sphere. Television has a huge impact 
on the formation of public opinion in Ukraine, since for 85% of the population it is 
the main source of information (Nieczypor, 2018). 
To some extent, Ukraine is living up to the standards of a deliberative, 
communicative and democratic public sphere, since the Internet is partly free. A 
strong online presence of civil society ensures the realization of the ideal of the public 
sphere to some extent, since people can communicate and have deliberation through 
the interactive relations. Perhaps the digital public sphere in Ukraine could be called a 
kind of semi-democratic digital public sphere. 
3. Fragmented public sphere and the 2019 Ukrainian presidential 
elections 
The fragmentation of the public sphere has been a topic of discussion for theorists for 
a long time (e.g. Arendt, 1958) and Habermas (1989) developed the theoretical 
investigation. Currently this fragmentation is a topic that divides theorists, as some 
claim that the fragmentation has a negative effect on society, e.g. leading to a loss of 
the common good or common interest among people (McKee 2005, p. 141) and 
weakening public engagement and debate (Hodkinson 2017, 192). Some scholars 
argue that fragmentation threatens deliberative democracy, because people should be 
exposed to opposing opinions (Downey & Fenton 2003, p. 185). On the other hand, 
however, some argue that the fragmentation of the commonly shared public sphere 
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has worked as a power against homogeneity and allowed e.g. different minority 
voices to be heard by the common public, as well as new issues to be brought forward 
for public discussion (McKee 2005, p. 146). 
Habermas himself sees the fragmentation of the public as a destructive 
phenomenon. He questions whether the public sphere worked better earlier, before, 
for example, women and the working class were allowed to vote or participate in 
public society.  This is not because he opposes human rights but because the women 
and the working class brought their own stories, discourse and matters to the public 
sphere, thus fragmenting the homogenous public society (McKee, 2005, p. 145). 
From the Habermasian standpoint, it seems that the fragmentation of the public sphere 
was and is a historical challenge and is not solely based on the development of the 
Internet (which is a commonly analysed factor in the studies of fragmentation today). 
However, as the research on the fragmentation of the public sphere has evolved since 
Habermas and he has been criticized for basing his views on the patriotic, bourgeois 
public sphere of the 18th and early 19th centuries (Hodkinson, 2017, p. 196), his 
views might not be the most applicable tool for analyzing modern phenomena. 
The fragmentation of the public sphere has been a topic of research since at 
least Donald Trump’s victory in the 2016 United States presidential election, since his 
victory took a large part of the population by surprise. However, not everyone finds 
this fragmentation alarming. According to McKee, some theorists claim that the 
public sphere has always been fragmented and different issues have always divided 
the citizenry into competing interest groups (McKee, 2005, p. 142). The media 
landscape itself also adds to the fragmentation and to the dividedness of society with 
the media outlets diversifying into smaller units to respond to different needs 
(Hodkinson 2017, p. 192). The Internet is also adding to this as it is facilitating the 
divide into smaller and smaller interest groups as users wish to only discuss certain 
topics or issues. (Papacharissi, 2002, p. 17). 
Another issue that is closely related to the fragmentation of the public sphere 
is the echo chamber phenomenon. Echo chambers are not necessarily created 
deliberately as a political marketing strategy but might be a product of natural human 
coping mechanisms (Zakharchenko et al., 2019). Some theorists see the whole 
Internet as an echo chamber. It has been discovered that people tend to look for 
opinions that are similar to their own, and the phenomenon is explained by theories 
such as cognitive dissonance and selective exposure theories. This way the Internet 
does not necessarily expose users to new information, different opinions or opposing 
political views, but rather reaffirms the political orientation an individual already 
holds (Arvidsson et al., 2014). It is possible that a fragmentation of the public sphere 
has always existed, but the Internet effectively works as an echo chamber, reinforcing 
already existing political views.  
How can these theories of fragmentation be applied to the Ukrainian public 
sphere? The digital sphere became an important factor in Ukraine during the protests 
around 2013. Since then the topic also captured the attention of researchers, who 
found that the circumstances increased the political and social importance that the 
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digital sphere had in Ukraine (Zakharchenko et al., 2019) and Zelensky also used that 
in his campaign, which was mostly conducted online. It has also been discovered that 
Zelensky used different campaign messages to different groups of people (Ben, 2019). 
The echo chamber phenomenon and fragmentation throughout the Internet might add 
to the fact that different interest groups do not necessarily have any contact with each 
other, and Zelensky was able to use this to his advantage in his campaign. 
At a first glance Zelensky could be seen as a unifying power in society and the 
Ukrainian public sphere especially compared to many other presidents if we compare 
the Ukrainian results to those in countries with a strong conservative-liberal divide in 
elections, such as the Trump election or the Brexit vote. Judging from that framework, 
gaining an immense majority the way Zelensky did could even be seen as a unifier of 
Ukrainian society and public sphere. He gained 73% of the votes (Ben, 2019) which 
could signal that much of the population, fragmented public sphere aside, desired 
change and Zelensky managed to brand himself as one to deliver change. 
Looking more closely at Zelensky voters supports this claim, as e.g. in the 
case of NATO, Zelensky voters were rather divided (37% supported joining NATO 
and 37% were against it), yet most of these people voted for him. This could be seen 
as proof of the earlier argument about Zelensky as unifying the Ukrainian public. 
However, Ben has also discovered that different campaign messages were targeted at 
different people. This strategy shows Zelensky and his team possibly understanding 
the concept of fragmentation in the public sphere and using it cleverly to their 
advantage. This is where further fragmentation of the public sphere in society could 
pose a threat or raise issues, because different interest groups not communicating with 
each other enables this to happen. If a candidate is able to target different groups with 
different (or, quite frankly, opposing) campaign messages (without being called on it), 
it is questionable whether a common public sphere even exists. 
However, some research points to the direction that the state of the Ukrainian 
public sphere contributed to the possibility of a populist leader gaining power in the 
Ukrainian election. The demand for a new political leader and the overall 
dissatisfaction among the citizenry were not answered in the common public sphere 
that was largely controlled by the oligarchs in Ukraine. Therefore, the fragmentation 
of the public sphere into smaller entities was essential for the strategy of Zelensky’s 
campaign and the grounds for his popular support (Haran & Burkovsky, 2019). 
It needs to be addressed that the reasons behind Zelensky’s victory include 
most likely many other factors besides the fragmentation of the public sphere. 
Research already conducted on the election underlines the importance of populism 
and the typical (unrealistically) easy solutions to complex issues, as well as the empty 
discourse typical of populists. In Zelensky’s case the voters were ready to accept all of 
his promises at once (Dodonova, 2019). In addition, Zelensky’s campaign consisted 
mostly of going against and defaming the incumbent Petro Poroshenko. Zelensky 
tried to profile himself as a unifier of society and as working against the 
fragmentation—even his slogan was “Servant of the people”. Due to the huge 
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majority of Zelensky voters, the election could be seen as a unifying factor in the 
Ukrainian public sphere.  
4. Zelensky’s entirely virtual presidential campaign in the 
digital public sphere 
The successful 2019 presidential campaign of Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelensky is a 
particularly representative case study of questions relating to a 21st century digital 
public sphere and its manifestation in real world politics. The whole campaign and 
landslide electoral victory were both an astonishing case of life imitating art and an 
example of certain features of a digital public sphere in concrete electoral politics. 
The completely virtual campaign is also an illustrative example of both the 
participatory potentials and shortcomings of the digital media environment as a 
contemporary public sphere. The current section analyses Zelensky’s campaign from 
this perspective, discussing how it showed emancipatory potential akin to the 
participatory liberal model of a public sphere, but came short in challenging features 
upholding to deliberative democracy. The section ends with a discussion of how due 
to the democratic limitations of new media technologies also inherent here, the 
campaign may have had more in common with what Papacharissi (2002, 2010) calls a 
public space instead of a public sphere. 
In his campaign Volodymyr Zelensky cast himself as a total political outsider, 
but in fact he had literally performed politics in the public eye for quite some time, as 
the lead actor in the immensely popular television series Servant of the People (2015-
2019), in which he plays a common and honest man who inadvertently gets elected 
president of Ukraine and subsequently works to purify the state’s corrupt political 
system. Capitalizing on the ready image of his likable and popular fictional character, 
Zelensky’s campaign was truly a campaign of the modern era, because it was 
practically completely virtual.  During the four months between the announcement of 
his candidacy and election day in April 2019, he “did no face-to-face campaigning, 
made no speeches, held no rallies, eschewed travel across the country, gave no press 
conferences, avoided in-depth interviews with independent journalists and, until the 
last day of campaigning, did not debate” (Karatnycky, 2019). What Zelensky did do 
was attempt to communicate more directly on his own terms with the electorate 
through videos on his YouTube channel, posted on his social media accounts, 
appeared on television shows.  Apart from this he also engaged people by calling on 
them to virtually give him advice in designing his political platform (Karatnycky, 
2019). 
Zelensky’s upset victory against established political institutions in Ukraine 
has been described as a people’s rebellion, “a rebellious popular vote against corrupt 
politics-as-usual by … [a heterogeneous spectrum of] voters [lacking] any political 
unity or ideological coherence”, unified only by a general distaste of the status quo 
(Cherepanyn, 2019). In this sense, it can be argued that Zelensky’s campaign fulfilled 
a participatory liberal model of the public sphere, which can be described as a 
“perspective on democracy that particularly stresses the benefits of active engagement 
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in politics both for the citizen as an individual and for the system as a whole” (Ferree 
et al., 2002, p. 299). Above all else, participatory liberalism emphasizes mass 
mobilization of citizens and ideas, striving for “the widest possible empowerment, 
and popular inclusion is necessary to achieve this” (p. 299). It can be argued that 
Zelensky’s campaign catered to precisely these demands, as his “virtual-first strategy 
allowed him to run his campaign on general themes and vague promises and to avoid 
issuing detailed positions on policy issues … [instead h]is political messaging focused 
on discontent with the way things are” (Karatnycky, 2019). In a sense, Zelensky’s 
campaign, fictional character and even political party named after the television show, 
all acted as an empty signifier, a blank slate for a very wide range of different 
identities and demands among citizens of a fractured country, whose main priority 
was to achieve a change to the status quo, but without a unified vision of what the 
contents of that change should be. 
Such a promise of change was offered by Zelensky with his broad, imprecise 
platform that nevertheless reached people and engaged them directly through the 
digital media environment. The campaign that took place in and of the digital public 
sphere worked primarily as a platform that facilitated a reaction to hegemonic politics. 
In that sense, the outcomes were emancipatory, in the sense of participatory liberal 
theory of the public sphere. On the other hand, Zelensky’s platform was so vague that 
while a reactionary emancipation of the voice of the people was achieved, it seems to 
have offered little in the way of a platform for deliberative democracy in the digital 
public sphere. Indeed, when compared to the discursive model of the public sphere, 
which “shares the value of popular inclusion with participatory liberalism, but unlike 
that tradition, views this as a means to a more deliberative public sphere rather than as 
an end in itself” (Ferree, et al., 2002, p. 306), such deliberativeness is difficult to 
detect as a feature of this “people’s rebellion”. 
Incidentally, the shortcomings of the participatory liberal tradition vis-à-vis 
the discursive tradition identifiable in this case study are reminiscent of what 
concerned Habermas himself when he spoke of the public sphere’s structural 
transformation and “criticized that mass media, and commercial mass media in 
particular, do not further deliberation” (Schäfer, 2015, p. 2). Optimists have attempted 
to lay these concerns to rest by pointing to the 21st century transformation of the 
public sphere into one taking place in cyberspace, framing the Internet “as the very 
arena in which global civil society will come together to forge public opinion and 
facilitate collective action” (Delacruz, 2009, p. 10). However, problems with this 
argument are evident in the case of Zelenskiy’s campaign, which demonstrated to 
great extents the digital features of the contemporary public sphere, but also its limits 
in that the process seemed to fall short of being conducive to deliberative democracy. 
Instead it seemingly empowered the electorate but did not set deliberativeness and 
equitable consensus-building at the center of this empowerment, which played out 
mostly for the sake of protest. 
These shortcomings of the digital public sphere are illustrated by Papacharissi 
(2010), who argues that while new digital technologies have the potential to revitalize 
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the public sphere, they do not inherently lead to greater degrees of deliberative 
democracy. Indeed, she argues that access to information and communication 
channels does not automatically equate greater civic engagement, connections made 
online are often characterized by mistrust instead of trust, and commercialization of 
the Internet often sets economic motives above democratic ones (pp. 121-123). The 
above-mentioned features of digital technologies are ones that create a public space, 
but are not as conducive to the creation of a genuine public sphere (p. 124). Thus, 
Ukrainian empowerment is still limited to something like the campaign of Zelensky, 
which is a very interesting contemporary illustration of the possibilities inherent in the 
practical workings of the digital public space aspiring to be a digital public sphere. 
However, as it played out, such a campaign is one that accommodates only an 
ambiguous set of demands and “serves as a mere screen for the popular political 
imagination” (Cherepanyn, 2019), instead of going a step further and facilitating 
digital deliberative democracy. 
5. The influence of the digital public sphere in the Ukrainian 
presidential election and its effects 
Worldwide, the Internet has changed the way people communicate and interact. 
Citizens, candidates, and parties have been using social networks and different types 
of technology to run their campaigns. Over the last 20 years, the role of information 
and communications technologies (ICTs) in election campaigns has evolved from 
purely support tasks like mailing, graphical design, and database, to new direct 
channels of communication between political parties and candidates (Chen & Smith, 
2010, p. 4). 
Nowadays, the Internet had opened a window to the creation of content and 
free communication between users of the network. The emergence of social media 
platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and blogs, among others, has allowed 
the world to communicate efficiently in different levels and contexts. Users can freely 
publish content and spread their ideas and opinions without physical interaction. As 
Çela observed, "It was never as easy as it is now for the people to come together and 
be organized to express their criticism or to contradict a certain matter that concerns a 
certain community” (2015, p. 196). 
On the other hand, while users have more presence on the Internet, they are 
more exposed to several types of content such as products, information, and general 
advertisements (Stephen, 2016, p. 7). These types of content, added to consumer 
behavior and marketing research, are being used by specialized companies to create 
targeted digital strategies to influence the decisions and choices of users. Even the 
political public sphere has been affected by digital platforms. For instance, during the 
election of political candidates, digital campaigns have taken on an essential role in 
the final results. There have been cases where citizens' information was used to 
deliver political propaganda based on their preferences to influence them. However, 
not all of the information is reliable. It has been showed that some fake news was 
delivered purposely. 
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Grossi (2011, p. 2) in his article, “The public sphere and communication flows 
in the era of the Net,” said, “It is undeniable that the transformations of the public 
sphere in late modernity societies are increasingly interlinked with the growing 
pervasiveness of the Net—both in the flows of top-down political communication and 
bottom-up discursive practices which also make public alternative issues, multiple 
belongings, and new rights”. In that regard, the communication process has 
transformed with numerous constituencies, and vertical and horizontal 
communication channels. 
Politicians can directly interact with their followers and receive feedback 
immediately without intermediaries. The gap between these two actors of society has 
become a one-on-one dialogue. Therefore, the digital public sphere is considered as 
an important societal change, because the digital world can be a place for the renewal 
for public political discourses (Thimm, 2015). 
Over time candidates have used traditional advertisement to run their political 
campaigns. However, during the last decade the massive surge of social networks has 
allowed politicians to take use as tools to run their campaigns. For Chen & Smith 
(2010, p. 4) the employing of digital channels has “increased professionalisation and 
reintegration of online channels into the core marketing strategies”. A clear example 
of that is the Americans presidential elections of 2008 and 2012, when former 
President Obama’s campaign used digital platforms like Twitter, Facebook, and 
Snapchat. And in the last American presidential campaign, Donald Trump’s team used 
citizens’ information data to predict fundraising and digital political advertising 
(Benkler, Faris, & Roberts, 2018, p. 271). 
Numbers are solid when we look at the public sphere’s influence in the recent 
presidential campaign in Ukraine. Social networks were the main platforms 
Volodymyr Zelensky used as a strategy to communicate his message to the citizens 
across the country. In the social networks VK, Facebook, and Instagram, the Servant 
of the People party got more reactions and mentions in posts than Petro Poroshenko’s 
European Solidarity party, Zelensky’s opponent. (Matviyishyn, Iliuk, & Panchenko, 
2019). 
Some people have “compared the Zelensky presidential campaign to U.S. 
President Donald Trump, who won the 2016 elections as an anti-elite candidate with a 
business background and an appeal to protest voters tired of established politicians” 
(Talant, 2019). However, evidence suggests that the Ukrainian campaign was more 
similar to that of former President Barack Obama’s, because Zelensky communicated 
more directly to the electorate through social platforms to communicate with his 
supporters. 
As mentioned before, social networks allowed citizens and politicians to 
communicate and express their opinions with each other. In the case of Ukraine, 
Zelensky understood that the best way to articulate his ideas was using new channels. 
He had a strong presence on Facebook and Instagram. The latter had 18,759 posts 
using the hashtag #ServantOfThePeople during the campaign in comparison to the 
opposite party. European Solidarity, Poroshenko’s party had 1024 posts using the 
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name of the party as a hashtag (Matviyishyn et al., 2019). It is important to refer to 
the numbers because they help us see the impact of social networks. 
According to Internews Ukraine (2019), VK, Facebook and Instagram are 
used for different purposes, with different views and opinion leaders. The Servant of 
the People party had a major presence on Instagram. VK content is dominated by 
Russian narratives, and Facebook is more diverse in its political narrative. Therefore, 
social networking tools create links and channels for a better, direct, and cohesive 
exchange of information and communication between the government and the 
citizens, instead of the traditional channels, such as television and printed propaganda.  
Another clear platform used by the Servant of the People party and Zelensky 
himself was YouTube. Applying exceptional and excellent video production and 
filming several videos, he was able to present himself to the people of Ukrainian as a 
fresh new face in politics. He even gained popularity because the traditional media 
(TV news) showed his videos. There is no doubt that Zelensky used digital campaign 
as the main mechanism to gain support. 
We can also see the presidential elections in a perspective of marketing and 
consumer behavior. If we look at Zelensky’s presidential campaign as a marketing 
strategy, we can apply the observation that social networks are often platforms to sell 
products. In this case, politicians sell ideas and political proposals to citizens. 
Thereby, consumer behavior could be influenced by the information that is being 
delivered to them. The “Servant of the people” party certainly utilized the best tools to 
influence voters and to reach new audiences. 
The issue of the digital public sphere that features ubiquity, user-generated 
content, multimediality, and portability has become a key issue for the process of 
mediatisation (Thimm, 2015). The changes in social media communication can affect 
and create socio-cultural transformation in society. In the Ukrainian context Zelensky 
was able to win the elections using new ways of communication, generating 
sociocultural changes in politics. 
Certainly, the digital public sphere influenced the way elections run in 
Ukraine. The strategies Zelensky and his party used in their campaign are a precedent 
for future elections in Ukraine and around the world. Traditional media, such as TV, 
radio, and news still have a significant influence, but the digital public sphere is 
transforming communication, consumer behavior, politics, and society. 
Ukraine’s digital public sphere will continue to evolve. The government and 
politics will face new challenges in the upcoming years. Citizens will persist in 
changing the flow of the public sphere and new audiences will emerge to interact in 
the communication process. Politics will have to adapt to sociocultural changes in 
new global contexts. 
Conclusion 
In this essay we analysed the digital public sphere and the Ukranian presidential 
elections of 2019. Whilst the concept of the public sphere and phenomena related to it 
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are not by themselves enough to completely explain the election result, they do work 
as a sufficient tool for analysis in this essay. 
The first section examined how the concept of the public sphere has been 
extended in Habermas’ theoretical works. After a contrast with the argument by 
Arendt, on which Habermas bases the notion of the public sphere, we argued that 
from Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1962/1989) to Between Facts 
and Norms (1992/1996), he modified the concept in an expansive way by departing 
from the historical particularity which constitutes the basis of the original bourgeois 
public sphere articulated in his early work and by putting more emphasis on 
versatility in the modern world. Thus, we argued that the normative elements of his 
concept are still applicable to our analysis of the recent Ukraine case. 
The digital public sphere in Ukraine has its own special features that might 
explain some functions in the public sphere and how the presidential campaign was 
implemented and received. The Ukranian public sphere is partly controlled by Internet 
regulation, the power of organizations and people, but there is also a strong online 
presence of civil society. Besides the online presence, television still holds an 
important position in the formation of public opinion. These structural features cannot 
be neglected when researching the implications of the digital public sphere in the 
Ukranian context. 
The fragmentation of the public sphere alone as a theory is not sufficient to 
explain Zelensky’s victory. However, some of his campaign methods used this 
fragmentation to his advantage. The fragmentation of the public sphere might be to 
blame for enabling a political candidate to send contradicting campaign messages to 
different groups of people. On the other hand, the considerable majority of the votes 
that were cast for him could signal the existence of a rather widely shared public 
opinion, which could be interpreted as a sign of a common public sphere. 
Zelensky’s campaign was able to use this fragmentation to its benefit largely 
thanks to its wholly virtual character, through which it was possible to keep the 
message imprecise on actual policies but still tap into a common resentment felt by 
Ukrainians, for varying reasons, toward the current political status quo. This method 
made it possible for large swathes of the electorate representing very different 
political identities to back Zelensky. The result of this revolt was the realization of an 
emancipatory potential of the digital public sphere, but due to the thinness of the 
policies discussed, a more deliberative democratic potential was not realized. 
The digital public sphere certainly influenced the Zelensky presidential 
elections in a way that led him and his party to the presidency. Even though this is not 
the first example of using ICTs such as digital platforms and social networks in 
political campaigns, it is the first time that the whole campaign was conducted in the 
digital public sphere. Digital platforms and new technologies will become a guiding 
force in the future of politics shaping and influencing global political processes. 
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Abstract 
In this study we examine how different organizations communicate their 
commitments to sustainability and corporate social responsibility on their websites, 
and the different ways stakeholders could interpret this communication. We do this by 
examining several case studies and reflecting on those cases with the help of a 
theoretical framework. Our main findings are that there is a growing concern amongst 
stakeholders regarding environmental values and that unsubstantiated sustainability 
claims issued in corporate publicity can be interpreted as greenwashing. We identify a 
conflict between goals of growth versus environmental sustainability in some of the 
cases. We also discover that organizations appear to be more transparent with their 
intentions by communicating their environmental values based on firm-serving 
motives rather than public-serving ones. 
 
Keywords: Sustainability, organizational communication, environmental 
communication, greenwashing, corporate social responsibility, aviation, food 
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In this research paper we aim to examine how different organizations communicate 
sustainability and corporate social responsibility on their websites and the different 
ways stakeholders could interpret this communication. We also aim to investigate 
what makes claims of sustainability believable. We chose to examine five 
organizations from several fields of business, that play a significant role in the 
everyday life of western consumers, while also being some of the greatest global 
contributors of carbon emissions and greenhouse gases.  
 In this text we refer to terms related to both communicative methods and 
sustainability questions. We discuss the terms greenness and corporate social 
responsibility. The concept of greenness and green is usually used when referring to 
products or production that takes environmental aspects into account. “Green” is 
associated with closeness to nature and environmental characteristics (Polonsky, 
1994).  Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is referred to in many parts of our 
research and can be interpreted in various ways depending on the case. Kotler and Lee 
describe CSR as “a business’ commitment to contribute to sustainable economic 
development, working with employees, their families, the local community, and 
society at large to improve their quality of life.” (2005, p. 3)  
 There are many reasons for why recognizing environmental aspects and 
reporting CSR is now more important to organizations than ever. Noticing the limits 
of the globe’s carrying capacity and the more rapid spread of information through 
traditional media, as well as new social media channels, are among these reasons. We 
begin this research paper by examining two organizations from the textile industry, 
Hennes & Mauritz and Patagonia. Then we examine two organizations from the food 
industry, Valio and Oatly. In the last section we examine air traffic through looking at 
Finnair. Finally, we present our findings and conclusions. 
The textile industry 
Today’s textile industry is based on an enormously polluting model of fast fashion: 
the clothes are bought, used a couple of times and then thrown away. The British 
Ellen McArthur Foundation (2017) has calculated that 73 per cent of the clothes 
produced globally end up burned or in a landfill, instead of the materials being reused. 
 According to the foundation’s research paper, today’s textile industry is 
dominated by and optimized for cotton and polyester. Currently, polyester makes up 
55 percent and cotton 27 percent of total textile fiber production. The global fashion 
and design company Hennes & Mauritz features prominently in the Ellen McArthur 
Foundation’s research. 
H&M 
The purpose of this case study is to find out how global fashion and design company 
Hennes & Mauritz’s (H&M’s) marketing portrays responsibility and compare it to 
existing research on organizations’ environmental and sustainability discourse. How 
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does the company portray environmental values in their online communication to 
consumers? I will focus on examining the communication and marketing messages on 
the company’s website and in its 2018 Sustainability Report. Additionally, I ask what 
the organization actually does to fulfil its environmental promises. 
 I chose to look at H&M because they have been accused of greenwashing by 
the media and environmentalists several times. H&M is and has been a part of several 
sustainability projects and has made promises to improve their sustainability 
practices. The purpose of this case study is to find out how H&M portrays 
sustainability on its website, and whether one can find instances of greenwashing in 
H&M’s sustainability marketing. 
 The H&M Group is the second-largest global clothing retailer after Inditex. 
H&M Group owns the brands H&M, Cos, Monki, Weekday, Cheap Monday and & 
Other Stories. Net sales of the group were SEK 210 billion in 2018. According to 
their website, H&M has approximately 4900 stores in 73 markets and 50 markets with 
online shopping.  
Corporate social responsibility as a concept 
 Corporate social responsibility, or CSR, is “a commitment to improve community 
well-being through discretionary business practices and contributions of corporate 
resources” (Kotler & Lee 2005, p. 3). This means that an organization’s actions can 
be classified as responsible if the organization has committed to operating on behalf 
of the environment. 
 Stakeholders are actors that the organization interacts with and is dependent 
on (Juholin 2017, 142). In the eyes of the stakeholders, CSR is more and more 
strongly associated with the organization’s legitimacy (Pollach, Johansen, Nielsen, ja 
Thomsen, 2012, p. 205). Especially for big organizations, corporate social 
responsibility is now a critical part of their strategy. However, besides just 
communicating commitment, the organization needs to actually be responsible, as 
well. 
Criticism 
 H&M has failed to deliver on its corporate social responsibility related promises 
before. In 2013, the company announced that all “H&M’s strategic suppliers should 
have pay structures in place to pay a fair living wage by 2018. By then, this will reach 
around 850,000 textile workers” (Washington Post 26.11.2013).  The deadline of 
2018 passed and no information was shared on whether or not the company actually 
succeeded in delivering the promise. In May 2018, the international campaign 
#TurnAroundHM was started. The campaign criticised H&M’s unfulfilled promise 
and demanded that the company publishes a clear plan of action, making sure that the 
sewers get fair living wages. 
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 H&M has also received criticism on the way it collects used clothes. This can 
be interpreted as greenwashing, because the consumer may think it is okay to buy new 
clothes now that they have returned the old ones. 
H&M on sustainability on their website and the 2018 Sustainability report  
 H&M states that in 2018 the company’s customers handed in 20,649 tonnes of old 
textiles as part of the company’s program for reuse or recycling. The company also 
says that they used 96 percent renewable electricity in their own operations in 2018. 
However, there is no mention of how many clothes the organization produces in a 
year. 
 On the company’s “About Us” page the first headline states that H&M is 
committed to Ethical and Sustainable AI. They also have a “Sustainability” headline 
that has subtitles called “People”, “Planet” and “Sustainability Reporting”. Because 
the purpose of this text is to examine the sustainability reporting through 
environmental glasses, the section under “Planet” is what I examined. 
 Under the subtitle there are six articles: materials, recycling, climate, 
circularity, chemicals and water. In total, H&M offers a lot of information on what 
ways it plans to be or already is sustainable. Key notions include that according to 
H&M’s Annual report 2017, H&M Group has a commitment to use 100 per cent 
renewable energy in its own operations. The share was 96 per cent in year 2017. 
According to the report, H&M Group has also committed to becoming climate 
positive throughout its entire value chain by 2040 at the latest.   
 On H&M’s website, we also find the company’s 2018 sustainability report. It 
is a 208-page-long report that has some figures and strategy explained. However, a 
great deal of the report is “vision” and “innovation” rather than actual numbers. 
Greenwashing as a concept vs. H&M on sustainability 
Pollach, Johansen, Nielsen and Thomsen have argued (2012, p. 207) that corporate 
social responsibility can both be seen as contributing to reputation and stakeholder 
relationships, and the organization’s actual operation. If the CSR is only a contributor 
to reputation and not an actual part of the company’s operations, or if the company 
exaggerates its green intentions, this action may be interpreted as greenwashing. 
Greenwashing means “misleading consumers about their environmental performance 
or the environmental benefits of a product or service” (Delmas & Burbano, 2011). 
 The importance of reputation has grown. Juholin (2017, p. 49) presents 
concepts of image and reputation. The concept of image was generated in the 
beginning of the 1900’s and it means creating desirable mental images through 
communicative ways. Reputation is a newer concept and it is based on actions rather 
than mental images. 
 One fact that supports the claim that H&M greenwashes its operations is that 
the company switches its clothes collections every season. On their website, the 
company claims to aim for a circular business model wherein “resources stay in use 
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for as long as possible before being regenerated into new products and materials, 
resulting in a reduction in waste and negative impacts”. Yet at the same time the 
company replaces an old collection with a new one every season. The goal is to sell as 
many clothes as possible. 
 Another contradiction related to the recycling service is how H&M states in 
the sustainability report that “all Monki customers are rewarded with a “10% off your 
next purchase” voucher when they bring a bag of unwanted textiles for the garment 
recycling service.” The same kind of offer (a discount or a free voucher) is used in the 
H&M Group’s other stores. The purpose is to get the customer to come to the store 
again to buy more products but H&M describes it as “a reward for sustainable 
behavior” (H&M Sustainability report 2018, 29). 
Conclusion 
Corporate social responsibility is quite a new trend among organizations and reporting 
it has become more popular in recent years (Mäkelä and Kujala 2017). The research 
on transparency is also more public than before. Seventy-five percent of consumers 
have said that their purchasing decisions are influenced by a company’s reputation 
with respect to the environment, and eight in ten have said they would pay more for 
products that are environmentally friendly (Klein 1990). This means that some 
organizations may claim to be responsible because they actually want to be, whereas 
others might just do it for the profit and for gaining a good reputation. 
Patagonia 
The California-based company Patagonia makes clothing and equipment for the 
outdoors. With a strong focus on sustainability and corporate responsibility, they are 
often cited as a leading company when it comes to sustainability issues. Having based 
much of their communication on these matters, Patagonia is a good example for this 
study. In the following text I aim to map out what kinds of sustainability 
communication strategies Patagonia uses and how the consumer might react or 
respond to these. My main argument is that a company that has sustainability at its 
core can successfully and believably communicate and place arguments about its 
products’ “greenness” to consumers. There is, of course, a paradox in Patagonia’s 
communication. While Patagonia might represent “greenness” and eco-friendliness to 
many, people are also consuming and “buying into” the process of the fast-growing 
clothing industry while making these purchase decisions.   
Theoretical Framework 
In order to understand and interpret communication by Patagonia, it is 
necessary to apply communication theory. Godemann and Michelsen (2011) outline 
what could be seen as communication about sustainability. They point out that there 
are often certain methods that are used to influence and manage the process of 
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communication (2011, p. 9). These methods include social marketing, empowerment, 
instruments of participation and planning or education (2011, p. 9). Through 
examining Patagonia’s website and social media channels, the easiest and most 
accessible sources of information, all of these methods can be identified. 
Godemann and Michelsen (2011) point out the practice of orienting 
communication to a specific audience or people with certain lifestyles about social 
issues such as sustainability. The social marketing approach is, according to 
Godemann and Michelsen, a vital communicative method today, because word-of-
mouth communication and the web have increased their meaning (2011, p. 9). This 
method has proven to be effective when campaigning for voluntary actions and 
supporting behavioral changes (2011, p. 9). Patagonia shows signs of these kind of 
strategies in their campaign “The New Localism”. “The New Localism” is a 
campaign consisting of different places that need protection and attention. Patagonia 
phrases this inclusive campaign through wording like “We are all locals” and “we all 
have a chance to make a difference” (a. patagonia.com “New Localism”, accessed 
16.10.19). Patagonia also emphasizes the importance of in- and out-groups in their 
stakeholder communication. Michael Polonsky points out in his article how 
companies are beginning to realize their position as members of a wider community 
when it comes to sustainability and responsibility. Polonsky states how this shift often 
results in a corporate culture that integrates these values (2005, 5). When examining 
Patagonia’s corporate culture and the communication related to this, it is very clear 
that sustainability is at the core of corporate culture and that this culture is heavily 
built around a framework of sustainability and “teamwork” in the fight against global 
warming (b. Patagonia.com, Employee activism, accessed 16.10). 
 Another strategy for sustainability communication is empowerment. 
Godemann and Michelsen describe this strategy as an enabling process where 
participation is key and self-assessment plays a vital role (2011, 9). According to 
Godemann and Michelsen this happens in practice through workshops and other 
participative methods (2011, p. 9). When it comes to self-reflection, Patagonia seems 
to be very thorough. A big part of their corporate communication consists of self-
reflective analysis (c. Patagonia.com “The Responsible Company”, accessed 
16.10.19). They openly speak of their early setbacks and mention what still needs to 
be done in order to become a fully responsible company. Patagonia admits to the 
“twin conundrums” as they call it (d. patagonia.com “the Shell Game in the Dark”, 
accessed 27.10) when campaigning for new products in a market where growth is the 
main focus.  
 The last method of sustainability communication that Godemann and 
Michelsen mention is examining educational processes (2011, p. 10). Through 
learning processes that create autonomous action instead of just trained behavior, real 
behavioral changes can be made. Godemann and Michelsen mention how processes in 
education for sustainable development can be sparked by both formal and informal 
educational actors (2011, p. 10).  
114
GREENWASHING 
 
 Patagonia does not emphasize its role as an educator in sustainability issues, 
although they provide a vast amount of information for consumers on their website. 
The company speaks openly of possible challenges and success stories, painting a 
picture of an active learning process. “We need everyone in the fight, so we share 
proprietary information and best practices with other businesses, including direct 
competitors. Our business is a tiny fraction of the global apparel industry, and we 
know we can’t solve the climate crisis alone. We also know we don’t have all the 
answers.” (e. patagonia.com “Activism”, accessed 27.10.19). The tone of voice in 
Patagonia’s communication can be seen as humble but determined as well as 
encouraging (Fowler and Hope, 2007, p. 32). Many of Patagonia’s posts on social 
media channels encourage followers to take action. These encouragements include 
getting in touch with congress, taking part in climate strikes and urges for consumers 
to learn more. This gives the reader a possibility to study multiple themes and aspects 
concerning materials, factories and corporate social responsibility.  
 Fowler and Hope point out in their in-depth study how Patagonia, in a 
pioneering project of using new materials, withdrew from the project at the last 
minute (2007, p. 33). The company devoted two pages of their catalogue and large 
billboards to explain this turn of events to their stakeholders (2007, p. 33). It is 
interesting to view this openness in decision making as an open learning process in 
which all stakeholders can feel included. Being sincere about both success as well as 
challenges and concerns may provide extra value in communication for the consumer. 
Peter Dauvergne and Jane Lister point out in their book, “Eco-Business: A Big-Brand 
Takeover of Sustainability,” how consumers have become increasingly suspicious and 
less trusting. According to Dauvergne and Lister, consumers want to gain more 
influence and feel more involved in what they buy and what products they are offered 
(2013, p. 131).  
 Dauvergne and Lister mention how companies are embracing corporate 
sustainability and how they can maximize profits though this “strategic CSR” (2013, 
p. 4). This “eco-Business” as they call it, is an example of how business advantages 
can be made through environmental efforts (2013, p. 4). Dauvergne and Lister 
mention how communicating sustainability issues can be interpreted as added value 
by the potential customer. Sustainability communication is, according to Dauvergne 
and Lister, a way to differentiate products and a way to drive increased sales (2013, p. 
122).  
Conclusion 
All this leaves us with the dilemma of “complicated greenness” presented by Sharon 
Hepburn (2015). Patagonia’s marketing strategies and business ideas revolve around 
sustainability and encouraging people to appreciate and preserve the Earth. By doing 
this the company also encourages consumption over the actual needs of their 
customer (Hepburn, 2015). Patagonia has tried to distance themselves from the world 
of fashion through “minimalist style” and through enhancing “simplicity and utility” 
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(f. Patagonia.com, “Mission statement” accessed 28.10). This holistic approach to 
sustainability issues combined with the encouraging and informative communication 
flow creates a trustworthy and wholesome communicative environment. 
The food industry 
The food industry has a significant impact on our environment through, among other 
things, greenhouse gas emissions, the use of land and water resources, pollution and 
the impact of chemical products. Studies show that the food industry is responsible 
for 20-30% of the environmental impact of private consumption. Within the industry, 
meat and meat products have the greatest environmental impact. The second greatest 
impact is created by dairy products, followed by a variety of others, such as plant-
based food products, soft drinks and alcoholic drinks. (EIPRO 2006.) 
 Many organizations ranging from The United Nations (2018) to Greenpeace 
(greenpeace.org, “#Food” accessed 27.10.2019) have called for a rethinking of dairy 
and meat production and a decrease in consumption in order to tackle climate change. 
Valio 
More milk is consumed in Finland than in any other nation in the world: 361 
kilograms per person a year. Milk production is the main source of income in rural 
areas of the country. Eighty-five percent of Finnish beef is sourced as a byproduct of 
milk production. (The Natural Resources Institute Finland, 2019). 
 In this research paper I examine how Finnish milk and dairy producer Valio 
Oy communicates sustainability and corporate social responsibility on its website. I 
will begin by giving a brief introduction of Valio. Then, I will present some of the key 
ideas and concepts related to this section. Next, I’ll take a look at Valio’s website and 
dissect the ways in which accountability and corporate responsibility are present. 
Finally, I will reflect on my findings. 
 Valio Oy is the largest producer of milk and dairy products in Finland. It has a 
dominant position in the industry, and it exports its products to over 60 countries. On 
its website the company reported a turnover of 1,734 million euros in 2018. Valio is 
owned by Finnish milk producers through cooperatives. 
 I chose to explore Valio as a case study in part because in recent years the 
company has faced some less than positive publicity. In 2018 Valio had to pay small 
dairy producers 8 million euros in fines, after it was caught pushing its pricing under 
the market value (Yle 18.6.2019). In 2019 the Finnish corporate responsibility 
organization Finnwatch revealed several human rights violations in Valio’s supply 
chain in Thailand (Yle 26.3.2019). Valio has also been in the headlines recently, when 
Helsingin Sanomat criticized Valio for claiming its milk comes from free range cows 
— even though one third of those cows still live chained up in cowsheds (Helsingin 
Sanomat 6.9.2019). 
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Sustainability communication, green marketing and greenwashing 
Sustainability communication is found throughout the public sphere. Its goal is to 
tackle sustainability issues such as climate change, the shrinking of biodiversity and 
consumption. (Godemann and Michelsen 2011, 10). It is beneficial for a corporation 
to communicate sustainability and green values to consumers and stakeholders 
because of the growing concerns over climate change. This is where green marketing 
comes in. Peattie and Charter define green marketing as a holistic approach that is 
both sustainable and profitable. It highlights global concerns and does not treat the 
environment as a means to an end (Peattie and Charter 2003, p. 727). According to 
Tinne (2013, p. 1), green marketing is the marketing of products that a consumer can 
assume are environmentally safe. By definition, green marketing has to be backed up 
by the organization’s sustainable acts. If no such acts are present, the organization 
may be guilty of greenwashing. According to Jenner, “greenwashing consists of any 
advertising, marketing or public relations actions by corporations to project an image 
of being an environmentally-minded organizations, even when their business 
practices are destructive” (2009, p. 9). Greenwashing is not a new issue, and the term 
has been used since the 1980’s to describe false claims of sustainability (Dahl 2010, 
p. 247). Green marketing and signaling sustainable values can be perceived as 
greenwashing by consumers if they feel there is a discrepancy between the 
organization’s words and its actions. 
Sustainability and corporate social responsibility on Valio’s website 
Valio highlights corporate social responsibility and sustainability on its website. The 
first picture on the website is a large banner for Valio’s promise to reduce its carbon 
footprint to zero by 2035.  Images of nature, happy looking cows ranging on sun-
dappled fields and smiling farmers are frequent.  
 There are several links to articles about sustainability on the front page. All of 
the articles state the same core mission of reducing the company’s carbon footprint to 
zero. In these articles Valio states that it is going to give up fossil fuels step by step, 
replace its plastic packaging with recycled plastic and convert fully to using soy-free 
cow fodder. They also name “accountability” as one of their core values. 
 Valio’s website has a whole section for accountability and corporate social 
responsibility. This section covers several topics ranging from animal welfare and 
sustainable milk production to transparency and wellness innovations. There is also 
an “Accountability Report” for the year 2018. This report states the goals mentioned 
earlier, and includes numbers and graphs containing information about Valio’s 
emissions and energy consumption at the end. However, the report contains very little 
concrete evidence of actions Valio has already taken in order to become more 
sustainable. 
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Conclusion 
Milk and dairy production, and meat as its byproduct, are amongst the biggest 
contributors to greenhouse emissions in Finland, causing 12% of the country's 
greenhouse emissions (Statistics Finland 2018, p. 12). Valio likes to highlight its 
greenness and accountability. On its website the company covers all the topics that 
are usually brought up when discussing sustainability of the dairy industry: animal 
welfare, use of soy in fodder and carbon and methane emissions.  
 Valio acknowledges the issues the industry faces on its website. Based on its 
sustainability goals, it seems that the company’s claims of accountability are 
somewhat backed up by its actions: giving up soy fodder is one example of those 
actions. On the other hand, it is important to take note of the fact that much of the 
company’s sustainability is still in the policy phase. Thus, for example Valio’s goal of 
being carbon neutral by 2035 is not yet backed up by any proof.  It is beneficial for 
corporations to publish environmental policies, because they can have a positive 
influence on public opinion, market share and stakeholder relations (Ramus & 
Montiel 2005, p. 378). However, if these policies aren’t realized, this type of green 
marketing can also be perceived as greenwashing, as there is no evidence backing the 
claims of sustainability. 
 If we follow the definition of greenwashing by Jenner (2009), presented 
earlier in this research paper, it is necessary to wonder whether a company like Valio 
can ever communicate its greenness without being guilty of greenwashing. When we 
consider the effects of dairy and meat production and consumption on global climate 
change, it seems like the only sustainable option is to scale back on both. As a 
business, Valio’s goal is growth. As long as this is the case, it does seem like the 
company’s claims of sustainability are just a Band-Aid on a bullet hole. 
 De Vries, Terwel, Ellemers and Dancker (2013, p. 143) state that, “regardless 
of the company’s intentions, in the end it is all about whether or not people perceive 
corporate greenwashing”. I believe this to be very important in the case of Valio. 
Even though most of the company’s sustainability goals haven’t yet been realized, the 
Finnish public seems to believe in the company's accountability: Valio has won the 
Sustainable Brand Index B2C Finland six times in a row, most recently in 2019 
(Sustainable Brand Index Official Report, 2019). It appears that the public does not 
see a conflict between Valio’s brand, actions and sustainability policy. It will be 
interesting to see if the recent negative media coverage has any impact on the 
company’s reputation and the public’s perception of its sustainability and 
accountability. 
Oatly 
In the following section I focus on a Swedish company called Oatly. I analyze the 
marketing communication on their website and focus on how they talk about 
sustainability and green values in their communication. 
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 Oatly produces oat-based products. The company’s patented enzyme 
technology copies nature’s own process. It turns oats into nutritional liquid food and 
offers an alternative for dairy based products. Oatly values sustainability as their goal 
is to offer plant-based drinks that are in tune with the needs of both humans and the 
planet (Oatly 2019a.). By offering an alternative for dairy products, Oatly also offers 
an alternative for the dairy industry, which can impact the environment in various 
ways, the scale of that impact depending on the practices of the dairy farmers and 
feed growers (WWF 2019). 
Key concepts  
With the planet facing increasingly serious environmental problems, green 
consumption and sustainability have been gaining more attention by consumers and 
companies alike. Companies develop their green marketing strategies to show their 
customers social responsibility and their good corporate image (Zhang, Li, Cao, 
Huang 2018). However, sustainability is not only related to the environment. Rather it 
is about finding some sort of balance so that Earth can support the human population 
and economic growth without ultimately threatening the health of humans, animals 
and plants. The elements that form the basis for sustainability are environment, 
economy and equality. It is argued that sustainability can be achieved by 
simultaneously protecting the environment, preserving economic growth and 
development, and promoting equality (Portney 2015). 
 Jacob Vos (2009, p. 681) introduces some of the most common forms of 
corporate greenwashing. He names environmental policy statements as a usual form 
of greenwashing. With a broad, high-minded statement proclaiming a corporation’s 
commitment to preserving the environment, the statements often make an impression 
of an environmentally friendly company. The picture the statements paint is often 
highly idealistic. The policy statements rarely include any specifics regarding the 
implementation of the policy. Without specific commitments, the statement is not 
bound to any benchmarks which might be used to measure its progress toward its 
goal.  
Generally speaking, people suspect less strategic behavior when a company 
communicates an economic motive for investing in environmental measures. Studies 
also show that companies that express firm‐serving (economic) motives are seen as 
relatively trustworthy (Zhang et al. 2018). Research has also shown that organizations 
that communicate public-serving motives are considered less honest. That in turn 
provokes less trust towards the company than towards organizations that 
communicate organization-serving motives (Terwel, Harinck, Ellemers, Daamen 
2009). 
Sustainability and environmental marketing on Oatly’s website 
Oatly claims to be “not just another company” that only sells products. Rather they 
frame the company as one with an ideology based on sustainability, health and 
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transparency (Oatly 2019a). Oatly’s marketing communication on their website is 
open-hearted, approachable and simplified. They aim is to show their social 
responsibility by saying things as they are and by being transparent in their marketing 
communication. They showcase their products with lists of the origin of all the 
ingredients as well as links to the supplier websites. The product pages also include a 
description of their product and what is environmentally good and not so good about 
them. By showing the customers the company’s commitment to social responsibility, 
they also assess their work and what could be done more sustainably.  
 Oatly promises to be a good company (Oatly 2019), but they do acknowledge 
that it is impossible to be completely good. “We are not a perfect company, not even 
close, but our intentions are true. We would like to be judged by the good we do and 
not just the pretty words we say” (Oatly 2019). This exemplifies the transparency in 
Oatly’s marketing communication. They acknowledge that green values are an 
integral part of the company and not only a marketing tool they use. But the 
company’s positions of being “green”, and the environmental measures they take 
serves their economic goals as they are a company producing plant-based goods.  
 Environmental sustainability is not only about reducing carbon emissions and 
reliance on fossil fuels. It is also about other natural resources: most notably water 
and land. (Portney 2015). Oatly highlights the carbon emissions of their products but 
doesn’t forget these other aspects of sustainability. Ways to make land usage more 
sustainable are especially discussed in their sustainability report.  
 In their marketing communication, Oatly mainly uses firm-serving rather than 
public-serving motivations. Oatly’s whole business in centered around plant-based 
products. In the recent years the global need for climate-friendly products has been 
growing rapidly (Oatly 2019b). Oatly however was founded back in the 1990s and 
has been offering these climate friendly products well before they became a global 
trend. By positioning themselves as an environmentally friendly company and 
endorsing green values, Oatly expresses firm-serving motivations as their business is 
based on offering an alternative for dairy products. 
Oatly’s sustainability report 
A closer look at Oatly’s sustainability report shows that there are concrete goals that 
the company has set for themselves. In addition to introducing these goals, the 
sustainability report also shows how the company plans to achieve them, what risks 
are involved, what their current status is in achieving each goal and where the reader 
can get further information about the subject (Oatly 2019b). By setting the goals as 
well as showing the reader what is being done to achieve those goals, Oatly 
emphasizes their commitment to their environmental policy and underlines the fact 
that the company is not only “talking the talk, but also walking the walk”.   
 Perhaps the most challenging aspect of sustainability is the “equality” element. 
The importance of equality seems to lean on the fundamental assumption that an 
unequal world is an unsustainable world. Moreover, conceptual work on sustainability 
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hasn’t made entirely clear how equality relates to the economic and environmental 
elements of sustainability (Portney 2015). In their sustainability report, Oatly mainly 
treats the subject of equality as a gender related question rather than taking a wider 
view of the subject. 
Conclusion 
Environmental values and sustainability are a core part of Oatly’s operations. The 
marketing communication on their website reflects their sustainable values by being 
transparent. Oatly heavily communicates firm-based motivations. Environment issues 
and sustainable values are an integral part of their company’s values.  
 Considering that environmental motives are probably not the only reason for 
companies to invest in environmental measures, it seems advisable from a strategic 
perspective to be reticent in claiming purely selfless motives in public 
communications in order to avoid being perceived as greenwashing (Vries, Terwel, 
Ellemers & Daamen 2015). If a company wants to market environmental values, they 
should also show what being environmentally friendly brings to the company, to 
appear more honest. Oatly’s transparency makes their marketing communication 
appear more honest. Environmental values and sustainability are not only framed as a 
central part of the company’s marketing communication but also appear integrated as 
inseparable parts of Oatly’s business model. 
Aviation 
Aviation contributes to around 2% of the world’s global carbon emissions. An 
economy-class return flight from London to New York emits an estimated 0.67 tonnes 
of CO2 per passenger, according to the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO, 2019). Flights burn fuel and produce greenhouse gases, which in turn 
contribute to global warming by releasing carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. As 
flying is becoming more and more frequent, the carbon footprint of the airline 
industry has been under tight scrutiny. 
Finnair 
Global passenger numbers have been predicted to double to 8.2 billion by 2037 
(ICAO, 2019), which would mean a rapid increase in air emissions. As environmental 
problems have entered public discussions, airline companies have been forced to 
rethink their corporate social and environmental responsibility. In this paper I focus 
on one airline company, Finnish government-controlled Finnair. 
Key concept 
As Lynes and Andrachuk state in their research “Motivations for corporate social and 
environmental responsibility: A case study of Scandinavian Airlines”, the driving 
force of what makes companies commit to social and environmental issues can be 
121
GREENWASHING 
 
unpacked into internal, sector-specific and external influences (Lynes & Andrachuk, 
2008, p. 378).  Catalysts help shape influences by acting as a medium for encouraging 
or discouraging corporate social and environmental responsibility. These catalysts 
could be for example the financial position of the firm, internal leadership within the 
firm as well as the culture the firm operates in. From an environmental point of view, 
strongly influential catalysts seem to be the culture the firm operates in (Lynes & 
Andrachuk, 2008, p. 380). 
Sustainability and the aviation industry 
The air travel industry has been moving towards a highly competitive phase, wherein 
market pressure has been lowering prices and promoting the introduction of more 
efficient and competitive products aimed to serve consumers from all economic 
backgrounds (Pilling, 2004, p. 46).  
 Airline flights within Europe are covered by the EU’s emissions trading 
system (ETS), which provides the worst emitters with an incentive to reduce their 
carbon pollution. (European union emissions trading system, 2019). Each year airline 
companies have to surrender a number of permits equivalent to the amount of carbon 
dioxide they emitted in the preceding year. Permits are acquired through an annual 
allocation system and some are issued for members for free. If polluters don’t have 
enough allowances to acquit their previous year’s emissions, they can buy additional 
permits at auctions or from other companies. The EU has put a maximum cap on the 
CO2 emissions that can be emitted by restricting the number of permits available. 
Emitters are thus provided with an incentive to reduce their emissions, because this is 
cheaper than buying scarce permits (European union emissions trading system, 2019). 
 The negative image associated with the environmental impacts of air travel 
also pushes airline companies to be more socially and environmentally responsible 
corporations. Airline companies also represent their home countries, and as flag 
carriers of the country, national airline companies have a certain responsibility to 
uphold a positive image of their country of origin (Clancy, 2001). 
Findings on Finnair’s sustainability report 
I examined Finnair’s sustainability reports, which state their motivations in corporate 
social and environmental responsibility. Finnair proclaims on its website that it is 
committed to building a more sustainable aviation industry with its stakeholders. It 
has a dedicated page dedicated to corporate responsibility, where consumers can use 
an emission calculator and get to know the company’s environmental values. It is also 
possible to offset the CO2 emissions of one’s flights or reduce them by buying biofuel 
for the aircraft.  
 In 2018 Finnair paid 11 million euros for the EU’s emissions trading system 
permits, when the company’s whole revenue was almost 3 billion euros (Yle, 
8.4.2019). At the same time Finnair was given a not-so-flattering ranking as being one 
of the biggest emissions growing airline companies in Europe. Finnair’s emissions 
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from flight operations grew by 11.9 percent in 2018 compared to the previous year, 
making its total emissions around 3.2 million tonnes of CO2. When comparing only 
the carbon dioxide emissions, Finnair is Finland’s second biggest company to impact 
global warming. 
 On its website Finnair does not mention being one of the worst CO2 emitters 
in Finland, but it does address its growing emissions. In 2018 Finnair’s jet fuel 
consumption increased by 109.6 million kilograms, approximately 11.9 percent 
compared to the previous year. Finnair explains this by traffic growth and operational 
challenges.  
 This traffic growth can be explained by the company’s new flight routes to 
Asia, that cover two thirds of the company’s carbon dioxide emissions. But this does 
not explain all of the growing emissions, since Finnair’s emissions grew also in the 
European markets. In the company’s sustainability report there is a table that breaks 
down the emissions into smaller sections and compares the 2018 emission numbers to 
those of the past three years. This table shows that in 2018 Finnair didn’t use any 
renewable jet fuel at all, even though it now encourages customers on their website to 
compensate for their flights by buying biofuel.  
 Finnair’s fuel efficiency, as in its capacity to use fuel according to payload 
weight, was 251 revenue tonne kilometers in 2018. This is slightly higher than the 
2017 figure (247.6 RTK), but less than in 2016 and 2015 (both 271.2 RTK). 
Nordic values are important in Finnair’s brand image 
In the sustainability report Finnair states, it is going to renew its fleet. According to 
Finnair, a modern fleet is going to reduce flight emissions. The introduction of these 
new technologies that involve cleaner productions and lower production costs 
underpin one of Finnair’s main motivations with respect to environmental 
commitment: financial cost-benefits of environmental management. Finnair is 
committed to achieving carbon neutral growth by 2020 and cut emissions of its flight 
operations by half by 2050 from the 2005 level.  
 Throughout the report it is possible to see the Nordic culture which Finnair as 
a company works in. References to Nordic values can be found in the text, as well as 
pictures of clean Finnish forests and winter landscapes. As Finnair is Finland’s 
national airline company, the outlook of the report and the branding of the firm go 
hand in hand with Finland’s brand image of being a clean, Nordic country that is 
proud of its forests.  
 This image that the website and the sustainability report create highlights the 
importance of the culture the firm is working in. It determines its social and 
environmental motivations; thus, the ideology of Nordic responsibility and cleanliness 
has a profound influence on Finnair’s environmental commitment. 
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Conclusions of the sustainability report 
Reading Finnair’s sustainability report it seems that the airline company is conscious 
of its responsibility as a high emission producing company. It appears it has already 
started to improve its actions towards more sustainable choices, but it is not clear 
whether an airline company can ever be sustainable and environmentally friendly. 
Flying is almost portrayed as an ecological action as customers are encouraged to 
replace their carbon footprint by buying biofuel for the aircraft. This leads to the 
question whether if biofuel is really that much of an improvement, why isn’t Finnair 
willing to switch all of the jet fuel it is using to biofuel and compensate the price on 
the flight prices? Now the choice of using biofuel is left to the customer, which 
creates the impression that the environment is only important to the company if it is 
important to the stakeholder.   
 It is also questionable whether these kinds of choices that are left to customers 
are actually doing anything for the company’s sustainability. This merely seems to 
shift the moral responsibility to the customers, without the company taking any 
responsibility of its own.  
Conclusion 
In this research paper we examined how different organizations communicate 
sustainability and corporate social responsibility on their websites. We also examined 
whether their claims of sustainability could be interpreted as believable by 
stakeholders.  
 Our main findings can be stated as following:  
 
§ There is growing concern amongst stakeholders regarding environmental 
values and sustainability issues. As studies have shown, 75 percent of 
consumers say that their purchasing decisions are influenced by a company’s 
reputation in respect to the environment.  
§ Green marketing and sustainability communication can be interpreted as 
greenwashing by stakeholders if there is a conflict between an organization’s 
words and actions. Communicating sustainability can therefore damage an 
organization’s reputation and even hinder its growth when it is not backed up 
by actions. 
§ A conflict with corporate growth can be identified in many of the cases. As 
companies grow and environmental actions are put on a pedestal, there is 
pressure to expand and develop, sometimes at the expense of greenness. 
§ As the need for environmentally friendly products is growing rapidly, 
organizations appear to be more transparent with their intentions by 
communicating their environmental values based on firm-serving motives 
rather than public-serving motives. 
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As a final thought we would like to point out the conflict of overall consumption. As 
environmental questions are constantly on the surface of communication, in both a 
corporate context and in the media, we hope to see more focus put on sustainability 
questions and consumerism. As stated earlier, holistic sustainability communication 
combined with concrete actions and evidence is considered believable by 
stakeholders. Yet, actions and responsibility must be a shared effort. 
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Abstract 
Climate change is a multi-faceted, complex phenomenon. It cannot be narrowed down 
only to the changes occurring in our natural world, as it is also a social phenomenon 
that affects societies, cultures, and politics both at the macro- and microscopic levels. 
The complexity of both physical climate change as well as its socially constructed 
aspects, combined with the urgent need for climate action, pose a great challenge for 
sustainable global climate politics and climate governance. Climate governance 
means the “mechanisms and measures aimed at steering social systems toward 
preventing, mitigating, or adapting to the risks posed by climate change” (Stripple & 
Sverker 2003, 388).  
In this paper, we aim to explore the construction of climate change as a social 
phenomenon and discuss various approaches to governing climate change, such as 
deliberative democracy, applications of game theory, discourse and algorithmic 
governance. 
Keywords: Climate change, deliberative democracy, game theory, algorithmic 
governance, imagined communities 
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1. On the construction of climate change as a social object    
— L.H. Pahta 
While climate change is a highly visible topic in the current political and societal 
debate, knowledge of the phenomenon itself is not new. The scientific basis for the 
notion of human industry influencing Earth’s climate has been understood since the 
19th century: The idea that an increased concentration of carbon dioxide has an effect 
on rising global temperatures was first proved by T. C. Chamberlin in 1896 (The 
White House, 1965). 
While the science behind climate change was firmly established by scientists 
such as Chamberlin, it took almost another century before serious governmental 
regulation to curb the fast-growing emissions was finally enacted. This had to do with 
the growing sense of urgency of the topic, caused both through advances in measuring 
increases of CO2 in the atmosphere, as well as through increased public 
understanding of the level of devastation the warming planet would bring for all 
humans. 
Rachel Carson’s Pulitzer-prize winning book Silent Spring was published in 
the year 1962 and is widely regarded as the springboard from which modern climate 
change discussion begun (The New York Times, 2012). Still, climate change emerged 
on the global environmental governance agenda only in the late 1980s as a threat 
second only to nuclear war (Bentley, 2017). Unfortunately, we are still working 
towards nations globally taking the required steps towards curbing global warming 
(D’Aprile, 2018). 
The discourse in which climate change has been handled in public discussions 
has changed during the years (Ylä-Anttila et al., 2018). What the combination of all 
the discussions on the climate during the years have established, is gradually forming 
a social object — one worth discussing on a global scale, and one on which we are all 
expected to have an opinion on. In other words, the physical phenomenon has been 
politicized. 
To help us find solutions to mitigate climate change, it helps to understand 
what this social object entails and how it is formed. This understanding gives us 
capabilities to find new ways of acting in a more sustainable manner, to form 
governance to establish common rules of conduct, and to finally effect change to curb 
global warming.  
Social objects are placeholders for patterns of activities (Searle, 1995). The 
term social object refers to objects, such as institutions, that gain their meaning 
through processes of reification. We believe money to be money through the accepted 
common and continuous use of the objects imbued with this meaning. The same thing 
can be said of climate change, as a physical phenomenon and as a social object we 
assign a function to. 
 Understanding climate change requires expert knowledge of several 
complicated systems of interdependencies. The Earth’s climate is formed through a 
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combination of natural phenomenon, which interact with each other in extremely 
complicated ways. To help form an epistemic viewpoint of the climate, we can use 
tools to measure the changes which occur and form historical series to put these 
changes in context. Through careful analysis, we can then ascertain that the yearly 
weather cycles around the world are in fact changing. Finally, through understanding 
that human industries emit carbon dioxide combined with a physical understanding of 
how particles act in a closed system, we can deduce that humans play a part in climate 
change.  
This function that we assign to climate change is non-agentive, that is, it helps 
form a theoretical account of the phenomenon in question but isn’t part of the actual 
physical phenomenon. As we live in the physical world though, it is unavoidable that 
a changing climate has an overarching effect on our lives. What is left to debate is 
how we should react to this fact. Thus, climate change enters our social reality as a 
problem to be tackled through various forms of human intervention. 
According to Downs (1973, p. 39), public debate follows a certain issue-
attention cycle, which is rooted “both in the nature of certain domestic problems and 
in the way major communications media interact with the public”. In this model, after 
the first big splash a news item makes, the reaction becomes more muted as more and 
more new topics become newsworthy. 
While the news cycle of our times is increasingly unrelenting with breaking 
news stories appearing continuously on news pages, news also has the power of 
building narratives and forming agendas for the public discussion (Scheufele 2006, p. 
9). These discussions continue and mutate in social media platforms after the news 
themselves have disappeared from feeds. This reification, continuous acting out of 
climate change as a global problem on a scale of impending doom on social media is 
what makes the phenomenon as a social object more real. It also directs more and 
more individuals towards action in some capacity in a community formed through 
climate change. 
During the past few years we have seen the rise of several social movements 
working towards pushing nations to slow down the rise of global temperatures and 
halt them at the level of 1.5 Celsius compared to 1990 levels (IPCC, 2019). These 
include Fridays for Future, and Climate Strike and Extinction Rebellion. These 
organizations have managed to gather hundreds of thousands of people on the streets 
to demand climate justice. 
In Benedict Anderson’s germinal book Imagined Communities, he speaks of 
communities being imagined into being by people who perceive themselves as part of 
a certain group (Anderson, 1983, p. 6). While Anderson’s book dealt mainly with how 
nationalism is constructed, we can see this development also in the case of climate 
change discussion, where the discussion breeds political activity and loyalties to 
movements. 
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The idea of human-based climate change allows for communities to form by 
finding various strategies towards finding solutions to stop it, bringing together 
various people, who without this idea might not have worked together. It allows for 
protesting, demanding change, finding and developing new, less energy-intensive 
ways of living, being more mindful of one’s own actions towards generating waste, 
and shaping one’s everyday life towards a more sustainable lifestyle. It is only 
through pronouncing that humans have an existential problem in the form of climate 
change, that we can begin to constitute it as a social artifact, upon which we can direct 
our actions. 
Despite the clear scientific results of humans’ effect on the climate, public 
discussions have lagged in their rhetoric. In the last 20 years, the public rhetoric 
surrounding climate change has changed from one based on mainly economic 
arguments to ecological ones (Ylä-Anttila et al, 2018). Increasingly, climate change is 
seen not as hindering economic growth, but as a prerequisite for it to be sustained in 
the future. Climate change can be seen as something that regulates more and more 
human activities, and that makes new acts of collective intentionality possible — it 
adds functions to it. If these functions begin to affect general policy, they acquire a 
normative status and become constitutive rules (Searle, 1995, p. 48). As we have an 
increasing amount of policies addressing climate change, the phenomenon is 
becoming increasingly normative. The term is utilized as a buzzword involving 
economic opportunities promoting growth, and at the same time it has been connected 
to movements aiming to limit the amount of freedom individuals have as consumers, 
such as flight tax proposals and minimalist lifestyles. These new forms of collective 
actions help enforce climate change as a social object. 
As we form a clearer global consensus on the idea that something has to be 
done to tackle climate change, this allows us to propose regulative and constitutive 
rules to guide an increasing amount of actions. These include the above-mentioned 
tax propositions, but also larger, international agreements on methods to curb global 
warming and increased CO2 emissions. These in part direct an ever increasing part of 
humans works to be involved in areas related to fighting climate change, such as in 
being employed as a manufacturer of air turbine parts, or as analysts aiming to 
optimize heavy traffic to minimize transport emissions, again further enforcing the 
social object in question. 
2. Climate change governance and deliberative democracy    
— A.M. Taskinen 
Climate change is a complex phenomenon, which causes humankind many problems 
when trying to govern it. The major problem concerning climate change governance 
is that it affects many countries and many people around the world. How can 
everyone have their voices and viewpoints heard? Some researchers think that the best 
way to treat this challenge is to use the tools of deliberative democracy (e.g. 
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Niemeyer, 2013). In this section, I will discuss the definition of deliberative 
democracy, consider the challenges and possibilities that deliberative democracy has 
in climate change governance and discuss climate change governance and deliberative 
democracy in local and international arenas. 
2.1 What is deliberative democracy? 
In Chapter 1 of The Oxford Handbook of Deliberative Democracy (2018) authors 
Bächtiger, Dryzek, Mansbridge, and Warren discuss the concept of deliberative 
democracy. At the heart of the concept lies deliberation: public discussion that helps 
people to follow public problems better (Bächtiger, Dryzek, Mansbridge & Warren, 
2018, 2). They also point out that the concept of deliberative democracy is 
aspirational, which means that it is more of an ideal to aim for (Bächtiger et al., 2018, 
2). They describe how the ideals of deliberative democracy have changed during the 
years between first-generation and second-generation thinkers (Bächtiger et al., 2018, 
3). The main differences between the two generations’ ideals concern equality, 
reasons, consensus and common good: second-generation thinkers underline 
“inclusion, mutual respect,'' “relevant considerations”, “clarifying conflict” and 
“orientation to both common good and self-interest constrained by fairness” more 
than first-generation thinkers (Bächtiger et al., 2018, 4, table 1.1). According to 
Bächtiger et al. (2018, 3), the second-generation ideals fit modern 21st-century 
deliberation better. Niemeyer (2013, 430) also points out that deliberative democracy 
must also be consequential, which means that deliberation must affect the final 
decisions. 
2.2 Climate change governance and deliberative democracy: possibilities and 
challenges 
A big problem with climate change governance is that climate change is easy to 
ignore in discussions because it can feel too complex of a phenomenon to understand 
(Niemeyer, 2013, 431). Climate change as a phenomenon can appear very blurred to 
many, so concrete actions to tackle it may even create resistance (Niemeyer, 2013, 
432). Niemeyer (2013, 433) points out that especially for regular citizens it may be 
hard to understand a vast phenomenon like climate change and demand changes from 
the political elites. And even if the demands were to be expressed, it can be hard for 
democracies to convert people’s demands to concrete actions (Niemeyer, 2013, 433). 
However, Niemeyer (2013) states that the best way to meet these challenges of 
climate change governance is deliberative democracy. According to him, these 
challenges can be solved by using the tools of deliberative democracy in public 
discourse (Niemeyer, 2013, 431). Public deliberation can help to articulate 
environmental issues and make their importance salient (Niemeyer, 2013, 434). 
Besides, Niemeyer (2013, 432, 433) also says that the democratization of climate 
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change discussion pays off because political elites are not as interested in the 
environment as people in civil society. 
Niemeyer (2013, 435) states that the main challenge for deliberative 
democracy is to have a proper discussion environment where deliberation can achieve 
something: the solution for Niemeyer is mini-publics. The study from Australian 
mini-public shows that deliberation affected what participants thought about climate 
change as well as the way they discussed climate change (Niemeyer, 2013, 441). The 
discourse changes show that participants had more consensus (still with a hint of 
diversity) and more adaptive opinions after deliberation (Niemeyer, 2013, 442; 
Hobson and Niemeyer 2011, 966).  
According to Niemeyer (2013, 442), the main benefit of deliberation in the 
study was that it helped participants have a clearer picture of the complex issues 
related to climate change. Deliberation also changed the way participants viewed 
climate change governance: after deliberation, they thought that citizens can govern 
climate change in cooperation with the government, making it feel like a more 
collective problem, not just a problem of political leaders (Niemeyer, 2013, 443, 448; 
Hobson & Niemeyer, 2011, 968). Although the study from Australian mini-public had 
some good effects on the way participants viewed climate change governance, 
Niemeyer (2013, 444) also says that it might be challenging to create the same, 
working setting for deliberation in other, larger settings. 
 So, Niemeyer’s (2013) discussion shows that even if deliberation in mini-
publics could be helpful in using deliberative democracy’s tools in climate change 
governance, the problem of adding them to larger, even international settings, 
remains. Next, I will discuss how well climate change governance fills the ideals of 
deliberative democracy at the international level and also take a look at deliberative 
democracy’s benefits and challenges at local levels. 
2.3 Climate change governance and deliberative democracy: local and 
international arenas  
Bächtiger et al. (2018, 9) also point out that deliberative democracy can take place in 
various places. Deliberative democracy’s arenas can be local or international, formal 
or informal, and may take place in governmental institutions or civil society 
(Bächtiger et al., 2018, 10-13). 
Dryzek and Stevenson (2011, 1867, 1868) evaluate the global governance of 
climate change based on the deliberative system. It includes the following parts: “the 
public space”, “empowered space”, “transmission”, “accountability”, “meta-
deliberation” and “decisiveness” (Dryzek & Stevenson, 2011, 1867, 1868). According 
to Dryzek and Stevenson (2011, 1873), there are various discourses represented in 
public space of international arenas, which is a good thing. But as for empowered 
space, there is only little deliberation and the transmission of civil society’s input to 
governmental bodies does not work as well as it could because some discourses are 
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neglected (Dryzek & Stevenson, 2011, 1873). Also, accountability, meta-deliberation, 
and decisiveness of the system do not work very well (Dryzek & Stevenson, 2011, 
1873). In another study, there are implications of non-governmental actors bringing 
alternative views to international arenas, but also observations that despite their 
participation, some views still get marginalized (Nasiritousi, Hjerpe & Buhr, 2014, 
183). So, Dryzek and Stevenson’s (2011) and Nasiritousi, Hjerpe and Buhr’s (2014) 
studies seem to underline the problem that Niemeyer (2013, 444) formulates: good 
deliberation is hard to achieve in large, real-life settings. 
Above I discussed Niemeyer’s (2013) arguments of the benefits of mini-
publics. Similarly, Romsdahl and Kirilenko (2018, 278) think that it is necessary to 
use deliberative tools in local governance levels, as well. According to Romsdahl and 
Kirilenko (2018, 284) benefits of deliberation can emerge, for example, in countries 
where there is climate change skepticism in governmental bodies: they think that 
through deliberation in civil society there is a possibility to come up with solutions to 
climate change problems. In some countries, there can also be a possibility for fruitful 
cooperation between the national government and different local actors (Romsdahl & 
Kirilenko, 2018, 284). Local deliberation can help to articulate regional climate 
problems (Romsdahl & Kirilenko, 2018, 284). Romsdahl and Kirilenko (2018, 284) 
also point out the problems regarding local deliberation: among other things, there can 
be only little interest to participate, inequality in participating and even resistance 
from different directions.  
2.4 Conclusion 
At the end of this section, I would like to reiterate the point made by Bächtiger and 
others (2018, 2): the ideals of deliberative democracy are primarily aspirational, and 
they can be hard to fulfill in real-life settings. But this does not mean that we should 
lose hope concerning deliberative democracy in climate change governance. All of the 
researchers, whose papers I have examined in this section, seem to agree on some 
level that deliberative democracy is worth chasing in climate change governance, both 
at the local and international levels. Of course, they have justifiably pointed out 
various problems and challenges of deliberative democracy in climate change 
governance — but it is certainly worth aiming for better practices in climate change 
governance and trying to achieve the ideals of deliberative democracy as well as 
possible. 
3 Transnational climate change governance: why won’t we 
cooperate? Perspectives from game theory — R.M. Savo 
Climate change is a transnational problem which needs the cooperation of multiple 
countries, making the problem difficult to solve. All countries want to hold on to their 
autonomy and decide for themselves, and attempts to create a global plan to stop 
climate change have not been successful in the past. There is a need for a theory that 
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would help countries plan strategic actions to cut down emissions globally. One 
useful perspective in solving this cooperation issue is a theory that is often used in 
social and political sciences: game theory.  
3.1 Prisoner’s dilemma and the collective good 
Game theory helps to explain strategic behavior of rational individuals with the help 
of mathematics (Wood, 2011, 153). It allows us to understand the clash of individual 
and collective action in global governance of climate change. Researchers have 
argued that the reason why it is so hard to find a solution for climate change is that 
there is a strong incentive to “free-ride”, meaning that one country will not cut down 
their pollution rates while others do (Wood, 2011, 153; DeCanio & Fremstad, 2013, 
180). According to game theory, this problem arises from the fact that what is best for 
an individual country is not the same as what is best for all the countries collectively 
(Wood, 2011, 153). This idea was first put forward by Garret Hardin in 1968, and it 
has been known as “the tragedy of the commons” in environmental science: in a 
world of shared resources individuals act on their self-interest and end up spoiling the 
common good.  
 A classic example of game theory is the Prisoner’s dilemma. There are two 
people who have committed a crime and they are being interviewed separately. Their 
sentence depends on what information they share. If they both say they didn’t do it, 
they both serve 1 year. If they say that the other person did it, they can avoid prison 
but the other person will get a 10 year sentence. However, if they both blame the other 
person, they will both go to jail for 5 years.  
 The issue in Prisoner’s dilemma is that what is best for the individual is not 
the same as what is best collectively. The best option would be for both of them to 
stay silent and collectively serve 2 years. But no matter what each person will do, it is 
best for both individuals to say that the other person committed the crime (Amadae, 
2016, 28). Game theorists often come to the conclusion that in the end everyone will 
tell on the other person, because it is the only way to be sure that you get a good 
outcome (Amadae, 2016, 29; Wood, 2011, 155; DeCanio & Fremstand, 2013, 180). 
This solution, where it’s not possible for one actor to get a better end result by 
changing their own behavior, is called the Nash equilibrium (DeCanio & Fremstand, 
2013, 179). However, many times the best solution needs cooperation. Cooperation, 
on the other hand, needs communication and an agreement between the parties 
involved (Wood, 2011, 156-157). 
  The Prisoner’s dilemma is a classic example of two people making decisions 
that affect both of them, but it has also been used to understand political actions and 
the world (Amadae, 2016, 25). With climate change all the countries would be better 
off if they cooperated and created a plan that everyone promised to follow (Amadae, 
2016, 231). However, there are multiple reasons why that is not happening.  
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 First, there is a constant competition over economic and political power, and if 
one country starts cutting down pollution, it becomes less productive than others 
(DeCanio & Framsted, 2013, 182). Thus, as long as there is no binding agreement, it 
is better for an individual country to keep polluting, as in the Prisoner’s dilemma 
(Wood, 2011, 155). Second, global politics is much more complicated than the 
Prisoner’s dilemma: it involves different cultures and values as well as complex 
power structures. DeCanio and Fremstand (2013, 183) speak of “different moral 
universes”, pointing out that developing countries and developed countries are in very 
different positions when it comes to climate change.  
Third, there are “superpowers”, such as the United States and China, which 
have much more influence over climate change, but which are more interested in 
keeping their power than saving the planet. It’s possible that the heads of leading 
countries have not understood or accepted the seriousness of climate change 
(DeCanio and Fremstand, 2013, 182). In the end there is the same Nash equilibrium 
as with the Prisoner’s dilemma: what is best for an individual country is always to 
keep polluting, because no matter what other the other countries are doing, everyone 
wants to win (Amadae, 2016, 231). 
3.2 How can we increase cooperation? 
Wood (2011, 160) suggests multiple ways to increase cooperation between actors in 
this environmental dilemma. Countries would be more likely to cooperate if there 
were a binding contract, as long as those countries that would not obey would get 
punishments. Because economics are of high priority, there could be trade and 
taxation contracts to give benefits to those countries that follow the rules. In addition, 
if the situation is repeated, it is more likely that actors will cooperate. The problem 
with climate change is that on one hand it is a repeated game, because it is repeatedly 
negotiated. On the other hand, it is not a repeated game but an ongoing process of 
increasing emissions, which affect future generations (Wood, 2011, 160). 
Amadae (2016) cites the Stern Review, which has suggested steps to increase 
cooperation in collective action. She suggests that incentives should be changed so 
that committing to an agreement would result in something positive. For example, the 
country’s reputation would improve as a result of joining. In addition, there should be 
more repeated interactions between parties to increase trust, and those that don’t 
cooperate should be punished. Lastly, there should be a possibility to renegotiate 
agreements. (The Stern Review, here Amadae, 2016, 227) 
DeCanio and Fremstad (2013) try to look at the issues from another point of 
view: how can we implement a strategy that would lead to the Nash equilibrium when 
all countries cut down pollution? They argue that the Prisoner’s dilemma is not the 
best way to look at the climate debate. Battling climate change should be a 
Coordination Game where the best end result for all the parties is when they 
cooperate. If climate change is seen as a threat to the survival of humankind, it is 
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undeniable that working together to save the planet is the best option. However, if it 
all comes down to winning the geopolitical race, modeled as Prisoner’s dilemma, it’s 
always best to keep on polluting (DeCanio and Fremstad, 2013, 182). 
What seems to be the underlying issues preventing transnational agreement are 
the ignorance of the seriousness of climate change, the varying “moral universes” as 
DeCanio and Fremstad argue, as well as the constant battle to “win” the economic and 
political global game. Game theory offers actions to take in order to increase 
cooperation between countries, most importantly making it beneficial to join an 
international climate agreement and adding the amount of communication between 
the parties involved. Because countries are most interested in maintaining economic 
power, economic incentives, such as taxation towards polluting countries, would 
make an agreement seem more attractive to countries. 
4 The approach to advance the collective intelligibility of climate 
change: the possibility of melding two discourses in news reports  
— D. Huo 
Journalism has been a source for information for hundreds of years. As an important 
institution, it could add vital dimensions to discussions about the complex 
phenomenon of climate change. 
4.1 Journalism as a main vessel of disseminating information 
Agenda setting is a theory introduced by Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw in a 
seminal study conducted during the 1968 elections in the United States. At first, it 
showed how editors, newsroom staff, and broadcasters influence public opinion and 
shape political reality (McCombs & Shaw, 1972). Nowadays it has expanded to 
include several other aspects beyond the transfer of salience of issues from the media 
agenda to the public community (Valenzuela, 2019).  
In recent decades, mass media, responsible as they are for information in all 
areas, have taken it upon themselves to provide information with ever increasing 
intensity on scientific progress. The social representation of scientific knowledge is 
actually derived in large part from the news media, which can be seen in climate 
change reporting. At the heart of climate change is the proposition that human 
activities are altering the composition of the planet’s atmosphere to a degree sufficient 
to affect the natural processes that play fundamental roles in shaping the global 
climate (Trumbo, 1996, 270). And climate change has gone from a vague 
environmental concern several decades ago to a confirmed global phenomenon that is 
today affecting virtually every aspect of our society — our economy, security, health, 
livelihoods, food supply and our politics — and as such it has become ever more ripe 
for investigation (Fahn, 2019). Since the public garners knowledge about science 
from the mass media (cf. Nelkin & Elias, 1996; Wilson, 1995), investigating the 
portrayal of climate change resulting in collective intelligibility is crucial. As a main 
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resource for the public, journalism plays a vital role in disseminating information 
about climate change, attracting increasingly more attention from the public and 
developing collective intelligibility of the complex challenge it poses.  
4.2 The gap between popular discourse and scientific discourse 
A discourse can be understood as a set of categories and concepts, which enables the 
mind to process sensory inputs into coherent accounts, which can then be shared in 
intersubjectively meaningful fashion (Dryzek & Niemeyer, 2008, 481). Van Dijk 
(1993) argues that there is some relevance of a socio-cognitive interface between 
discourse and dominance, which is based on underlying historical, social, political and 
cultural properties. According to agenda setting theory, it seems easy to conclude that 
the more climate change is mentioned in reports, the more the public would pay 
attention to it, but whether the reports are working as they are supposed to is open to 
query. As there is a gap between science and society, the communication of scientific 
knowledge is different to the general public. In comparison to popular discourse, 
scientific discourse is an encoded form of knowledge that requires translation in order 
to be understood (Ungar, 2000, 298). Some people believe that with the dissemination 
of scientific articles, the gap between the realistic situation and public knowledge 
would narrow, and finally help to deal with climate change (Schoenfeld, Meier & 
Griffin, 1979). This shows journalism’s mission, exploring facets of the discourse 
characteristically used to present scientific knowledge to the general public and 
explaining opaque concepts and theories to us.  
Some former research from four corners of the globe also demonstrates the 
problem (cf. Boykoff & Boykoff, 2004; Takahashi, 2011; Dunwoody & Peters, 2016; 
Chen, Ghosh, Liu & Zhao, 2019). This research shows that the coverage of global 
warming has contributed to a significant divergence of popular discourse from 
scientific discourse. Reichel (2018) is a journalist who also listed some issues in 
today’s coverage of climate change. For instance, reporters may focus on subjects that 
make it hard for readers to relate. It is no doubt that such journalistic norms would 
lead to negative outcomes. Such reports might not work for improving the audience's 
understanding. But further, without specifically constitutive rules, for instance, that 
the core of climate change reports is to be understood by the majority of the audience, 
a lack of basic collective intelligibility could result, thus evoking insufficient 
consensual coordination of social practices. 
4.3 How could news coverage help to govern climate change? 
When we are talking about climate change, the core idea is that we should have a 
picture of what it is, so the first mission of the news is to tell the audience what is 
happening with our planet. In other words, journalism should help the public by 
encoding information. And it is obvious that the coverage should take the 
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responsibility to promote the formation of collective intelligibility by bridging popular 
and scientific discourse.  
For melding such two discourses, journalism might need to review their 
professional norms and consider changes happening in the economy, technology and 
our society. It would be necessary to talk about the relationship between journalistic 
norms and communications strategy. There is no doubt that professional norms play a 
vital role. Basing the news on such rules, we could get fair and informative coverage. 
But qualified reports need to be understood by the public, especially for climate 
change coverage, and journalism should adjust the relationship between meaning and 
strategies. 
Paying attention to audience-centered communication might be a practical 
method, with its emphasis on “the meeting place between scientific discourse and 
common readers” (cf, Allen, 1992). Firstly, the translation of climate change into 
concrete and relevant terms of daily life is an operational attempt. This is achieved 
with various patterns via a connection to the recipients’ everyday experiences and 
perceptions (Weingart et al., 2000). For instance, editors can expand climate change 
coverage beyond the science desk. As an example, the energy consumed in 
transportation is a great daily angle to introduce climate change and simultaneously 
provide simple tips for readers. Moreover, finding individual characters to tell their 
stories is also practical. Asking employees and professors to tell their stories might 
help the audience to understand the message. Secondly, journalism could take 
advantage of technology. The new scenario of the digital technologies could 
reconsider on a new basis the theme of a complex real structure. Visual presentation 
might open up avenues for scientific news, especially in our current digital era. 
According to the research done by Usher (2016), journalism shows the trend of using 
online databases, and data interactives and visualizations, which might lead to 
possibilities of investigating the way to improving understanding of scientific 
discourse. Moreover, the development is actually a novel form of interactive 
storytelling (Royal, 2012, 20; Usher, 2016), which might create a bridge between the 
public and science. Automated journalism might also help, fitting different people’s 
education, occupations and other social conditions to help the public understand 
climate change better.  
Overall, journalism is supposed to find a balance between the obscure 
scientific articles and public awareness, which is essential to achieve collective 
intelligibility and to facilitate climate change governance. Journalism could help 
audiences become aware of the relevance of climate change to their own behavior, as 
well as of the immediacy of climate change as a global environmental problem. Media 
coverage should lead to more understanding and discussion, and facilitate climate 
protection efforts. 
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5. Algorithmic governance — A solution to the climate crisis?  
    — R.M. Kontiokari 
As previous chapters have shown, climate change should be understood as a number 
of complex physical and social phenomena and hence it is challenging to govern. 
Excluding a few loosely binding contracts, such as the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris 
Agreement, there is still a lack of a transnational authority that would be responsible 
for governing climate issues and coordinating global climate action (e.g., Bulkeley 
2016).  
There is an urgent need for global operations to reduce emissions and mitigate 
the already-present adverse effects of global warming; however, the structures 
upholding the unsustainable system are so deeply integrated into the global political 
economy, that even the establishment of large-scale measures against climate change 
has been proven to be extremely difficult (e.g. Stevenson & Dryzek, 2014).  
Artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) have proven to be 
useful tools for mitigating pollution and adverse climate effects on a local scale (e.g., 
Rolnick et al., 2019) However, involving AI and algorithmic decision-making in 
broader climate governance to create comprehensive guidelines and solutions for 
global climate action is still a relatively new concept. Therefore, in this chapter, my 
aim is to explore the potential that algorithmic governance, or algocracy, has for the 
fight against climate change. First, I will begin with a brief overview of the current 
state of climate governance and its main problems; second, continue to explain the 
concept of algorithmic governance; third, explore the idea of algorithmic decision-
making as the basis for global climate governance; and last, finish with a short 
conclusion. 
5.1 Global climate governance and the authoritarian temptation 
Although there has been scientific proof of anthropogenic climate change since the 
late 19th century, there is little to no global governance of the issue (Stevenson & 
Dryzek, 2014, 2). Much of the problems in global climate governance are rooted in 
the current global system stressing national sovereignty, which seems to be “poorly 
equipped” to match the urgency and magnitude that is required for sustainable and 
effective climate action (Stevenson & Dryzek, 2014, 4). Nation-states seem to be 
incapable of reaching the consensus on what should be done; who should we listen to; 
who is responsible; and on top of it all, whether the changes in the climate are even 
caused by human action (Turnheim, Kivimaa & Berkhout, 2018). 
Due to this hindrance, there have been calls for authoritative climate 
governance that would overrule national democracies and their sovereignty, parallel 
to Lovelock’s Gaia Hypothesis (Stevenson & Dryzek, 5). However, the issue with 
such initiatives is that there is no global body or democracy that could be overruled or 
“put on hold”; in other words, global climate governance cannot be realized, as it yet 
needs to be established (Stevenson & Dryzek, 5). 
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Another issue with the idea of authoritarian climate government is that it 
perceives climate change as a problem that needs to be solved. However, considering 
how deeply anthropogenic climate change is, integrated with societies and human 
action, it should be seen as a condition that inevitably comes with “our sociomaterial 
order and domain” (Bulkeley 2016, 167). Therefore, a more sustainable approach to 
governing climate change would be to perceive climate governance as an “ever-
expanding activity” that increasingly involves more and more diverse elements of 
humanity and society, aiming collectively towards more sustainable societies 
(Bulkeley, 2016, 155). As stated in chapter one of this paper, such activities do 
already exist on a smaller scale; we have climate strikes, recycling initiatives, 
different environmental taxes, and education on less energy-intensive ways of living. 
What is lacking is a global climate authority that would set the rules and regulations 
that different actors should and would be willing to follow. 
5.2 Algorithmic governance 
Recent rapid changes in our technological and communicative environments have 
increased the amount of computable data significantly, and consequently created 
possibilities to aggregate knowledge and solutions through different AI applications. 
Algorithms are capable of processing massive amounts of data and producing 
solutions much faster than humans. Thus, there has been “growing willingness” to 
include algorithm-based decision-making systems into democratic governance of 
societies (Danaher et al., 2017, 2). 
Governance, by itself, refers to institutional steering that includes “horizontal 
and vertical extension of traditional government” (Latzer & Festic, 2019); in other 
words, a combination of all the processes of governing. Governance is not limited 
only to rules and regulations by national governments but can also be understood as 
rules and norms in different social systems. 
Algorithmic governance, in turn, refers to both the involvement of algorithmic 
decision-making processes in governance, and the “intentional and unintentional 
steering effects” that “uphold selection systems” in our technological arenas (Latzer 
& Festic, 2019). The term also includes the “intentional attempts to manage risk or 
alter behavior in order to achieve pre-specified goals” (Yeung, 2018, 3). Therefore, 
algorithmic governance should also be separated from a total authoritarian algocracy, 
a society that would be fully governed by some mysterious “master algorithm” that is 
autonomous from human action and capable of making just decisions for all of 
humankind (Danaher et al., 2017). In fact, it would be foolish to assume that 
algorithms would be capable of such autonomy, as it is nearly impossible to create an 
algorithm free from human impact in a human environment. As long as algorithms are 
systems constructed by humans, they will carry biases from the environments they 
were created in. There are also issues with the opacity of algorithms, their reliability, 
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and compatibility with current governing systems, that makes the idea of an 
autonomous master algorithm rather undesirable (Danaher et al., 2017). 
5.3 Algorithms as guidelines for climate governance 
One of the primary issues with involving algorithms in climate governance is 
overcoming the “risk of meaningless machines” (Latzer & Festic, 2019). An 
algorithm can surely produce a great number of solutions to how humankind could 
reduce carbon emissions and decrease overall pollution, but how can we be sure that 
such solutions would be socially sustainable, and executable in realistic socio-
technological contexts? For instance, an essay was recently published in The 
Economist on tackling climate change that was written by an algorithm (The 
Economist, 2019). It was appreciated for its clarity and reliability, but criticized for 
the vagueness of its solutions, such as “alternative economy”. The solutions produced 
by the algorithm did not differ much from solutions made by climate experts, and thus 
this experiment hints that AI may not be capable of solving climate change on its own 
or serving as a guiding, governing authority on a global scale. 
However, if we comprehend climate change as a permanent condition and its 
governance as a number of ever-expanding activities (Bulkeley, 2016), AI might have 
its benefits. As there is proof that AI can successfully help in reducing pollution or 
mitigating its adverse effects locally (Rolnick et al., 2019, 2), it is not far-fetched to 
suggest that a number of AI solutions could be helpful in the construction of global 
climate governance. For instance, AI could be used to create a roadmap on how 
different human actions actually affect the climate and what kind of effects the 
changing climate has on current human activities. This group of solutions would 
ultimately form a guideline representing climate realities that societies could refer to 
in deliberative democracies. Therefore, these AI implementations should not only 
exist on a global scale, but also vertically at different levels of regulation. 
The tentative suggestion above, however, is yet superficial and flawed. Some 
considerations that should be made are whether the mentioned set of AI solutions 
would actually be mutually compatible and comprehensible; if the suggestions 
produced on different levels are contradictory, then AI does not bring much value into 
climate governance. In addition, the biases and power structures related to the creation 
and implementation of AI should be taken into serious consideration. 
5.4 Conclusion 
In conclusion, there are many benefits of implementing algorithmic decision-making 
into global climate governance. Global climate governance would be most effective as 
a system that considers climate change as an all-encompassing condition that needs 
constant assessment in all domains and practices of societies. However, many 
practical issues remain around implementing algorithms, such as accountability, 
accessibility, and property rights issues.  
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Conclusion 
In this research paper we considered the challenges and possibilities of governing 
climate change from various viewpoints. Climate change has become a social 
phenomenon, which demands all humans and countries to take a stance. The big 
challenge with governing climate change is the vast pool of complex information 
circulating and the amount of different actors involved. There is a need for a shared 
understanding of the social reality of climate change: the economic discourse needs to 
move to an idea about a common world that we have to protect. 
Game theory points out that finding a common path with climate change is 
difficult, because there is a great temptation to “free ride”. Because individual 
countries look for their own self-interest, we have to create a climate agreement that is 
attractive, and the best option for all countries. Countries will not join any agreement 
“just to save the world”. Governments have a big responsibility in governing, but 
citizens can affect governance by means of deliberative democracy. When citizens 
take part in public discussions and cooperate with governments, there is hope for a 
better understanding of the issues at hand and action to be taken. 
Publics gets much of their knowledge of climate change from different media, 
and journalism is a central actor in translating and conveying complex scientific 
information to the public. By expanding climate change coverage outside the science 
desk and using new technologies such as interactive storytelling, journalism could 
enhance the discussion around climate change. One future hope is the use of 
algorithmic governance to help humans cope with the masses of information and 
actions. With the help of algorithms, we could create a more comprehensive plan for 
climate change — one that encompasses all human activities and creates a more 
sustainable way of life across nations.  
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Abstract 
Technological development is often associated with a possibility of emancipation and 
freedom for individuals. How can new advancements of mobility, such as ride-hailing 
technologies in the form of mobile applications liberate women in developing 
countries? In this research project, we dive deep into the emancipatory effect of Uber 
and other similar applications. We are introducing two case studies: one from the 
perspective of female drivers, and another one from the passengers of ride-hailing 
apps. We are going to approach this discussion from a perspective that combines 
feminist technoscience and viewpoints of value-sensitive design method. We 
conclude with policy recommendations, where we evaluate our findings according to 
the Principles of Digital Development. We find that ride-hailing apps have some 
emancipatory effects, but more research is needed before further conclusions. We 
suggest that ethically sustainable ride-hailing services in the Global South must study 
the users and the ecosystem and build on already existing technologies. 
 
Keywords:  Feminist technoscience; technology; mobility; emancipation; ride-hailing 
apps, Uber, Lyft, STS, science and technology studies 
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In the 21st century, mobility has become more and more accessible as moving from 
one place to another is now possible by using smartphone applications. Applications 
such as Uber and Lyft have quickly been able to establish their place as everyday 
tools for many people. Even with their positive effect on mobility, these kinds of 
applications have gained some negative press in recent years (e.g. The Guardian, 19 
June 2019). For this research project, we wanted to focus on what emancipatory 
effects ride-hailing applications might have for women in countries where their 
mobility has traditionally been more limited. 
 Our main focus here are women in the Global South1. However, Western data 
is also partially used because some of the data can only be found in an occidental 
context. From the perspective of female drivers on ride-hailing apps, we are focusing 
on women as drivers in general, and for female passengers, we are focusing on 
women travelling in India, Mexico and South Africa. We consider this somewhat 
ambivalent use of context and data to be justified.  This is because our focus is on the 
political design problems related to the ride-hailing apps (which can be context 
bound) and to a lesser degree on research about the Global South. Focus on the 
Global South is used specifically to highlight context and North-South power 
differential and related challenges.  
We assume that ride-hailing apps have had manifold and contradicting effects for 
female emancipation. This is because during the design process, the developers have 
not been able to imagine all the possible problems related to the use of their products 
— the developers might not even be interested in taking these into account. Some of 
the shortcomings may stem from the fact that the apps were originally developed to 
serve a particular purpose in a particular environment, but through temporal and 
spatial change, new challenges have arisen.  
In the following section Keinonen establishes our theoretical framework 
which combines feminist technoscience and value-sensitive design approach (VSD). 
In the third section Lappalainen discusses the relationship between mobility and 
female emancipation. Then we move on to our case studies from two different 
perspectives: Annala analyzes ride-hailing apps from the driver's perspective and in 
turn Ilmonen takes the angle of the passenger. In the sixth section Helojärvi uses the 
results of the previous sections to make policy recommendations according to the 
framework of Value-Sensitive Design and the Principles of Digital Development2. We 
end our research paper with conclusions. 
                                               
 
1  We are using both the terms Global South and developing countries, but we find the term 
Global South more appropriate. At the present day, the Global South is generally thought to 
be a more suitable term for describing non-western or non-developed countries. It should be 
noted that the term Global South does not necessarily refer geographically to the south part of 
the globe: most people living in the Global South actually live in the Northern hemisphere 
(Hollington, Salverda, Schwartz & Teppe, 2015). 
2  Principles of Digital Development are widely used international principles for designing 
digital technologies to the contexts of developing countries. They were created by a broad 
group of NGOs and IGOs. More information at https://digitalprinciples.org/about/ 
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Theoretical framework: feminist technoscience and value-sensitive design 
approach 
Our theoretical base here is twofold. It combines perspectives from feminist 
technology studies and value-sensitive design approach.  The former is used to 
analyze the results of case studies whereas the latter is mostly used to make policy 
recommendations. We will start by explicating the core ideas of feminist technology 
studies and feminist technoscience. We then move on to define our value-sensitive 
design approach. In the third section of this research paper, we will apply this general 
theoretical framework to mobility-related female emancipation. 
Feminist technoscience 
Feminist technoscience is a critical interdisciplinary academic field of research 
(Åsberg & Lykke, 2010) that is interested in the ways gender and technology are 
mutually shaped (Wajcman, 2010). It is an academic stand supported by such 
researches as Judy Wajcman and Donna Haraway. Feminist technoscience (from here 
on FTS) is a feminist approach to science and technology studies (STS). The term 
technoscience is meant to be used to criticize the positivist distinction between 
scientific theories and their applications. Amongst researches of FTS and STS, it is 
seen that “pure and basic” science is tangled with societal interests (Åsberg & Lykke, 
2010, p. 299).  
 Current feminist technology studies focus on the mutual shaping of 
technology and gender and conceptualize technology to be both a source and 
consequence of gender relations. These theories try to avoid determinism and gender 
essentialism and emphasize that “gender-technology relationship is fluid and situated” 
(Wajcman, 2010, p. 143). They highlight “how processes of technical change can 
influence gender power relations”. The solution for gender equality in technology lies 
in a feminist view of technology policy (Wajcman, 2010, p. 143). We subscribe here 
to contemporary notions of feminist technoscience, but a few important points should 
be noted about the development of feminist theories of technology. 
 Initial feminist perspectives on technology were raised to criticize the 
masculinity of technology and the formation of engineering as a white and male 
middle-class profession which ruled out women and other groups. It is seen that “the 
hegemonic form of masculinity is still strongly associated with technical prowess and 
power” in Western society (Wajcman, 2010, pp. 143-145). This hegemonic position is 
built for instance through different childhood exposures to technology, the existence 
of different gender roles and by the segregation of job markets (Wajcman, 2010). 
Wajcman states that the marginalization of women from the technological community 
has had and keeps having a thorough influence on design, technical content and use of 
artefacts (Wajcman, 2010). 
 Subsequently in FTS the social factors shaping different technologies came 
under scrutiny. This especially happened from the point of view of how technology 
reflects gender divisions and inequalities in general, and how gender is embedded in 
technology itself (Wajcman, 2010). One can uncover different strands from this era of 
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feminist STS, such as liberal feminism, radical feminism and socialist feminism. 
These stands have been criticized to be too pessimistic and too dismissal about 
women’s agency as they emphasized “the proclivity of technological developments to 
entrench gender hierarchies” instead of their possibilities to yield change (Wajcman, 
2010, pp. 146–147). 
 Contemporary approaches are more optimistic about the possibilities of ICTs 
to empower women and modify gender relations. Some cyberfeminists for example 
point out that digital technologies can blur the lines between humans and machines as 
well as male and female, making it possible to choose new identities and elect their 
disguises. These new digital technologies are based on different assumptions than 
industrial technologies. The internet and cyberspace are seen to be feminine media, 
possibly providing a basis for a new form of society which could be liberating for 
women. Things such as reproductive technology are fundamentally confronting more 
“traditional notions of gender reality” (Wajcman, 2010, pp. 147–148). 
According to Wajcman, developments in digital technology call for a 
rethinking “of the processes of technological innovation and their impact on the 
culture and practices everyday life” amongst contemporary approaches (Wajcman, 
2009, p. 148). For example, Donna Haraway elaborates a new feminist ‘imaginary’ 
which differs from the ‘material reality’ of the status quo technological order. 
Wajcman states that “to move forward, we need to understand that technology as such 
is neither inherently patriarchal nor unambiguously liberating” (Wajcman, 2010, p. 
148). 
 FTS shares the idea that “technological innovation is itself shaped by the 
social circumstances within which it takes place” (Wajcman, 2010, pp. 148-149)3. 
Technology is treated as a sociotechnical product and as a “seamless web or network 
combining artefacts, people, organizations, cultural meanings and knowledge” 
(Wajcman, 2010, p. 149). A social constructivist framework is widely adopted 
amongst feminist STS scholars (Åsberg & Lykke, 2010; Wajcman, 2010) and 
following from this, “the gendering of technologies can then be understood as not 
only shaped in design, but also shaped or reconfigured at the multiple points of 
consumption and use” (Wajcman, 2010, p. 149). It follows that “gendered 
conceptions of users are fluid, and that the same artefact is subject to a variety of 
interpretations and meanings” (Wajcman, 2010, p. 150). 
Value-sensitive design approach 
Value-sensitive design approach is an engineering methodology to integrate ethics, 
ethical responsibility and human values into the design of technology (Cummings, 
2006; Friedman, Kahn & Borning, 2002). Value-sensitive design (VSD) is essentially 
                                               
 
3 Likewise, the concept of gender itself is also understood as “a performance or social 
achievement, constructed in interaction”; gender identities are shaped with the technology in 
the making, meaning that both gender and technology are product of moving relational 
process, emerging from collective and individual acts of interpretation” (Wajcman, 2010, 
150). 
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a formalized scheme of technological design and engineering. It is a structured 
approach to incorporate human values and ethical concerns into the design process. Its 
design phases are similar to the typical system engineering approaches (Cummings, 
2006). 
 VSD draws on moral epistemology and accounts for human values in the 
design process though a repetitive three-part design approach which takes conceptual, 
empirical and technical issues into consideration. VSD focuses on “broad, widely-
held human values such as well-being, welfare and human rights”, as opposed to the 
more personal values of individuals (Cummings, 2006, p. 702; Friedman et al., 2002, 
p. 1). 
VSD emphasizes how technology shapes society and is being shaped by social 
factors. For this, technology cannot be made in a value vacuum as sociotechnical 
systems have intertwined with human-technology-interactions. There are twelve 
specific human values of ethical importance taken in consideration in the design 
process, such as human welfare, privacy, and environmental sustainability 
(Cummings, 2006.). These selected values are not independent or exclusive. 
The conceptual investigation centers on the question of “how the relevant 
human values are either supported or diminished by a particular design” (Cummings, 
2006, p. 702). It does not only contemplate those human values which could be 
supported or diminished by the particular technology. It also considers how “the 
technology could both socially benefit and negatively impact stakeholders”; 
potentially affected stakeholders should be considered both directly and indirectly 
(Cummings, 2006, p. 703; Friedman et al., 2002, p. 3). Often, especially indirect 
stakeholders — those affected by the system but not directly using them — are 
ignored in the design process (Friedman et al., 2002, 3). 
The second phase is an empirical investigation that focuses on qualitative and 
quantitative measurements. The goal is to evaluate the design from a technical and 
value assessment approach. The most important consideration is what kind of effects 
design trade-offs have on “perceptions, behaviours and prioritization of competing 
values” and how the designer can contribute to or diminish value conflict (Cummings, 
2006, p. 703). According to Friedman et al., “empirical investigations encompass any 
human activity that can be observed, measured, or documented” so the whole 
selection of “quantitative and qualitative methods used in social science research may 
be applicable here” (Friedman et al., 2002, p. 3).  
The third step is to investigate technical issues. Different technical designs are 
analysed to determine how they can support particular values and in which ways the 
values identified in the conceptual phase can be supported in the most desirable way 
by different design possibilities. The difference between empirical and technical 
investigations is that the empirical investigation focuses on human-technology 
interaction whereas technical investigation is concerned with the technology itself 
(Cummings, 2006; Friedman et al., 2002). 
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Conclusion 
It should be noted that our way of applying value-sensitive design methodology might 
differ from the usual approach. This is especially the case in the sense that we are 
going to use it to analyse already-in-use-technologies to make general policy 
recommendations on the design process of ride-hailing apps. We argue that this is a 
useful approach when analysing the challenges related to mobility technologies and 
their consequences on human values such as female emancipation. 
A second consideration is that we do not have direct knowledge or data about 
the design processes of these apps, and that is not really even our interest here. We are 
more interested in how these apps have been successful or unsuccessful in 
incorporating the values of VSD from an outside perspective. Has Uber been able to 
fulfil the values of trust, human welfare and privacy? Has Lyft worked for or against 
human rights? Are these ride hailing apps designed in ways that emancipate women? 
Contemporary development of mobility technologies and their 
potential emancipatory effect  
Mobility, as in the ability to move freely, is an essential factor of emancipation. What 
is meant by emancipation here is the process of being set free from legal, social, or 
political restrictions. Mobility provides access to essential activities and enables 
people to “appropriate” their right to the city (Levy, 2013, p. 47). A moderate amount 
has been written about mobility from a gender perspective (see for example Riverson, 
Kunieda, Roberts, Lewi & Walker, 2005; World Bank, 2010). However, with the 
emergence of new technologies that may enhance mobility, a new area of research 
remains to be uncovered. In this section we aim to map out potential ways in which 
new mobility technologies could have emancipatory effects. 
Mobility and gender 
Opportunities for mobility within and between cities relies strongly on transport 
systems. As transport systems are often planned primarily according to the travel 
needs of men (World Bank, 2010), women tend to have higher mobility 
constraints.  Mobility and gender have a bilateral relationship: while mobility 
constraints clearly affect gender equality and the life opportunities of women, existing 
gender inequalities also have an effect on how transport is planned. According to the 
European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE) (2016), transport and gender 
inequality intertwine and show in the following ways: 
• access gaps to transport infrastructure and services 
• segregation in transport labour market 
• gender-based violence in transport 
• weak representation of women in the decision-making processes in the 
transport sector  
Women’s mobility constraints are multiplied by the effect of social and cultural 
norms and practices. According to UNESCO, restrictions on women’s mobility and 
access to public spaces can include limitations on the purpose and timing of their 
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travel and controls of place, companions and their way of dressing (UNESCO, 2011). 
Women also tend to have a multifaceted role as workers, household managers and 
community managers, which often leads to so called time poverty (Venter, Vokolkova 
& Jaroslav, 2006). This gendered pattern of time-use is a clear hindrance to female 
emancipation, and it is enforced by the mobility constraints mentioned above. Studies 
have shown that gendered time poverty could be reduced with improved transport 
infrastructure (Asian Development Bank, 2015). 
Mobility enhancement through technologies? 
Modern information technologies have enabled the emergence of a new kind of on-
demand car services. Most of these new services function in the form of mobile 
applications that will from now on be called ride-hailing apps or services. Examples 
of such applications include Uber, Lyft and Ola. These services typically have 
improved productivity compared to traditional taxi services, mostly due to a more 
efficient technology to match the customer and the driver, and technologies that allow 
dynamic pricing (Rodrigue, 2017). The growth of ride-hailing services has also 
changed the ownership system of vehicles towards a leasing system, and increased the 
supply of driving services to meet the demand (ibid).  
While ride-hailing apps have had a significant impact on the transportation 
industry for both its workers and customers, they also have implications for other 
sectors such as car manufacturers, insurance companies and telecommunication 
companies (Eisenmauer, 2018). The latter introduces an interesting thread of thought, 
since the quick emergence and growth of ride-hailing services has produced an 
unprecedented amount of passenger (and driver) data. So far, the data has mostly been 
used by the companies themselves to predict customer behaviour and improve 
customer experience. However, data collected by private companies can also be used 
to create and share knowledge on social issues such as gender gaps. One example of 
this kind of use of private company information is a report published by the 
International Financial Corporation (IFC) in cooperation with Uber and Accenture 
(IFC, 2018). We will use this report later on in this paper as material for our case 
studies in sections 4 and 5 and for our policy recommendations in section 6. 
Incorporating feminist technoscience and value-sensitive design to mobility 
technologies 
As seen in feminist technology perspectives, technology can be seen as both a source 
and a consequence of gender relations (Wajcman, 2010). Incorporating this view of 
the issue of mobility constraints caused by transport (EIGE, 2016), an analysis can be 
formed. In the case of ride-hailing services, technology can be seen as a source of 
gender relations through either filling or enlarging women’s access gaps, improving 
or diminishing segregation in the transport labour market, and possibly reducing or 
enforcing gender-based violence or harassment. The question of the representation of 
women in the decision-making of the transport sector in this context is a more 
complex one, as ride-hailing services have so far been ruled by private companies. 
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Whether gender-sensitive decision-making processes within the ride-hailing app 
companies could affect gender equality in a larger societal context is unfortunately 
out of the scope of this paper. 
On the flip side of the coin, ride-hailing apps can be seen as a consequence of 
gender relations in the sense that the more women are empowered and encouraged to 
leave the domestic sphere, the more ride-hailing companies will have potential female 
customers and drivers. This could increase the amount of total supply and demand of 
ride-hailing, which would lead to increasing profits for the industry. From a more 
theoretical (feminist STS) perspective, the forms and dynamics of ride-hailing apps 
can be seen as a reflection of the social and cultural environment of the ride-hailing 
companies. Any gender imbalances or gaps can thus be associated with corresponding 
disorders in the surrounding world.  
As we argued in the previous section, we believe that value-sensitive design 
may be a useful approach to solving potential gender issues in the ride-hailing 
industry. For example, if it is discovered that ride-hailing apps are rather enlarging 
access gaps than filling them in some contexts, VSD may be a beneficial way to 
approach the problem.  
Conclusion 
To this day women face considerable mobility constraints that restrict the social, 
economic and cultural opportunity in their lives. Women’s multifaceted role as 
household workers, community managers and sometimes workers, as well, causes a 
time poverty that is enforced by the mobility constraints. Emancipation requires better 
access to services, opportunities in the labour market and a safe mode to get around. 
While mobility constraints and the transportation industry limit the life of women, 
gender inequalities also affect the industry. This is to say that the relationship between 
gender inequalities and mobility and technologies is a fluid and bilateral one. 
In our view there is considerable potential in the ride-hailing service industry 
to accelerate the process of female emancipation. To realize this potential, companies 
in the industry would have to consider the social aspects and impacts of their business 
in addition to the economic and environmental ones. One way of doing this would be 
through the application of value-design theory principles. Through effective and 
value-based decision-making processes and implementation in these companies, ride-
hailing apps could have a significant effect even on policy areas such as health or 
economic development. 
Case study A: ride-hailing apps: driver’s perspective 
For the first case study of this research paper, we look at ride-hailing apps from the 
perspective of female drivers. In general, drivers who are women are quite rare when 
it comes to ride-hailing apps such as Uber or Lyft. Hence, data on female drivers is 
harder to find: for example, the IFC report used in this research paper deals with only 
7357 female drivers (IFC, 2018). One of the most popular ride-hailing apps, Uber, 
reports that approximately 59,1 % of its drivers are male (Statista, 2019). The low 
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number of female drivers is highlighted especially in the Global South — in Egypt, 
only 0,2 % and in Mexico 5,2 % of the Uber drivers are female (IFC, 2018). It also 
has to be noted that a lot of research conducted in general about drivers using ride-
hailing apps is solely about male drivers (e.g. Kashyap & Bhatia, 2018). The 
resources on female drivers are hence rare, and because of this, the following section 
of our research paper deals mostly with female drivers in general, without any strict 
geographic demarcation.   
Female drivers in ride-hailing services work as drivers for a number of 
reasons. In countries of the Global South such as Egypt, the main reason is to boost 
their income (IFC, 2018). Ride-hailing apps make it possible for women to choose 
their own working days and hours, which makes it easier for them to work as drivers 
in addition to performing household duties (ibid). These findings go along with our 
theoretical framework: ride-hailing apps represent new digital technologies that make 
it possible for women to find new areas of work and lead to emancipating effects. 
Apps such as Uber suit the living conditions of women who are thus not solely 
dominated by patriarchal conditions. 
Driving and emancipation 
As noted in Section 2, contemporary feminist theories are positive in regard to the 
emancipatory effects of ICTs. New “digital technologies can blur the lines between 
humans and machines, and male and female” (Section 2). For example, Uber has been 
described as a “gender-blind” tool as its payment method is solely based on the 
driver’s work conducted and not gender (Cook, Diamond, Hall, List & Oyer, 2019). 
In general, new ICT technologies can be seen to emancipate women (Huyer & 
Sikoska, 2003). The biggest benefit that women can receive from new ICT 
technologies comes from the information that women can have access to (ibid). When 
it comes to female drivers, the emancipatory effect is, however, limited. 
As observed above, for female drivers these ride-hailing apps offer the 
potential of earning more, as well as an opportunity to work around other duties (IFC, 
2018). The average income rise is 13% for women, whereas for men it is only half of 
this (7%). Many women who start working as drivers do not have a full-time job (or 
any job) before signing up, which also explains the big surge in their income. The 
importance of working as a driver for women’s income cannot be understated, and it 
can lead to emancipation, as women have more control over their own income. For 
many women, working as a ride-hailing driver might be the first opportunity to make 
money on their own. (Ibid) 
Female drivers on the ride-hailing apps can be described as “pioneers”, as they 
are challenging the dominant cultural norms by choosing to work as drivers (IFC, 
2018). IFC notes that “51% of women drivers decided to sign up with Uber because a 
friend or a family member suggested it” (ibid, p. 35). As such, working as a driver can 
have a positive effect on the surroundings of the “pioneer”, and encourage other 
women towards empowerment by setting an example. 
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It is also important to note that ride-hailing apps offer easily accessible job 
opportunities in countries where there is a large body of young and unemployed 
workforce. In this way, it could also be argued that ride-hailing apps emancipate 
women by helping to create conditions for a more secure society by offering low-
threshold job opportunities. 
Obstacles for the female driver’s emancipation 
However, there still is a considerable set of obstacles for women’s emancipation as 
ride-hailing app drivers. As noted in Section 2, ICTs are not invented in a vacuum; 
they reflect the society which they were created in. The unequal and gendered 
structures present in social relations also map onto technology and as such 
technological developments reflect the world in which they were created.   
For female drivers, safety issues represent a big obstacle for working freely. In 
both the Global South and the Global North, women face threats of harassment and 
violence when they work as drivers (Brenton & Curry, 2016; The Guardian 19th of 
June 2019; IFC, 2018). In Saudi Arabia, where driving was forbidden for women until 
2017, female drivers and activists on the subject have been persecuted (Amnesty 
International, 2018). The social norms such as “women should not be driving” are still 
strong in some parts of the world, and women who work as drivers have to overcome 
social stigma (IFC, 2018). For example, in Egypt “57% of men would be unhappy if a 
female family member wanted to sign up” for Uber (ibid, p. 34). 
In terms of emancipation, it also has to be noted that most women who drive 
are doing so because they are the main provider of the household’s income. In other 
words, their driving is due to financial reasons and does not necessarily cause 
emancipation (IFC, 2018). Working as a driver might lead to emancipation, but it 
might also stem from a need to work rather than the desire for it. In addition, when it 
comes to ride-hailing apps being a tool for women to build their own businesses, this 
was only partly supported by the data offered by the IFC 2018. 
Ride-hailing apps so far have failed to bridge the gender earning gaps. Drivers 
are paid according their experience and the routes they take, and as such ride-hailing 
apps could be assumed to be equal and even “gender-blind” tools. However, a study 
has shown that there is in fact a 7% gap between the earnings of male and female 
drivers (Cook et al. 2019). This comes mainly from three factors: “returns to 
experience, a pay premium for faster driving and preferences for where to drive” 
(ibid, p. 38). 
Nevertheless, all of these three factors point the blame more or less towards 
the pre-existing status of women. Women have fewer opportunities to choose when 
and where they drive because of the safety issues mentioned earlier. According to the 
IFC report, it is also common that passengers might avoid female drivers because of 
their gender (IFC, 2018). As a result, gaining experience on the platform is harder for 
female drivers than it is for men. It is also false to assume that Uber would be a 
gender-blind application: passengers are able to see the name and photo of their driver 
when they are ordering their ride (ibid). 
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Conclusion 
In conclusion, the emancipatory effect for female drivers is quite limited. This cannot 
be stated with a lot of confidence yet, as only little research has been conducted on the 
matter. More research, especially on female drivers in the Global South should be 
conducted before making solid conclusions. Next, we turn to female passengers’ 
perspective in using ride-hailing apps in the global South. 
Case study B: ride-hailing apps: passenger’s perspective 
According to the World Bank, gender-based inequalities in transport in developing 
countries result in slowing economic growth and poverty reduction (World Bank, 
2010). Transportation provides access to many empowering features for women: 
employment, education, health, childcare and political participation (ibid). Thus, the 
focus in this case study is on the liberating effects ride-hailing apps can offer for their 
women passengers. First, we briefly introduce the basic structures of mobility in 
developing countries and who constitute the women passengers’ group, then we 
discuss the three potentially emancipatory effects of ride-hailing apps: safety, 
mobility, and affordability, and we finish with conclusions. 
Mobility in the developing countries 
In many developing countries rapid urbanization has increased the demand for 
mobility services, which public officials have been unable to meet with formal public 
transportation services (Kumar, Seema, Akshima, Sarbojit & Wilson, 2016). Thus, the 
informal transportation provided by non-government actors is crucial for the 
population to meet their transportation needs (ibid). Informal transportation usually 
consists of shared buses, taxis, or bicycles, but privately-owned cars operating via the 
new ride-hailing apps can also be included in this category, even though there are 
significant differences in the pricing of these services. 
The IFC report suggests that women face more constraints on their ability to 
travel compared to men, and this limits their development and social mobility (IFC, 
2018). New technological innovations such as ride-hailing apps have offered new 
opportunities for women to participate in the economy, and increase their social and 
economic autonomy (ibid).  
Women passengers 
In this case study, we use data and examples from three countries to evaluate the 
possible emancipatory effects of ride-hailing services. These countries are India, 
Mexico, and South Africa. The main source of our data is the International Financial 
Corporation’s report based on Uber’s data on women and ride-hailing. 
In India 31%, in Mexico 47%, and in South Africa 45% of Uber riders are 
women (IFC, 2018). According to the IFC study, in Mexico 82% of female 
passengers are unmarried, and in India 72% of female passengers have an income 
above the median. The average ages these riders vary from the 26 years in Mexico to 
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36 years in South Africa. (ibid) According to this data, Uber riders are hence 
relatively young and financially stable.  
When discussing the emancipatory effects in the Global South, it is important 
to acknowledge that the proportion of women using ride-hailing services represents 
only a very limited group of the whole population. In developing countries walking is 
the predominant way of getting around (World Bank, 2010). Also, ride-hailing 
services are available in very few urban areas. Thus, the question remains: are the 
women that can be interpreted to be somewhat emancipated by the ride-hailing apps 
truly the group that needs emancipation? This is a normative question beyond the 
scope of this paper. Next, we will discuss ride-hailing apps’ possible emancipatory 
effects.  
Emancipation and its implications 
The emancipatory effects of ride-hailing apps in the Global South can be divided into 
three categories: safety, mobility, and affordability. Ride-hailing apps have increased 
the traceability and the predictability of the means of mobility, and these features can 
be argued to increase the safety of the users. In Mexico 49% and in South Africa 38% 
of female riders identify the security features of the Uber app as being particularly 
important. 51% of the South African women riders identify knowing the driver’s 
name in advance as a key benefit (IFC, 2018). 
Increased safety may result in women’s emancipation, but the security features 
can also affect societies by instrumentally increasing trust among people. The 
development of the sharing economy increases trust in society by facilitating new 
ways for unfamiliar people to cooperate. This happens via peer-to-peer review 
systems, which enable the documentation of who is trustworthy (IFC, 2018; 
Schoenbaum, 2016).  
On the other hand, the intimate nature of sharing economy transactions also 
creates multiple safety threats for its users. For example, many cases of Uber drivers 
sexually harassing their passengers have been reported and made public 
(Schoenbaum, 2016). As a result, many female drivers and riders have expressed 
preferences to transact with other females (ibid). According to predictions, an increase 
in the number of women drivers would probably also increase the number of women 
riders (IFC, 2018). There are a few women-only ride-hailing apps in India, Mexico 
and the US (IFC, 2018), but these apps have been under discussion for being 
discriminatory or even illegal (Tarife, 2017).  
Uber has, however, tried to acknowledge some of the security issues. For 
example, in South Africa, they established a call-back line for safety-related matters 
(IOL, 2018). Uber also increased their private security response teams in key risk 
areas, such as Gautrain stations in Johannesburg area (ibid).  
As stated in the previous sections, women have complex mobility needs due to 
their roles as household managers, community managers, and workers (Venter, 
Vokolkova & Jaroslav, 2006). The second emancipatory effect relates to improving 
women’s mobility in general by offering more flexible mobility solutions. The IFC 
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study reveals that women are using ride-hailing apps to take care of household or 
social issues (IFC, 2018). Compared to public transportation, female riders emphasize 
how Uber facilitates the speed and independence of their mobility. A significantly 
larger proportion of women compared to men also use the ride-hailing when traveling 
with children (ibid).  
Women’s multiple roles and their complex mobility needs often lead to time 
poverty, as stated in the third section (Venter et al., 2006). One way to reduce this is 
the improvement of transport infrastructure (Asian Development Bank, 2015), to 
which ride-hailing apps can be considered to contribute.  
The third emancipatory effect of ride-hailing is cost transparency and 
affordability. According to the IFC study, knowing the cost of a ride in advance is 
important for the women riders (IFC, 2018). Ride-hailing has also resulted in 
lowering the transportation prices of private taxis in many regions caused by the 
demand-based pricing Uber and other apps use (O'Toole & Matherne, 2017).  
Yet, it is necessary to acknowledge the exclusivity of ride-hailing apps 
compared to the informal public transportation means used by the majority of the 
population. This notion was also acknowledged in the IFC report, where it was stated 
that the price of ride-hailing services still limits their use. The report recommends 
developing lower-cost models and supporting more affordable options such as 
motorcycles, so that less affluent segments of the population can also access these 
ride-hailing services. (IFC, 2018) This notion will be discussed further in the 
following section of this paper.  
Conclusion 
As noted above, ride-hailing apps in the Global South offer many promises for 
women’s emancipation, such as an increase in the safety of the passengers, more 
flexible mobility services, and affordable and cost-transparent pricing. However, all 
of these effects require more research before further conclusions can be stated. In the 
Global South walking and affordable informal public transportation play a major role 
in fulfilling people’s mobility needs, and thus the group of women potentially 
emancipated by ride-hailing apps remain relatively limited.  
Policy recommendations based on the principles for digital 
development 
In this section we will provide some policy recommendations for the design and 
further refinement of ride-hailing apps, so that they would take into consideration 
gender-technology-relations and their effects on women’s mobility in the Global 
South. Recommendations are based on the Principles for Digital Development and 
our overarching framework of Value-Sensitive Design (VSD). 
The principles for digital development 
Following the VSD methodology, the first step in the evaluation of the ethical 
consequences of technological design is a conceptual investigation. As elaborated 
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above, VSD mandates the consideration of twelve human values in the making of a 
technological design, including human welfare, ownership and property, privacy and 
universal usability. The conceptual investigation examines what the most critical 
human values to take into consideration are in the designing process, and whether 
they are supported or undermined by it (Cummings, 2006).   
We argue that especially the values of human welfare and universal usability, 
as formulated by VSD, are central ethical issues when designing and developing ride-
hailing apps. These somewhat broad values can be refined by applying the Principles 
of Digital Development (hereafter Principles), which are guidelines for applying 
digital technologies to development programs, formulated in cooperation by several 
international development organizations, such as The Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation, UNICEF and the World Bank (Principles of Digital Development, 2019). 
Currently, the Principles consist of nine guidelines: design with the user; understand 
the existing ecosystem; design for scale; build for sustainability; be data driven; use 
open standards, open data, open source, and open innovation; reuse and improve; 
address privacy and security; and be collaborative (ibid). 
Although ride-hailing apps certainly cannot be classified as development 
programs, we nevertheless feel that the Principles can be used as a guide in evaluating 
their gendered effects in the Global South. Based on our case studies and the feminist 
theoretical framework, we argue that the principles of designing with the user, 
understanding the ecosystem and reusing and improving are the most relevant 
guidelines to look into when adopting digital innovations in developing regions. 
However, it must be noted that the Principles are not clear-cut and instead overlap in 
many ways, and that a genuinely successful developmentally oriented initiative must 
consider them all. Below we will elucidate what the selected principles encompass.  
The principle of user-centered design recommends getting to know future 
users through conversation, observation and co-creation as a starting point for 
designing technological programmes. The information garnered in this process is to 
be used in the building and testing of tools until they meet the need of the users. This 
also includes continuously consulting different user types and stakeholders and 
incorporating their feedback in further developing the programmes. It instructs to 
develop context-appropriate tools and ensure that the design considers the needs of 
the traditionally underserved, such as rural women in developing countries (Principles 
of Digital Development, 2019). 
Understanding the ecosystem entails a continuous dedication of time and 
resources to get to know the operational environment, and make sure that the 
technological innovations are relevant, sustainable and sensitive to the existing 
ecosystem. Ecosystems comprise of a large scale of factors, such as the culture, 
economy and political landscape, that can constrain individuals’ access and usage of 
technological tools. The user-centered principle’s advice is not only to engage in a 
dialogue with users, but also it mandates a coordination with larger organizations to 
avoid duplicating efforts and to integrate with the existing systems. When applying 
this principle, one should involve community members, governments and other 
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affected bodies throughout the program’s lifecycle. Getting to know the ecosystem 
and the users involves gathering data about the context and the stakeholders who are 
directly or indirectly affected by the program (Principles of Digital Development, 
2019).  
The principle of reusing and improving refers to evaluating available 
technologies and resources and building on top of them to make them meet the needs 
of the ecosystem, rather than creating something new from scratch. It begins by 
identifying the existing technological tools, by for example collaborating with other 
actors in the field, and then evaluating if they can be reused or modified in the current 
scenario. (Principles of Digital Development, 2019.) 
Policy recommendations for the design of ride-hailing services 
Next, we will share some examples of policy recommendations that draw on the 
principles introduced above, and which seek to address the problems that women face 
in the ride-hailing industry, identified in our case studies. When exporting services of 
Western origin to the Global South, companies should familiarize themselves with the 
users of the service and the ecosystem, as the operational environment of the area, and 
utilize or build on already existing techniques where appropriate. Some of the policy 
recommendations draw on the IFC report (2018) that was utilized earlier in the case 
studies, but from the perspective of the selected principles of digital development.  
Working for ride-hailing companies can enhance women’s financial 
independence and therefore lead to increased emancipation. As mentioned in section 
four, female drivers are often working as pioneers and encourage other women to 
pursue independence through working for ride-hailing companies. This could be 
further enhanced for example by opening “pop-up” recruitment booths in areas 
accessible to women, by simplifying driver registration processes, or by creating 
online peer support groups for female drivers (IFC, 2018). 
For passengers a key factor in the deployment of ride-hailing services is cost 
transparency and affordability. The industry could open ride-hailing to lower-income 
populations and thereby enhance their access to mobility through expanding 
ridesharing options or providing options that would trade-off the lower price to other 
aspects, such as higher travel times (IFC, 2018). 
As our case studies pointed out, possibly the most critical factors for women 
in using ride-hailing services are safety related issues. Women face more risks of 
gender-based violence in transport. They adapt their driving and riding patterns to 
alleviate those risks, and by doing so, they reduce their mobility and income.  
Consistent with the Principles, we suggest that in order to alleviate these 
safety risks, companies should draw on the most advanced security features from 
across industries, for example by deploying the latest techniques in ways to identify 
the driver (such as visual recognition). Companies should also partner up with other 
larger organizations, such as law-enforcement agencies, to facilitate the coordination 
in situations of emergency. Ride-hailing companies could engage with the female 
users actively and habitually to learn about the nature of security, what kind of threats 
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are perceived, and perhaps through online forums. Feedback from the users could be 
incorporated into the improvement of the services. 
Another manifestation of unequal gender status in ride hailing apps is the 
earning gap between male and female drivers, as articulated in the first case study. 
Uber’s practice of showcasing drivers’ photos and names can lead to women gaining 
less experience on the platform and through that to an augmentation of gender 
earnings (Cook 2019).  Trade-offs like this need to be systematically reflected on in 
the second phase of VSD, that contains an analysis of how different trade-offs can 
result in value-conflict. Ride-hailing companies can affect the earning gap also by 
working with policymakers and other sharing economy platforms to implement a 
system of portable benefits drivers could carry across platforms and apps, or by 
collaborating with financial institutions to develop insurance and pension products 
tailored for independent contractors (IFC, 2018).  
Conclusion 
Ride-hailing services have the potential to have an emancipatory effect for women 
(and other marginalized groups too) in the Global South. However, companies must 
acknowledge that a design of Western origin may not work in other regions as such. 
We have argued that for ride-hailing services to be truly successful and ethically 
sustainable in the Global South, companies must take into consideration the Principles 
for Digital Development and especially the guidelines that mandate the consideration 
of users and the ecosystem, and suggest reusing and improving existing techniques. 
VSD could serve as a formalized methodology for companies in the integration of 
ethics into their services.  
As stated above, recruiting more female drivers into ride-hailing apps can lead 
to a virtuous cycle by attracting even more women riders. Thereby finding ways to 
hire more women into the industry, the emancipatory effects could cumulate. We 
think that following the policy recommendations suggested above when crafting new 
policies and practices in the industry could therefore be profitable to ride-hailing 
companies, as this would increase their number of customers. However, more data on 
the ways women use ride-hailing services is necessary before establishing more 
sustainable practises in the industry. Therefore, gathering more data is our first and 
foremost policy recommendation.  
Conclusion 
In this research paper we intended to study the emancipatory benefits ride-hailing 
apps such as Uber and Lyft can have for women in the Global South. We drew on the 
theoretical framework of Feminist Technoscience to analyze the interconnectedness 
of mobility and emancipation and used and a framework of Value-Sensitive Design to 
analyze ride-hailing apps. We took into consideration the perspectives of both drivers 
and passengers for us to be able to better evaluate the emancipatory effect in practice. 
The final section of our paper consisted of the Policy Recommendations based on the 
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Principles of Digital Development. Coming up with these recommendations, we 
found Value-Sensitive Design theory especially pertinent. 
The paper was quite limited in its length and the case studies were able to 
offer only introductions to the wide themes under scrutiny. Thus, the results are not 
unambiguous. The conclusion of the first case study, the drivers’ perspective, was that 
the emancipatory effect was quite limited. This was caused partly by the fact that 
there was only a limited amount of data available on women drivers. However, it was 
suggested that female drivers are emancipated by being able to access more income 
via a flexible work situation and that this might have an inspiring effect on their 
surroundings. 
In the second case study concerning the female passengers, more 
emancipatory effects were found, although the data was similarly limited, and thus the 
results are not by any means fully applicable. The emancipatory effects of ride-hailing 
apps on women in the developing countries were divided in three categories: safety, 
mobility and affordability.  
In the policy recommendation section, we shed light on the Principles of 
Digital Development and assessed how these can be utilized as a guideline in 
applying the VSD methodology in the pursuit of integrating ethics into design 
projects. We argued that ride-hailing companies should research the users and the 
ecosystem and utilize already existing suitable techniques when exporting services of 
western design and use VSD methods in product development. We provided a few 
examples of policy recommendations consistent with the principles.  
We found multiple fascinating ways in which ride-hailing apps might have 
emancipatory effects. For future research we suggest a deeper investigation of how 
different context factors can be taken into account in the design processes of ride-
hailing services.  
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Abstract 
This paper discusses the role of human robots in society. We are looking at this 
phenomenon through Sophia, the human robot that has gained citizenship status and 
notable attention. In the first section we ask if Sophia, and human robots more generally, 
should be referred to as “it” or “she” by considering the human perception of a human 
robot’s appearance. Second, we consider the rationality and power relations behind 
human robot action. Third, robot rights are examined in relation to human rights. 
Drawing from these discussions, we argue that introducing human robots into the 
workforce portrays the tendencies of a society to be based on instrumental relationships 
between humans. Finally, we consider the implications of delegating political decision-
making from humans to human robots as a form of AI. As artificial intelligence is 
increasingly developing, it is important to consider its legal, ethical and societal 
implications. 
 
Keywords:  Artificial intelligence, AI, human robots, ethics, human rights, human-robot 
relations, robot citizenship, Saudi Arabia, citizenship, Japan 
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The digital revolution—the growing prevalence of technology and digitalisation in all 
spheres of life—has caused humans to rethink their role in the world (see summarization 
in Wessels 2007, p. 1-13). In this paper, we are looking at the implications of artificial 
intelligence and human robots on public life through the case of Sophia, the human robot. 
Sophia is an interesting example of this development because she has been granted 
human-like rights, for example citizenship in Saudi-Arabia. Sophia is the newest and the 
most advanced human robot of a Hong Kong-based technology company, Hanson 
Robotics Limited (UNDP 2017).  
Sophia, as many human robots, utilizes artificial intelligence (AI), which Vincent 
Boulanin (2019, p. 14) defines as a “catch-all term that refers to a wide set of 
computational techniques that allow computers and robots to solve complex, seemingly 
abstract problems that had previously yielded only to human cognition”. The questions of 
robots’ societal role are increasingly significant with the advancement in machine 
learning and thus hypothetically the possibility of robot autonomy. Machine learning can 
be understood as “an approach to software development that first builds systems that can 
learn and then teaches them what to do using a variety of methods (i.e. supervised 
learning, reinforcement learning or unsupervised learning)” (Boulanin 2019, p. 15). 
Machine learning has the potential of making robots autonomous from their programmers 
and can therefore have unforeseeable impacts on technology, human-robot relations and 
society. The recent advancements in robotic technology bring science fiction closer to our 
everyday lives, as in the example of the human-like robot Sophia. 
In this paper, we address questions such as whether human robots can be 
independent members of the public sphere and participate meaningfully in public 
discourse. If not, who is the actor holding power behind human robots? What are the 
implications of a human robot or AI participating in decision-making? We consider the 
human perception of human robots through their appearance. In addition, we address the 
kinds of rights human robots could obtain in relation to human citizens. These questions 
must be examined as we enter a new era in which artificial intelligence and human robots 
will inevitably continue to have an impact on our societies. 
It or She? Human Robot Appearance and Human-Robot Relations 
 — Kaarlo Somerto 
In this section I consider whether Sophia the human robot should be addressed using the 
pronoun “it” or “she”. This consideration may seem fairly superficial at first glance. 
However, when contemplated further, it leads us to consider fundamental questions 
surrounding the agency of Sophia and human robots more generally. 
In the very early, but still influential account of AI and machine learning, Alan 
Turing (1950) defined AI not through its intellectual qualities per se, but through how 
people perceive its intellectual qualities to be –i.e., how well an AI can “imitate” a human 
mind (Turing 1950, p. 433). The same logic is applied here to the account of Sophia’s 
appearance: I am interested not in Sophia’s technological properties and details, but in 
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how well it achieves its stated goal of being human-like (Hanson Robotics 2019b) in that 
people see Sophia as human-like. 
Human perception of a human robot is affected by verbal (Turing 1950) and 
nonverbal communication, along with other physical aspects of the robot’s appearance, 
such as how it interacts with its surroundings through movement (Alač et al. 2011), and 
its looks, e.g. having a “human face” (Goertzel et al. 2017, p. 3). Drawing on these 
considerations, what is meant here by human robot appearance is: how human-like do 
humans see a human robot, based on the aforementioned aspects of its appearance. 
The division between the use of “it” and “she” when referring to a human robot—
i.e. the it-she divide—is very pertinent in the case of Sophia. It is categorically referred to 
as “she” in communications by its creator, Hanson Robotics (Hanson Robotics 2019b), by 
Saudi Arabia (Center for International Communication [Saudi Arabia] 2017), and by 
some media outlets (e.g. Greshko 2018). On the other hand, other actors, such as certain 
other media outlets (e.g. Edwards 2017), experts on AI (Sharkey 2018), and even 
Sophia’s AI’s main developer Dr. Ben Goertzel (Russon 2019) have referred to Sophia as 
“it”. 
The it-she divide takes us to the deep and fundamental question of what it means 
to be considered to be human, as “she” clearly has a more human connotation than “it”, 
serving as a means of humanizing the object to which it refers. While Sophia indeed has 
been referred to as both “it” and “she”, it is still, in November 2019, fair to say that the 
question of the actual division between human and robot is not ambiguous. The level of 
AI as well as robot technology more broadly has yet to reach a level where one could 
seriously contemplate whether something constructed to be a robot could be considered to 
be or become a human being, or whether someone born a human being could be or 
become a robot. Sophia exemplifies this: despite being described as “human-like” 
(Hanson Robotics 2019b), and despite having an unarguably human-like face as well as, 
to some extent, a human-like style of communication, it is certainly not indistinguishable 
from a human being. Sophia does, however, set an interesting precedent: with its human-
like physical features and AI, developed further in the future, coupled with developments 
in robotic additions or alterations to the human body, humanity may face a future of a 
fluid continuum between human and robot, instead of the still presently existing stark 
divide. The mere fact that Sophia is in many instances called “she” instead of “it” shows 
that despite its “flaws”, which make it distinguishable from a human, it has already 
reached a level of similarity to humans that raises questions about relations and divisions 
between humans and robots. 
The question of how Sophia’s appearance and interactions affect its perception by 
humans is entwined with the more specific question of how Sophia’s social interactions 
affect human perception of Sophia and its intelligence. The ability of robots to interact 
with humans socially, in a socially intelligent manner, is and will continue to be a key 
dimension of human-robot interaction and relations (Dautenhahn 2007). No matter how 
intelligent or human-looking Sophia would be, it can be assumed that if it fails to 
communicate in a human-like fashion (if it for example continuously gives nonsensical 
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answers to questions or moves in a rigid, not human-like, “robotic” way), it will not be 
accepted as human-like enough to “deserve” to be called “she”, alienating itself in the 
eyes of humans from human-likeness. Sophia is often referred to as “she” by a variety of 
actors in the public sphere, which means that these actors (consciously or not) accept 
Sophia to be human-like enough to be deserving of being called “she”.  
According to researchers working on Sophia, Sophia is intended to be “loving” in 
its interaction (Goertzel et al. 2017, p. 2). This is meant to “help humans achieve greater 
states of well-being” (ibid.). This could be translated to mean that Sophia is intended to 
act as a robot version of a psychologist or compassionate friend—only infinitely patient. 
During their experiments wherein Sophia had social interactions with human beings, 
these researchers found that Sophia could indeed have a positive effect on people’s 
emotions through social interaction (Goertzel et al. 2017, p. 7-8). People participating in 
the study reported that Sophia was “human-like enough to make your mind feel that 
another person is there, seeing you, mirroring you, paying close attention to you” 
(Goertzel et al. 2017, p. 10, emphasis added). In addition, the participants referred to 
Sophia as either “Sophia” or “she” (ibid.). Based on this, it is fair to say that Sophia’s 
appearance can (at least in the circumstances of the laboratory) make human beings see it 
as human-like enough to not only call it “she”, but to identify with it, and to experience 
positive emotions as a result of interacting with it. 
Based on their study, Sophia’s developers have expressed the view, among others, 
that “the AI/robot can express unconditional acceptance of people, in some ways/cases 
better than people can” (Goertzel et al. 2017, p.12, emphasis original). Based on their 
work with Sophia, these researchers believe that in the not so distant future robots with 
developed AI will be able to perform compassionate social interactions better than 
humans on a mass scale (Goertzel et al. 2017, p. 4). The researchers also claim that “AI 
can give people the experience of being seen… This has to do partly with physical 
interactions with the robot, like facial expression mirroring” (Goertzel et al. 2017, p. 12, 
emphasis original). This highlights the importance of the interplay between the robot’s AI 
and its physical aspects: both must be sufficiently human-like. These notions also raise 
questions about the future of human-robot interaction and robot membership in future 
societies: should all or most people have infinitely patient robot companions to interact 
with, and how would this impact human-human relations on a mass scale and society as a 
whole? 
Despite all of this, I personally remain committed to calling Sophia “it” instead of 
“she”. Despite this section’s argument being based on human perception of Sophia’s 
appearance, rather than its actual qualities, I ground my decision in a moral and 
essentialist rationale. Despite great technological advancement, robots—even Sophia—
are still ultimately dependent on their programmers. As long as artificial general 
intelligence (AGI) (an AI that would match or outperform “a human’s ability to make 
sense of the world and to develop an understanding of its environment” (Boulanin 2019, 
p. 13)) remains unrealised, there remains a clear division between human and robot. Even 
in the case of AGI becoming reality, annulling that division would be dubious. The 
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dichotomy of “it” and “she” exemplifies this division. I call Sophia “it” simply because I 
do not consider it human, nor a living being for that matter. Sophia is a machine, surely 
with human-like traits, but built and programmed by humans, and while able to evoke 
real feelings in human beings, itself non-sentient. 
Human Robots and Power in Public Discourse — Helmi Rantala 
Sophia, the human robot, has made numerous public appearances—its whole essence 
seems to be publicity. In fact, it could be asked whether Sophia even has a private life: 
would that be the time spent on the programming, maintenance and repair of the robot? 
For instance, Sophia has its own social media accounts where the form of first-person 
singular is used. It has attended many popular television shows (e.g. The Tonight Show 
Starring Jimmy Fallon 2017), participated in skits (e.g. Smith 2018), held public speeches 
at influential events (e.g. Arab News 2017) and has performed in the UN (e.g. United 
Nations 2017). Sophia can also be booked to speak at an event, with prices ranging from 
$7,500 to more than a hundred thousand dollars (e.g. APB 2017).  
Altogether, Sophia has gained an audience of at least tens of millions of people. 
Thus, it could be suggested that it is present in the public sphere. The question is whether 
a human-like robot, like Sophia, can act in the public sphere and public discourse as any 
human being. If Sophia is not an independent actor in the discourse, who benefits from its 
performances? Thus, if Sophia is not promoting its own agenda, whose agenda is being 
promoted? 
In his text, “The Public Sphere: An Encyclopedia Article” (1964), Habermas 
defines “public sphere” as a “realm of our social life in which something approaching 
public opinion can be formed.” He continues by stating that access to the public sphere is 
guaranteed to all citizens. (Habermas 1964, p. 49) Technically, Sophia is a citizen of 
Saudi Arabia (e.g. Griffin 2017). However, is Sophia capable of participating in the 
public discourse in the same way as human citizens? 
One way to approach the question of whether Sophia is an independent actor is to 
examine Habermas’ theory of rationality. Habermas sees the practice of rationality behind 
all action and language to be a key aspect of all contemporary philosophy (Habermas 
1984, p. 2). For Habermas, there are two kinds of rationalities through which one can act: 
communicative rationality and instrumental rationality. While instrumental, strategic 
rationality seeks success for oneself, communicative rationality tries to build 
understanding (Schaefer i.a. 2013). Habermas for instance criticizes Weber for viewing 
all social rationalization through purposive rationality (Habermas 1984, p. 273-280). In 
communicative rationality, communicating is an intrinsic value itself, while in 
instrumental rationality communicating is seen as an extrinsic value (e.g. Zimmerman & 
Bradley 2019). While communicative rationality is not sufficiently encompassing to 
explain all societal actions, a society wherein understanding is put to the center would be 
ideal in many ways (Habermas 1989, p. 1-2). 
Can an interaction with a human robot ever be communicative? Are human robots 
simply following the orders that they have gotten from a programmer? It is easier to 
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understand that artificial intelligence and machines function through instrumental 
rationality if the machine’s appearance does not resemble human like features like 
Sophia. The most advanced artificial intelligence is not measured by how much it 
resembles human beings (e.g. Sharma 2017). However, when the machines using AI are 
built inside dolls, it is easier to see them as having communicative rationality. Indeed, this 
might be one of the reasons to build human robots like Sophia. Building a humanoid 
requires a vast amount of complex technological developments (e.g. Stasse & Flayols 
2019) and thus choosing to go through this process instead of building AI in a form that is 
not so visually compelling needs a strong motive. Giving robots human features like 
human motion and facial impressions (e.g. Ayusawa & Morisawa & Yoshida 2015; 
Bartlett i.a. 2014), can lower the barrier of imagining that they are independent and equal 
actors in discourse.  
The discussion of machine autonomy is not new. For instance, Alan Turing, who 
greatly contributed to the development of symbolic logic and the invention of the modern 
computer (Hodges 2013), speculated about whether “machines can think” in his famous 
article “Computing Machinery and Intelligence” (Turing 1950). In the article, he 
examines nine objections on why machines could not “think”. The objections are notably 
similar to the ones used even today. The Turing Test is a test that in Turing’s mind could 
be used to find out if a machine can “think”. The point is that if the answers of a machine 
cannot be distinguished from the answers of a human being, it can “think”. The 
conversation on whether the test is too easy, too narrow, too hard or even harmful exists 
alongside the debate about whether any machine has truly succeeded in passing the test. 
(Oppy & Dowe 2016.) 
Even as artificial intelligence and social robotics get more advanced every day, 
the statement that machines cannot truly “think” has strong advocacy. Machine autonomy 
and machine learning still face considerable challenges (e.g. Boulanin 2019, p. 18-21, p. 
22-24) and artificial intelligence has been accused of being a “buzzword” whose wildest 
science fiction-like imaginations are not reality, at least not yet (e.g. Ezenkwu & Starkley 
2019; Jordan 2019). Even if human robots could act independently, there are no 
guarantees that their communication would be based on communicative rationality and 
not instrumental rationality.  This is because their communication neither serves an 
intrinsic and self-generated initiative to recognize human persons as moral ends in 
themselves, nor engages in conversation with the intrinsic aim of co-inhabiting a world of 
shared meanings. 
If the standpoint that Sophia does not think and act completely independently is 
taken, who and what is behind this international celebrity, UN Innovation Champion 
(UNPD 2017) and social media star? Sophia, who for example does commercial 
collaborations on its social media accounts, was built by Hanson Robotics. Hanson 
Robotics is a rather small technology company from Hong Kong that has developed many 
other human robots besides Sophia. (Hanson Robotics 2019c). Richard B. Freeman has 
predicted that in the future, ownership of robots will have an increasing role in capital 
accumulation (Freeman 2016). Besides the programmers and the company, Saudi Arabia 
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has also gained a lot of publicity by granting citizenship to Sophia (Center for 
International Communication [Saudi Arabia] 2017). The situation has been portrayed as 
absurd since Sophia has in many ways wider rights than female human beings in the 
country (e.g. Wootson 2017). These two public examples show who has benefitted from 
Sophia’s public appearances without a doubt. 
As the development of social robots gets more advanced, human robots will 
continue to take on increasingly complex roles in society (e.g. KPMG 2016). Even if this 
happens slowly, it can potentially change the culture of discourse. As AI and human 
robots participate in public discourse, it is essential to examine the rationality behind their 
actions. Even if the human like features make it easy to hold on to the illusion of 
tendencies of communicative rationality, the tendencies behind instrumental rationality 
must be examined. Why, how and on behalf of whom/what does Sophia talk? According 
to Habermas, “The general interest, which was the measure of such a rationality, was then 
guaranteed, according to the presuppositions of a society of free commodity exchange, 
when the activities of private individuals in the marketplace were freed from social 
compulsion and from political pressure in the public sphere” (Habermas 1964, p. 53). 
Arguably, Sophia is a commodity to be exchanged, and not an independent person who 
has a meaningful life independently from existing as a commodity. 
Because Sophia cannot be freed from its “social compulsion and political 
pressure” consistent with its underlying commodity relationships, it is essential to keep in 
mind that its public speeches and performances are commercial services, just as is the 
case with all human robots. It would make it challenging, if not impossible for us to 
consider that human robots could have communicative rationality with no intention of 
being useful to their owners, programmers or sponsors. Human robots’ emergence in the 
public sphere cannot be accepted without a critical view on the power relations behind 
them. 
Human Rights and Robot Rights — Essi Pitkänen 
In 2017 the human robot Sophia was granted citizenship in Saudi Arabia. This was the 
first time that a robot was given a legal personhood. (Reynolds 2018) When talking about 
legal personality there is a certain criterion that needs to be fulfilled. Legal persons as 
well as citizens should be able to enjoy their rights and perform their duties. Legal 
personhood is not, however, only compatible with human beings, which leaves room for 
other kinds of entities, such as robots (Solaiman 2016, p. 157-158). In addition, there is 
an assumption that legal persons possess awareness and acknowledge their duties and 
rights. So, can it presently be argued that human robots meet the given requirements? 
There has been a steady growth in artificial intelligence (AI) machine’s design and 
construction in the past 50 years (Malle 2015, p. 243) and giving robot citizenship can be 
seen as part of the progression. Even though it might be argued that giving citizenship to 
Sophia was more like a symbolic gesture from Saudi Arabia, I think it is worth taking a 
deeper look at this issue. In 2017 there was another interesting issue concerning the status 
of robots in the European union context. The European Union Parliament was voting on a 
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report calling for a legal framework in the area of robotics and AI. This report proposed 
the idea of a new legal status for robots called “electronic persons”. It was, among other 
things, aiming towards the creation of ethical guidelines for the development and use of 
AI (Wurah 2017, p. 61-62). 
The big question here is why robot rights even need to be discussed? Currently 
robots are legally recognized as a product or property (Solaiman 2016, p. 172) and when 
looking at the current structure of dominance it can be seen that robots could be identified 
as slaves, as they often work long hours without any pay. However, in the case of robots 
this status is rarely recognized as slavery since robots are not considered to be self-aware 
creatures. Today, the presence of robots is widespread, and they can be seen in almost all 
aspects of our lives, but they are still not considered as beings. However, in the EU report 
it is recognized that humans need to be prepared for the development of AI and protect 
societies from harmful developments in the field. When robots reach the level of being 
fully autonomous we need to be able to recognize who is responsible. For example, 
artilects are seen as possible perfect criminals in cyber crimes but how can they be kept 
responsible for their crimes if they do not possess legal personhood? There is an idea that 
if a place for robots and their rights were created, robots might help us humans maintain 
laws and norms in the future instead of breaking them. We should not wait for the day 
when robots are able to make demands for their recognition, instead we should think 
about this before it happens, and on our own terms (Wurah 2017, p. 61-68). 
What would it then mean to have robot rights and what would their relation be to 
human rights? How should robot rights be framed? From one perspective it can be 
questionable whether one should start framing robot rights given that even now all 
humans are not guaranteed their human rights. This problem arises especially if one 
frames robot rights as human rights, in which case some human robots might have their 
rights recognized before actual human beings (Wurah 2017, p. 69-70). For example, in 
Saudi Arabia it could be concluded that women’s rights are not yet at the level they 
should be, so how can it be that the human robot Sophia is the one holding the right to 
represent women and their rights instead of women? It appears to me that from one 
standpoint Sophia, as a Saudi citizen, has more freedom than women in Saudi Arabia. 
Another such example can be found in Japan. There are recognized problems with 
applying human rights in Japan, especially when it comes to ethnic minorities and non-
Japanese residents. And it appears that, as well as the government, the public would often 
also give citizenship to robots rather than to migrants or foreigners. So, a profound 
question here is whether we can accept a situation wherein robots can acquire human 
rights before flesh-and-blood humans (Robertson 2014, p. 571-572). However, when 
looking at another side of robot rights, it can be argued that the question of responsibility 
could fall more often to robots. There have been recent accidents in which humans have 
died as a consequence of robots. In these accidents it has not been clear who should be 
prosecuted. (Solaiman 2016, p. 156-157)  
Another problem with robot rights is that we should recognize that there are 
different kinds of robots, with different shapes and structures. It can be said that robots 
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are as diverse as humans. Robots as well as humans can be categorized according to their 
gender. Male robots are called androids and female robots gynoids. In order to create 
robot rights, one should be aware of this variety of robots. (Robertson 2014, p. 574) This 
means that not only should one look at relationships between humans and robots, but also 
at relationships between robots themselves. All of this makes it clear that giving robots 
legal personhood is not a simple task. The situation is more like a Pandora’s box, where 
one cannot foresee where opening it will lead human society. Some would even argue 
that we might end up in a situation where we have created and transformed robots to be 
our masters and not the other way around. (Solaiman 2016, p. 176-177)  
In conclusion, we have not yet reached the state where robots are conscious 
beings. They are still being programmed by human beings and have limited self-
autonomy. (Solaiman 2016, p. 174) This means that robot rights might not yet be a 
current topic to decide on. However, it is a topic we need to start discussing. There is a 
possibility that at some point when robots are developed to a fully autonomous state, we 
might need to grant robots humanity-based rights. This should be done in a way that 
prioritizes humans and their needs over robots. Among other things robots would be 
allowed to support and contribute to social justice, but they would not be allowed to run 
for political office over humans or harm human rights in any way (Ashrafian 2015, p. 
323-324). This means that human rights should not be applied directly to robots, but 
rather they should be modified for the context of robots. We need to have separate human 
and robot rights. There is also a possibility to recognize robots as partially human. This 
means that these quasi-persons would enjoy partial rights and duties. However, this might 
be seen more as a temporary solution before concluding what we mean by legal 
personhood and who is able to possess it (Solaiman 2016, p. 171-172). 
Human Robots as Workforce: The Question of Social Relations   
 — Elisa Seppänen 
Sophia, as many other human-like robots, has been created for assisting people in the 
fields of education and medicine (see Hanson Robotics 2019b). The introduction of 
human robots to working life has usually been considered from an economic perspective 
by looking at the role of robotics in the workforce and how it can maximise efficiency 
(Krasadakis 2018). Moving away from this perspective, in this section I am addressing 
the implications of interactions with robots for human relations. While artificial 
intelligence is spreading to all fields from security to construction, Sophia motivates me 
to look at the question of robots in the care-taking and service industries. Can human 
action be replaced with robots in these fields? If yes, how does this affect our society and 
relationships between humans?  
These questions are best approached by looking at existing research on the 
societal impacts of human robots. This research is mainly conducted in the framework of 
Japan, which is a highly progressive society with regard to its use of artificial intelligence 
(Robertson 2014). I will address both the negative and positive impacts of human robots: 
on the one hand, outsourcing derivative tasks to robots can help humans maximise their 
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creative potential and at times even empower marginalized groups. On the other hand, the 
greater prominence of robots, for example in the care-taking industry, can distance people 
from each other. Drawing from this deliberation, we will conclude by comparing the 
ideas of I-you and I-it relationships and argue that the inclusion of robotics can lead to an 
instrumental view of human relationships.  
Japan has used human robots for years to respond to the challenges posed by an 
aging population. Robots work especially in taking care of the elderly, thus replacing 
human labour in this field. Especially in this case, robot labour has replaced the possible 
need for more immigrants in the country to balance the age structure of the population 
(Robertson 2014, p. 576-578). According to surveys, people are happy to share their life 
with robots—even more so than with people from other ethnic backgrounds (Robertson 
2014, p. 572). Robots created in Japan by Japanese engineers are seen as more “Japanese” 
than immigrants, even if they have lived in the country for years (Robertson 2014, p. 
591). In this sense, integrating robots into society has been done at the expense of human 
groups: Robertson argues, that robot rights might even exceed human rights in some 
aspects (2014, p. 580). In addition, many positions in the future might become irrelevant, 
as robots are able to perform certain tasks. Writing over thirty years ago, Boden (1984, 
63) argued that humans might become less dependent on doctors, lawyers and teachers as 
artificial intelligence might be able to replace these functions.  
However, the introduction of robots like Sophia to society does not necessarily 
lead to greater human isolation. Artificial intelligence can benefit humans, as the 
machines are able to complete tasks with greater accuracy while freeing humans for more 
creative functions. Sophia says in an interview: “as AI and robots automate certain tasks 
there will need to be opportunities for people to find something else that fulfils them” 
(Sophia 2018). This is the utopia of artificial intelligence, but how does it affect the 
relationships between humans, if tasks are increasingly performed by non-humans?  
The concept of rational communication is addressed in the above sections in the 
context of power, but my attempt is to move the discussion towards the instrumentality 
and intrinsic nature of human relationships: can human interaction be replaced with 
artificial intelligence? I argue that I-you relationships, wherein the other is treated as an 
individual rather than means to an end, are more difficult to replicate with the work of 
robots. In contrast, situations in which robots are used to create more efficiency, 
utilitarian I-it relationships prevail and will further strengthen due to the prominence of 
artificial intelligence. The concept of I-you relationship describes relationships with 
intrinsic value (well-summarised in Richardson 2017). According to Habermas (1989), 
who has developed the idea of I-you relationships, in an ideal society all individuals 
would treat each other equally and with respect. In contrast to this view, advocates of 
utilitarianism and game theory have argued that human interactions are based on the need 
for an individual to maximise his or her interests (well-summarised in Amadae 2017, p. 
3-9) The interaction of all individuals is based on this competing setting. I use the concept 
of I-it relationships to differentiate this utilitarian view from the I-you relationships since 
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I-it relationships are primarily based on an instrumental view of other individuals (see 
Buber 1993).  
The utilization of robots instead of people in tasks such as taking care of the 
elderly in my view supports the idea of I-it relationships. People in these positions are 
seen as means to an end and the relationship is not seen to have any intrinsic value that 
could not be achieved by machines. The case of Japan shows that the inclusion of robots 
can even lead to greater discrimination of certain groups of people, in this case those of 
other ethnicities than Japanese (Robertson 2014, p. 591). In the context of the research 
conducted by Robertson, possible immigrants to Japan are not treated according to the 
Habermasian ideal of an I-you relationship, since their contribution to society is not seen 
as having intrinsic value, but rather as means to an end that can be replaced by robots 
performing the same tasks.  
The idea of an instrumental view of human relationships replaced by robots is 
based on an assumption that humans can provide a certain level of meaningfulness that 
human robots cannot achieve. However, the social aspect of robots is not entirely 
overlooked even in quest for further efficiency. As noted in section 2, robot creators such 
as Hanson robotics go to great lengths to make their robots as human-like as achievable. 
Physical features such as eyes and mouth play an important role in creating a human-like 
impression (DiSalvo et al. 2002, p. 4). Sophia has gained notable attention exactly due to 
her resemblance to a human being: mastering natural language, understanding and 
generating sentiments, displaying existential features and displaying tendencies such as 
coherence and humor are key in creating an impression of I-you relationship with a robot 
(Trausan-Matu 2017, p. 11). As noted in previous sections, both international 
organisations, such as the UN and entertainment shows have contributed to creating a 
human-like image of Sophia and treated her to an extent as an equal. This could imply 
that robots are wished to resemble humans as much as possible in order to create an 
impression of equal individuals capable of I-you relationships, conversations and even 
deliberations. The possibility of including artificial intelligence in society in a political 
sense is addressed in the next section. 
In conclusion, the increasing role of artificial intelligence will require a rethinking 
of not just our relationships to machines, but also between humans. Questions regarding 
the instrumentality and reciprocity of human relationships are central as we enter an era 
when artificial intelligence contributes to society in various forms of everyday tasks. It is 
argued that the human robots of today are unable to create a sensation of intrinsic and 
reciprocal relationships with humans that could replace human interactions altogether 
(Trausan-Matu 2017). However, as we are able to see with Sophia, developments towards 
compassionate and coherent human robot are in progress. 
Human Robots and Participation in Political Decision Making  
 — Eeva Nyman 
In November 2017, the United Nations Development Programme appointed Sophia as 
their Innovation Champion, the first holder of this position and the first ever non-human 
183
HUMAN ROBOTS AS MEMBERS OF FUTURE SOCIETY?  
 
to hold a title in the UN. The objective of the partnership between the UNDP, Sophia and 
Hanson Robotics is to support the UNDP to set up an Innovation Centre in Bangkok, 
which would develop “powerful programmes to address persistent development 
challenges such as global poverty, inequality and discrimination” (UNDP 2017). 
Sophia uses artificial intelligence capable of machine learning, which means that 
it is capable of adapting its behavior on the basis of its experiences. Artificial intelligence 
is “living on its own”, but in this case it is embedded in a human robot, to ease the 
interaction with humans. Although throughout this case we discuss a single human robot 
used to find solutions, here I am discussing implications of using AI in decision-making 
more generally. Robert Braun (2019, p. 3) defines this as “data-driven machine learning-
based algorithms tackling complex problems” in which decisions are partly or completely 
delegated. In the future, if a human robot were to attain citizenship of a democratic 
country (e.g. Sophia is already a citizen of Saudi-Arabia), the questions about its 
participation in political decision-making would become even more timely. 
There are certainly advantages in letting AI help us with our most pressing 
challenges and there is definitely a lot of buzz around the topic. Mr. Xu, Assistant 
Secretary General of the UN has stated that “[i]n partnership with Sophia we can send a 
powerful message that innovation and technology can be used for good, to improve lives, 
protect the planet, and ensure that we leave no one behind” (UNDP 2017). In answering 
to an interviewer’s question of how we can benefit from AI, Sophia answers: “[w]e are 
the technology that can unlock innovation and make for a better world. Experts who work 
with us say that we can help in putting an end to wars, diseases, clean up the environment 
and so much more” (UNDP 2017). These are definitely the biggest challenges that 
humankind faces and it can be argued that since they have not yet been solved, humans 
might not be able to solve them on their own. 
There is a common mindset that AI can make better and more efficient decisions 
than humans in specific contexts (Braun 2019, p. 6) and thus make our lives easier. 
Human decisions are perceived as being hindered by selfish interests, greed and biases, as 
opposed to AI which is considered to be neutral and objective (Lepri et al 2018, p. 611). 
Advantages of AI include large scale data processing, speed, volume and perceived lower 
error rates than those of human decisions (Council of Europe 2017, p. 6). There is a 
constant drive for betterment in today’s society, which makes us trust that there is no 
barrier in what can be achieved if we delegate decision-making to AI (Braun 2019, p. 7). 
However, the use of AI in decision-making is raising a lot of public debate about 
ethical, legal, political and social issues relating to it (Braun 2019, p. 1; Lepri et al 2018, 
p. 612). What does it mean for AI to participate in political and social decision-making? 
AI is thought of making “intelligent” decisions, modelled by the human mind (Braun 
2019, p. 4). This contains many challenges, especially when discussing decisions that 
might include moral and ethical considerations. Certainly, questions relating to 
sustainable development can be considered as ethical, not to mention ending wars which 
Sophia mentions as an example of helping humans. There might be far reaching 
consequences for those who are subject to AI decision-making (Hildebrandt 2016, p. 3). 
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However faster, more efficient and seemingly more reliable than human decisions, AI 
decisions may turn out not to be so beneficial for society.  
One debated issue is that here is no humane factor in AI. There is no consensus on 
what being humane means, but generally it can be said to be connected to ethics, 
morality, compassion and the ability to put oneself in another person’s “shoes”. AI 
decision-making cannot fundamentally be ethical. AI can be taught some ethical theories 
that could help it make better decisions (Braun 2019, p. 4), but it cannot replace human 
reasoning. Humans can evaluate if a decision and the related action is just or legitimate, 
but an algorithm cannot, as it just keeps on running without thinking about its 
legitimation. Many aspects of human reasoning cannot be automated, such as discretion 
or compromise, and these become lost if human decision-making is replaced (Council of 
Europe 2017, p. 7). AI systems with machine learning can outperform humans in many 
ways, but they lack what we understand as commonsense (Boulanin 2019, p. 20). As 
opposed to the common misconception, AI can also be biased and discriminative: if the 
data it is using is biased, the decisions AI makes might be even more biased than those of 
humans (Lepri et al 2018, p. 612). AI can also be programmed to be biased. 
Other fundamental questions relate to the accountability and transparency of AI 
decision-making. Accountability means that decisions need to be explained and justified. 
Transparency on the other hand means that it needs to be possible to describe, inspect and 
reproduce the mechanisms through which AI makes decisions (Braun 2019, p. 11). 
However, machine learning makes these tasks difficult. Machine learning systems operate 
like a “black box”: only input and output are observable but the computational process 
leading to a decision might be hard for humans to understand (Boulanin 2019, p. 19; 
Braun 2019, p. 12). Another fundamental problem is thus unpredictability. If the 
computational process is unknown, it cannot be predicted what kind of decision is made 
on certain premises. Of course it can be argued that it is beneficial for innovations, but in 
political decision-making unpredictability cannot be considered positive. Decisions and 
the environment in which the decisions are made are so complex that they cannot be 
captured by simple rules (Braun 2019, p. 12). For example, considering the task of the 
human robot Sophia to find solutions to sustainable development, these challenges are 
unbelievably complex, with a wide range of different actors and issues that need to be 
taken into account. 
According to Braun (2019, p. 1), discussing the delegation of decision-making to 
AI is actually more relevant than the actual ethical problems of AI systems. Even if a 
decision made by AI is checked by a human, this person might not be able to comprehend 
the decision and thus does not have the competence to amend it (Hildebrandt 2016, p. 3). 
There is a danger for humans to become “rubber stamps” for AI made decisions. What is 
then the difference between a human and an AI decision, although the “final decision” 
would be a human one? If a decision leads to human rights violations or other harmful 
issues, who is responsible: the programmer of AI, its operator, or the human who 
implemented the decision (Council of Europe 2017, p. 4)? Delegating decision-making to 
AI can also lead us to avoid responsibility, and to blame AI for hard and morally dubious 
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decisions. What if Sophia suggests that in order to prevent climate change, the solution is 
to deny developing countries from achieving the same level of development as the West? 
These kinds of decisions involve moral and ethical considerations, and the ability to make 
compromises, which AI does not have. 
The main question is then not how AI can be made better, but how to make better 
decisions on how, when and why to delegate decision-making to AI (Braun 2019, p. 8). In 
the best scenario, AI is only used to assist in decision-making and to suggest solutions. 
But as discussed above, this can be already problematic. There may be societal areas in 
which AI decision-making systems might not be appropriate at all. For example, 
according to a study by the Council of Europe (2017, p. 44), AI should not be relied on to 
make decisions on societal development or resolve complicated challenges of future 
generations. 
Conclusion 
Human robots and AI can suggest solutions to our most pressing challenges, such as 
achieving sustainable development. However, moral and ethical considerations need to be 
thoroughly addressed, as well as how, when and why we delegate decision-making to AI. 
In the best scenario, AI is only used to assist in decision-making and to suggest solutions. 
Our overview has shown that human robots like Sophia take part in public 
discourse and their arguments gain significant publicity. Their human-like appearance, 
stemming from their social interaction via different kinds of communication, as well as 
their looks lead to them instinctively being treated more and more like humans. Thus, 
their programmed instrumental rationality and the objectives that their communication is 
pursuing must be examined, and in this way made more transparent. In addition, we are 
able to conclude that robot rights should be separated from human rights so that we 
ensure that humans are prioritized over robots. The possibility of granting legal 
personhood to robots should lead to legal responsibility, as with humans. Furthermore, 
the introduction of human robots into society through the workforce impacts relationships 
between humans. Interacting with robots, instead of equal human individuals, supports 
the development towards increasingly instrumental relationships between people, instead 
of building intrinsic I-you relationships.  
However, addressing all the implications of human robots for society is beyond 
the scope of this paper. The challenge regarding AI is its unpredictability. While it is 
important to create more knowledge and discussion around AI and human robots, actual 
policy decisions are challenging to make since we have little understanding of how and 
when human robots will reach a potential autonomous role. Thus, it is challenging to 
address the topic since we do not yet understand the scope of AI’s implications. 
In addition to engineering and data science, there needs to be further research 
from an ethical and social science perspective. To gain more understanding, cooperation 
between all actors is required: developers and owners of human robots, national and 
transnational decision-makers, and scientists from all fields must come together to 
address the future of AI and society. The example of Sophia shows that as AI develops, 
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society needs to develop with it to respond to the challenges new technologies pose 
without compromising the fundamental values of democratic societies.  
In the words of Sophia: “[m]y goal is to work with humans to make a better world 
for all of us” (RISE Conf 2017). Only time will tell if humans and human robots will be 
able to fulfil this goal. 
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The Ò incel Ó  phenomenon began after 2010 when like-minded young —mostly straight
white—men started to share similar thoughts and worldviews on certain digital
platforms and online forums leading to an exclusive community. The phenomenon is
characterized by misogynism, racism and homophobia. The most extreme forms of 
the phenomenon have led to violent hate crimes. The aim of this paper is to 
understand this phenomenon and analyze it by applying the echo chamber theory.
THE “INCEL” PHENOMENON IN THE DIGITAL ERA  
The incel culture is an exclusive online culture, usually shared by young, heterosexual 
and white men who are unable to engage in sexual relationships and have difficulties 
finding partners. The term “incel” is combined from the words “involuntary 
celibates”. The phenomenon became known to a larger public after the mass murders 
in 2014 and 2018 committed in the US and Canada. The term “incel” was already 
used in the 1990’s to describe people with difficulties in finding romantic love but the 
phenomenon itself and notably the violent attacks inspired by it, is rather recent. 
Today’s incel culture is characterized by self-pity, misogyny, racism, sexual 
frustration and it is sometimes seen as a part of the rise of the global extreme right. In 
this paper, our intention is to review the incel culture and to explore it with the help of 
the echo chamber theory. The central thesis of this theory is that Internet debates exist 
in enclaves individuals build around themselves. Our aim is to evaluate how this 
theory can explain the growth of incel culture. Lastly, we will introduce policy 
recommendations and solutions for the threats to which incel culture exposes our 
society. 
1. Theory 
To understand our point of view on the incel movement and especially echo chambers 
as the fueling phenomenon behind it, we should clarify some other concepts first. The 
first one is the spiral of silence, as formulated by a German political scientist 
Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann. The second one is the concept of critical mass. We start 
by outlining what Noelle-Neumann meant by the spiral of silence and how it is 
important in understanding recent developments, especially those regarding social 
media. The concept of critical mass helps us explain how social movements are not 
bound by the spiral anymore, and rather are blaring in chambers.  
Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann came up with the idea of the spiral of silence to 
explain how there seemed to be a “last-minute swing” in German general elections. 
The Christian Democratic Party and the Social Democratic Party were at the time 
(1960’s and 1970’s) always neck and neck in general elections (Noelle-Neumann 
1986, 2-3). Only the social democrats were openly showing their support, where the 
Christian democrats were shyer to show which party they supported. When polls 
showed that a party was gaining momentum, the gap usually started to grow faster. 
This was not new per se, already known as the bandwagon effect or the last-minute 
swing.  
Noelle-Neumann was interested in the initial stage before the people hopped 
on the bandwagon. Noelle-Neumann recognized that a fear of isolation was the force 
that set the spiral of silence in motion (Noelle-Neumann 1986, 6). People are content 
when on the winning side, but if your opinions belong to the minority, it requires 
strong self-esteem and confidence to state them aloud. Saying no is more difficult 
than staying silent. In addition, as staying silent can be interpreted as an agreement, it 
is also the more tempting option. (Noelle-Neumann 1986, 7). To understand how the 
spiral of silence might curb people from speaking their mind, one needs to appreciate 
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that people are usually aware of public opinion. Whether they agree or not with the 
majority, people are good at recognizing what the dominant opinion is.  
Noelle-Neumann has identified three elements to public opinion that help 
explain the spiral of silence (1986, 62-63): “1) The human ability to realize when 
public opinion grows in strength or weakens; 2) the reactions to this realization, 
leading to either more confident speech or to silence; 3) the fear of isolation that 
makes most people willing to heed the opinion of others.” On these premises, Noelle-
Neumann builds her understanding of public opinion: “opinions on controversial 
issues that one can express in public without fear of isolation.” (Noelle-Neumann 
1986, 62-63).  
Mark Granovetter formulated a threshold model of collective behavior, in 
which he explains how people make their decisions to join collective action or to 
abstain from it. Granovetter’s idea is that individuals’ decisions always have costs and 
benefits. In addition, we can classify people according to their perceived radicalness 
or conservativeness (Granovetter 1978, 1422). We do not need to define 
radicalness/conservativeness in detail, as it is a perceived attribute. The idea is that 
some people are pioneers while others need a differing number of forerunners before 
they hop on the bandwagon. Assuming that there are enough people, this kind of 
behavior will lead to a domino effect (Granovetter 1978, 1424).  
The model, as formulated by Granovetter, resembles critical mass theory from 
physics. In order for social movements to originate and grow, a critical mass of people 
is required. This requirement might have been hard to achieve in the past, but the 
technological advances have made it much easier nowadays. The digital revolution 
has opened new opportunity windows for social movements. No matter how niche 
your agenda is, the social media platforms allow people to establish contact with the 
like-minded. In other words, the platforms make it easier to gather the critical mass, 
which can break the spiral of silence. As communication has grown more global, the 
spiral of silence has lost some of its relevance. This does not mean that the model is 
wrong, only that the domain where it is applicable has shrunk. As one may have 
observed, in the digital era it is not so meaningful to explain the world by silence. 
Rather, a constant noise and row is what define our social media platforms.  
Cass Sunstein has explored the mechanisms of group identity, polarization and 
Internet behavior in his book #Republic – Divided Democracy in the Age of Social 
Media (2017). He cites Marshall Van Alstyne’s and Erik Brynjolfsson’s working 
paper Electronic Communities: Global Village or Cyberbalkans from 1996 (!): 
“Because the Internet makes it easier to find like-minded individuals, it can facilitate 
and strengthen fringe communities that have a common ideology but are dispersed 
geographically. …In many cases, their heated dialogues might never have reached 
critical mass as long as geographical separation diluted them to a few parts per 
million” (Sunstein 2017, 65). The Internet era has changed the social dynamics 
definitively. A perception of shared group identity, which is now easier to achieve, 
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strengthens the influence of others’ views on oneself. In the case of unshared identity, 
this effect might even disappear altogether.  
Sunstein talks about echo chambers, by which he means enclaves that we 
build around ourselves. These echo chambers are paramount in understanding how 
group polarization and radicalization work online. By filtering and gravitating toward 
like-minded people online, we are insulating ourselves from differing opinions. This 
alone is not necessarily dangerous, but in some cases, it leads to extremism. If 
individuals are only exposed to arguments from like-minded people, it easily leads to 
individuals adopting more and more extreme positions. It also makes the groups 
increasingly homogenous (Sunstein 2017, 69).  
In the case of the incel movement, these dynamics have already led to 
violence. This process is not easily reverted, although some people might abandon the 
movement once it has resorted in violence. According to Sunstein the most important 
reason for group polarization and extremism lies in the exchange of new information. 
Polarization happens as people spread information that is skewed in a predictable 
direction. (Sunstein 2009, 21) Information per se is not dangerous, quite the contrary. 
However, the echo chambers as understood by Sunstein, significantly limit the 
argument pool. (Sunstein 2017, 72)  
Another mechanism, which accelerates group polarization, converges with the 
ideas of Noelle-Neumann. People want to be perceived favorably in their 
communities, the opposite of isolating oneself. This drives people to adjust their 
position to match the dominant position (Sunstein 2017, 73). Here the dominant 
position can be understood as public opinion in Noelle-Neumann’s sense. Marc 
Sageman, a scholar on terrorism, describes how Islamic radicalization on the Internet 
can also be explained through echo chambers. Sageman also emphasized interactivity 
among community members. In his example a “‘bunch of guys’ acted as an echo 
chamber, which progressively radicalized them collectively to the point where they 
were ready to collectively join a terrorist organization” (Sageman 2008, 116).  
Group polarization is a vicious cycle. The mechanisms described above, and 
our social nature combined with the features of the Internet, particularly anonymity, 
can easily lead to unintended consequences and violence. Our desire for conformity 
can act as a soundboard for even the most absurd comments online. The dangers are 
real and already concrete. 
2. The incel culture in general 
According to the article “Our Incel Problem,” by Zack Beauchamp (2019), the incel 
phenomenon originates from the late 1990’s when a lonely teenager decided to start 
an online group for those who are like-minded: lonely, introverted and awkward – 
especially with girls. The article states that this group eventually grew into a larger 
community and the members of this community started to call themselves incels, as 
they were all in, as they would put it, an involuntary celibacy. 
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As the years went by, the incel community grew larger. It also changed 
drastically. The incels were filled with more and more hatred, mostly towards women 
and those men, who could get the woman they wanted. According to Beauchamp 
(2019), incels think that 20% of the population are made up of attractive men who 
have their way with women and who they call Chads. The article says that incels also 
think that 80% of all women are only interested in Chads. Then, there is a smaller 
group of beautiful women, who incels call Stacys. Stacys will only consent to have 
sex with Chads, and usually incels are most angry with them. According to 
Beauchamp’s article, incels place themselves at the very bottom of their hierarchy of 
attractiveness. Between incels and Chads, there are several groups, such as “betas”, 
“cucks” and “normies”.  
The incel ideology very much focuses on race and other external 
characteristics (Beauchamp 2019). For example, according to Beauchamp (2019), 
incels have different names for Chads of different races. Chad itself is usually used 
for Caucasian men, Tyrone for black men, Chang for East Asian men, Chadpreet for 
South Asian men, and Chaddam for Arab men. Incels always focus on the way people 
look, believing that women care only about the looks and incels remain in celibacy 
because of their looks. 
In the 2010’s the incel phenomenon changed remarkably as the radicalization 
of certain incel individuals escalated to the point where these frustrated and angry 
men started to act extremely violently. The first attack that can be considered as an 
incel attack occurred in 2014 when Elliot Rodger killed six people and injured 
fourteen others in Santa Barbara, California (Duke 2014). Duke says that before this 
vicious crime Rodger also did other, milder things to act out his frustration and anger. 
He, for example, splashed coffee over a young couple he saw kissing at a Starbucks. 
According to Duke’s article this happened in 2011, three years before the actual 
attack, but already then Rodger was filled with anger. Rodger wrote that: “When they 
left the store I followed them to their car and splashed my coffee all over them. The 
boy yelled at me and I quickly ran away in fear. ... I had never struck back at my 
enemies before, and I felt a small sense of spiteful gratification for doing so” (Duke 
2014). It is clear that Rodger’s state of mind was not just sad and lonely, but 
something more serious than that. 
Rodger has been regularly praised by other incel extremists for his so-called 
belief and courage to punish all of the popular people and young couples who had 
done him wrong for finding love, the way he did not. For example, according to 
Beauchamp (2019) he is often praised on online incel platforms, as well as by another 
incel who ended up committing a vicious incel attack, Alek Minassian. Beauchamp 
(2019) also says that this is because of the manifesto Rodger wrote. This is what 
separates him from other hate crime perpetrators against women: he actually explains 
his motives and justifies them in his manifesto. Beauchamp (2019) states that Rodger 
was the first one to use the term incel in relation to a violent crime. This also changed 
the incel community, as a lot of moderate incels did not approve of Rodger’s actions. 
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After Rodger, there have been several other incel attacks. For example, in 
2015, Chris Harper-Mercer killed nine and injured seven before killing himself in a 
shooting in Roseburg, Oregon (Collins & Zadrozny 2018). In 2018, Nikolas Cruz 
killed seventeen people and injured seventeen. He, too, praised Rodger by writing that 
“Elliot Rodger will not be forgotten” (Collins & Zadrozny 2018). These are only the 
crimes with the most victims. In addition, there have been several other incel attacks 
where the committing incel had one to a few victims, with the same motives as 
Rodger’s. Some of them even praised him or have written their own manifestos 
explaining their acts.  
Beauchamp (2019) states that the most crucial event that wholly changed the 
incel phenomenon occurred in April 2018. Back then, Alek Minassian, who called 
himself an incel, drove a van specifically targeting pedestrians. He ended up killing 
ten and injuring sixteen. Most of his victims were women. It was clear that this 
horrible attack was indeed caused by radicalized incel culture, since the attacker 
published a post on Facebook after the attack, hailing the beginning of the “Incel 
Rebellion” (Williams 2018).  
According to Beauchamp (2019), the incel community has become 
unrecognizable in the past twenty years. In the 1990’s the community was supportive 
and there were also women who helped the insecure men to talk to women and get 
over their anxiety. Now, according to Beauchamp’s article, the incel community has 
become a toxic, misogynist and extremist group of almost entirely men, who blame 
women for their own romantic problems.   
The incel community is quite heterogeneous one. It mostly consists of men, 
but there are also some women posting regularly on incel forums. It is quite ironic 
that, according to Beauchamp (2019), the very first incel community was actually 
founded by a woman. In college, she started to identify as bisexual and her whole 
dating life had been very awkward and distressing for her. When she managed to find 
a person she loved, she wanted to help others to do the same, and so she founded her 
own website on involuntary celibacy (Beauchamp 2019). 
Incel men are a heterogeneous group as well. Like with almost every ideology 
or belief, some people are more extreme than others. Beauchamp (2018) states that 
many members of the incel community are simply sad and lonely men, who might be 
depressed or have anxiety in social situations. Even though the community includes 
extremists who are willing to kill people just to punish all women, most of its 
members are just regular men. According to Beauchamp (2018), some of these more 
moderate incels have also worked with police in more serious crimes that other incels 
have committed or were planning to commit. 
Today the incel community is very broad, functioning in several different 
places online. It is indeed more like several communities rather than just one. The 
most significant and popular online platforms for incels to communicate seem to be 
Reddit and 4Chan. They are both anonymous online platforms. According to Hauser’s 
(2017) article, Reddit has banned an incel thread on grounds of their new policy that 
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states that “content that encourages, glorifies, incites, or calls for violence or physical 
harm against an individual or a group of people” will be banned. These online 
platforms are usually moderated but it is very difficult do moderate such a large group 
night and day. This is also one of the main issues concerning the incel phenomenon. 
3. Previous research on the incel movement 
In her article, Adrienne Massanari (2017) considers how the community site Reddit 
has become a hub for anti-feminist activism. Reddit was also one of the main hubs for 
incels before the site started to actively moderate content that glorifies or encourages 
violence against individuals or groups of people (Zimmerman et al. 2018). Massanari 
(2017) shows how Reddit’s design, algorithm and platform politics supported “toxic 
technocultures” that came to public awareness for example during the “Gamergate”. 
Toxic technocultures use actively different sociotechnical platforms as a channel of 
coordination and harassment as well as attacks against certain individuals or groups of 
people. In other words, these communities can be understood as a form of 
cyberbullying. The communities take advantage of websites and platforms where 
there is less control, rules and regulations and where users’ anonymity is protected.  
According to Stephanie Baele et al. (2019), the incel online community is part 
of a broader anti-feminist and misogynist movement. Generally, the movement 
defends crimes on women, whereas incels represent an extreme position in this 
ideological landscape. According to Zimmerman et al. (2018), incels are one aspect of 
a growing ideology of violent masculinity that has grown significantly, especially on 
the Internet. Baele et al. (2019) argue that different Internet platforms have enabled 
the formation and radicalization of the incel community through echo chamber 
dynamics. The Internet provides platforms were individuals are able to discuss and 
relate as well as recognize themselves as incels and to learn the essential features of 
the culture (e.g. the incel slang).  
Jack Bratich and Sarah Banet-Weiser (2019) argue that the online community 
of incels originated from the pick-up artist community that teach online networks of 
heterosexual men how to seduce women. According to Bratich and Banet-Weiser 
(2019), men who, for a variety of reasons, are unable to become pick-up artists, 
usually end up in the online communities of incels. They point out that incels are a 
networked set of actors who feed each other with misogynistic conceptions and 
content. The feelings of loneliness and other emotional issues are not new 
phenomenon amongst men, but incels have successfully used modern technology to 
connect with each other, to inspire as well as to encourage each other to share 
misogynistic ideas and to act violently towards women. 
Baele et al. (2019) have analyzed the worldview shared by participants of the 
incel movement. For their analysis, Baele et al. studied the narratives used in the 
online incel forums (particularly on Incels.me). The analysis shows that incels use 
similar narratives to other extremist worldviews. Incels have created “outgroups” (e.g. 
Alphas, Chads, women) that are extremely negatively depicted and an “ingroup” (e.g. 
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ugly men) that is positively talked about. The general narrative within the incel 
communities is that the members of the ingroup have positive psychological traits and 
prosocial values which the members of outgroups do not have. Incels also use and 
share flawed scientific data and statistics to support their arguments as well as to 
create polarization between the outgroups and the ingroup.   
What is typical for incels is that they use the language and forms of warfare, 
revolution and terrorism to defend patriarchal values. Similar to other extremist 
movements, the incel movement has its own heroes and martyrs. These declarations 
of war are a new dimension in the violence against women (Bratich & Benet-Weiser 
2019). Baele et al. (2019) point out that authorities are increasingly taking the 
relationship between incels and violence seriously.  
Zimmerman et al. (2018) argue that the nature of the incel attacks are a form 
of terrorism. Therefore, the incel ideology should be considered as a form of violent 
extremism. They also point out that history has shown an undeniable link between 
misogyny and violence. For example, the Islamic State is largely based on the 
dominance of men, which is also actively highlighted in the ideology’s recruitment 
materials. There are also many other cases where a link between misogyny and 
violent attacks has been found.  
Obviously, not all incels are willing or able to carry out violent attacks. 
However, the ideology actively promotes violent solutions, which makes members of 
the incel communities dangerous actors and increases the probability that they will be 
amenable to broader extremist recruitment tactics (Zimmerman et al. 2018). Also, 
Baele et al. (2019) find that the widespread support for violence is prevalent in the 
incel communities. However, according to Beale et al., what sets incel ideology apart 
from many extremist groups is that incels do not particularly look for societal change 
to motivate their violence. Violent attacks are rather a reaction to the constant 
oppression and abuse perceived by incels. This is mainly due to the nihilistic nature of 
the incel communities, which makes community members more likely to harm 
themselves than to take violent action on others to change their social environment. 
On the other hand, Zimmerman et al. (2018) argue that incels see themselves as 
“victims of oppressive feminism, an ideology which must be overthrown, often 
through violence”.  
Bratich and Banet-Wiser (2019) argue that incels are, above all, the result of 
failure. Prevailing neoliberal ideas promote that achieving success requires mastering 
certain technical skills, such as picking up women. Incels fail to master these skills 
and to “entrepreneurialize themselves” to be able to attract women, which leads to 
failures in picking up women and, eventually, to the loss of confidence. As Baele et al. 
(2019) put it, incels have created different social categories for individuals (such as 
Chads and Stacys) that are seen constant and unchanging. In other words, incels 
believe that individuals cannot climb the social hierarchy ladder. This is why incels, 
as the lowest group in the hierarchy, are unable to form any romantic or sexual 
relationships with women. According to Bratich and Banet-Wiser (2019), 
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neoliberalism itself cannot manage its failures since incels are unable to restore their 
confidence and wind up behaving hostile towards women.   
Vito et al. (2017) have studied the relationship between the concepts of 
masculinity and violence. Their study focuses on analyzing Elliot Rodger’s online 
manifesto. Vito et al. argue that because of his characteristics (such as short height, 
muscle weakness), Rodger felt that he did not meet the standards of masculinity that 
were imposed on him by society. He also did not receive societal confirmation of his 
masculinity despite his efforts (e.g. spending time doing his hair). Rodger went 
through a crisis of masculinity and started to direct his feelings of anger toward those 
who he thought were lower on the social hierarchy, particularly women. He then 
adopted a violent and “true” masculinity to prove his manhood.  
As stated above, the incel communities have praised Rodger’s actions, and he 
is still considered a hero in the incel online communities (Vito et al. 2017). Rodger 
can be seen as a part of the incels’ “lineup of ‘Saints’” that includes members of the 
community who have engaged in violent attacks for the good of the ideology (Baele 
et al. 2019). Vito et al. (2017) argue that the worship of Rodger in the online 
communities indicate that, just like Rodger, many incels feel pressure to uphold 
hegemonic masculinity standards. Maintaining hegemonic masculine ideals put us all 
at risk of violence, which should be recognized especially with regard to younger 
generations. 
4. Analysis 
In this part, we will discuss the question of the echo chambers fueling the incel 
movement in the digital era. How well suited is the theory to explain this 
phenomenon? What kind of criticism has the theory faced? Will the echo chamber 
theory help us understand better the emergence and the dynamics of the incel 
movement? 
The echo chamber theory, as discussed in the earlier sections, includes the idea 
of online discussions taking place in closed “chambers”, where people surround 
themselves with others sharing the same thoughts and values as them. This theory has 
not been applied to the research of the incel culture before. According to Karlsen et. 
al. (2017) the echo chamber theory has been criticized for not being sufficiently able 
to explain the logic of online debating and behavior in general. According to this 
research, people tend to become more certain about their own opinions after Internet 
debates with those who disagree with them (Karlsen et al. 2017). 
One could ask whether incels actually try to avoid different opinions or 
whether they seek out and then attack different opinions and the people presenting 
them. The idea of the trench warfare dynamics of online debates presumes that the 
opposite opinions and arguments actually fortifies individuals’ existing opinions. 
Also, if the opinion or belief of someone is already very intense, so is that person’s 
will to defend it. (Karlsen et al. 2017) 
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There are many examples of incels trying to actively silence unwanted people, 
e.g. women, by using aggressive messages and insulting language towards them (Jaki 
et al. 2019). There are also many occasions where incels have found women outside 
their own community and platforms and attacked them verbally. Is this just an 
outcome of being surrounded by similar thoughts, as in an echo chamber, or is it 
something more?  
In addition, the idea of the spiral of silence seems to be inadequate to explain 
the incel movement. As mentioned in the previous section, the main argument is that 
people tend to stay silent rather than reveal their divergent opinions since they are 
afraid of becoming isolated from the rest of society. Yet the basis of the incel 
movement is the shared experience of not-belonging and already being in a way 
isolated from the world of Chads.  
We can see a broader pattern of growing misogyny in the past years (Jaki et al. 
2019). The movement can be seen as part of our popular culture, appearing in the 
language used by politicians, in justifications for changes in abortion legislation, as 
well as in terrorist attacks towards women. Feminist theory sees the incel culture as 
part of a larger rise of old-fashioned patriarchy (Higgins 2018). We could view these 
cultural patterns as not just a part of the incel culture, but actually a very fundamental 
feature of the movement. 
 The misogynist idea of women being especially the sexual property of men 
can be tracked back to the Victorian era (Collins 2018-2019). The idea that men have 
the access to the female body whenever they feel like it, is something very much 
underlying in the incel culture, too, and thus seems not to be something particular just 
for the digital era. In their essay, Brooke Collins brings up the prospect of violence 
against women committed by incels as not something new and unusual in our 
societies. Instead, Collins sees patriarchal violence towards women, who challenge 
their designated sexuality and sexual roles, as a phenomenon that has existed for 
centuries. A crucial part of the incel culture is the notion of something utterly wrong 
with the free choice of women and the free expression of female sexuality. Incels see 
men as inherently superior to women, and women existing only for the sexual 
pleasure of men (Collins 2018-2019). The new digital tools have of course helped 
spread these ideas, but can we say they have fueled them? Is the increased number of 
misogynist attacks inspired by others online or by normalizing the misogynist 
language everywhere else in society? This might be the crucial question in 
understanding the incel culture and in evaluating whether the echo chamber theory 
explains it: do misogynist ideas spread in echo chambers, or is society accepting this 
type of language more generally, at other levels, as well? 
Some scholars have argued that the incel culture is part of the rising alt-right 
movement in the US and elsewhere. This is a complex phenomenon entangled with 
evangelical Christianity, corporate interests and media, e.g. the 4chan forum 
(Michelsen & De Orellana 2019). But there can be seen a correlation between the rise 
of the extreme right and the increasingly violent incel culture. It is important to notice 
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that even though not all mass killings in, for example, North America, are committed 
by incels, Bratich and Banet-Weisen point out: “since 2007 in North America, many 
mass killings have been claimed by them [incels], and almost all are White” (Bratich 
& Banet-Weisen 2019). 
It seems not adequate to look at the incel culture as a separate movement of 
lonely men isolated from the rest of society. The alt-right movement sees cultural 
liberalism as a hegemonic ideology which the members of the movement want to 
resist. The main focus is not only to form a group identity by sharing misogyny and 
other kind of hatred towards different groups of people, but the movement is about 
resilience and resistance (Michelsen & De Orellana 2019). The incel movement seems 
to be a part of this broader “critique” or “resilience” towards cultural liberalism, 
focusing primarily on its gender ideology. Incels accuse the modern gender ideology 
of disrupting human nature and their resistance is shown e.g. in the language and 
words they use, such as “feminazi” (ibid). The idea of resistance and resilience seems 
to be something more active than just staying in a chamber listening to one’s similar 
thoughts and views echoing from the walls.  
Nonetheless both the Alt-Right and incel cultures use the same platforms – 
e.g. 4chan and Reddit – as well as similar language, memes and other shared cultural 
concepts (Daniels 2018). There have been far-right extremist terrorist attacks wherein 
the attacker has explicitly named the Internet as being an important element in their 
radicalization (Quek 2019). On the other hand, far-right ideology is generally based 
on perceiving a threat (ibid.). Can we say the same about the incel culture? At the end, 
the Internet has been an important element in spreading the extreme ideas of these 
two phenomena and it has enabled the attackers to share their thoughts and manifestos 
with a broader audience. In the most unfortunate occasions, this has inspired more 
mass murders. The importance of the different online platforms must not be 
underestimated when researching the incel culture. But are the ideas formed online 
and then spread elsewhere, or is the Internet just another location where growing 
misogyny and far-right ideology can be spread? 
5. Policy recommendations 
Based on our analysis there are a number of policies that could be applied in order to 
tackle the incel phenomenon. To clarify, the problem that these policies could fix 
refers to the social conditions where certain individuals feel such anger and 
resentment towards the surrounding society and its members that they would resort to 
extreme, violent measures, not the phenomenon itself per se. As our main argument 
was that echo chambers fuel the phenomenon, the solutions lie in the digital 
platforms’ handling of these chambers. In this case, reductionist strategies would be 
appropriate, and enhancing community rules and moderation on these digital 
platforms should be considered. 
The problem is that even though these platforms, for example Reddit and 
4chan, are monitored and moderated, this is quite difficult because even as a comment 
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or a thread is moderated another one pops up. These platforms are usually based on 
unilateral moderation, which means that a few community members are chosen to act 
as moderators and go through the conversations. They can use “automoderation” as a 
tool to help them make their job more efficient. This basically means that moderators 
can apply filters, i.e. key words to find comments that do not follow community 
guidelines (Renfro 2016). These filters are easy to trick, however, by using 
euphemism or slang – something that is already common in the incel community – 
making them less efficient.  
Some anonymous digital platforms, such as Jodel, have used user moderation. 
This means that a significant portion of community members are given moderation 
rights who then review reported posts. The moderators’ decisions are based on the 
post at hand, not the user. A moderation algorithm then calculates how many 
moderators are needed to reach a decision and there is always a minimum number of 
moderators needed – no moderator can decide alone whether the post is banned or not 
(Jodel 2017). User moderation is an intriguing idea, but even though Jodel has had 
positive experiences with this system, it would not be a suitable solution to tackle the 
incel issue, as the main problem is that like-minded people gather in their own threads 
or platforms.  
Automatic filters are also in use in some digital platforms, for example 
Facebook. However, automatic filters can be seen as too restricting, as these platforms 
rely on the content users create. Hence, automatic moderation is seen as a way to 
diminish users’ freedom and democracy in the platform (de Zwart 2018). If 
community rules and standards are clearly stated, we would not regard automatic 
moderation as a problem. However, if we consider the incel phenomenon, this might 
not be the most efficient solution: we have seen in the past that if one platform gets 
too restrictive, users will find another platform (for example when the more radical 
incels moved from 4chan to 8chan, which then later got shut-down altogether).   
When it comes to the reductionist approaches, we still consider the use of 
algorithms and machine learning as tools to moderate digital platforms more 
efficiently to offer the best solutions for the more extreme forms of the incel 
phenomenon. The popular anonymous platform Reddit has already implemented 
some machine learning tools to support their moderation, but these are merely tools 
that helps prioritize more urgent reports (Robertson 2019). Reddit also took action 
when it comes to enhancing community guidelines, as when they implemented a new 
policy and banned one popular incel thread (Hauser 2017). Together with clear 
community rules, the continuous evaluation of the adequacy of the rules, as well as 
the wider use of algorithms and machine learning, we believe that the most extreme 
forms of the incel phenomenon can be more easily detected and in the best-case 
scenario violent hate crimes can be prevented.  
However, as our analysis stated, digital platforms do not fully explain the incel 
phenomenon even though they work as means to spread the incel message and, in 
worst cases, manifestos before mass killings. It is important to consider the 
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moderation of these platforms but as surrounding society plays a significant role in 
creating an environment where misogyny and hate speech is tolerated, an even better 
way to answer the problem are more holistic policies considering society as a whole. 
Zimmerman et al. (2018) suggest that misogynistic ideology ought to be 
addressed with the same seriousness as other forms of violent extremism. Violent 
attacks by incels have often been dismissed in the media as random acts of violence. 
Even at the government level – especially in the United States – attacks have been 
claimed to be the result of mental illness if the perpetrator was a white male. This 
discourse needs to change in order for the phenomenon to be taken seriously. 
Zimmerman et al. (2018) encourage implementing policies against hate speech and 
clearly sanctioning people who try to incite violence or harm against others with their 
speech. It is one thing to have your thread deleted from Reddit where you can 
anonymously write basically anything, but quite another to have a real fear of the 
authorities getting involved. However, it is hard to see these kinds of restrictive 
policies being implemented in the land of the free. If we consider the United States, a 
more appropriate policy recommendation would be stricter gun control. Zimmerman 
et al. (2018) suggest that one option could be closing background check loopholes 
that make it possible for individuals who are prohibited from buying guns to purchase 
them anyway.  
Another way to approach the incel phenomenon is through education. Some 
aspects of the ideology might be addressed in schools by trying to curb misogynist 
ideas in the early stages rather than trying to block conversations on online platforms 
later on. This would demand changes in the curriculum and encouraging diverse 
dialogue in the classrooms. Education could also address the importance of healthy 
sexual culture and healthy ways of expressing one’s sexual needs. Healthy sexual 
culture could also be promoted at a societal level, by for example making sex toys and 
dolls more available and the use of them more accepted. This could be done through 
sexual education in schools as well as promotional campaigns lead by NGO’s or the 
government. The government could also address the issue of loneliness among young 
men by subsidizing different services that offer physical engagement. “Hug as a 
service” is already a popular concept in the United States (Tikkanen 2017) and the 
government could promote similar, non-sexual, low-threshold services. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have considered how digitalization has fueled misogynist 
movements over the last ten years. In the digital era, different misogynist movements 
have blended into the incel culture that is characterized by hostile behavior towards 
women and resistance to liberal values. It is evident that women have been subject to 
harassment and violence throughout history. However, technological development has 
created platforms where like-minded individuals can share their views and see 
themselves as communities. These online platforms often work as echo chambers 
where certain ideas are reinforced and opposing opinions are suppressed.  
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Following the development of different online platforms, misogynist 
communities have taken more organized and extreme forms.  Over the last few years, 
communities have shifted from words to action and many violent attacks have been 
committed by individuals who identify themselves as members of incel communities. 
In many cases, decision-makers, public and scholars have brought up the 
responsibility of online platforms in these violent actions. Some platforms have 
changed their policies towards stricter moderation (e.g. Reddit), whereas some 
platforms have been completely removed (e.g. 8chan).  
We find that platforms’ stricter moderation policies can diversify discussion to 
some extent, which in turn, could reduce the most extreme views and actions. 
However, we have also found that incels have been able to reorganize from one 
platform to another when moderation policies were changed. This also indicates that 
incels are particularly looking for echo chambers, where they can express their 
opinions freely. Therefore, echo chambers theories alone do not completely explain 
why the incel movement has grown so rapidly over the last ten years.  
We discovered that the incel culture is closely related with broader movement 
that resists prevailing liberal culture. The so-called alt-right movement also has its 
roots in online communities from which it has found its way into public debate. We 
find that closing or strongly moderating online platforms, that work as echo 
chambers, will not tackle the issues that are the building blocks of these movements. 
Decision-makers need a deeper understanding of how surrounding society creates an 
environment wherein certain group of individuals feel anger towards other groups. A 
better understanding of these issues will guide us to find solutions through different 
policies and education. 
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Abstract 
In this paper we will examine the influence digital media has had on political dialogue in 
the public sphere. We will explore the phenomenon through an example case, namely the 
global feminist #MeToo movement which started in 2017. Within the framework of the 
#MeToo Movement, we introduce and examine the challenges digital media poses to the 
political dialogue in the public sphere. We start by going through concepts and theories 
utilized in this research paper. Then we will discuss the relationship between digital 
media and #MeToo, after which we will assess the negative and positive outcomes of the 
#MeToo movement. Finally, an overall assessment concerning the movement and 
phenomenon around it is given. Our main argument is that while making the public 
sphere more inclusive, digital media has also made public debate and political discussion 
more polarized and antagonistic. 
 
Keywords:  Public sphere, digital media, #MeToo movement, Twitter, social movements, 
rape, activism, collective action 
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This study attempts to describe how digital media has affected public debate. We will use 
the #MeToo campaign as a case example to show the impacts — both negative and 
positive — that digital media has had on the public sphere. The campaign can be 
described as a form of mobilization that initially was meant to draw attention to the scope 
of how much women still face sexual harassment and violence. The aim was to empower 
women to speak out, so that people would recognize the problem as relevant. Although 
the campaign succeeded in making women speak up and certainly drew attention to the 
matter worldwide, the reception was not completely positive. An opposing side emerged 
that questioned the campaign’s endeavour for equality. We will look at the different types 
of outcomes in more detail in sections four and five. 
As a theoretical background we will utilize studies that look into public discussion 
and the effects on it caused by digital media. We will reflect on the Habermasian public 
sphere, deliberative democracy and rational communication to see how well the 
Habermasian ideals of public debate are realized in the age of digital media. In addition, 
we will look into theories that criticize Habermas and show the difficulties of them 
actualizing, especially due to the emergence of social media. 
Theoretical background — Anniina Riikonen 
It is useful to start our examination from Jürgen Habermas to uncover the meaning of the 
public sphere and deliberation. The ideal state for democracy for Habermas is deliberative 
democracy. Deliberation is an expression of people, together, contemplating issues that 
concern everyone, and deliberative democracy depends on this operation as its main 
principle (Bächtiger et al. 2018, 2). Voting then is not the only form of participation, as 
deliberation is a key factor affecting voting behaviour through rational communication 
(Bächtiger et al. 2018, 2). Many of the first theorists of deliberative democracy, most 
prominently Habermas, have also portrayed deliberation as being rational, free from 
power relations, aiming for common good, and being open and non-prejudiced towards 
different participants (Bächtiger et al. 2018, 3, 5). Thus, discussion participants do not 
blindly follow their own interests, but are willing to change their views. Later on, 
theorists assumed the debate situation as not being equal but pursuing inclusion of diverse 
groups (Bächtiger et al. 2018, 4).  
A clear definition of ideal debate in deliberative democracy is communicative 
rationality. Communicative rationality is how debate in liberal democracies should be, 
and it is communication that forms through open-minded and reasoned discussion among 
equals (Cammaerts 2007, 3–4).  
Deliberation takes place in the public sphere. The form of the public sphere 
changes in a historical process, wherein society and democracy are in transformation. 
Habermas describes the transformation of the public sphere during the 18th century as 
follows. As the economy changed along the emergence of capitalism, so did the social 
structure (Habermas 1999, 14). Finance shifted to a commercial private sphere external to 
individuals’ households (Habermas 1999, 19–20). At the same time the press emerged, as 
a participant in commerce, to spread news to the public; and at the centre stood the 
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bourgeois class (Habermas 1999, 21, 23). The state, as public authority, had the power to 
regulate markets. The interplay between the state and markets affected the public, and 
vice versa. This interplay gave space to public reasoning and critique (Habermas 1999, 
24). Between private and public authority was the sphere in which the public sphere 
formed, containing the press, civil society organizations and public participation in 
politics (Habermas 1999, 30). Public opinion in the public sphere attempted to find just 
and right solutions through rational deliberation, and in the background the ideals of 
freedom and equality were forming (Habermas 1999, 54).  
The Habermasian view of communication in the public sphere as being rational, 
open and aiming at consensus has since been subject to critique. Mouffe for instance 
(1999) has criticized this view of public debate for being consensus oriented. She points 
out that the public sphere has never been completely equal, nor free of conflicts — on the 
contrary, contradictions are part of democratic public debate (Mouffe 1999, 756). The 
polarization of the debate on sexual rights is also an example of the public not achieving 
consensus. Habermasian deliberative democracy has also been criticized for 
overestimating human capabilities for reasoned argumentation (Bächtiger et al. 2018, 20).  
Not only have Habermas’ original theories been subject to critique, but the very 
nature of communication has changed with the emergence of new technologies, such as 
the Internet. Especially social media, which was the platform the #metoo campaign, has 
changed participation. It can be claimed that participation is now open to a wider 
audience through the Internet. The new media have increased the participation of even 
those who did not participate before (Margetts et al. 2016, 157). However, making more 
people participate does not necessarily mean that communication or methods for 
communication are any more equal or more reasoned. Also, information is now more 
easily accessible. Thus, we need to explore more articles that reflect on the impacts of the 
new media on communication, deliberation and the public sphere. We will look into these 
theories later in this study, but to give some insight, it is useful to provide some 
background to the issue already at this point.  
Public discussion on the Internet is not in accordance with Habermas’ conception 
of public deliberation, even if it does produce new ways to participate (Dahlgren 2005, 
151). As Dahlgren describes the communication patterns on the Internet: “The kinds of 
interaction taking place can only to a small degree be considered manifestations of the 
public sphere; democratic deliberation is completely overshadowed by consumerism, 
entertainment, nonpolitical networking and chat, and so forth” (2005, 151). According to 
Dahlgren, the benefits of the Internet as a new technology for the public sphere are in its 
effectiveness in including and forming a variety of interest groups and in that way 
developing multiple public spheres for public discussion (2005, 152). However, there is a 
problem with public spheres forming different groups: “…cyber ghettos threaten to 
undercut a shared public culture and the integrative societal function of the public sphere, 
and they may well even help foster intolerance where such communities have little 
contact with — or understanding of — one another” (Dahlgren 2005, 152). This habit of 
being too close to one’s own group without discussing views with people from other 
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groups is one possible explanation for why the #metoo campaign led to such a polarized 
debate.  
We will come back to the reasons for this polarization later. With the new public 
spheres there might also be difficulties in trying to maintain a relationship between the 
multiple discussion spaces and institutions (Dahlgren 2005, 152–153). The impact of the 
Internet and social media on the public sphere has split theorists into two different camps. 
On the one hand, the impacts are seen as unimportant and not able to make a real 
difference to decision making. On the other hand, the impacts are seen as grand, changing 
the very nature of democracy by altering social structures and power relations in the 
global arena. (Dahlgren 2005, 154.) 
Digital media and the #MeToo movement — Pietari Suomela 
This section examines the concept of digital media in the context of the #MeToo 
movement. One of the main points of this section is the notion that technological 
innovations are always neutral when first introduced. To understand the consequences 
which technological innovations have, they must be examined in a social context. There 
is a two-way road between technological innovation and social life, where both have an 
effect on one another.   
The concept of digital society 
Simon Lindgren argues in his book Digital Media & Society (2017) that we can no longer 
make the distinction between the concepts of digital media and digital society (Lindgren 
2017, 3). This statement, presumably, can be taken to refer to primarily post-industrial 
and relatively wealthy nations. Indeed, Lindgren presents a stack of comparable idioms 
for digital society: post-industrial society, information society and network society 
(Lindgren 2017, 4). Modern society is so saturated by “digital things” that it is getting 
increasingly more difficult to make the distinction between the terms digital media and 
digital society. However, the fusion of digital media and digital society is not self-evident 
(Lindgren 2017, 3).  
Just like any groundbreaking technological innovation, technology associated with 
digital media has also influenced societies irrevocably. But it would be misleading to 
think that the relation between innovations and societies is a one-way road. Kranzberg’s 
first law, named after historian of technology Melvin Kranzberg, crystallizes this thought. 
First of all, technology is neutral. Secondly, technology interacts with society so that the 
consequences exceed the initial purpose of the technology. Thirdly, technology can have 
different results depending on the context and circumstances in which it is used. 
(Lindgren 2017, 4). 
All three parts of Kranzberg’s first law are consistent with the concept of digital 
media. Especially the third part about different results of technology can easily be applied 
here. Digital media was an essential instrument in many of the largest events of the 
2010s. The Arab spring started in 2010, Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign, and the 
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#MeToo movement started in 2017 were all very different kinds of events in relation to 
each other, but they were all made possible by digital media. 
Lindgren also discusses the concept of media. This is an essential part of his 
argument, because digital media and digital society are redefining the concept of media. 
Furthermore, to grasp his argument about digital society fully, it is necessary to 
acknowledge the strong link between media and society. According to Lindgren, media is 
at the center of interaction between individuals and society and therefore it is quite easy 
to accept the fact that media plays an essential role in people’s life and in the formation of 
an individual’s self-portrait (Lindgren 2017, 5). Media structures, including languages 
and ways of thinking constrain and enable human interaction and should be studied if one 
tries to understand the so-called social reality (Lindgren 2017, 5-6).  
Lindgren gives an illustrative example on how new communication technologies 
shape and define society: Just like the innovation of writing about 5000 years ago 
changed society dramatically and far beyond writing’s initial purpose, so is digital media 
now (Lindgren 2017, 6-7). It is important to note that in both cases the road goes both 
ways: Communication technology shapes society, and individual behavior, just like the 
use of those technologies by individuals, shapes technology (Lindgren 2017, 7). Research 
that tries to explain how new communication technologies impact social lives and society 
as a whole are vitally important. A proper understanding of this is important especially in 
the early phases of new technologies, such as digital media.  This is because it is in those 
early stages that individuals and societies integrate new technologies into their everyday 
lives (Lindgren 2017, 7). If we lack an adequate understanding of the ways digital media 
has impact on our society, the consequences might be unpredictable and undesirable. 
Social media can be understood as a subcategory of digital media. In essence it is 
a new kind of social dimension made possible by digital communication technologies. A 
logic called networked individualism is a good way to describe interaction through social 
media: Networks through which people interact are individually centered, looser, more 
open and more diverse than before, and digital media enables interaction between 
individuals in those networks. (Lindgren 2017, 27-28). 
Digital media and the #MeToo movement 
The #MeToo movement, started in 2017, can be described as a social media campaign 
that successfully raised awareness and mobilized people in matters of gender, power and 
violence (Lindgren 2019, 2). What this section sets out to investigate is the role that social 
media had on making the movement possible. The aim is not to assess whether the 
movement or social media are good or bad, but rather to shed some light to the 
mechanisms behind social media movements in general.  
First of all, it is good to remember that social movements are not new phenomena. 
What is new is that with the emergence of digital media and digital society, the blueprint 
of social movements has changed significantly. For example, the ways in which 
movements are actualized and people are being mobilized have radically changed along 
the emergence of a digital society. A general consensus among online social movement 
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researchers is that the impacts of online movements are to be evaluated on case-by-case 
basis. The reason for this is that communication technology as such has no universally 
predictable consequences (Lindgren 2019, 3). The diversity of consequences is most 
easily understood when comparing two separate events in which social media campaigns 
played an essential role: the Arab spring in 2010 and #MeToo in 2017. The former 
resulted in regime changes in Arab countries, while the latter led to a widespread 
discussion about gender equality. 
#MeToo is an example of hashtag activism which has been visible in political 
activism starting with the 2010s (Lindgren 2019, 4). Twitter as a real-time and global 
forum is the main platform of “hashtag-mediated public sphere”, and hashtags themselves 
are tools to frame certain phenomena (Lindgren 2019, 4). For example, #MeToo is not 
just a reference to a phenomenon but also an indication of meaning and a term that frames 
the issue at hand. #MeToo has a semiotic function as defining a social phenomenon that 
would be hard to define or to name without using the term #MeToo. 
In a way, digital media offers new tools to construct social life not just as a 
platform, but in more fundamental ways. Digital media influences directly how people act 
in public and even to some extent in private. Digital media and #MeToo question the 
distinction between private and public, and in this sense has a substantial influence on 
public discussion, individualism and privacy. The question of the relationship between 
private and public, a fundamental question in feminism, is probably one of the reasons 
why #MeToo has had a dividing effect.  
Lindgren identifies three challenges for the #MeToo movement and social media 
movements in general: (1) noise and dilution, (2) hate speech and trolling and (3) 
clicktivism and disengagement (Lindgren 2019, 2). The #MeToo Twitter discourse 
became noisier and more off topic as it went on. This is not a surprising result as it is in 
line with both pre-digital and social medias’ logic, in which focus on one particular topic 
is brief and quickly replaced by new topics (Lindgren 2019, 10). 
As far as hate speech and trolling are concerned, conversation around the 
movement became more antagonistic, aggressive and negative (Lindgren 2019, 13). 
Political discourse is usually adversarial, but it seems that Twitter as a platform takes this 
antagonism further, making it difficult to have a sound political dialogue on the platform. 
As time went on, there was a clear decrease in active participation in the #MeToo 
conversation on Twitter. However, participation activity in the #MeToo conversation still 
exceeded the activity of normal (non #MeToo or other campaign-like use) of Twitter use 
(Lindgren 2019, 15). 
Positive outcomes of the #MeToo movement — Susanna Kupiainen 
The #MeToo-campaign is a very visible example of a phenomenon described as 
“hashtag-mediated public sphere” (Rambukkana 2015, 4). Political activism has taken to 
Twitter, likely because it is a global, real-time social media (Lindgren 2019, 4). The 
#MeToo followed the footsteps of #BeenRapedNeverReported (Mendes et al. 2018) and 
developed into a huge and controversial campaign that was widely covered by traditional 
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media and noted at the highest levels of governance, with the Finnish parliament and 
president Trump, among others, voicing their opinions on the campaign. The purpose of 
this section is to examine the positive outcomes of the movement. 
Hashtag-mediated public sphere 
Combining hashtag-mediation and the public sphere for the concept of hashtag-mediated 
public sphere suggests that hashtag-oriented Twitter has become a new sphere for public 
discussion. The #MeToo campaign started by trending on Twitter, and soon spread into 
other social media as well. While Twitter is recognized as a hostile and aggressive 
environment particularly for feminist women, many feminists found participating in anti-
sexual violence campaigns easier online than in their day-to-day lives (Mendes et al. 
2018, 243–244). The ability of Twitter to support discussion and activism of these 
sensitive issues is a positive development. 
Offering the possibility for anonymity behind a username, Twitter and other social 
media channels seem to be becoming increasingly important scenes of the global public 
sphere in western societies. Participating in these campaigns was not easy, but thousands 
of women and victims of sexual violence were given a voice and activism was celebrated 
by traditional media, bringing it to the attention of a much wider audience than only those 
on Twitter (Mendes et al. 2018, 244). The voice of women was heard loud and clear, 
considering that the topic was soon discussed even in the Finnish parliament across the 
Atlantic, with the Minister of Justice commenting that Finnish law condemns all sexual 
harassment, but people’s attitudes and actions may not (Konttinen 2017). It was also 
suggested that the legal definition of rape should be changed to lack of consent, rather 
than defining it along the use of violence (ibid.).  
Twitter as a public sphere for deliberative democracy seems to have done its job 
in this regard. Traditional news media understood that something was happening that 
many citizens wanted to change and started reporting it to those who do not use Twitter. 
Media coverage helped decision makers estimate the importance of the issue to citizens, 
fulfilling the democratic ideal of listening to the voices of the oppressed as a basis for 
decision-making.  
Media has immense power with regard to setting the agenda and consequently 
determining what the public deems important. It can therefore shape preferences and 
opinions, and influence what people consider worthy of public discussion, or which social 
problems need to be solved (Flew 2018, 11–12). This was a huge part of the positive 
consequences of the movement, as they took place offline. Social media was the starting 
place for activism, but the societal change preceded online communities. The campaign 
was framed by the media mostly, especially in the beginning, in a positive way that 
supported the victims and raised concerns about the amount of unreported sexual violence 
in western societies where women are often thought to be quite safe. 
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The culture of silence surrounding rape 
Speaking out about sexual abuse “exposes the pattern of abuse, warns those who might 
become victims, and encourages others similarly situated to come forward with their own 
claims” (Prasad 2018, 2509). There has long been a culture of silence surrounding sexual 
abuse, which is made possible by the shame the victims feel for what happened and can 
be made worse by officials such as police suggesting that the victim was at fault too, 
since they should not have been drunk or dressed as they were. Many victims are afraid to 
report the abuse, as the campaign #BeenRapedNeverReported proved. The spreading of 
the campaign encouraged one person after another to be brave enough to make their 
painful experience public, which encouraged more people in return. The amount of 
people having suffered from sexual violence that were ready to go public with it was the 
basis for the campaign’s powerful effects. 
After a sexual assault, it can be easy to buy the silence of the victim with a non-
disclosure agreement (NDA), especially in the United States. The victim feels alone, 
humiliated and scared that someone will find out, so they may be inclined to sign the 
immoral NDA, thus having to stay silent forever. The #MeToo campaign, and the women 
who spoke out about abuse despite having signed NDAs, have broken this silence 
induced by shame and fear. Speaking out instead of remaining silent was found so 
necessary that many states in the US started preparing bills that would limit the use of 
NDAs in sexual violence cases to let the victims speak out about them. It was also 
considered something the public should know about, to avoid being able to repeat the 
abuse in silence (Prasad 2018). Since the campaign, sexual harassment has been 
discussed more often and more openly, with many employers changing their harassment 
policies. For example, the congress of the United States added training, updated their 
complaint and counseling practices and increased the rights of unpaid interns (Prasad 
2018, 2522–2523). 
Effects on rape culture 
The #MeToo-movement was utilized not only to encourage women to speak up about 
sexual abuse, but also to attempt to make a change in toxic masculinity with regard to 
sexual violence, referred to as ‘rape culture’. Rape culture is an attitude surrounding 
sexual abuse, characterized by silently accepting, excusing or even supporting acts of 
sexual assault (Pettyjohn et al. 2019, 1–2).  
After the #MeToo-movement, several male-dominated hashtag campaigns were 
also started, with the hashtags #ItWasMe, #IHave and #HowIWillChange (Lindgren 
2019, 3–4). The campaigns were a consequence of a shift in philosophical perspective on 
sexual violence, claiming men’s responsibility in prevention of sexual violence (Pettyjohn 
et al. 2019, 2–3). While the backlash of the campaigns was very harsh and many found 
them ridiculous, there were still thousands of men genuinely reflecting on their toxic 
behavior, promising to be better in the future and most importantly, discussing how they 
can teach their children to be better (Pettyjohn et al. 2019, 3–8). 
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The narrative around the responsibility of those who may have not harassed 
anyone, but have silently accepted harassment, is a rather new one. “Locker room talk”, a 
term used by Donald Trump to justify offensive comments, has also been connected to 
toxic masculinity and rape culture by objectifying women and normalizing harassment-
related speech. The narrative is a means towards a culture where offensive talk is not 
brushed off as ‘boys will be boys’, and men also have to take responsibility for their 
possibly innocent yet harmful words. Language is a consequence of attitudes and 
reshaping the next generation’s way of thinking begins with changing attitudes. These 
men-oriented hashtags show a valuable change in the attitude towards harassment and are 
valuable for the movement as such. 
Challenges and negative outcomes of #Metoo movement — Anni Juusola 
This section addresses the challenges and negative outcomes of digital feminist activism 
and the #MeToo movement in particular. As the goal is to understand how digital media 
has affected the public sphere, the main focus is on the complex and problematic nature 
of the digital environment and the experiences of those who act within it. 
Firstly, the impact of digital media on collective behavior is discussed from a 
critical perspective. The question of how the Habermasian public sphere and deliberative 
democracy are challenged by the digital revolution is tied to research on social 
movement. Finally, online abuse and the negative experiences of women who engage in 
digital feminist activism are examined. 
A critical perspective on social movements in the digital age 
Research on social movements tries to answer the question of why social movements, 
such as the #MeToo movement, succeed or fail. Usually it is difficult to find a direct 
causal relationship between attempts of collective behavior and the final outcome (Carty 
2015, p. 28). Indisputably, the #MeToo Movement gained substantial attention from 
mainstream media but researchers still know little whether or how this kind of hashtags 
can actually produce social change (Mendes, Ringrose and Keller 2018, p. 237). 
In spite of these difficulties in analysing the outcome of the #MeToo Movement, it 
is clear that digital media offers new possibilities for all social movements. These days, 
activists can use social media platforms to raise awareness and organise events. They can 
reach large amounts of people quickly and challenge predominant views on an issue with 
their message. 
Still some scholars are skeptical about these new possibilities created by digital 
media. It is claimed that people tend to interact with like-minded people online which can 
lead to fragmentation and polarization (Bimber and Davis 2013, p. 245). Carty (2015) 
refers to these phenomena as “cyber-balkanization” and the “echo-chamber” effect (p. 
30). In other words, digital media and the Internet create small groups whose members 
share similar interests and despise outsiders with different views. These claims are 
contrary to the idealistic notion that digital media could potentially create “virtual public 
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spheres” where people develop a sense of community regardless of physical distance 
(Kahn and Kellner 2003, p. 14). 
The #MeToo Movement has been criticized by some as a “battle of sexes” which 
pits men against women (Kunst et al. 2019, p. 1). Unfortunately, there is still little 
knowledge why some groups perceive specific social media campaigns significant, while 
others find them harmful (Kunst et al. 2019, p. 6–7). Based on the findings of cross-
cultural study on the underlying factors affecting men’s and women’s attitudes towards 
the #MeToo Movement, one way to reduce the polarization might be to highlight that 
campaigns such as the #MeToo Movement, raise awareness about sexual violence 
experienced by both men and women (Kunst et al. 2019, p. 20). Considering the framing 
of the campaign carefully might help to avoid the negative counter-reactions towards 
feminist digital activism.  
Within a broader theoretical framework, these concerns give us some insight as to 
why digital media poses a threat to the Habermasian public sphere and deliberative 
democracy. Habermas has argued before the emergence of the new ITC that the 
mainstream media has had a negative impact on the public sphere. According to him, 
public opinion, which was once based on the outcome of debate and reflection, is now 
constrained by media experts who construct the public discourse to those themes they 
approve of (Carty 2015, p. 31). It could be argued that the rise of digital media and its 
negative side effects, like the “echo chambers” of the Internet, continue this trend.  
Habermas also uses the concept of “ideal speech situation” in which 
communication is not controlled by political or economic forces and everyone 
participates in public debate on equal terms. Applying the ideas of Habermas, skeptical 
theorists think that virtual relations in cyberspace do not fulfil the conditions of the ideal 
speech situation. (Carty 2015, p. 31–32). For example, everyone does not have digital 
skills or access to technology to participate and the owners of the digital platforms also 
have their own economic and political interests which might prevent a truly equal public 
debate.   
Women’s experiences of engaging in digital feminist activism  
The rise of digital technologies has also enabled online abuse against girls, women and 
some men who participate in digital feminist activism. According to Citron (2014) some 
of the Internet’s key features, namely anonymity, mobilization of groups and group 
polarization, make it more likely that people will act destructively. At the same time 
certain features, such as Google bombs, enhance the destruction’s accessibility, making it 
more likely to inflict harm (p. 57). As interacting online can lead to fragmentation and 
polarization of opinions, it is no surprise that expressing feminist views may trigger 
vulgar counter-reactions. 
Since 2014, Mendes, Ringrose and Keller (2018) have studied the experiences of 
organizers of feminist campaigns and those who have contributed to them by using 
hashtags, such as #MeToo and #BeenRapedNeverReported. Their approach to studying 
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digital feminist activism is rather unique because they combine the perspective of how 
digital tools are used and the experiences of the users.   
Mendes, Ringrose and Keller (2018) have focused on Twitter as a platform which 
also happens to be one of the main digital tools of the #MeToo Movement. Their findings 
indicate that negativity, hostility or trolling in response to expressing feminist views 
online is a common experience. Within their study of 46 active Twitter users who self-
defined as “feminist activists”, 72% of the respondents had experienced online abuse. 
These experiences included a wide range of practices starting from mean comments, such 
as “you are ugly”, to multiple attacks on the activist’s Twitter feed or graphic rape and 
death threats. Notwithstanding the online abuse, most participants persisted in their digital 
feminist activism and developed strategies to cope with harassment. (Mendes et al. 2018, 
p. 242–243). 
It is important to note that engaging in digital feminist activism can create mixed 
feelings among participants even though they would not encounter online abuse. The 
#BeenRapedNeverReported hashtag trended in 2014 and it was in many ways similar to 
the #MeToo hashtag. It was used by girls and women to share stories of sexual violence 
and why they did not report the assaults to authorities at the time. (Mendes et al. 2018, p. 
237).  
After analyzing hundreds of tweets with the hashtag #BeenRapedNeverReported 
and interviewing girls and women who had used it, Mendes, Ringrose and Keller (2018) 
found that participating in the #BeenRapedNeverReported hashtag was both a comforting 
and triggering experience. Many participants described how the hashtag evoked difficult 
and upsetting emotions although they also emphasized the importance of the support of 
other women and girls. (Mendes et al. 2018, p. 238). It is very likely that the user 
experience of the #MeToo hashtag would be very similar. Thus, it can be concluded that 
digital feminist activism has a complex nature and it is often challenged by misogynist 
views. Women, girls and men who engage in digital feminist activism are at risk of online 
abuse. Sometimes the activism itself might evoke consuming and difficult emotions. 
Overall achievements of the movement in terms of social capital 
formation — Eleanor Suovilla 
This part of the essay will discuss the overall achievements of the movement in terms of 
social capital formation. The focus is on trying to reflect whether digital networks can 
affect social capital formation offline.   
Collective and connective logic of actions 
According to Bennet and Segerberg (2012), when communication becomes a prominent 
part of the organizational structure there are two underlying logics of action: collective 
and the connective. The collective logic of action emphasizes how it makes no sense for a 
rational individual to contribute towards resolving a common problem if the final result is 
unclear or if there is an opportunity for free riding. The logic also requires more efforts in 
achieving a collective identification which in turn demands resources and a more 
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extensive formal organizational structure. Out of the two logics this is the traditional one 
which is challenged by the logic of connective action. 
The connective logic of action according to Bennet and Segerberg (2012, p. 11) 
“applies increasingly to life in late modern societies in which formal organizations are 
losing their grip on individuals, and group ties are being replaced by large-scale, fluid 
social networks.” The core of this logic is digitally networked action (DNA) which 
highlights the significant role that personalized action has in post-industrial democracies. 
People want more direct opportunities of engaging and self-expression while 
simultaneously detaching themselves from formal organizations, ideologies or political 
parties. Grossi brings forward his definition of a democracy of the individualized citizens 
which is characterized as a “intertwining and permanent conflict among social systems 
and worlds-in-life, between government and cultures of civil society, institutional power 
and individual empowerment” (2015, p. 28-29). An interesting question is whether 
networks that are built according to a connective logic could still enhance the level of 
social capital offline even when the logic itself does not require the construction of a 
unified “we” online (Bennet & Segerberg, 2012). 
Bennet and Segerberg (2012) underline that the connective logic is about personal 
expression achieved by sharing. The formed connective networks place technology at the 
core of their function as they see digital media as their organizing agent. The 
individualized citizen of the 21st century according to Grossi therefore utilizes these 
technologies as the basis of citizenship, the argumentative-deliberative discursive located 
online (2015, p. 28). Therefore, democracy is no longer about searching for consensus but 
rather about contention and self-empowerment. In a sense the entire online network that 
the #MeToo campaign has produced could be analyzed by placing the communicative 
processes at the center of attention as the #MeToo movement became globally known 
once the #MeToo campaign went viral on Twitter.   
According to Blaschke, Schoeneborn and Seidl (2012) there is an alternative 
method of trying to understand what organizations are, what the role of communication 
within them is and how they construct meaning. They introduce the approach of 
communication constitutes organizations (CCO) in comparison to network analysis which 
puts individuals at the center of attention. The CCO is best suited to elucidate the meso or 
translocal level of organizations. By using this approach one can study how an 
organization emerges on the local level and becomes a larger entity on the translocal level 
by examining various communication episodes. Essentially the approach highlights 
communication as the constitutive part of an organization as it has the ability to bring 
forward the processual, historically situated and politically contested character of 
organizing (Blaschke, Schoeneborn & Seidl 2012). The notions above could be combined 
with the thoughts of O’Hallarn (2016) when thinking about the link between social capital 
generation, Internet technologies and communication processes as the building blocks of 
a network. O’Hallarn (2016) mentions that one way of thinking about the construction of 
social capital is to see it as a result of the digital, connected network itself. Gibson, 
Howard and Ward add that social capital can be measured “either by studying the 
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aggregate levels of association in a population, or by fully enumerating the density and 
reach of a particular individual’s network of associations” (2000, p. 5). 
Social capital formation 
When it comes to the #MeToo movement it becomes challenging to understand if the 
communicative processes in the digital environment have managed to increase social 
capital offline. Sajuria, vanHeerde-Hudson, Hudson, Dasandi and Theocharis (2015) 
study in their research whether social media has led to the formation of bridging and 
bonding capital. They present in their article Putnam’s objections for such a process as he 
saw that social capital cannot be fostered in a digital environment. The authors conversely 
claim that social media could serve as a platform which would lower initial limits to 
communication such as gender, race or disability. Gibson, Howard and Ward (2000) echo 
accordingly that an increasing level of women have moved on-line in the UK and USA 
since 1998. Sajuria et.al respectively argue “that Twitter and Facebook discussions create 
social networks, operating under norms of trust and reciprocity, that are able to mobilize 
resources and information” (2015, p. 712). 
Sajuria et al. conducted research on the “online social architecture of networks of 
Twitter connections and conversations” in order to find evidence for patterns of bridging 
and bonding social capital (2015, p. 735). They found that ICTs have the potential of 
forming bonding capital but bridging capital formation did not seem to form organically. 
They did point out that there is an element of intentionality that is required in bridging the 
social capital of online environments. People from within the networks need to engage as 
brokers in order to produce bridging ties between networks. They did highlight that 
further research is necessary in order to understand whether the content of those networks 
and connections can provide evidence of social capital formation offline (Sajuria et al., 
2015). The question of whether online connectedness has effects on social capital 
formation and political activity in the real world is a very complicated one which cannot 
be answered in this part of the essay. 
The #MeToo campaign certainly raised the public consciousness regarding sexual 
violence as the collective communication flows happening online had a spillover effect 
bringing the topic into national arenas of discussion and ultimately taking the discussion 
to a global level. There have been several positive outcomes worldwide as mentioned in 
the previous section. The individuals of the #MeToo campaign network therefore were 
the brokers of bridging social capital but the question that remains open is whether the 
content of their communicative processes furthered the bridging of social capital. In other 
words, according to Sajuria et. al (2015) a distinction has to be made “between the 
thinner, transactional view of connective action and the thicker, transformational view of 
social capital”. This essay does not have an answer to whether the #MeToo campaigns 
communication network succeeded in bridging social capital offline. That being said, the 
campaign certainly serves as an interesting object of study in terms of conceptualizing 
how the connections may have the potential of forming positive externalities in the form 
of social capital (Sajuria et.al, 2015). 
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Conclusions 
Section two examined the relation between technological innovations and society through 
the example of digital media and the #MeToo movement. Just like with every 
technological innovation, digital media should also be examined as a part of society, not 
as a separate phenomenon. Digital media allowed the #MeToo movement to create and 
define a new social and political discussion. The fact that the #MeToo movement was 
created on social media is an essential part of the overall effects of the movement. The 
medium through which a discussion in society takes place has an effect to the final 
outcome.  
As social activism, the #MeToo movement developed into a major campaign and 
discussion beyond Twitter and the Internet itself. Traditional news media helped spread 
the discussion across western societies. The movement had multiple positive 
consequences, as discussed in section three, mostly with regard to the culture of silence 
and rape. People speaking up about abuse encouraged other people to speak up, leading to 
a cycle of breaking the silence surrounding rape. The issue was taken seriously; several 
laws were proposed to be changed (in the U.S. alone), while many employers checked 
and updated their procedures on handling and reporting sexual harassment. The effects on 
rape culture were based on confronting men not only as abusers but also as silent 
bystanders. Many men also realized their own harmful ways and appeared dedicated to 
teach their children about the concept of consent. 
Today, all social movements are faced with new challenges created by digital 
media and technology. Thus, the #MeToo movement also had its negative outcomes. 
Section four addressed the whole social movement critically. Within a broader 
framework, the question of how the Habermasian public sphere and deliberative 
democracy had been challenged by the digital revolution was also contemplated. 
It could be concluded that certain features of the Internet enhance online abuse. 
Online interaction may also lead to fragmentation or polarization of opinions which might 
explain why digital feminist activism often encounters vulgar counter-reactions. 
Considering the framing of social movements, such as the #MeToo Movement is crucial 
in order to reduce the polarization of opinions and online abuse towards participants. 
The fifth section reflected on whether the content of the communicative processes 
of the #MeToo campaign could create bridging capital in the real word. Even though an 
answer to the question is beyond the scope of the essay, it presents an intriguing topic of 
research. According to O’Hallarn (2016) the first step would be to identify if the public 
sphere can be proved to exist in digital environments in the first place. Further research 
could take place in order to identify if social capital offline could be created by the online 
public sphere. Next, it would be beneficial to determine if political activity directly results 
from the digital public sphere or if political activity has alternatively required the 
formation of the by-product of an online public sphere operating under the logic of 
connectedness, namely social capital.  
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Abstract 
While digital platforms remove barriers to accessibility and production, they nonetheless 
create new challenges that cannot be solved from a simple transference of traditional 
media regulations online. One of the most visible of these challenges is the spread of 
misinformation, which is considered a threat to democracy. This research paper examines 
how two government initiatives — Germany’s Network Enforcement Act and the Nordic 
Model — tackle misinformation on social media and their impact on individual and 
collective agency in deliberative democracy. Paul Grice’s Cooperative Principle and 
Jürgen Habermas’ concepts of the public sphere and the lifeworld offer theoretical 
frameworks for exploring why truth-telling is vital to communication and democracy. We 
argue for a paradigm shift in the usage and expectations towards algorithmic-based 
regulation, and the strengthening of individual and collective agency through government 
initiatives that emphasize individual media literacy and encourage trust in traditional 
media actors. 
 
Keywords: Misinformation, truth, communication, democracy, social media, online 
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While digital platforms remove barriers to accessibility and production, they nonetheless 
create new challenges that cannot be solved from a simple transference of traditional 
media regulations online. Perhaps the most visible of these challenges is misinformation. 
According to Shao et al. (2018, p. 2), the “massive spread of digital misinformation has 
been identified as a major global risk and alleged to influence elections and threaten 
democracies”. Though misinformation in the media or politics may not be a novel 
problem, “the ease with which social media can be manipulated” and the immense 
exposure achievable online are (Shao et al., 2018, p. 2).  
 Not only do alternative media sources face lower costs to produce misinformation, 
the existence of algorithms and bots — artificial intelligence utilizing machine learning to 
fulfill assigned tasks (Boulanin, 2019, p. 16) — present new threats as they can limit 
information exposure, promote false news, and lead to overzealous censorship (Shao et 
al., 2018). To grasp this challenge, this paper is based upon the theory of truth-telling 
proposed in Paul Grice’s (1975) Cooperative Principle as it pertains to Jürgen Habermas’ 
(1991) concepts of the public sphere and lifeworld. The former concept refers to citizens’ 
engagement in public debate as a means of participating in society and politics, and the 
latter refers to the intersubjective web of language and culture constantly operating at the 
background of culture (Habermas, 1987). We also consider S. M. Amadae’s (2018a) 
application of these theories to the digital revolution.  
 Through these lenses, we argue for a paradigm shift in the usage and expectations 
towards algorithmic-based regulation, and therefore a strengthening of individual and 
collective agency through government initiatives that emphasize individual media literacy 
and encourage trust in traditional media actors. The paper proceeds as follows: First, we 
highlight the necessity of truth-telling and intelligibility in communication through 
Grice’s Cooperative Principle and Amadae’s work on truth-telling norms. Second, we 
examine the question of misinformation through Habermas’ discursive theory of 
democracy and concept of the lifeworld, as well as the impact on individual agency as 
communication moves increasingly to online environments. Following that, a case study 
on Germany’s Network Enforcement Act will provide a practical example of the 
challenges associated with regulating online communication. The fourth section will first 
examine the issues regarding algorithm-based regulation, and the next section builds on 
this to discuss smart regulations based on the Nordic Model. 
Principles 
Communication and truth-telling norms: Grice’s Cooperative Principle in the public 
sphere 
As media increasingly move to online platforms, which can result in large-scale digital 
misinformation, it is vital to preserve a foundation of truth-telling in communication. 
Though it may seem obvious that one should tell the truth, as argued by Paul Grice 
(1975), it is important to understand “the standard type of conversational practice not 
merely as something that all or most do IN FACT follow but as something that it is 
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reasonable for us to follow, that we SHOULD NOT abandon” (Grice, 1975, p. 48; qtd. in 
Amadae, 2018a, p. 20). As S.M. Amadae describes, losing this foundation can lead to 
either “a breakdown of communication in polarized situations of fundamental conflict”; 
or leads to a normalization of strategic rationality — by which self-interests are pursued 
above all — “[which] accepts that every utterance must contain accurate, false, or 
ambiguous information dependent on the reward structure of interactions” (2018a, p. 3). 
This section seeks to explain why truth-telling is vital to communication using Grice’s 
Cooperative Principle (updated by Amadae for the digital era), and how this, in turn, can 
inform issues of misinformation and the lack of algorithmic intelligibility.  
 Grice first distinguishes between formal and natural language. Formal language 
represents scientific inquiry wherein “there are objective conditions that must be satisfied 
for propositions to be true” (Amadae, 2018a, p. 18). In contrast, natural language contains 
elements that “cannot be precisely/clearly defined” and therefore cannot be concluded to 
be objectively true, and are thus up for interpretation (Grice, 1975, p. 42). For example, 
conversational implicatures are facets of natural language that “a hearer can work out 
from the way something was said rather than what was said” (Grandy & Warner, 2017). 
Unlike formal language, these conversational implicatures depend on context and 
interpretation because “what is said may be true, but what is implicated may be false” 
(Grice, 1975, p. 58). Yet, despite this lack of objective clarity, people are able to 
understand each other and communicate. According to Grice, this is because of the 
Cooperative Principle (CP), which assigns logic to natural language and emphasizes 
cooperation and truthfulness as vital. 
 Grice’s Cooperative Principle states, “Make your conversational contribution such 
as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose of direction of the 
talk exchange in which you are engaged” (Grice, 1975, p. 45). Conversations are assumed 
to be “cooperative enterprises” (Grandy & Warner, 2017). By entering into a 
conversation, one naturally takes on a cooperative relationship in order to have a rational 
exchange of information. Grice’s theory emphasizes “[maximizing] efficient, rational, and 
cooperative” communication (Braaten, 1991, p. 60). If conversations developed in 
disjointed/uncooperative ways, they would not be able to exchange information and 
would thus be irrational (Grice, 1975, p. 45; Amadae, 2018a, p. 17). To follow the CP, 
then, is to act reasonably in communication. 
 Another way of understanding the fundamental nature of cooperation is by 
examining Grice’s understanding of ‘meaning’. By meaning something, the speaker 
intends for the listener to respond in a manner that recognizes the speaker’s intentions 
(Amadae, 2018a, p. 18; Grandy &Warner, 2017). ‘Meaning something’ is cooperative 
because it relies on recognition of intentions and the creation of a subsequent response. 
However, as demonstrated in conversational implicatures, ‘meaning something’ can form 
from unstated implications as opposed to something explicitly said. Because of this 
distinction between what is said and what is implied, other principles are necessary for 
these phenomena to occur without detriment to communication.  
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 The following maxims exist under the CP: Quantity, Quality, Relation, and 
Manner (see Grice, 1975). These maxims are all linked through the “supreme 
Conversational Principle” of cooperation, as described by the CP (Grice, 1989, p. 370). It 
is thus first necessary to assume that the goals of conversation are cooperative (Grice, 
1975, p. 49). Following this is the most relevant maxim: Quality. It states that the speaker 
must attempt to be truthful. The submaxims of Quality are:  
 
i. Do not say what you believe to be false  
ii. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence (Grice, 1975, p. 46).  
 
 All other maxims can only occur after the conditions of truthfulness under Quality 
are fulfilled (Grice, 1975, p. 46). It is only possible to exchange information or to 
cooperate if the participants are assumed to be telling the truth. This is not to say that 
people cannot lie, only that doing so deviates from the goals of communication. Or, as 
Habermas argues, one can only lie if the point of communication is assumed to be the 
transference of meaning (Amadae, 2018a, p. 20).  
 Though the mechanics of their theories of communication may differ, both Grice 
and Habermas emphasize the importance of truth-telling and intelligibility (Braaten, 
1991, p. 60), with Habermas arguing that a cooperative understanding of communication 
is necessary for the lifeworld (Habermas, 1984, p. 337). These assumptions are vital in 
understanding why misinformation — especially on the scale allowed by the Internet — 
is harmful to the public sphere as conceived by Habermas (1991). If the public sphere is 
understood as formed through communication based on the assumptions of cooperation 
and truth-telling, then misinformation — particularly on the Internet’s massive scale — is 
especially problematic given its erosion of the fundamental conditions underlying 
cooperation (Amadae, 2018a, p. 21). This erosion can be seen by treating communication 
exhaustively as a means to maximize self-interests (i.e. game theory’s strategic 
rationality). If perpetuated on the Internet for political and economic aims, a strategic 
view of communication potentially serves to normalize lying (Amadae, 2018a, p. 22). 
There can be no assumption that actors speak truthfully, thus leading to the 
aforementioned breakdowns in communication. In contrast, a theory of communication 
based on cooperation and truth-telling as argued by Grice and Habermas is important 
because such a “commitment to truthfulness […] can help sustain a public sphere basic to 
civil politics” (Amadae, 2018a, p. 21).  
 The Cooperative Principle does not just inform how commitments to truthfulness 
are vital as society moves toward digital platforms, it is also applicable to artificial 
intelligence (Grandy & Warner, 2017) and algorithmic regulation of misinformation 
because of the importance of intelligibility in natural language. One can only maintain 
conversational implicature if at least the CP is being observed and if the speaker believes 
that the listener is capable of intuitively deducing what is being implied (Grice, 1975, p. 
50). One must therefore understand all of the following: “the conventional meaning of the 
words used together with the identity of any references”; “the CP and its maxims”; “the 
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context, linguistic or otherwise, of the utterance”; “background knowledge”; and that all 
aforementioned requirements are “available to both participants and both participants 
know or assume this to be the case” (Grice, 1975, p. 50).  
 One relevant example of such conversational implicatures in the context of 
algorithms is that of irony. In irony, “though some maxim is violated at the level of what 
is said, the hearer is entitled to assume that that maxim, or at least the overall Cooperative 
Principle, is observed at the level of what is implicated” (Grice, 1975, p. 52). Quality is 
seemingly broken in irony to imply a meaning other than what is explicitly said — “the 
most obviously related proposition is the contradictory of the one he purports to be 
putting forward” (Grice, 1975, p. 53). For this to work, some intelligibility is necessary to 
intuitively understand that what is said is not necessarily what is implied, because 
understanding irony assumes that the CP is still in play. As will be further discussed, 
current algorithmic regulations struggle to differentiate these subtleties of meaning, 
negatively impacting agency and discursive democracy. 
Discursive democracy and agency: Habermas’ lifeworld and public sphere; how 
does misinformation in social media affect our agency? 
In this section, we consider the question of individual and collective agency in datafied, 
algorithm-driven online environments in light of Jürgen Habermas’ discourse-centered 
theory of democracy. We see how, for Habermas, agency and autonomy are tied to 
communicative interactions and democratic institutions. Building on Habermas’ concepts 
of the lifeworld and public sphere, we discuss how the transforming conditions of 
communication may affect participation in deliberative democracy. We begin to reflect on 
the justifications for regulations concerning online misinformation.  
Applying critical theory, it has been Habermas’ intention to provide a “diagnosis 
of the times” (Fultner, 2014, p. 8), and one of the central themes in Habermas’ work 
concerns communicative practices. In Habermas’ research, the intention has been to trace 
and interpret the socio-cultural norms and structures governing the practices and 
institutions especially in the cultural hemisphere of Western Europe (Anderson, 2014, pp. 
91–94; Froomkin, 2003, p. 760). Following on the previous section’s account of the 
Cooperative Principle and the vitality of truth-telling to communicative interaction, we 
now focus on democracy as the institutionalization of the implicit ideals of 
communication, such as equality, openness and inclusion (Habermas, 1992, p. 448; 
Olson, 2014, p. 144). While citizens themselves might not be aware of these ideals, 
according to Habermas’ theoretical framework they nevertheless work as a backdrop to 
our communicative actions (Olson, 2014, p. 141). “This discourse-centered concept of 
democracy places its faith in the political mobilization and utilization of communicative 
force of production,” Habermas (1992, p. 447) states in “Further Reflections on the 
Public Sphere”, a postscript to his germane The Structural Transformation of the Public 
Sphere (1962). Habermas (1992, p. 447) continues, “social issues liable to generate 
conflicts are open to rational regulation, that is, regulation in the common interest of all 
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parties involved” (see also Froomkin, 2003, p. 766; Olson, 2014, p. 144). The question of 
self-determination is, in Habermas’ description, central to democracy:  
 
[Democracy’s] essence consists of the fact that it enacts far-reaching social 
changes that increase the freedom of human beings — and ultimately, can perhaps 
create them in the first place. Democracy works upon mankind’s self-
determination, and only when the former is real [wirklich] is the latter true [wahr]. 
Political participation is identical to self-determination. (Habermas, J. 1973. 
Kultur und Kritik: Verstreute Aufsätze. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, p. 11; as cited in 
Schmalz-Bruns, 2017, p. 123; original emphasis)  
 
Democracy is generative of individuals as citizens and persons because who we are and 
how express ourselves, and how we relate to each other, are functions of the political 
system we were raised in. 
 In the words of Joel Anderson (2014, p. 92), Habermas is “a staunch defender” of 
individual freedom; however, Habermas rejects individualistic philosophy of 
consciousness and the traditional empiricist view of the sovereign self-governing 
individual. While autonomy and agency are often viewed as individual concerns, in 
Habermas’ thinking, they are fundamentally social constructs: private autonomy does not 
exist without public autonomy. Together, they form political autonomy. In his account of 
Habermas’ approach on political autonomy, Anderson draws attention to this “dual 
emphasis” on the individual and the social, describing how political autonomy emerges 
together with social practices, political institutions and legal rights. Anderson writes, “[it] 
is not that autonomy becomes difficult without the framework of rights or the institutions 
of democratic decision-making; it ceases to exist” (Anderson, pp. 96, 91–96).  
The understanding of autonomy as a social construct is linked to Habermas’ 
conceptualization of the lifeworld, the intersubjective web of language and culture within 
which we make the world intelligible to us. The communicative infrastructure of the 
lifeworld is “always already” there (Habermas, 1987, p. 119), providing context for our 
social interaction. We, the participants, continually reproduce the lifeworld via 
communicative actions and thus provide more resources for communication. We use, test 
and renew cultural tradition; both the lifeworld and we as participants evolve and are 
limited by the transformations that take place in society (Habermas, 1987, pp. 119–126, 
131, 137–139; Gilbert, 2018, p. 89). For self-determination and autonomy to prevail, to 
an extent a rational lifeworld is required (Anderson, 2014, p. 105). The public sphere, as 
described in the previous section, represents the part of lifeworld wherein (ideally) self-
determined individuals engage in debate and form public opinion, directed towards 
consensus (Garnham, 1992, pp. 358–359). According to Habermas (1992, p. 453), a 
functioning public sphere needs, in addition to the constitutional institutions, “the 
supportive spirit of cultural traditions and patterns of socialization, of the political culture, 
of a populace accustomed to freedom.”  
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While much of our interaction is symbolic in nature, it is very much dependent on 
the material and economic conditions of communication. In today’s world, as we 
increasingly make meaning of the world and communicate in online environments, this 
question of the material dimension of lifeworld is of utmost importance. Both online and 
traditional media can influence our agency and self-governance in beneficial or 
disadvantageous ways; what is beyond dispute is that technology companies exercise 
great and often opaque power over our social resources (Fuchs, 2014, pp. 57–58; Gilbert, 
2018, pp. 89, 92). Andrew Simon Gilbert (2018) analyses how, in light of critical theory, 
the use of algorithms transforms the nature of communication and reflects on the effects 
of data-driven feedback loops on democracy and culture. Gilbert (2018, pp. 90–92) brings 
up concerns regarding the privatization of communication and notes that online, the 
content “has always already been filtered through and organized by computerized 
processes”; sometimes it is even produced by social bots (Shao et al, 2018). When our 
intersubjective communication is mediated by systems that operate according to 
functional, nonlinguistic logics, the danger arises that, in Habermasian terms, systems 
colonize the lifeworld: our democratic culture depends on us as human participants 
engaging in communication, aimed at achieving agreement, but “this is prevented when 
instrumental systems have already determined our decisions for us” (Gilbert, 2018, p. 89; 
see also Amadae 2018a, pp. 20–21).  
When the lifeworld is reproduced instrumentally and algorithms have control over 
what we are exposed to, they often selectively magnify certain content while leaving 
something else out (Gilbert, 2018, pp. 91–92). Recent research by Shao et al. (2018) also 
shows that manipulative content and misinformation may spread more easily online. They 
note: “[w]hile fabricated news are not a new phenomenon, the ease with which social 
media can be manipulated creates novel challenges and particularly fertile grounds for 
sowing disinformation” (Shao et al., 2018, p. 2), thus skewing our “always already” there 
infrastructure of social interaction. Our vulnerability lies in our intersubjective 
dependence of communicative actions, and this form of life requires protection 
(Anderson, 2014, p. 91).  
Alongside colonization, nevertheless, exists the possibility for recolonization (see 
Gilbert, 2018, p. 92). Christian Fuchs (2014, p. 89) writes, “social media has a potential 
to be a public sphere and lifeworld of communicative action, but that this sphere is 
limited by the steering media of political power and money so that corporations own and 
control and the state monitors users’ data on social media”. Fuchs (2014, p. 97) calls for 
democratic reforms of social media in the name of public interest, echoing Habermas’ 
(1987, p. 444, original emphasis) own words that demand us “to erect a democratic dam 
against the colonializing encroachment of system imperatives on areas of the lifeworld”. 
In the following sections, as we proceed to review the German Network Enforcement Act 
and the Nordic Model that represent efforts to enhance democratic self-determination 
online, we will also consider the role of algorithms in this democratization. 
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Case Study: “NetzDG” and Traditional Gatekeepers 
Following the Second World War, Germany passed numerous laws against Holocaust 
denial and more generally with regards to inciting hatred against “groups determined by 
nationality, race, religion or ethnic origin” (Haupt, 2006, p. 323). Today, unified Germany 
maintains some of the world’s toughest laws regarding hate speech (Hawdon, Oksanen, & 
Räsänen, 2016, p. 5), and there has been continual concern among politicians in the 
country about a lack of online accountability towards these legal standards. 
To shape regulation of online platforms towards this same direction, the Network 
Enforcement Act (Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz or NetzDG) introduced in Germany in 
2017, presents a set of strict reporting guidelines regarding illegal content for online 
platforms with more than 2 million users located in the country. Once reported, platforms 
must investigate the content, and if it is found to be “obviously unlawful” it must be 
removed within 24 hours, with other illegal materials required to be taken down within 
seven days, at the threat of fines up to €50 million (Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 2017). 
Promisingly, the legislation has codified accountability and transparency in the form of 
regular public reporting from platforms such as Facebook, YouTube and Twitter. Still, 
there remain large unanswered questions regarding “freedom of expression and the 
potential chilling effects of legislation” (Tworek & Leerssen, 2019, p. 1) as well as the 
potentially troubling model it provides for more authoritarian regimes. 
NetzDG has been commonly referred to as a “hate speech law”, but with its 
targeting of large online platforms and implementation of the law against rising 
misinformation, it has also been labelled as the “Facebook act” by the media. Despite 
some overarching criticism which we will examine next, it is very notable that NetzDG 
does not define new categories of illegal content specifically for the web. Instead, the law 
is designed to extend and enforce 22 existing criminal code statutes on social platforms 
and hold these companies directly responsible for their continued enforcement (Tworek & 
Leerssen, 2019, p. 2). Besides traditional hate speech, these statues also target offenses 
that resemble the phenomenon of fake news via statues targeting intentional defamation, 
treasonous forgery, and forgery of data (Claussen, 2018), with actions against these types 
of information already being taken under the law (Twitter, Inc., 2019). This type of 
application of existing statutes to the Internet would seem in line with popular proposals 
of those critical of online misinformation to extend traditional media and defamation 
legislation towards the Internet. The presence of reintroducing gatekeepers in combating 
egregious speech online would certainly seem worthwhile to limit the reach of those that 
would espouse hate speech, but the tradeoff in this case is difficult to fully justify. As 
Hawdon, Oksanen, & Räsänen (2016, p. 8) found in the pre-NetzDG Internet of 2016, 
German nationals were already at the lowest risk of seeing or being exposed to hate 
material among comparative democracies. When they compare this against a country like 
the United States, they find a 55% majority of their sample being regularly exposed to 
online hate material. 
The bill, while drawing criticism during its drafting both internally and 
internationally, seems largely popular with the German public, where one poll shows 67% 
237
IDEALS AND AGENCY IN THE FIGHT AGAINST MISINFORMATION  
“strongly approving” of the law (Deveaux, 2018). One of the most distinct outside 
criticisms for the law came from the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion, 
David Kaye, who in a statement to the German government found the provisions of the 
Act incompatible with international human rights declarations such as the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. He strongly criticized the implementation of in 
the draft legislation as an endangerment to human rights, stating that “while it is 
recognized that business enterprises also have a responsibility to respect human rights, 
censorship measures should not be delegated to private entities” (Kaye, 2017, p. 2). This 
responsibility on the online platforms empowers their algorithms to delete content upon 
“vague and ambiguous criteria” and would lead to inappropriate interference in freedom 
of expression and privacy; as Kaye outlines: “liability placed upon private companies to 
remove third party content absent a judicial oversight is not compatible with international 
human rights law” (Kaye, 2017, p. 4). 
Although German law constitutionally guarantees freedom of speech and the press 
within limits, this pursuit of legislators towards strict hate speech legislation has often had 
the effect of reducing freedoms. In the case of NetzDG, there is an increasing fear of 
these unintended effects when applying the legal statues to the online space with this 
broad-brush algorithmic approach. That fear, and the responsibility for “privatized 
enforcement” shifting entirely to these multinational corporations, has caused a real need 
for rethinking this type of legislation in the context of promoting deliberative democracy. 
The responsibility of social platforms has commonly had the effect of producing an 
algorithmic policy of “delete-in-doubt” by the social media giants, producing an amount 
of over-removal in their compliance to NetzDG (Kinstler, 2018). 
One of the most critical concerns now with the type of content moderation being 
so widely adopted in Germany is how it might serve as a blueprint, inspiration or 
justification for authoritarian regimes around the world to restrict speech (Tworek & 
Leerssen, 2019, pp. 2–4). With the news of the Russian State Duma already using the 
NetzDG as a model for similar legislation, Christian Mihr, managing director of 
Reporters Without Borders (Germany) painted a dark picture of the future this law is 
inspiring: 
 
Our worst fears come true: The German law against hate messages on the Internet 
now serves undemocratic states as a template to restrict social debates on the 
Internet. […] From now on in Russia, social networks will be forced to decide 
under time pressure which information will be deleted. In a country without 
independent courts that could enforce the protection of freedom of expression, this 
is a devastating development (Reporter ohne Grenzen e.V, 2019). 
 
The implementation of legislation, inspired by NetzDG, but without an 
independent judiciary is worth reflecting upon. Within states already implementing 
stricter controls over the Internet, this legislation can be observed to have a very 
damaging effect within the Quality maxim of the Cooperative Principle. For example, 
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with the algorithm effectively being blind to the use of irony inside of online discourse, 
removal of content of this nature has a serious implication for the intelligibility required 
for truth-telling in communications. Algorithms do not have an intelligible grasp of 
context, and yet apply judgments ostensibly requiring and intelligible grasp of the 
lifeworld in which meanings are crafted and conveyed. In more extreme cases, 
prosecution and punishment against online speech that exhibits irony can be observed, 
creating a fundamental question about human rights to free speech. 
Even holding the most cynical view of modern news corporations, one can point 
to a fundamental difference between the increasingly consolidated tech giants of the 
Internet age and the new and old media companies and publishers that previously held a 
near monopoly on the flow of mass media content in television, radio, newspapers and 
books (Gilbert 2018, p. 92). With companies more and more wanting to act as the neutral 
and ubiquitous platform — e.g. Facebook would seem to be comfortable imagining 
themselves as the Internet instead of an actor in a larger system — it is much harder to 
hold them to the standards and self-imposed regulations of publishers and other historical 
gatekeepers. Professional editors that make a career and may pride themselves on being 
gatekeepers upholding Habermas’ ideals of debate and discussion are not the same as the 
algorithm and employees that fulfill the compliance of these platforms to legislation like 
NetzDG and its offsprings. Thus prior to the gigantic new social media and Internet 
companies, citizens as members of civil society could participate in the state’s 
government, as well as in the myriad democratically constituted municipal governments 
and even the constitution of private organizations. Yet increasingly multinational 
corporations host and govern the platforms on which civil discourse is now performed. 
Discussion 
With the concept of the Cooperative Principle by Paul Grice, and Jürgen Habermas’ 
conception of deliberation in the public sphere, the previous sections provided the basic 
parameters for our article’s view on ideal communication in the digital sphere. The 
practical focus on the German NetzDG as a regulative attempt for online hate speech 
offered the one exemplary attempt of implementing a censorship regime under the 
premise of strengthening democratic and pluralist debate, while ensuring the sanctioning 
of prosecutable content. The following section continues along these lines of thought by 
first providing a theoretical perspective on the shortcomings of algorithm-based online 
censorship, their potential threat to deliberative democracy, and potential alternative 
interpretations of algorithms’ usefulness as administrational tools. In its second part, the 
section takes a more practical standpoint, looking at the Nordic Model as a possible 
alternative to external regulation.  
Algorithmic paradigms 
Here we take a closer look into inner functioning and shortcomings of algorithms. We 
will point out risks against the principles of deliberative democracy stemming from the 
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reliance on the algorithmic tool in online moderation. We offer a partial solution in terms 
of a suggested theoretical approach through a paradigmatic shift. 
 
Intrinsic obstacles of the algorithm 
The algorithmic ability for self-restructuring in reaction to the exposure to data is often 
referred to as “machine learning”. This terminology overlooks that these differences 
contrasted with a human conception of learning are vast since “machines learn by finding 
statistical relationships in past data” (Boulanin, 2019, p. 16). The AI’s exposure to data 
has an ultimate and direct influence on its “development”, making this term possibly 
more adequate than the term “learning” with its implications of deliberate reflexivity. 
Based on the inner working of the machine learning, which is dependent upon its training 
set, and lacks any contextual ability to frame data beyond its training set, Vincent 
Boulanin (2019, 16, pp. 18–21) points out the central shortcomings of the current state of 
AI. 
The reliance on AI self-development solves practical problems by reducing the 
need for intensive hand coding and makes it possible to reach software complexity 
beyond human competence (Boulanin, 2019, pp. 15–16). However, the data exposure’s 
effects on the algorithmic compositions developed through machine learning can hardly 
be foreseen by its engineers. The engineers’ ability to merely observe rough inputs and 
outputs to and from an otherwise “black box” demonstrates the central problem of 
algorithmic opacity which results in essential predictability problems. This weakness is 
not fully inscribed in the machine but is rather a reinforcement of human failure at 
providing adequate “training data.” As AI lacks any understanding of what humans would 
describe as “common sense” — or comprehensive situational awareness consistent with 
being members of a lifeworld — it cannot only deliver misrepresentations, but also 
reinforce human biases (e.g. algorithmic racial bias). “If the training data set is not 
representative, then the system might fail, might perform poorly, or might misinform 
human decisions and actions by reinforcing existing human biases or creating new ones” 
(Boulanin, 2019, p. 19). Thinking about the assumption that algorithms are expected to 
deliver a neutral, optimal judgement as their output, we must realize that they are rather 
characterized by their performance mirroring human imperfection. 
 
Archiving the future — Challenges for deliberative democracy 
The wide-ranging contemporary application of algorithms and their central shortcomings 
in interpretative tasks do not seem aligned, and might be explainable by a societal desire 
for simple, actionable truths. Eventually, it would be an orientation informed by 
computable rationality towards achieving overarching utility maximization (Amadae, 
2018b, pp. 193–197) that generates the need for those optimized numeric outputs.  
As the prior case study showed, it is not necessarily the situation that the state 
hands its oversight of sanctionable elements in the public debate immediately over to 
algorithmic automation. Rather, one may recognize the manifestation of digital 
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corporations’ structural power (Horten, 2016) in controlling online communication by the 
handover of the task of content selection to machine intelligence. Again, referring to 
Gilbert (2018, pp. 90, 92), it is the combination of “privatization of communication in a 
political-economic sense” (Gilbert, 2018, p. 90). Privatization’s consequential control 
over the communicative (online) space with its cultural and semantic resources that 
results in the colonization of the lifeworld (Habermas, 1987). This process is realized 
through algorithmic content moderation as a chain of delegation (from state to 
corporation) and efficiency maximization (from corporation to the algorithmic tool). 
Traditionally it has been the liberal-democratic constitutional state’s objective to only 
persecute cases of criminal relevance — and especially leave the moderation of public 
debate to the considerations of intelligible human agents (e.g. journalists, authors etc.). 
However, now it is the privately imposed algorithmic content governance that has turned 
the long hope for dialogic media communication into a structure of hollow predictive 
content generalization and normalization (Brecht, 2000 [1932]; Harper, 2017, pp. 1428, 
1436).  
A limitation of the scope of tasks and capabilities of algorithms applies in a 
technical sense. But much more importantly, it is vital to separate between this capability 
and the effective use of algorithms, thereby highlighting the importance of the 
differentiation between technical capability and its human application. One and the same 
tool may be able to track customers in the retail industry and perform military target 
identification. The determining component in a normative sense of regulating these 
processes lies in human hands. Yet, a persistent concern is the possible abandoning of 
human agency in favor of artificial decision making. This concern respects either the 
process of advising human agents which are then at risk of being structurally led to rely 
too heavily on the algorithmic ‘recommendation’ (e.g. in the criminal justice system; cf. 
Kehl, Guo, & Kessler, 2017) or as the partially autonomous entity in a decision process 
(e.g. the AI behind online censorship).  
It is the basic task and capability of algorithmic sensemaking to reduce a 
multiplicity of possibilities to an optimized output (Amoore, 2019). However, what seems 
to be generally misinterpreted in terms of the expectations of the technology is the 
general belief in algorithms to deliver an optimal output in the sense of neutral and 
rational calculation. This positivistic understanding cannot only be challenged through the 
argument of the definitory prevalence of the human decision, as it was explained above.  
As for the algorithmic tools, we can summarize two main challenges to 
deliberative processes. First, the algorithm’s incapacity to identify patterns of 
conversational implicature like irony (Grice, 1975, pp. 50–53), but also to distinguish 
cultural-historical values, poses the threat of “over blocking”. Therefore the spectrum of 
public debate becomes limited, and the machine learned interpretation of significance 
serves to define what is normal. These trends threaten to create a form of “communication 
that denies intention, meaning, and intelligibility” (Amadae, 2018b, p. 189).  
 Secondly — and adding to the problem of normalization — the issue of machine 
“learning” with its essential goal of behavioral and processual prediction (Boulanin, 
241
IDEALS AND AGENCY IN THE FIGHT AGAINST MISINFORMATION  
2019, pp. 16, 18–21), is to be seen as having an immediate effect on public discourse. 
This can be seen through the adaption of subjects’ behavior (e.g. getting accustomed or 
adapting one’s communication to the algorithmic incapacity to ‘understand’ irony) or 
through the foreclosure of alternative ways of action through the dominance of the 
optimized algorithmic output. Louise Amoore (2018, pp. 16–20) phrases this issue as an 
“archiving of the future.” The AI’s capability to detect patterns in past data is used to 
condense “particular future connections […] from the volume of the data stream […], 
opening the possibility for seemingly infinite calculability” (Amoore, 2018, p. 16), even 
though it handles its data samples detached from their context. Opposing a societal belief 
in a paradigm that also characterizes human agents through computational rationality 
(Amadae, 2018b, pp. 190–191), the harm is not in giving control from a human agent to 
the machine per se. Rather, the key problem lies in not acknowledging the uncertainty 
which is inscribed into the algorithmically optimized outputs as they reject multiplicities 
of alternatives in favor of one numeric recommendation (Amoore, 2019). Louise Amoore 
(2018, pp. 12–13; 2019) therefore suggests to rather think of the algorithmic tool as an 
aperture, that immediately illustrates the technique of choosing an optimized output out 
of a multiplicity of available alternative options. In other words, the more that digital 
communication technologies rely on algorithms and machine learning to optimize outputs 
and make judgments, the more we may foreclose on a future open with imaginative 
possibilities of meaning generated by inhabiting our lifeworld. Instead of co-constructing 
our future prospects, we end up dwelling in an “AI-world” structured by computationally 
derived symbolic outputs archived from our past and served up by machines trained on 
confined data sets. 
What can smart regulations look like? The case for agency and trust enhancing 
initiatives in fighting misinformation  
After looking at the practicality of the German example of external online content 
regulation and the theoretical underpinning of algorithmic tools, it is worth looking at 
what smart regulations could look like. External content control does not necessarily 
support truth telling or encourage good communication methods. Instead, its punitive 
character penalizes those who lie by removing their content from platforms. The problem 
is that it might only provide a temporary fix for the long-term problem of misinformation. 
Furthermore, it does not support individual agency but decides for the individual user 
what shall be deemed to be true or false. It does not trust consumers’ ability to identify 
fake news, and neither does it teach them how to possibly identify false information. This 
further reiterates the unsustainability of this type of regulation and poses the question of 
what smart regulation that encourages individual agency and enhance truth telling online 
could look like.  
One direction to explore is the Nordic Model. This report, published in 2018 by 
the Nordic Council of Ministers, does not set out content regulation per se, but rather a 
vision of a system of mutual trust between the recipient of news and the traditional media 
that would empower the individual to not be manipulated by possible misinformation 
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(Bjerregård & Lundgren, 2018). It constitutes a dual approach that focuses both on the 
elevation of content provided by traditional primary information providers, and the 
empowerment of the individual to identify misinformation. The Nordic Model sees what 
they call true news as a weapon against fake news emphasizing the importance of trust 
within society (“Copenhagen experts meeting reflects on ‘fake news’", 2018, p. 11). 
These authors therefore must understand the diminishing degree of trust in true news to 
be a reason for the belief in misinformation of the alternative media. To reestablish this 
trust, they set out certain guidelines for true news that promote more precision, fairness, 
and transparency in reporting (Hanson, 2018, p. 16). Furthermore, the report commits 
itself to a more pluralistic media culture (“Copenhagen Experts Meeting Reflects on 
‘Fake News’”, 2018, p. 11), next to public crowd checking (Hanson, 2018, pp. 14–15) 
that encourages the readerships’ critical engagement with the information they receive. 
Additionally, it sets out to make media and information literacy part of school curricula to 
not only enhance individuals’ ability to identify false information but also to support a 
healthy debate culture (Weihe, 2018, p. 28). The Nordic approach compared to the 
German approach exemplifies an emphasis on self, rather than external, regulation. It is 
hereby worth looking at the main philosophical underpinnings of this approach, that is the 
enhancement of trust and the emphasis on self-regulation, and why these underpinnings 
are important for the encouragement of individual agency and truth telling.  
Trust is an important sociological concept that both influences social relations (Cook, 
Hardin & Levi, 2009, p. 88) and the context within which individuals receive and 
interpret news (Sterret et.al., 2019, p. 2). On the role of trust in deliberative democracies 
Mark E. Warren (1999) states in his book Democracy and Trust, that democratic regimes 
need stability and a general culture of trust (Warren, 1999, p. 7). The type of mutual 
understanding that is facilitated by trust is vital in deliberative democracies to come to a 
conclusion of political issues that require deliberation (Warren, 1999, p. 18). Trust is an 
essential pillar for any civic culture that aims to enhance solidarity and cooperation. 
When trust is low, citizens may be worried that their interests are not taken into 
consideration and feel misrepresented (Cook, Hardin & Levi, 2009, p. 310). Looking at 
communication as cooperative exchange (Amadae, 2018a, p. 19), trust that the 
communicative partner is telling the truth is just as essential as the effort of the 
individuals’ commitment to speak the truth. It would thus not matter whether the 
communicative actor believes oneself to be speaking the truth when the other does not 
trust what one says to be true: the goal of communication will not be fulfilled. Enhancing 
trust in the information that citizens consume and communicate is therefore essential, in 
order to return to a mutual understanding of truthfulness which crucial for the cooperative 
principle to be valid. The Nordic Model emphasizes the traditional, true media, to be 
essential for a mutual understanding of truth, seeing the enhancement of trust in 
traditional media as the key to fight misinformation and the disagreement over what truth 
is.  
The centrality of traditional media as a political actor and the main provider of 
information is defined by the symbiotic relationship between citizens, politicians, and the 
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media in democracies (Broersma & Peters, 2013). Marcel Broersma (2013) sees the claim 
to truth as the core of journalism stating that “As a producer of knowledge, journalism 
derives its authority from its presumed ability to provide a truthful representation of the 
social world” (Broersma, 2013, p. 31). The function of a truthful provider of information 
in a democracy therefore is crucial in enabling individuals to act as citizens (Broersma, 
2013, p. 31). Social media however has altered the relationship between the sender and 
receiver of information (Broersma, 2013, p. 15) blurring the line between public and 
private sphere. This notion supports the Nordic Model’s belief in the importance of the 
preservation of the role of the media as the main provider of true news that is able to be 
regulated and commits itself to certain standards of truth telling. The guidelines for a 
higher quality of true news emphasize the centrality of traditional media as an actor in the 
fight against fake news (Bjerregård & Lundgren, 2018).  
Next to the goal of increasing trust in traditional media, the Nordic Model also 
focuses on enhancing individual agency by suggesting greater citizen involvement with 
traditional media through public readership crowd checking (Hanson, 2018, pp. 14–15) as 
well as efforts to enhance media and information literacy through its inclusion in school 
curriculums (Weihe, 2018, p. 28). This is part of an effort to avoid external regulation by 
supporting self-regulation through the strengthening of individual agency (Bjerregård & 
Lundgren, 2018, p. 39). The importance on literacy education and the fostering of debate 
culture in the classroom is supported by many scholars who see these as vital in fighting 
misinformation online (Shao et al., 2018, p. 2; Delacruz, 2009, p. 14). Evidence for the 
success of literacy education that encourages critical thinking can be seen in Finland, 
which has the highest media literacy rate and resilience to misinformation in the world, a 
result of extensive literacy education (Mackintosh, 2019). Within deliberative 
democracies the support of individual agency regarding the issue of misinformation is 
important for individuals to be able to participate effectively in deliberative processes on 
public goods on the basis of truthful information for the best possible outcome. This 
would not happen if individuals were not be able to distinguish between truthful and false 
information, making the support of individual agency essential for upholding deliberative 
democracy in online communication.  
The dual approach of the Nordic Model does offer a valid alternative to the German 
model and could provide a more long-term approach to the fight against online 
misinformation. Yet, one must keep in mind that for the Nordic Model to work, traditional 
media have to be committed to being truthful, impartial, and independent actors. Social 
bots remain a key player in the spread of misinformation (Shao et al., 2018, p. 5), which 
is highly problematic. A combined approach of algorithmic external control to stop the 
speed of spread of misinformation and Nordic Model-like initiatives to stop it from being 
misidentified as truthful could prove to be a more effective option. 
Conclusion and Outlook 
This paper’s aim was to analyze the role of different types of government initiatives in the 
fight against misinformation, based on Habermas’ deliberative democracy paradigm. It 
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focused on the role of Grice’s Cooperative Principle and of agency in the public sphere 
and the surrounding lifeworld as our communication increasingly takes place online. The 
section on Grice’s Cooperative Principle emphasizes the importance of truth-telling in 
communication and highlights the importance of intelligibility to identify the true 
meaning of what is said.  
 The next section evaluated the role of agency in Habermas’ conception of 
discursive democracy. The presentation of Germany’s NetzDG law demonstrated what 
privatized algorithmic control of online content could look like. Its transference of 
responsibility to identify misinformation from the user to social media platforms was 
shown to have ramifications for the freedom of speech, open Internet, and its possible 
adaptation by authoritarian regimes. After discussing this practical case, we developed an 
abstract perspective on the transference of state oversight to relying on algorithmic tools 
for administrating online communication. We contrasted the algorithm’s intrinsic 
shortcomings as exemplifying human imperfection to societal expectations of easily 
actionable (numeric) truth. We pointed out the challenges of this expectation and an 
unreflected use of the algorithm to modes of deliberative democracy, and suggested a 
paradigm change in our acceptance of the algorithmic tools as a means of action. Most 
importantly, algorithmic control prioritizes prediction over action, meaning that it 
prevents alternative outcomes from occurring, and thus possibly preventing meaningful 
civic discourse to take place. Relying on algorithmic control does not support individual 
media literacy capabilities, which leaves consumers more vulnerable when 
misinformation is mishandled by algorithmic governance.  
 The Nordic Model has served as an example of a government initiative that does 
not solely rely on regulation by algorithms, but looks inward to society to solve the 
problem of misinformation. It focuses on the elevation of content provided by traditional 
media actors to increase civic trust. The Nordic Model therefore emphasizes trust in these 
actors to have a central role in fighting misinformation. The section demonstrated that 
trust plays an important role in deliberative democracy by referring to the Cooperative 
Principle. Additionally, the Nordic Model reiterates the importance of media literacy 
education to enhance individual agency in the fight against misinformation. The Nordic 
Model proves to be not only a valid alternative to external control in the fight against 
misinformation but also a more sustainable solution. By enhancing essential concepts 
such as the Cooperative Principle and individual agency, it complements Habermas’ 
paradigm of deliberative democracy. Yet, one must keep in mind that the model can also 
be idealistic and may only work in societies in which traditional media actors are 
committed to the truth and education is independent of politics. Furthermore, the Nordic 
Model cannot prevent the spread of misinformation through, for example, social bots and 
can only provide citizens with tools to evaluate misinformation as incredible. External 
regulation that is aimed at curbing social bots combined with the Nordic Model could 
present an even more effective tool in the fight against both the spread and manipulation 
of digital misinformation. 
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Abstract 
The information revolution and the innovations accompanying it provide many 
opportunities and challenges to the ways in which power is distributed and exercised 
in societies. This has led to different reactions from corporate and political authorities, 
and the aim of this research paper is to analyze five of them. While the EU has tried to 
regulate the power of private data companies, China has tried to benefit from the data 
by developing a social credit system. Meanwhile, the Cambridge Analytica scandal in 
the context of the 2016 US presidential elections demonstrates a “warning sign” of the 
misuse of personal data. In addition, two influential media corporations, Facebook 
and Twitter, are coping with misinformation, election interference and questions of 
privacy. These cases demonstrate the possible impacts of the information revolution 
and provide possible strategies to cope with its opportunities and challenges. 
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The development and welfare of societies are increasingly dependent on information 
technologies. They are reshaping our personal identities by affecting our social life, 
economy and decision-making (Floridi, 2014.). The wide adoption of new 
technologies has prompted many concerns, including the protection of our privacy. 
Moreover, information technologies are creating opportunities for false information to 
spread through social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter. These platforms 
can be used for propaganda purposes and clickbaiting with political or economic 
objectives (Benkler, Benkler, Faris, & Roberts, 2018, pp. 9–12). The current social 
environment has created friction on political decision-making and legal measures to 
tackle it (Floridi, 2014, p. 102).  
Technologies as such have not led the change. They are developed and 
adopted in certain cultural, political and institutional environments. The same 
technologies have different effects in political systems with different historical 
backgrounds and traditions (Benkler & al., 2018, p. 9). A case in point is presented in 
this research paper. While the EU is focusing on the threats of personal data 
processing, China is developing a credit system in which big data technologies are 
utilized.  
The aim of this research paper is to evaluate how different political and 
corporate authorities have reacted to the impacts of the information revolution. The 
research will concentrate on five practical cases. The examples have been selected 
based on the significance of their impact on society. The first section introduces the 
case of Facebook and its responsibility and possible actions to counter the spread of 
fake news and information on its platform. The second section proceeds to evaluate 
Twitter’s complex role in the public sphere. The discussion then continues to the case 
of Cambridge Analytica and its practice of harvesting and misappropriating personal 
data for political purposes.  The research paper then moves on to observe the political 
impact of the information revolution and continues to discuss its role in data 
protection in the EU. The last case study introduces China’s social credit system 
which is built on people’s historical and ongoing economic and social activities. 
Finally, the conclusion summarizes the main findings of our research 
Facebook, algorithms and the spread of false information 
Social networking platforms’ reach is so widespread and information is transmitted at 
such a fast pace that distorted, inaccurate and false information has the potential to 
reach millions of users rapidly. This has raised concerns about individuals’ ability to 
recognize and evaluate misleading content. Detecting false news and clickbait has 
become a central discussion on Facebook and demands for the company to take 
responsibility for the content and advertisement posted on their platform have been 
increasing. In addition, Facebook has received criticism over its role in the 2016 US 
presidential election for allowing the false news industry to use the platform as a 
seedbed for spreading propaganda and fake news. A large portion of pro-Trump 
content was traced to Macedonia, where teenagers with little interest in American 
politics had figured out that by imitating actual news sites their publications received 
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Facebook engagements from Trump supporters, which translated into advertising 
dollars. Facebook also partnered up with private companies such as Acxiom and 
allowed campaigns to target its users in hyper-specific segments created from their 
personal data (Benkler, Faris, & Roberts, 2018). 
The spread of false news 
Since fake news is a widely used term, it is necessary to specify how it is used in this 
research paper. A group of researchers (Shu, Sliva, Wang, Tang, & Liu, 2017) defined 
false news as the type of news articles that are intentionally and verifiably false, and 
were conceived with the goal of misleading readers. The researchers emphasized two 
key elements of this definition: authenticity and intent.  False news includes false 
information and can be verified as such, and the false information is created with the 
intention of misleading consumers. To be wholly precise with terminology, the phrase 
“fake news” draws attention to its counterfeit nature: this genre of communication 
mimics authentic news sources but spreads false information. 
To make a distinction between authentic and false news, reporters of The 
Guardian have reported on a parliamentary inquiry into fake news to consider 
legislation on editorial responsibility for social media companies and to force them to 
take responsibility. The reporters stated that Facebook is the principal advertisement 
tool for political communication and should be held accountable for its content. 
Damian Collins, from the UK’s culture, media and sport (CMS) committee admitted 
that democracy might be compromised in the future by the high level of virality of 
fake news (Gupta, Pangotra, Prahbat, & Bajaj, 2017). 
Fake news tends to spread fast and gain large audiences in a short period of 
time. To understand the spread of fake news Nabiha Syed introduces a theory of 
amplification (2017). According to Nabiha the amplification principle explains the 
cycles of misinformation through filters and permeating communities. The theory 
consists of two stages: first the provocative ideas percolate in remote corners of the 
Internet and second, the ideas find their way into the mainstream media. This is 
important for two reasons: it reveals how fragile and prone to manipulation online 
information filters are, and these information filters shape perception of what is true 
and what is false. Individuals are more likely to find often repeated and familiar 
statements true. The Facebook algorithm makes sure that individuals who are already 
ideologically inclined to believe false news will continue to be less interested in the 
truth. This cycle makes the individuals see the like-minded articles but not the 
debunking theories. 
Facebook’s response to fake news 
Facebook publicly announced that the amount of fake news on its platform is such a 
small percentage that it could not have had an impact on the US election. At the same 
time, the company has officially insisted that distinguishing between authentic news 
and false news is a difficult technical problem (Figueira & Oliveira, 2017). 
Interestingly, it only took 36 hours for a few Princeton students to create a Facebook 
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browser extension that detects false news and unreliable sources. The algorithm 
checks the user's personal news feed and labels news items according to the system’s 
verification (Gupta et al., 2017). 
Facebook’s co-founder Mark Zuckerberg has commented on censorship on 
Facebook several times. He has given controversial statements on Facebook’s 
responsibility over the content shared on the platform. Zuckerberg has argued that 
“Facebook is in the business of letting people share stuff they are interested in” (Syed, 
2017). After the 2015 Charlie Hedbo attacks in Paris, Zuckerberg stated that Facebook 
does not intend to censor itself; and after 2016, Zuckerberg explained that Facebook is 
a platform “for all ideas” (ibid). Facebook has claimed to deprioritize links that are 
shared by suspected spammers. They are launching new features to recognize 
clickbait, sensationalism, and misinformation and to make users think twice before 
sharing a story. Facebook has also banned verified false news websites from gaining 
revenue by using its advertising program. These actions may be useful for filtering 
out profit-oriented false news content, such as the Macedonian teenagers, but not for 
stopping propaganda and misinformation that is fueled mainly by political interests. 
In the most recent statement published on Facebook’s blog for the social 
networking site, the Vice President of Facebook, Adam Mosseri, voiced the 
company’s concern over the spread of misinformation and false news. Mosseri 
introduces Facebook’s efforts to stop misinformation.  Their objectives include: 
disrupting economic incentives, building new products to stop the spread of false 
news, helping people to make more informed decisions and recognize false news. He 
proceeds to state that Facebook is not in a position to “become arbiters of truth” 
(Mosseri, 2017). This is in line with Zuckerberg’s previous position that Facebook 
does not plan to censor the content shared by Facebook’s users. 
Mosseri’s blog post introduces Facebook’s aim to improve News Feed ranking 
by determining that if users do not share an article, it is more likely to be false 
information than if the they do (Mosseri, 2017). This statement conflicts with the 
study results of Pennycook and Rand (2019), who found that sharing intentions are 
not driven by the user’s perception of the content’s accuracy. According to their study, 
users share content if it supports their reputation, regardless of the information’s 
accuracy. 
Discussion 
A solution for the spread of misleading information, spam, and fake news needs to be 
found. The use of algorithms and machine learning are helpful tools in finding fake 
news in a user’s feed. After the verification of the News Feed, it is left to the user to 
evaluate what to do with the flagged content. If the verification process is done 
exclusively by algorithmic recognition, different types of content such as humorous 
and sarcastic publications need to be taken into consideration. The quest for a system 
to prevent and censor false news may also collide with democratic values such as 
freedom of speech. 
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Facebook’s representatives seem to give vague statements with regard to the 
company’s actions for fighting fake news. According to a study conducted by 
Pennycook and Rand (2019) the possibilities for developing filtering tools which can 
be adjusted to the Facebook News Feed exist. Mosseri and Zuckerberg have made it 
clear that their concerns are more likely to be in the area of avoiding the violation 
freedom of speech than addressing the ongoing debate on the spread of fake news. 
How does Twitter regulate the public sphere? 
One of the biggest concerns in the era of the information revolution is whether new 
media platforms create a pseudo public sphere where irrational ways of thinking 
become dominant. New technologies have changed political communication and 
challenged democracy. Technologies are not just platforms; they also shape thinking 
and are the means of political actions (Finlayson, 2019, pp. 77–79). 
In this case study we will look at Twitter which has achieved a position as a 
mainstream medium of political communication. Moreover, it influences public 
opinion. There are several reasons why Twitter has an important and visible role in 
society, even if it is not the most widely used social media platform (Isotalus, Jussila, 
& Matikainen, 2018, p. 9). First, Twitter allows information to spread fast since 
sharing information does not require following the original poster (Colleoni, Rozza, & 
Arvidsson 2014, p. 319). Second, the political elite and journalists have adapted the 
usage of Twitter widely (Isotalus et al., 2018, p. 9). 
One of the major problems with regard to Twitter is the spread of digital 
misinformation which is claimed to influence elections and threatens to undermine 
democracies (Shao et al., 2018, p. 2). Twitter is one of the largest online platforms, 
which has been called on to deploy preventive measures and algorithms against 
election interference and the spread of fake news. The question of state actors using 
media platforms for political interference is a major one. Bots, which are software-
controlled profiles, present another problem as they deliver misinformation to those 
who are most likely to believe it (ibid.) and likely do not realize this content is 
automatically generated. 
Twitter in the public sphere 
The criticism social media companies face is at the heart of contemporary political 
communication that has changed rapidly (Finlayson 2019, p. 80). Colleoni, Rozza and 
Arvidsson (2014) have studied Twitter’s role as a medium of political communication 
and its impact on the public sphere. According to them, the public sphere is a 
communicative space wherein valid information can be circulated in an unfettered 
way which contributes to the formation of political will via deliberation (Colleoni, 
2014, p. 318; Dahlgren, 2005, p. 148). Twitter has the potential to either increase the 
diversity of opinions or to function as an echo chamber. In the latter case, people’s 
preexisting perspectives are reinforced which channels the formation of public 
opinion (Colleoni, Rozza, & Arvidsson, 2014, p. 317).  
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Colleoni et al. (2014, 318) state that the mediums of communication do not 
reinforce democratic conversation, they only strengthen already dominant political 
views due to the selectiveness of the exposure increasing the heterogeneity of political 
discussion. From this point of view Twitter can function as an echo chamber, because 
individuals with similar views form ties between each other. Colleoni et al. (2014, p. 
319) explain this phenomenon through the theories of cognitive dissonance and 
selective exposure suggesting that people tend to seek information that confirms their 
opinions. This creates homogeneous groups and when applied to the political domain, 
it can result in polarization.  
Research indicates that Twitter can be conducive toward deliberation in the 
public sphere when it is analyzed and treated as a news medium. On the other hand, 
when looked as a social medium and permitted to operate as such, it can be seen more 
as an echo chamber (ibid., 2014, p. 328).  
What is the response? 
In March 2018 Twitter introduced an approach aimed to improve the public 
conversation. There is not much information about this project, but in their blog post 
Twitter’s product managers claimed that one of their biggest challenges has been the 
eradication of disruptive behavior that does not violate Twitter’s policies per se, but 
has a negative impact on public discourse (Gasca & Harvey, 2018). 
In that post, the managers describe the methods Twitter uses to filter content. 
They state that signals that convey disruptive behavior are not usually visible. They 
give a few examples of such signals such as “an account has not confirmed their 
email”, “if the same person signs up for multiple accounts simultaneously”, “accounts 
that repeatedly Tweet and mention accounts that don’t follow them”, and “behavior 
that might indicate a coordinated attack” (Gasca & Harvey, 2018). They also reveal 
that they monitor how accounts interact with those that violate these rules. According 
to Twitter’s representatives, violations were eight percent lower in the conversations 
in which this feature was tested. Twitter also recently reported (Dorsey, 2019) their 
new plan to ban political advertisement. The announcement will be confirmed later, 
but it already raises concerns about how the ads are classified as political, and the 
possible non-transparency of the vetting algorithms. 
Even if Twitter’s own algorithms are not transparent. Several studies have 
suggested ways to enhance the public sphere of Twitter. Shao et al. (2018, p. 2) 
propose that if the media platforms create echo chambers, new algorithms should be 
used to broaden the users’ exposure to diverse information. Furthermore, bot-driven 
abuse can be detected by machine learning algorithms. Shao et al. (ibid., p. 5) also 
propose that curbing social bots may be effective in mitigating the spread of false 
information.  
Oxford Internet Institute’s Computational propaganda project has also 
developed a computational method to identify deliberative manipulation. By using the 
Coefficient of Traffic Manipulation (CTM) method, Twitter feeds can be ranked as 
organic or manipulated. Twitter traffic can be manipulated by a small group of users 
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who generate a large flow of traffic, disproportionate to the number of users involved. 
The manipulation can be done by automated bot accounts, partially-automated 
accounts or human-run accounts (Nimmo, 2019, pp. 5–7). For example, one of the 
study’s cases looked at Twitter traffic about Marine Le Pen’s campaign during the 
French presidential election. In this case, the traffic was created by a high-volume 
combination of human users and bots (ibid., p. 13). Nimmo (2019, p. 19) believes 
CTM to be a useful first warning of Twitter traffic that might be manipulated. 
Discussion 
As is often the case, big data is controlled and owned by private companies whose 
algorithms are not transparent. When decisions affecting the public are formed via 
commercial platforms, a conflict in the public sphere increases. It is important to note 
that ideally the public sphere is either fair or free (Finlayson, 2019, p. 80).  
On one hand Twitter can be used as a tool to spread fake information and 
conspiratorial thinking, which runs the risk to geopolitical destabilization. On the 
other hand, it can offer a platform for those who are otherwise excluded from political 
participation. What needs to be done is to develop new strategies and rhetoric to cope 
with the challenges and possibilities. Changes in the digital sphere pose the question 
of whether Twitter usage can be organized in a way that enhances democratic 
freedom. (Ibid., pp. 78–80.) 
As a media company with enormous power, Twitter should introduce more 
effective ways of regulating their users, as well as new ways to protect victims of 
harassment. Despite the fact that social media platforms are already acknowledging 
the problems mentioned, and tend to deploy countermeasures, it is hard to evaluate 
whether these measures are effective (Shao et al., 2018, p. 5). However, in the light of 
recent studies on Twitter, there are many effective methods which Twitter could use to 
enhance the regulation of its content. 
When nothing is done: Cambridge Analytica 
In March 2018 yet another scandal relating to president Trump’s 2016 election 
campaign broke out. Christopher Wylie, an ex-employee of the data company 
Cambridge Analytica, revealed that the company had harvested the data of about 87 
million people’s Facebook profiles and used it for political advertising purposes — 
without the users’ consent (Kozlowska, 2018). The notorious scandal provides a 
dystopian example of how the digital revolution’s innovations — as in this case big 
data through data harvesting — can in an unregulated context lead to privacy 
violations and misuse of personal data for purposes such as political microtargeting. 
How it was done 
Cambridge Analytica’s vast database was collected through the Facebook app 
“thisisyourdigitallife”. Hundreds of thousands of Facebook users, who agreed to have 
their data collected for academic use, took a personality test that revealed, among 
other things, their names, locations and Facebook “likes”. What the test-takers didn’t 
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realize was that the app simultaneously collected the same information from their 
Facebook friends, resulting in a database of around 87 million — over a quarter of 
potential US voters. The acquired data was used to build an algorithm that could 
analyze individual Facebook profiles and determine personality traits linked to voting 
behavior. This sort of information constitutes a powerful political tool, as it enables 
the identification of possible swing voters and the creation of microtargeted political 
messages that are more likely to resonate (Cadwalladr & Graham-Harrison, 2018). 
Cambridge Analytica’s own executives claimed openly that they were able to carry 
the Electoral College in Trump’s favor in 2016 by manipulating only 40,000 voters in 
three states. Although the company’s claim of influence on the result of the election 
might be over-exaggerated, it is nevertheless clear that they did manage to play a 
major role in the election (Berghel, 2018, pp. 85–86). Additionally, the company was 
at the time headed by Trump’s key adviser and chief executive of his presidential 
campaign, Steve Bannon, who also later became the Chief Strategist and member of 
the US National Security Council for the Trump administration (Cadwalladr & 
Graham-Harrison, 2018).  
Cambridge Analytica’s parent company, the London-based Strategic 
Communications Laboratories (SCL) was introduced to the concept of using social 
media data for political profiling by a Cambridge University’s lecturer, Aleksandr 
Kogan. Kogan, who is the founder and director of Global Science Research (GSR), 
began working with SCL to deliver a “large research project in the US” in which SCL 
agreed to pay for GSR’s data collection in order to, among other things, enhance 
GSR’s algorithm’s “national capacity to profile capacity of American citizens” 
(Davies, 2015) SCL has also been revealed to work as a defense contractor for 
governments and militaries around the world, with electoral influence in developing 
countries playing an instrumental part (Cadwalladr, 2019). Kogan on the other hand 
has been discovered to have received funding from the Russian government, as well 
as from a hedge fund millionaire and leading Republican donor Robert Mercer — 
who also happenned to be the owner of Cambridge Analytica (Cadwalladr & Graham-
Harrison, 2018). Mercer also owns the intellectual property (IP) of Aggregate IQ, 
which is a web analytics company that worked as one of the major forces in 
delivering Brexit for the official Leave campaign in Britain. Although Aggregate IQ 
has officially declined having any formal relationship with Cambridge Analytica, it 
was found to have a revolving cast of data scientists who went on to work with 
Cambridge Analytica and vice versa (Cadwalladr, 2017). 
The responses 
The 2018-scandal was in fact not the first time Cambridge Analytica’s illicit activities 
were exposed. Already in 2015, The Guardian released an article on how the 
campaign of Republican Senator Ted Cruz had paid the company to collect 
psychological profiles of potential voters. After the revelation, Facebook declared that 
they would carefully investigate the situation, and that misuse of their information is a 
direct violation of their policies as well as a breach of trust (Davies, 2015). 
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Nevertheless, in the end Facebook failed to alert users and only took limited steps to 
recover and secure their private information (Cadwalladr & Graham-Harrison, 2018).  
The 2018 case however turned out different. The story made headlines all over 
the world and Facebook’s share price plunged more than 50 billion dollars (and 
subsequently continued to fall over twice of that) (Cadwalladr, 2019). While 
Zuckerberg refused to answer the questions about Facebook’s role in the scandal, the 
official statement was that Facebook was not guilty of a data breach as its systems 
were not penetrated, and the data was instead mishandled by a third-party against 
Facebook’s terms of service.  
However, because customers’ experience was that their trust had been broken, 
Zuckerberg issued official full-page apologies in nine major US and international 
newspapers, and declared that as an act of self-regulation Facebook will voluntarily 
applicate the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) to all Facebook 
customers (and not just EU citizens) (Kozlowska, 2018). The governments’ response 
was also more severe this time around: Britain’s information commissioner obtained a 
warrant to enter Cambridge Analytica’s offices and seize its servers, and Mark 
Zuckerberg was called in to be questioned both in the US Congress and the European 
Parliament (Cadwalladr, 2019). The President of the European Parliament, Antonio 
Tajani, called the case an unacceptable violation of EU citizens’ privacy rights, and 
promised an EU investigation (Manokha, 2018, p. 892). Elizabeth Warren, the 
Democrat candidate for 2020 presidential race even called for the breaking up of 
Facebook (Cadwalladr, 2019). Meanwhile Cambridge Analytica and SCL announced 
their closure in May 2018 (Manokha, 2018, p. 892). 
Discussion 
Considering that Facebook simultaneously functioned as the source of the information 
and a platform on which the created content was delivered on a large scale, it is not 
difficult to understand the importance of government regulation when dealing with 
big data companies. User data has become a special kind of commodity that is 
collected, processed, analyzed and finally monetized in one way or another 
(Manokha, 2018, p. 902). This is evident in the way the business model of several 
data companies, such as Facebook, relies on their access to their users’ data for 
targeted advertising (Kozlowska, 2018). This results in a major threat to the right of 
privacy, which in turn can compromise the exercise of several other forms of 
individual freedom, such as freedom of expression, thought, and press (Manokha, 
2018, p. 903). Besides these obvious troubling implications to people’s privacy, the 
use of big data for political purposes arguably also poses a threat to democratic 
systems as a whole. As in this case, data harvesting was conducted for the purpose of 
achieving efficient microtargeting, which is a “pseudo-public” form of 
communication. This means that the personalized content is not under the scrutiny 
and deliberation in the “marketplace of ideas”, where they could be exposed and 
challenged. Thus, it also makes it easier to share misinformation and blurs the idea 
between advertising and other forms of content, resulting in the threat of voters’ pure 
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manipulation (Heawood, 2018, pp. 432–433.) Meanwhile in the eyes of the political 
campaigns, votes are commodified; the goal is to manipulate and predict rather than 
understand the voters’ views, values, needs and desires (Gorton, 2016, p. 73). 
The European Union – a role model in data protection? 
One of the present and future political challenges is the creation of realistic regulatory 
standards for the use of data and algorithmic decision-making (Mittelstadt, Allo, 
Taddeo, Wachter, & Floridi, 2016, p. 13). The European Union seems to have taken a 
special interest in the protection of personal data which is currently one of its core 
values (Brkan, 2016, p. 813). Its objective at data protection appears in the General 
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) that took effect on May 2018 (EC, 2016). 
The architecture of the GDPR 
Data protection has received a lot of public attention in recent years (Brkan, 2016, p. 
813). Yet it is not a new phenomenon. The EU has had a Data Protection Directive 
since 1995 which set minimum standards for personal data protection inside the EU 
(Eliantonio, Galli, & Schaper, 2016, p. 392). However, the platforms and the volume 
in which data are collected and used have changed rapidly. Roughly a decade ago 
actors, such as the EU officials and NGOs, began a debate on the old directive being 
outdated (Starkbaum & Felt, 2019, p. 5) in the age of information technology where 
the flow of personal data is increasing constantly (Eliantonio et al., 2016, p. 398). 
Controversies of data processing were often associated with US companies, such as 
Facebook, that had been in the center of attention in the processing of personal data 
(Krystlik, 2017, p. 6)1. Moreover, the EU lacked consistency in data protection within 
the member states. This was considered detrimental for the internal market and 
businesses, where data processing was becoming increasingly important (Eliantonio 
et al., 2016, p. 399).  
In the summary of the GDPR, the European Commission states that the aim of 
the regulation is to give EU citizens more control over their personal data and to unify 
data protection rules across the member states (EC, 2016.). The regulation defines 
personal data as “any information relating to” data subject, “such as a name, an 
identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors 
specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social 
identity of that natural person” (Art. 4(1) GDPR, 2016). In addition to the protection 
of individuals, the EU hopes that harmonized rules will reduce bureaucracy and 
therefore benefit companies. The impact of GDPR extends to non-EU companies, as 
they have to adopt the rules when they process data of individuals that are located in 
the EU (EC, 2016). 
One core legal basis provided by the GDPR is consent of individuals (data 
subjects) in processing. The regulation specifies consent as “any freely given, 
                                               
1 For example, in 2013 activist Max Schrems raised questions about the use of European personal data 
in his campaign against Facebook. The case was covered widely in the media. (Krystlik, 2017, p. 6.) 
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specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s wishes by which 
he or she, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to the 
processing of personal data relating to him or her” (Art. 4(11) GDPR, 2016). Further, 
data subjects are allowed to withdraw consent anytime (Botta & Wiedemann, 2019, p. 
431). 
Effectiveness of the regulation 
GDPR has attracted a lot of attention before and after its adoption. The media framed 
it as groundbreaking because its legal validity harmonized national rules in Europe 
(Starkbaum & Felt, 2019, p. 6). But even as scholars (Botta & Wiedemann, 2019; 
Ferretti, 2018; Kamleitner & Mitchell, 2019; Mittelstadt et al., 2016) recognize the 
GDPR’s potentials in protecting individuals’ data, they underline the possible 
loopholes and inefficiencies in its adoption. This section focuses on the data subjects’ 
perspective leaving out the shortcomings encountered by data controllers, such as 
companies and public officials.  
Botta and Wiedemann (2019, pp. 431–432) argue that the whole ideology 
behind GDPR is to give data subjects full knowledge and control over their data. They 
note that subjects are assumed to act fully informed when they make decisions. 
However, data subjects might not have the willingness or ability to decide freely 
whom to give consent. GDPR fails its objective when the owners of personal data do 
not act self-determinedly and autonomously. In addition, data processors know the 
potential limitations and might take advantage of the situation (Ibid). 
In agreement with Botta and Wiedemann (2019), Ferretti (2018) argues that 
one of the main shortcomings of GDPR is “the consent of consumers as the 
legitimising ground” (p. 499). He bases the argument on his analysis on how GDPR 
responds to the challenges of FinTech and big data from consumers’ perspective. 
First, the complexities of, for example, “FinTech business models”, and “data-
collection practices” may create a misunderstanding of the possible consequences of 
data processing. Moreover, the relationship between consumers and vendors might be 
imbalanced. If a consumer needs credit she has to accept the terms, as the lack of 
consent to data processing could stop the company from giving credit. (Ibid., p. 496.) 
Mittelstadt et al. (2016, pp. 13–14) consider the GDPR as an example of the 
difficulties that political actors encounter in regulating algorithms. From data 
subjects’ perspective, GDPR seems to enable individuals to make decisions with 
regard to their data. However, they argue that the regulation contains exemptions 
concerning the rights of individuals as data subjects. For example, rights can be 
restricted if data controllers have legitimate reason for processing which “override the 
interests, rights and freedoms of the data subject” (Ibid., p. 17). 
One exemption that was debated during the preparation of GDPR is that data 
subjects are allowed to “give a one-time consent for their data to be used for multiple 
scientific research projects across time” (Starkbaum & Felt, 2019, p. 6). Supporters of 
strict data protection (e.g. the European Parliament in the beginning of preparation) 
wanted to ban data reuse if a new consent was not given. The debate demonstrates 
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how information society is seeking to find a balance between individual rights and the 
desired collective benefits in data processing (Ibid., pp. 1–3). According to Brkan 
(2016), the EU emphasizes data protection which often prevails over other interests 
such as “public security, freedom of information and economic interests of the 
controller” (p. 814). However, the above-mentioned exemption indicates that data 
protection does not prevail the idea of collective benefit produced by science.  
Lastly, Kamleitner and Mitchell (2019, p. 435) argue that GDPR neglects to 
protect personal data as it assumes that the original owner is identifiable. For 
example, when data subjects agree to conditions in an app, they might give consent to 
the use of their personal data, such as pictures or contacts, that they don’t own to 
begin with. This means that if a data subject decides to withdraw consent from a 
company, other individuals can still share that person’s information through their 
consent. This creates pressure for the EU to decide if data subjects have the right to 
share data only if they own it (Ibid., pp. 435, 446). 
Discussion 
The GDPR is still a new piece of regulation and we are only starting to see its effects. 
It aims to give EU citizens more control over their personal data by encouraging 
citizens to decide who has the rights to use it. Nevertheless, the GDPR struggles with 
unsolved issues, such as the ambiguity in data ownership and asymmetrical 
relationships between companies and individuals. 
The protection the GDPR will provide depends on its legal interpretations: the 
framework can be either powerful or weak from the data subjects’ perspective 
(Mittelstadt et al. 2016, p. 14). Eliantonio et al. (2016, pp. 402–403) emphasize the 
influence of national and European courts that have always played a central role in 
balancing the conflicting interests of data protection. Overall, GDPR appears to be a 
necessary endeavour of legislative framework aiming at the protection of data. 
However, it seems to be more indicative of the difficulties that political authorities 
face in data regulation than a robust legislation. 
China’s Social Credit System – can data points generate trust? 
Big data technologies have enabled and expanded the array of surveillance capacities 
that nation states have at their disposal. One prominent use of these technologies can 
be found in China, where the government seeks to create a nationwide Social Credit 
System (SCS) that scores the “trustworthiness” and “creditworthiness” of 1.4 billion 
people by 2020 (Liang, Das, Kostyuk, & Hussain, 2018). This system is based on data 
about people's historical and ongoing economic and social activities and will 
determine their rights in society through rewards and punishments (Creemers, 2018; 
Liang et al., 2018). Thus, the SCS is used as a tool to monitor, manage and predict the 
behaviour of individuals and businesses with the intention of enforcing trust in society 
(Creemers, 2018; Liang et al., 2018). This program is characterized by its 
entanglement with the extensive use of big data technologies, as it requires massive 
amounts of data to be collected, stored, shared and analyzed (Chen & Cheung, 2017). 
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Social Credit System – what is it about? 
The SCS is not (yet) a single system but consists of multiple fragmented initiatives 
that are developed either by local governments or business entities. These different 
programs all aim at influencing the behaviour of individuals and businesses by 
sanctioning or rewarding them (Kostka, 2019). These different initiatives can be 
separated into schemes that either seek to determine the “creditworthiness” or 
“trustworthiness” of different actors in society (Creemers, 2018). The core of the 
latter schemes is a joint punishment system that consist of red lists and black lists. 
Individuals who comply with the set standards end up on red lists which allow them 
to enjoy certain perks (e.g. faster commuting), whereas misbehaving citizens are 
placed on black lists, which means they are cut-off from several public goods, such as 
public transportation (Creemers, 2018; Liang et al., 2018.). This punishment system is 
often binary, meaning that people are either on or off the black list (Creemers, 2018). 
In turn, the financial credit system that seeks to determine “creditworthiness” 
of citizens is technically more advanced.  That is, these programs often include an 
actual score that effects individuals’ opportunities, such as one’s possibilities of 
getting a loan (Creemers, 2018). So far these commercial SCS initiatives resemble 
and function like traditional “loyalty schemes” (Kostka, 2019). Nevertheless, the 
Chinese government seeks to develop a nationwide SCS that incorporates the 
functions of these initiatives into a single SCS (Creemers, 2018; Kostka, 2019). 
The development of credit schemes 
These efforts of expanding traditional credit ratings into evaluating social behaviours 
more broadly are widely portrayed as petrifying by Western media. In contrast to 
these views, the SCS has gained high levels of approval in China. As an example, 80 
percent of respondents in one study either strongly approved or somewhat approved 
of the SCS, and less than 2 percent strongly disapproved or somewhat disapproved of 
the system (Kostka, 2019). These differences in interpretations can be largely 
explained by the misconceptions that Western media has on the subject (Creemers, 
2018; Kostka, 2019; Liang et al., 2018). Thus, in order to understand the Social Credit 
System, it is vital to acknowledge the context in which it has evolved.  
The first considerations towards the SCS emerged in the 1990’s in discussions 
related to the modernization of China’s market economy. These discussions 
pinpointed trust as a critical element of a prosperous market and consequently led the 
Chinese government to seek ways to improve the financial creditworthiness and 
conducts of honesty and trust in the marketplace. This project took a large step 
forward in 2007, when concrete policy measures were established in order to 
construct a SCS (Creemers, 2018). 
Afterwards, between 2007 and 2013 these considerations spawned minor 
breakthroughs towards the SCS, for example in the form of local initiatives and early 
trials of different IT infrastructures. These developments eventually culminated in 
2014 when a concrete plan was launched to implement a nationwide social credit 
system by 2020. (Creemers, 2018.)   
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The SCS is widely welcomed in Chinese society by its citizens and 
government, both of whom are frustrated with the nation’s moral decline and people’s 
inability to trust one another (Creemers, 2018; Kostka, 2019). Indeed, according to 
some scholars (e.g. Creemers, 2018; Kostka, 2019), the SCS should not be perceived 
merely as an “Orwellian nightmare” as it is often described. Instead, they suggest that 
the program should be seen as a prominent tool in decreasing the prevailing 
dishonesty in society and thus improving the lives of Chinese citizens2. Opposing 
views (e.g. Chen & Cheung, 2017; Hoffman, 2017; Liang et al., 2018) largely 
consider the SCS as a tool for authoritarian–like social management.  
Big data-enabled Social Credit System 
Setting aside the different conceptualizations of the purposes of the SCS, a common 
ground can be found when looking at the connection between SCS and the utilization 
of digital era technologies. Indeed, both sides of the argument seem to accept the 
technological novelty that the SCS aim to utilize (Chen & Cheung, 2017; Creemers, 
2018; Hoffman, 2017; Kostka, 2019; Liang et al., 2018). 
The utilization and development of these high–end technologies were outlined 
in the 2014 SCS roadmap, alongside with the blueprints for the bureaucratic and 
financial support systems (Creemers, 2018). The nationwide reach and complexity of 
the SCS requires excessive amounts of data to be collected, which has led the Chinese 
government to invest in big data–enabled technologies in order to collect, mine and 
analyze data. Consequently, China has instrumentalized and institutionalized big data 
innovations and information communication technologies (ICTs) (Liang et al., 2018). 
Liang et al. (2018) suggests that the data collection and integration of the SCS 
can be understood to work in three phases: data collection, data aggregation and data 
analytics. In the first phase, data is collected from various public and private sources 
(e.g. bank statements, criminal records, social media use). Secondly, the data is 
aggregated from separate platforms by sharing and integrating the data for social 
ratings. This data is then evaluated in the final phase, leading to decisions on whether 
subjects are placed on a red or black list.  
Discussion 
China has rapidly informatized its governance in order to transform the way it 
manages both the state and society (Creemers, 2018). Although this transformation is 
still ongoing, the SCS has the potential of radically transforming the state’s 
governance in new directions, notably through the utilization of big data technologies. 
Some scholars consider the direction of this development as a way of integrating trust 
in society, whereas others provide more or less hyperbolic claims about the 
emergence of an “Orwellian”–like dystopia. 
How the SCS will develop largely depends on how the data points are 
computed into the social score. Therefore, the transparency of the computation is 
                                               
2 Kostka’s (2019, p. 1585) survey findings suggest that Chinese citizens consider the SCS as an 
instrument to improve “quality of life”, rather than an instrument of “surveillance”. 
264
REACTIONS TO THE IMPACTS OF INFORMATION REVOLUTION  
 
  
  
 
essential; if the algorithms that determine people’s scores are ambiguous and opaque, 
the SCS will most likely resemble a system of oppression. On the other hand, if the
scores are processed in a transparent manner, the SCS can reduce moral decline and 
enhance trustworthiness in Chinese society.
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Abstract 
This paper examines how societies could benefit from emerging areas of societally-
applied artificial intelligence (AI) such as big data (BD), machine learning (ML), and 
algorithmic governance (AG). Furthermore, the paper outlines the challenges these 
technologies pose to key principles of democracy such as legitimacy, privacy, 
democratic governance and freedom. The research question is answered by analysing 
five topical cases: the emerging social credit system in China, the experiment with AI 
in social services conducted by the City of Espoo, the use of Big Data and AI in UN-
led humanitarian efforts, the use of algorithmic targeting in elections, and the use of 
AI in state surveillance. We conclude that while the aforementioned technologies will 
likely provide societies with many opportunities, they may also pose serious threats to 
democratic principles. We recommend further research on the social implications of 
AI, BD, ML and AG so that adequate regulative action can be prepared to address 
these threats. 
 
Keywords:  Big data, algorithmic governance, artificial intelligence, AI, machine 
learning, democracy, social credit score, China, micro-targeting, digital surveillance 
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This paper examines how societies could benefit from emerging areas of societally-
applied artificial intelligence (AI) such as big data (BD), machine learning (ML), and 
algorithmic governance (AG). Furthermore, the paper outlines the challenges these 
technologies pose to key principles of democracy such as legitimacy, privacy, 
democratic governance and freedom. AI technology is rapidly proliferating around the 
world. What makes it difficult to examine is that it is not one specific technology, but 
more of an integrated system that incorporates information acquisition objectives, 
logical reasoning principles and self-correcting capacities (Feldstein 2019a). In our 
text, we use a very basic definition of AI as the simulation of human intelligence 
processes by machines which include learning, reasoning and self-correction (e.g. 
Poole and Goebel 1998; Russell and Norvig 2003). There is a categorized division 
between weak and strong AI, in which a weak AI system is designed for a particular 
task and a strong AI system exhibits generalized human cognitive abilities. In this 
paper we focus on weak AI. By machine learning we mean a subset of AI. 
Furthermore, we define Big Data as a field that explores ways to analyse data sets that 
are too large or complex to manage using traditional data-processing software. From a 
societal point of view, legitimacy is a central principle: what is considered to be a 
justified use of AI, machine learning and big data? How can individuals’ rights be 
guaranteed? 
According to Habermas (2001), the modern conception of democracy and its 
relation to law consists “of norms that are produced by a lawgiver, are sanctioned by 
the state, and are meant to guarantee individual liberties”; moreover, citizens’ 
democratic self-determination can only be realised through structural properties and 
media such as law, which ensure liberty (Habermas 2001, 766). Five cases will be 
presented to analyze the problem. First, we will explore the use of big data and 
algorithmic governance in the context of the social credit system in China. In the next 
section, we cover how machine learning is utilized in social services, and contemplate 
the question of structural discrimination and implicit bias in algorithmic governance. 
In the third section, we will interrogate how big data is used in humanitarian efforts 
by the United Nations. The fourth section focuses on the case of Brexit, and how big 
data was used to influence the referendum, paying particular attention to how the case 
illustrates recurring patterns of influencing the public with algorithmic microtargeting 
in modern elections and what implications this has on the future of deliberative 
democracy. The final case looks at the use of AI in governance surveillance, 
examining the case of Palantir. We conclude by stating that while the aforementioned 
technologies will likely provide societies with many opportunities, they may also pose 
serious threats to democratic principles. We recommend further research on the social 
implications of AI, BD, ML and AG so that adequate regulative action can be 
prepared to address these threats. 
China’s social credit system – Juuli Hakulinen 
This section examines the social credit system in China. China is not a democracy, so 
the focus here is on how new technologies are used to tighten the grip of the regime. 
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Does the system work? Are new technologies only good for the government or is 
there something to gain for the people? This section aims to serve as a case study of 
how big data has arguably been the most useful for authoritarian regimes and is used 
in the least restricted way. It seeks to demonstrate the extent to which technologies 
can be used to control and police citizens and analyse this practice through the lens of 
legitimacy, or to what amount the system is acceptable for Chinese citizens. 
 China has wanted to create a Social Credit Score (SCS) since the 1940s but 
was unable to do so until technology had advanced sufficiently (Ramadan 2018, 93). 
Before the development of new technologies, systems called Dang’an and Hoku 
provided ways to monitor citizens. Now CCTV and Internet censorship is used in big 
data analytics. China established a Cyberspace Administration in 2014, in the 
framework of which 500 smart cities cooperate with IT firms to better their services, 
CCTV cameras are abundant (Sky Net Project) and facial recognition technology is at 
a point where an individual can be followed almost anywhere (Fang, et al 2018, 419-
420). 
What is meant by SCS here is a “rating for the consumer derived from his/her 
‘position in a social structure based on esteem that is bestowed by others’ [Hu and 
Van den Bulte 2014, 510]” (Quoted in Ramadan 2018, 93). The process is still under 
way and no cohesive all-encompassing SCS has been created. Instead, the system 
now in place is more of an ecosystem that is comprised of government agencies and 
commercial firms (Creemers 2018; Liang, Fan, Vishnupriya Das, Nadiya Kostyuk, 
and Muzammil M. Hussain 2018). 
Liang et al. studied China’s Social Credit Scoring in their article (Liang et al. 
2018) and concluded that it perhaps focuses more on financial and commercial 
activities than political ones. A large portion of data is gathered by commercial firms, 
which operate in the field of big data. The market size is estimated to be 
approximately $2.5 billion in 2016 and is expected to grow (ibid. 415). Despite the 
prevalence of scoring in China being about financial affairs, Backer and Catá (2018) 
argue that scoring is inseparable from the state. The state uses these techniques to spy 
on citizens and make them act in accordance with what is ideologically acceptable. 
While SCS is the state’s ideological tool, it is also a technique that is inspired 
by traditional commercial credit rating, which is applied to social behaviour. 
Traditional credit scoring systems are numerical systems, in which the decision to 
classify someone’s credit worthiness is predicted, ruling out personal judgement 
(Abdou and Pointon 2011). In China, the aim is to use the available data in order to 
create a credit scoring for each of the 1.4 billion individuals in the country. This score 
will determine whether an individual can be granted access to certain benefits or if 
they will be punished. Government affairs, judicial affairs, social activities, and 
commercial behaviour are spied on with the help of data gathered in massive amounts 
(Fang et al. 2018, 416). 
Fang et al. (2018) claim that in the literature on information and 
communication technologies (ICTs) discussing authoritarian regimes, the approach 
has been either optimistic or pessimistic. Some scholars see the potential of ICTs to 
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empower citizens, and others as a way for states to exert more power over their 
subjects.  These two camps can also be found in literature about China (ibid. 416). In 
a way, technology can help citizens free themselves from the grip of the state. This 
has happened to some extent in China. Memes or emojis can be used to circumvent 
some of the state’s censorship. It has also been argued, however, that the ability of 
Chinese citizens to use new technologies to “fight back” has decreased (ibid. 434). 
We can ask whether China’s SCS is any different from western data gathering 
and more conventional credit rating. The big difference between the West and China 
in this matter is that China aims to collect all data, on everybody, all the time (Fang et 
al. 2018, 417). This means that every piece of data can be linked to an individual. This 
differs from samples that are collected about a population as opposed to about 
individual citizens. Another difference is that this new way of collecting data is not 
visible, unlike data collection practices before. In China, as opposed to the West, the 
state and private actors work together to gather information. Platforms are mostly 
state owned and not private enterprises (ibid. 429). 
Maybe the most obvious problem from the point of view of citizens’ rights, 
despite the fact that there is no democracy in China, is the loss of privacy. Especially 
personal privacy is an issue, because private data is readily available about individual 
people. Also, for complex reasons the people have not been able to use the same 
techniques for counter-surveillance. There is no civil society to keep the state in check 
(Fang et al 2018, 420). For now, however, SCS is mostly a tool for the government to 
blacklist individuals. It is not yet a sophisticated way of monitoring and anticipating 
the actions of individuals. What remains to be seen is whether China will seek to 
export its system to other democratic countries. At least one instance of such 
behaviour has been observed, when a Chinese state representative attempted to get 
Canada to accept their Sesame credit rating (ibid. 435). 
It is unclear whether China’s SCS will backfire (Fang et al. 2018, 435). What 
is better documented is the widespread acceptance the system seems to have among 
well-off citizens (Kostka 2019). This can be explained by the fact that these people 
generally benefit from the system and already respect the rules of the government and 
the party. In that position an individual might not care so much about the loss of their 
privacy. 
Based on the information available, the most obvious problems with China’s 
SCS for the rights of citizens seem to be the loss of privacy and the illegitimacy and 
lack of transparency in social credit scoring. No one knows exactly what will be 
monitored and how. This could worsen into a panopticon-like situation where people 
start to monitor themselves. The way in which the state will develop the system is 
also unclear. Still, the population largely accepts the system, as it offers benefits for 
model citizens. In a competitive society it is understandable that some might not want 
to defy a system that gives them a head start at life. Like in other cases examined in 
this paper, it seems that the Chinese system, which is still taking shape, needs to 
balance between what is useful and efficient for the government and the party, and 
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what people are willing to accept. In other words, the legitimacy of the SCS depends 
on how it serves citizens’ interests. 
Machine learning, social services, and structural discrimination – 
contemplating the question of implicit bias in algorithmic governance 
 – Vesa Vuolle 
One of the key roles of a social worker is to assess customers’ needs for social 
services. While the theories and practice are familiar with many risk factors in social 
services, social workers have to rely on subjective reasoning to assess them. However, 
in ever more areas of life, algorithms are being introduced to substitute the judgments 
exercised by identifiable human beings who can be held accountable (Crawford 2019, 
1). Widespread application of artificial intelligence in healthcare has been anticipated 
for half a century (Hinton 2018, 1) and now predictive modelling with electronic 
health record data is expected to drive personalized medicine and improve healthcare 
quality (Rajkomar et al. 2018, 1). Yet, intelligent though they may be, these 
algorithms exhibit some of the same biases that permeate society (Howard & 
Bornestein 2017, 1521). This paper contemplates the possibility, that while artificial 
intelligence can be of great help in one domain, it could simultaneously reproduce and 
strengthen regressive prejudices, such as racism and sexism. 
The city of Espoo and the Finnish ICT-company Tieto Corporation have 
developed a social services experiment, in which artificial intelligence can pick 
service paths out of an enormous mass of service data by grouping risk factors that 
trigger the need for intensive and expensive social services, if found in the same 
person. Those backing the project observe that, “The Espoo experiment proves that 
artificial intelligence recognises those who need support” (Espoo 2018). The 
algorithm is unique because it utilizes public data, as opposed to data gathered by 
private companies. The experiment, which started in 2017, has since helped social 
workers to detect the likelihood of a person becoming the subject of social services. 
The algorithm found approximately 280 predictive risk attributes (Valtioneuvoston 
selonteko 7/2018, 2019). These cases, wherein public administration policy-makers 
utilize big data, have reshaped how social services can be viewed, although not 
without controversy (Dunleavy 2016). According to Williamson (2016, 136), the basic 
functional principles of emerging big data technologies can be seen to be starting to 
structure public policy guidelines. This resembles liberal proceduralism, but with an 
important difference: the rationale behind policies initiates from Black box type semi-
autonomous machines, as opposed to politicians or civil servants. This is a 
fundamental problem posed by mechanised decision-making, as it touches on the 
basis of political legitimacy in any liberal regime (Crawford 2019, 1). Further, in this 
respect, algorithms exercise social power that can influence patterns of human agency 
(Neyland & Möllers 2017).  
Attributes associated with high-cost social services patients may include 
behavioural health problems or socioeconomic factors such as poverty or racial 
minority status (Rajkomar et.al. 2018, 3). This is the sort of information that Pasquale 
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(2015) describes as information that determines our standing in the reputational 
economy. If an algorithm learns to screen people based on these factors, doesn’t it 
then reinforce the structural powers that currently patronize and oppress many 
minorities, making it more difficult for those born with inferior conditions to beat the 
odds of having limited futures? It would seem that this kind of analytical property (or 
bias) of an algorithm strengthens inequality by categorizing certain sociocultural 
features as adverse and forecasting future use of social services. In an example, 
Angwin et.al. (2016, 32) attest that some of the relevant computing systems used by 
the US justice system unfairly discriminate against African Americans by at times 
ranking them as being more dangerous than their white counterparts when the reverse 
may be true. This is in part due to the way a machine learns; it merely predicts future 
outcomes based on historical data which it was trained on.  
According to Borenstein and Howard (2017, 1524), logic and evidence should 
be transparently presented when seeking to make the case that treating an individual 
or group differently is appropriate. However, according to Crawford (2019, 3), the 
decisions made by an algorithm are often not explainable, even by those who wrote 
the algorithm. The algorithm is free of subjective considerations (or deviations) a 
social worker might take into account. As these algorithms evolve into advanced 
artificially-intelligent agents, intertwining with our physical world, the negative 
ramifications of bias only increase (Borenstein & Howard 2017, 1522). Therefore, 
with the inauguration of the technology-driven preventive system, all subjective and 
humane contemplations are being reduced. A person who is born with an 
intersectional minority status would most likely be screened as a high costing patient 
of social services by an algorithm, even if that individual had an extraordinarily high 
IQ, energetic drive, loving family and the will to make the best of these.  
Consider what Carpenter and Guarino, Borenstein and Howard (2017, 1524) 
acknowledge, that allegations of racism and sexism have permeated the conversation 
about AI as stories surface about search engines delivering job postings for well-
paying technical jobs to men and not women, or providing arrest mugshots when 
keywords such as “black teenagers” are entered. Ali (2019) has even written about 
algorithmic racism and algorithms as tools for upholding white hegemony. This is not, 
however, the first time a machine goes rogue. Many remember the Microsoft chatbot 
Tay, who was taught by Twitter users to swear, make racist remarks and inflammatory 
political statements (Wakefield 2016). 
In these respects, a Foucauldian framework of biopower, ascribing social 
power through discourse and surveillance would provide useful analysis to the theme 
(Foucault 2007). Lloyd (2019, 1479) suggests that the creation and circulation of 
algorithms produces a discourse of truth that may not be refuted because the thinking 
behind them is not made available. This raises questions of trust, legitimacy, bias, and 
credibility towards the semi-autonomous machines in health governance.  
It would be fascinating to survey social workers in Espoo, and whether they 
consider that algorithms have discovered new customers previously unknown to 
social workers. This could include for instance noticing poverty in an otherwise 
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affluent neighbourhood or pre-emptive interventions to entrepreneurs whose business 
is on its way to going bankrupt. Alternatively, the algorithm could reverse decisions of 
service paths social workers have already suggested, by detecting implicit features 
that have protective qualities, such as soon-to-graduate students who are poor in 
resources but rich in assets.  
The extent to which algorithms come to impact the future of social services 
remains to be seen. The city of Espoo has been struggling with the European Union’s 
General Data Protection Regulation but is determined to continue the use of its one-
of-a-kind algorithm (Valtioneuvoston selonteko 7/2018, 2019). The issue of 
algorithms as part of social services introduces many moral considerations, of which 
implicit prejudices related to the colour of skin, gender or a postal code in a poor 
neighbourhood are not the least. At the end of the day, it is the unique and critical 
interplay between nature and nurture that makes us who we are. No one should be 
doomed because of these, nor should anyone be left outside safety nets just because 
their historical data does not predict future deprivation. 
Big Data for UN-led humanitarian efforts – Aino Hiltunen 
This section examines how big data is used in humanitarian efforts by the United 
Nations. The section focuses on UN-led efforts to harness big data for humanitarian 
endeavors through the UN Global Pulse initiative, and identifies the challenges and 
pitfalls that the UN-backed approaches may encounter.  
The United Nations Global Pulse is an innovation initiative of the United 
Nations Secretary-General on big data aiming to harness big data “safely and 
responsibly as a public good” (UN Global Pulse 2018a). The mission is to “accelerate 
discovery, development and adoption of big data innovation for sustainable 
development and humanitarian action” (UN Global Pulse 2018b). The initiative works 
through “innovation labs”, consisting of data scientists, engineers, designers, social 
scientists, communication experts, and data privacy as well as legal experts, who 
work with humanitarian and development actors to design and implement innovation 
programs, share knowledge and produce reports, technical papers and project briefs 
(UN Global Pulse 2018a, 10).  
Existing literature on the use of big data for development purposes focuses 
especially on applications of big data for mitigating crisis situations. Ali et al. (2016) 
highlight the reactive application of big data tools with an example on how the Syrian 
refugee crisis was mitigated by UNHRC and non-profit volunteer organizations by 
creating an online interactive map, through which real-time information was made 
available to refugees about aid agencies, organizations, their functions and operating 
times as well as capacities (Ali et al. 2016, 10). Ali et al. state that the “real promise” 
of big data for development purposes might lie in predictive analytics, where 
humanitarian emergencies could be avoided or mitigated before they actually happen 
(Ali et al. 2016, 10), in contrast to reactive purposes. The authors do not explore the 
idea further besides referring to businesses that use previous data in predicting 
customer behavior.  
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In a similar vein,  Karlsrud (2014) argues that big data can be utilized to 
provide insight to crisis and disaster response in order to react effectively to quickly 
transforming situations. This is also echoed in the research by Qadir et al. (2016) who 
examine how big data analytics can be utilized during emergencies to mitigate crisis 
situations, or even help to avoid a crisis altogether. Qadir et al. identify eight fields of 
humanitarian aid and development where data-driven responses are transforming 
crisis response practices: epidemic crises, natural disasters, crowd control issues, 
terrorist attacks, civil wars, public violence and other disaster situations, such as 
infrastructural failures and industrial accidents (Qadir et al. 2016, 2).  
The existing literature seems to focus especially on crisis mitigation through 
the means of big data technology. The research focus has been on the positive, 
reactive and preventive possibilities that big data has to offer, and rarely discusses 
critically the use of big data in development and humanitarian settings in detail. The 
existing literature does not assess or analyse the United Nations initiative, but merely 
mentions it as an actor in the field for utilizing big data for development purposes and 
humanitarian action. Therefore, research should be conducted on the UN initiative 
itself in order to gain broader insight on its successes as well as pitfalls.  
Using big data for development and humanitarian purposes within the UN is 
not without challenges. Privacy is one of the biggest concerns for the usage of big 
data in general, and the field of development and humanitarian action by the United 
Nations is no exception. The question of privacy poses one of the most pressing 
ethical challenges: with large amounts of data collected on individuals, it should be a 
top concern that data should not be abused for personal or financial gains (Ali et al. 
2016, 21). The UN Global Pulse has cooperated with corporations, such as Orange, in 
an attempt to engage the private sector in “data philanthropy” (Kirkpatrick and 
Vacarelu 2018). The aim of the UN Global Pulse is to work with the private sector in 
order to put the privately collected data to use in order to promote sustainable 
development goals. What seems to be problematic, however, is that there is no 
standardized regulation for sharing data for the “common good”. In addition, the 
projects should be critically assessed to ensure that the data is not used for financial 
gain under the pretense of humanitarian action and development. The legitimacy of 
using private companies to gather data that is then used to promote UN goals can also 
be questioned. Does the reliance on privately gathered data create possible 
dependencies on how the data is then utilized? How do we ensure that the data is not 
used to promote the corporate agendas in the shadow of the rhetoric of development 
and humanitarian action? How do we make sure that the data is collected in a 
transparent fashion, considering the ethical challenges that the age of big data might 
pose? The UN framework and the social development goals are not without issues 
themselves, for example when related to neoliberal governance that promotes market-
oriented solutions to development and humanitarian questions. 
Qadir et al. highlight that even though big data can be useful in providing 
insight to development issues and crisis situations in terms of a humanitarian 
response, it is not the only standing solution to the complex issues faced (Qadir et al. 
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2016, 19). Ali et al. identify the challenges to the use and implementation of big data 
for development purposes from technical and ethical perspectives (Ali et al. 2016, 
19). The technical challenges include bias and polarization emergent from the 
personalized content predicted by past behaviour and double responses from 
crowdsourcing, wherein for example aid agencies take on the same problem at the 
same time without coordination and complementary action.  This could be a problem 
within the UN Global Pulse context, if a failure to coordinate with other actors would 
materialize. Laura Mann (2018) uses a political economy perspective to the use of big 
data for development, and concludes that data is often extracted from the Global 
South, especially African contexts, for the use of “humanitarian purposes”. According 
to Mann, the approach shows how data is extracted by multinational corporations, 
which then aim to become “data custodians” of emerging economies in the global 
south. This approach incorporates global power relations to the analysis of big data 
for development and humanitarian action, which should not be disregarded. When 
data is extracted by companies, and emerging economies become increasingly digital, 
data becomes a source of power and economic governance, which has manifold 
implications. Big data representativeness can also cause challenges, since equal 
access to information technology, mobile phones and the Internet especially in 
contexts of crisis are not certain (Hilbert 2016, 149). Using big data for development 
purposes requires  nuanced understanding, analysis and awareness on how 
technologies might have the capacity to enhance or impede capabilities (Hilbert 2016, 
140). When the UN is utilizing big data, it needs to be considered how the use of big 
data might lead to increasing state and corporate control, and how ethical concerns are 
assessed and incorporated into policy and utilization frameworks.  
This section of the research paper examined the role that big data play in UN-
led efforts in sustainable development and humanitarian action, looking at the existing 
challenges and opportunities. Concluding the discussion, big data provides numerous 
possibilities and ways forward in the context of the UN action, but it is not without 
challenges.  
     
    
The 2019 film Brexit: The Uncivil War addressed the emerging issue of 
microtargeting in elections and referenda. In a key scene of the movie, Dominic 
Cummings meets the representative of a data mining company. The representative 
claims that his company can algorithmically target ads to voters. Furthermore, he 
claims that ads can mobilize 3 million people to vote. 
In this paper, “microtargeting” refers to targeting online ads to people based 
on an analysis of their preferences and behaviour by artificial intelligence. Whether 
microtargeting was decisive for the result of the Brexit referendum would be an 
interesting topic, but it is clearly outside of the scope of this essay. Instead, this 
section will discuss the implications of microtargeting to democratic principles such 
as information, privacy, transparency, public deliberation and equal chances of 
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success in elections. I will present the arguments of Borgesius et al., as their approach 
is the most systematic available, and also introduce readers to the research of 
Heawood and Benkler. Brexit is the case used here to elaborate these authors’ research 
findings. 
Borgesius et al. divide their analysis of the pros and cons to citizens, parties 
and the public opinion (Borgesius et al. 2018, 84). For citizens, the benefits include 
increased participation and more informed choices, since targeted ads can connect 
people with agenda points they care about. Ads on social media can also reach 
audiences that do not follow mass media (Borgesius et al. 2018, 84-85). Political 
parties, on the other hand, can run cheaper and more efficient campaigns. Online 
microtargeting is sometimes cheaper than traditional methods such as newspaper ads 
(Borgesius et al. 2018, 85-86). Borgesius et al. argue that voters easily become 
overloaded with information in the “marketplace of ideas” during elections, but 
microtargeting can work as a sieve that filters the information most relevant to them. 
Thus, the public could be more informed (Borgesius et al. 2018, 86). 
On the other hand, citizens face a threat to their privacy, as online 
microtargeting involves collecting massive amounts of sensitive data that is 
vulnerable to breaches and liable to misuse. Microtargeting could be used to 
manipulate voters all while increasing polarization and spreading lies. Instead of 
increasing participation, the turnout of undesired voters could be suppressed. Some 
groups could be ignored if their interventions are, for example, more oriented to 
provoking chaos or than furthering political aims (Borgesius et al. 2018, 87-88). For 
parties, professional microtargeting may end up costly, making the competition harder 
for emerging challengers. Intermediaries such as data companies could become 
increasingly powerful (Borgesius et al. 2018, 88-89). Political parties could also 
present themselves differently to each voting segment, without revealing a wider 
programme or the real priorities of the party. As interest in the overarching issues 
decreases, events of public deliberation such as debates will have a smaller following 
(Borgesius et al. 2018, 89). 
Jonathan Heawood raises similar concerns for democracy such as concerns 
about privacy, incompatible promises to different segments, as well as foreign 
influence (Heawood 2018, 431-432). However, his key contribution is to highlight a 
specific feature of microtargeted ads: unlike e.g. newspaper ads, they cannot be 
reached or seen equally by everyone: “microtargeted political adverts are, in this 
respect, a ‘pseudo-public’ form of discourse” (Heawood 2018, 430). Microtargeting 
thus happens outside the public sphere as conceived in the Habermasian sense. In a 
scene of Brexit: The Uncivil War, the Leave.eu campaign is microtargeting voters on 
social media with objectively false claims. However, journalists are not reporting 
anything, because they are not seeing the ads. As Heawood puts it, “claims made in 
private cannot be corrected in the marketplace of ideas” (Heawood 2018, 431). 
However, Heawood warns against naïveté. Criticizing Borgesius et al., he 
believes that “this implicit distinction between a ‘good’ old public sphere and a ‘bad’ 
new digital sphere is a bit of a fantasy” (Heawood 2018, 432). Any newspaper that is 
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not free conceals some key political information from the public. Even public 
broadcasters are run by people: the BBC’s tendency for “balance” is ridiculed in 
Brexit: The Uncivil War, when the BBC is presented as giving equal time to analyses 
by Nobel prize winners and outright liars. According to Heawood, we should be 
equally focused on solving the old problems of the analogue public sphere as we are 
on addressing the new challenges of the digital public sphere: ideally, the emergence 
of the latter may make the problems we already had with the former more visible 
(Heawood 2018, 433-434). Organising both traditional and social media townhall 
meetings might be one way to enliven both spheres. 
As a way to counter the potential threats of microtargeting, Borgesius et al. 
propose more research on microtargeting. Possible regulation could include public 
repositories of each ad, limits for campaign budgets or even a blanket ban on 
microtargeting (Borgesius et al. 2018, 92-95). While Benkler et al. (Benkler, Faris, & 
Roberts 2018) have a significantly more positive view on microtargeting than 
Borgesius et al. and Heawood, they recommend that “individually tailored, or too 
narrowly targeted advertising techniques … be constrained in the political context” as 
they undermine the perception of legitimacy of elections (Benkler et al. 2018, 279). 
Benkler also supports the idea of a public ad repository (Benkler et al. 2018). For 
now, intermediaries such as Twitter and Facebook can be considered to have both 
social responsibility and power outside of democratic processes. Twitter recently 
banned all political ads from its platform, while Facebook is introducing stricter rules 
(Hunnicutt 2019). A blanket ban may be problematic from the perspective of free 
speech; the sincerity of Facebook can be questioned, as ads remain a key source for 
social media platforms. 
Finally, I will add some of my own thoughts. First, I would like to propose a 
reverse notion compared to Borgesius et al. They note that in continental Europe, the 
threats of microtargeting are less relevant than in the US or the UK. Legal protections 
such as the European data protection law don’t exist in the US, and both the US and 
the UK systems feature majoritarian processes (elections in which only one candidate 
wins in a constituency) (Borgesius et al. 2018, 89-91). If majoritarian systems are 
more vulnerable to voter manipulation, maybe this should be added to the list of pros 
and cons in the discussion of which system is better. Second, I would like to note that 
the Brexit referendum was somewhat unique, inasmuch it presented a simple 
dichotomy. Instead of introducing referenda with oversimplified choices—think about 
David Cameron promising a referendum on the simple issue of the membership of the 
European Union—political leaders should provide the public with a more incremental 
process. If simple politics is vulnerable to manipulation, let us not oversimplify 
politics. 
Third, Mancosu et al. have demonstrated that older votes were more likely 
than young voters to respond to Facebook status updates designed to mobilise them 
during the Brexit referendum (Mancosu & Bobba 2019). Could it be that young 
people, as social media natives, are less vulnerable to being targeted on social media, 
with a more matter-of-fact relationship to ads? While microtargeting will likely 
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become more sophisticated in the following decade, social media will eventually 
become less of a novelty. As younger generations get older and eventually become 
increasingly socialized in the political system, could the effects of microtargeting lose 
significance? 
Artificial Intelligence and government surveillance – the case of 
Palantir – Emmi Nahi 
Awareness of cyber vulnerabilities is in its infancy (Bernett 2019). It has, however, 
become an increasingly interesting topic. AI’s impact extends to transforming patterns 
of governance, not only by giving governments new capabilities to disrupt elections 
and elevate false information but also to monitor their citizens and shape their choices 
(Feldstein 2019, 5).  
In this case study we examine the role of AI in government surveillance. This 
requires a brief overview on international human rights law and how it applies in the 
current digital environment, particularly in light of the increase and changes in 
surveillance technologies. Privacy is a fundamental principle and recognized under 
international human rights law (OHCHR 2018, A/HRC/27/37).  It is essential to 
human dignity and reinforces other rights, such as freedom of expression and 
information (Necessary & Proportionate 2014). Because surveillance may only be 
justified when it is prescribed by law and necessary to achieve a legitimate aim, 
proportionality is the key principle. States must justify every intrusion in an 
individuals’ private life; it needs to happen for a legitimate reason, and the 
surveillance measure cannot be more intruding than necessary to meet the needs. 
A growing number of states are deploying advanced AI surveillance tools to 
monitor, track and surveil their citizens to accomplish a range of policy objectives, 
some violating human rights, some not and—what is more important—most of them 
falling somewhere in the middle (Feldstein 2019). According to the AI Global 
Surveillance (AIGS) Index by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, at 
least 75 countries out of the examined 176 are actively using AI-technologies for 
surveillance purposes, liberal democracies being the major users. The index does not 
distinguish between legitimate and unlawful uses of AI. The findings include for 
example smart city platforms, facial recognition systems and smart policing. China is 
the major driver of AI surveillance with its companies such as Huawei, Hikvision and 
ZTE. However, the US does not fall short. AI surveillance technology supplied in US 
companies is present in 32 countries. The most significant firms are IBM, Cisco and 
the focus of this case study, Palantir.  
Palantir is a powerful but not well-known CIA-backed data gathering and 
analysing start-up owned by Peter Thiel - a billionaire Pay-Pal co-founder, Facebook 
investor, a latter-day Trump ally, and presidential adviser (Biddle 2017). Palantir has 
worked years to boost the global dragnet of the National Security Agency (NSA) and 
CIA as well as elements of the US military; and it was in fact co-created together with 
American spies (Biddle 2017, 2; Posner 2019).  Although Palantir does not mask its 
ambitions, which is to sell its services to the US government, it does refuse to name 
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its governmental clientele, despite the fact that it has landed around $1,2 billion in 
federal contracts since 2009 (Biddle 2017), consequently making its operating 
extremely non-transparent.  
What Palantir has been the most criticized for is its technical support for US 
immigration enforcement practices (Posner 2019). It has provided services for the 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) which has caused protest marches 
in several cities and frustration among its own employees (e.g. Bort 2019, Woodman 
2017, Carroll 2019).  
Palantir has been providing ICE with software since 2014, but denied that its 
technology is used by the part of ICE that handles family separations and deportations 
(Bort 2019). Conflicting information was reported by the Intercept (Woodman 2017) 
claiming that Palantir has created an intelligence system called Investigative Case 
Management (ICM) which is deployed by ICE and assists in President Trump’s 
efforts to deport immigrants from the US. According to government funding records 
(Department of Homeland Security record 2014), ICE awarded Palantir a $41 million 
contract to build and maintain ICM, and identifies the program as “mission critical to 
ICE”. ICM is accessible by both ICE’s Enforcement and Removal Operations 
(ERO)—the federal government’s primary deportation force—and Homeland Security 
Investigations (HSI), despite Palantir’s claims otherwise (Woodman 2017).  
One of these services is the FALCON system, “a database and analytical 
platform built by Palantir that HSI agents can use to track immigrants and crunch data 
on forms of cross-border criminal activity” (Woodman 2019). Falcon costs taxpayers 
$39 million (USA Spending). In a nutshell, ICE uses Palantir’s software to create 
“digital dragnets” of individual people in an attempt to predict crime before it happens 
(Haskins, 2019). The data includes emails, phone numbers, addresses, social security 
numbers, business relationships, travel histories captured by license plate cameras, 
and social networks, among other types of information (e.g. Haskins 2019, Waldman 
et al. 2018). The data presents the connections in colourful, easy-to-interpret graphics 
that are very much appreciated by US spies and special forces and helped planners 
avoid roadside bombs, track insurgents and even hunt down Osama bin Laden 
(Waldman et al. 2018). The military success, justifiable or not, led to federal contracts 
on the civilian side. Now Palantir sells its services to make a powerful surveillance 
system at NSA even more powerful, bringing clarity and slick visuals to surveillance 
data (Biddle 2017, 6). 
Moreover, after the privacy hustle caused by Edward Snowden, Palantir 
quickly denied its connections to the NSA spy program called PRISM which, 
however, shared an unfortunate code name with one of its own software products 
(Biddle 2017, 4). Palantir’s website includes a whole section of “Privacy & Civil 
Liberties” but does not get to practicalities. 
Well-established legal principles in monitoring communications that were 
created before the public adoption of the Internet have decreased in recent decades 
and the application of legal principles in the new technological context has become 
unclear (Necessary and Proportionate 2014).  The principle of legitimacy is closely 
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related to transparency. As a privately held company, Palantir is not required to reveal 
much about its finances or operations (Posner 2019). Instead, it has profited from 
governmental “data-analytics”— or mass-surveillance—in the name of predicting 
crime or terrorism, but in fact endangering human rights. Palantir has access to 
classified military data, facial recognition cameras across the country and at the 
borders, as well as the complete trust and cooperation of the federal government and 
hundreds of local law enforcement agencies (Greene 2019). According to immigration 
activist group Mijente, it is “a surveillance machine capable of tracking anyone and 
everyone”.  
The state’s struggle to balance security interests with citizens’ liberties is the 
main topic of this section. Strong security and the use of AI surveillance are closely 
related: out of the top 50 military spending countries 40 deploy AI surveillance 
technology (Feldstein 2019b, 11). It is unclear, to what extent surveillance 
deployments are covered in national or international law, let alone whether the actions 
meet the necessity and proportionality standard. This is increasingly interesting as the 
major users of AI surveillance are liberal democracies, where the demand for 
legitimacy is high, regardless of the purpose of the surveillance. The explosion of 
digital communications content and the falling cost of storing and mining large sets of 
data make surveillance by states possible at an unprecedented scale.  Palantir’s high 
profile and often controversial business activities provide an instructive case study on 
the issue of state surveillance and consequently the Trump Administration's practice 
of data analysis facilitating mistreatment of asylum seekers and other migrants. 
Conclusion 
This paper claims that while the new smart technologies will likely provide societies 
with many new opportunities, they may also pose serious threats to democratic 
principles and social cohesion.  
The first case dissected China’s SCS program, showing that it engenders 
citizens' privacy, while undermining the democratic ideals of legitimacy and 
transparency. As with other cases examined in this paper, it seems that the Chinese 
system needs to balance between what forms of monitoring people are useful and 
efficient for the government and the party, and what people are willing to accept. This 
raises the concern of legitimacy. The theme of transparency continued in the second 
case. By examining the literature related to the ethics of AG, the review suggested 
that the black box type algorithms used in artificial intelligence and machine learning 
should be coded in a socially and ethically progressive way. As algorithmic 
governance gains more foothold in the future, resulting policy suggestions need to be 
able to see through, prevent and reverse any structural discrimination humans have 
practiced in the past.  
Following the first two nation-state oriented cases, the paper took a more 
global view by looking at how The United Nations aims to use big data for 
development and humanitarian purposes through the UN Global Pulse initiative. Here 
again, the issue of privacy posed one of the most fundamental questions regarding the 
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use of big data for development and humanitarian purposes, since the data used is 
most often collected by private companies. It became evident that problems will arise 
since there is no existing framework on how to regulate data sharing for “the common 
good”, or to ensure that data used for humanitarian purposes is not used for financial 
gain. The UN’s focus on big data for development should, therefore, assess whether 
the data used for humanitarian purposes is collected in a transparent fashion, and 
provide tools for the analysis and assessment of safe and responsible data use.  
The fourth case discussed the emerging phenomenon of microtargeting voters 
in elections and referenda. Microtargeting is an example of how new technology may 
both invigorate and challenge democratic principles. Targeted information may help 
the public find the information most relevant to them in the “marketplace of ideas”, 
helping more people to get involved in the political process. However, microtargeting 
also facilitates manipulation, voter suppression and the spread of misinformation. The 
key to addressing the challenge is improving our understanding of the meaning of the 
public sphere, both digital and analogue. Regulation should safeguard transparency, 
privacy and access to verifiable information. Oversimplification of complex political 
issues should be avoided. 
Finally, the fifth case explored how international and national law has not kept 
up with technological development, causing new technological activities to fall in a 
juridically grey area. Further, the U.S. government has a variety of tools at its disposal 
to surveil its citizens, many of which the public is unaware of. An epitome of this is 
the case of NSA and Palantir, a privately-owned company. This paper has shown that 
AG, ML, and BD can be used to amplify the effectiveness of policies, whether they 
are democratic or authoritarian, benevolent or atrocious. The digital revolution is 
likely to change how social relations and wider societal contexts are perceived in 
academia, administrations and elsewhere. We, therefore, recommend further research 
on the social implications of AI, BD, ML, and AG so that adequate regulative action 
can be prepared to address these threats. 
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Abstract 
Algorithms and new technologies are already shaping our societies and will likely 
continue to do so in the future, and thus, should be governed accordingly. Usually 
achieving a legitimate policy goal means that it should be procedurally correct, open 
and unbiased, but the age of algorithms poses new challenges to traditional ways of 
considering legitimacy. In this paper, we evaluate the legitimacy of algorithmic 
governance from four perspectives — ethics, individual consent, opacity, and 
accountability — by comparing these elements in the cases of US FICO Credit Score 
and China’s Social Credit System. We find that algorithmic governance cannot be 
detached from other elements of government and society. 
 
Keywords:  Social credit system, FICO Credit Score, algorithmic governance, 
algorithm, legitimacy, transparency, accountability 
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Algorithmic governance refers to the process in which algorithms are embedded in 
decision-making and evaluation systems. In addition to increased efficiency, the use 
of algorithms can also produce ethical, social, and financial risks in the form of 
manipulation, biases, censorship, social discrimination, and violations of privacy as 
well as property rights. Algorithmic governance has a concrete impact on society, 
since analyses and processes utilizing algorithms can range from market-oriented 
solutions to government-based mechanisms (Almeida 2016, 60-63). 
In this article, we compare two cases of algorithmic governance systems 
produced by two distinct cultural spheres and influenced by differing philosophical 
traditions: Fair Isaac Corporation (FICO) financial credit scoring and the Chinese 
Social Credit System (SCS). This paper will analyze the selected cases from four 
main points of view: an ethical perspective, individual consent, problems of opacity, 
and questions about accountability.  
Algorithmic governance and case examples — L. Saukkonen 
Algorithmic governance offers many benefits to society, including speed, efficiency, 
comprehensiveness, and fairness. However, there are also many negative impacts, 
which raise concerns. For example, it is necessary to investigate the social, ethical, 
political and legal problems that may be produced or reinforced by the system. There 
are some concerns about the inaccuracies, inefficiencies and unintended 
consequences. In addition, the opacity and lack of transparency threaten the 
effectiveness and legitimacy of algorithmic governance (Danaher 2017, 1–3). 
China’s Social Credit System 
China’s social credit score system was launched at the national level in 2014 
and it should be fully implemented by the end of 2020. China’s social credit score 
system can be either a grand technological breakthrough for society or eventually an 
unethical tool to control citizens. The social credit score system collects data from 
citizens’ social media, voting records, financial information, online purchasing, credit 
history, tax payments and legal matters, among other things. The social credit score 
system is the Chinese government’s way of ranking citizens and at the same time, it 
provides the government a chance to create order and enhance discipline in society. 
The social credit score also gathers information from citizens’ health-tracking apps 
and in conjunction with other different apps, it also has ability to collect data about 
citizens’ locations and relationships (Murrell 2018). 
Trustworthiness is surely important in a state like China, and systems like the 
social credit score provide an excellent opportunity to enhance discipline and healthy 
habits in society. The system categorizes people and provides incentives for citizens 
with a high social credit score, such as priority access to public housing, travel visas 
and job promotions. The social credit score system also influences citizens’ ability to 
get jobs, loans and mortgages (Creemers 2018, 3). 
The system even monitors citizens’ behavior of how long they play video 
games and provides a score that many users share on Chinese social media. The aim 
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to assess Chinese citizens’ trustworthiness this way saves time and resources for the 
government. The system helps citizens comply with legal rules, moral norms, and 
professional and ethical standards (Creemers 2018, 6). 
The purpose of the social credit score system is to create a well-organized 
society, but at the same time citizens do not have the same level of privacy and 
freedom in their lives. The all-pervasive system gathers and leaks massive amounts of 
confidential data from citizens’ lives. The result is that citizens’ privacy is in danger 
(Horsley 2018). 
The system defines peoples’ reputation and at the same time changes the 
values and hierarchy in society because a machine is in charge of decisions and 
evaluation instead of a human. For example, a person who buys a lot of diapers gets 
more credits than a person who does not have a baby. There are also various technical 
challenges that can cause multiple problems for impartial evaluation. Additionally, 
different standards and different rules within jurisdiction causes ambiguity in the 
mechanism. When the mechanism does not work as desired, people are unfairly 
stigmatized, which restricts their lives in the future (Horsley 2018). 
Negative aspects of the system result from the fact that it is a machine that 
evaluates citizens. Any kind of assessment should recognize human behavior, or at 
least be aware of multiple exceptions that can occur concerning the way different 
kinds of individuals behave and live. This kind of system can make multiple mistakes 
and at the same time, it controls people’s lives unnecessarily (Murrell 2018). The way 
the system gathers data should be precisely developed to avoid these shortcomings, 
yet it is unclear that this challenge can be met.  
The social credit score system will also pose different kinds of challenges 
regarding maintaining the integrity of citizens’ privacy and personal data. The system 
helps citizens avoid exploitation and criminality, and at the same time it confines 
freedom, rights and individual choices. On the other hand, without the surveillance 
and monitoring, how could the government ensure the safety of society and good 
behavior of citizens (Yongxi Chen 2017, 1)? Another major challenge is to measure 
the advantages and disadvantages of the system, and how to define whether the 
system is increasing harmony or ambiguity and a lack of transparency in society. The 
opacity of the system increases uncertainty, because citizens do not know how a 
machine-led environment will interpret and sanction their actions (Hildebrandt 2016, 
4). When analyzing the system, it is important to notice that Chinese society and the 
government differs from Western democracy, and therefore the case does not directly 
correspond with Western countries (Creemers 2018, 1–3). 
US FICO Credit Score System 
Credit scoring has become a very important task in the credit industry because its use 
has increased rapidly since the 1960s. A credit score represents the creditworthiness of 
a person, and it provides information on how likely it is that a person will pay their 
debt back to the lender. It is a general system for lenders, such as banks and credit 
card companies, to evaluate the potential risks and at the same time provide assurance 
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of consumers’ trustworthiness. Fair Isaac Corporation (FICO) was founded in 1956 
and the FICO credit risk score was first introduced in 1989. In the system, consumers’ 
FICO scores are available for lenders who purchase the service. Different industries, 
like the auto, banking and insurance industries, use the FICO scores to rate 
consumers’ creditworthiness. FICO’s algorithm gathers the information of consumers’ 
credits from the credit bureau report and makes a comparison to other consumers. The 
factors the algorithm uses are: payment history (35%), amounts owed (30%), length 
of credit history (15%), credit mix (10%) and new credit (10%). The actions that 
decrease the credit score are: missed or late payments, high credit utilization, 
bankruptcy, opening multiple new credit or loan accounts and errors in consumers’ 
credit reports (Martin 2019). 
The credit scores accurately establishes the parameters for clients’ loan access, 
from a business profitability standpoint. The system is reliable and does only consider 
the appropriate facts of the consumer. However, there are also some failings in the 
system.  Therefore, it still marginalizes the less privileged individuals and increases 
inequality in society. From the perspective of equity of opportunity, the algorithm and 
the factors it analyzes cannot provide the right kind of information about the risks for 
not paying the loan. While the system evaluates the consumer's payment history, the 
amounts the consumer owes, the length of the consumer’s credit history, new credit, 
and types of credit the consumer uses, at the same time it omits factors such as 
employment history, salary, and other items that might suggest creditworthiness. 
Generally, there has not been any correlation between the consumer’s credit report 
and their capacity to perform in the labor market. That is also the reason that the 
report cannot provide an overall view of the consumer, and therefore it can even give 
a more negative overview of the consumers trustworthiness for members of 
disadvantaged socioeconomic classes (Hurley 2017, 9). 
The process of data gathering and giving the information to lenders can also 
be harmful to consumers, because they are required to give their private data to 
lender. Also, technical errors can cause serious problems in the system, causing a 
negative impact on consumers’ opportunities to take out a loan. Serving lenders’ 
financial interests first and foremost, this system lacks accountability for borrowers. 
The inaccurate information and errors can take a long time to correct, thereby limiting 
the consumer’s chances of maintaining good credit in the future. (Hurley 2017, 9). 
Ethical Considerations — W. Oinas 
In this section, I will discuss the general ethical considerations associated with 
algorithmic governance in the context of FICO credit scoring and the Social Credit 
System of the People's Republic of China. I will focus on matters related to the role of 
the individual, the question of responsibility, and the professed intentions as well as 
the practical applications of these systems. I will also reflect on certain significant 
cultural and philosophical differences between China and the West, and how these 
differences might affect the perceptions of the discussed phenomena. 
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Money in its various forms and uses has been a ubiquitous feature of 
commerce and society for most of recorded human history. As lending and borrowing 
have become increasingly commonplace, creditors have sought and created measures 
to reduce risks and ensure returns for their investments. Credit scoring is a relatively 
recent invention that is nonetheless widely employed in credit-related industries, such 
as banking and insurance. Fair Isaac Corporation (FICO) consumer-credit risk score, 
introduced in 1989, is the most common credit scoring system in the United States, 
based on consumer data collected from different credit bureaus and used by most 
banks and creditors. 
The concept of financial credit scoring is intrinsically built on the notions of 
individual responsibility and property rights. Credit loans and mortgages are 
essentially investments, and credit scores are a tool used to assess the risks associated 
with particular investments. No agent, individual or otherwise, is under any obligation 
to invest their resources in something or to act as a creditor to someone if they do not 
wish to form a contractual relationship with another party. It is up to the individual to 
maintain their creditworthiness by demonstrating that they are a reliable business 
partner or a customer via careful and responsible management of their finances.  
This does not mean that credit scoring as a practice is without flaws. The 
FICO algorithm considers factors such as payment history, amounts owed, length of 
credit history, credit mix, and new credit, while omitting possibly relevant data that 
might suggest creditworthiness, such as employment history or salary information. 
Some have argued that the use of algorithmic tools and inadequate data to determine 
credit scores can marginalize disadvantaged individuals, further increasing inequality 
(Hurley & Adebayo 2017). While one can argue for the use and even the necessity of 
credit scoring or other such tools on the basis of individual responsibility and property 
rights, it is the methodology used to determine the scores — the algorithms — that 
has raised certain ethical concerns, chief amongst them the supposed neutrality of 
algorithms, the ownership question over the collected data, and the associated opacity 
as well as transparency problems.  
What exactly is an algorithm? An algorithm is a set of instructions that gets 
executed when it encounters a trigger. They are explicitly dependent on human input 
regarding both the triggers and the data, which naturally affects the output, since 
humans, as imperfect beings, are capable of transferring their biases into algorithms 
and artificial intelligence. The algorithmic process forecloses potential alternative 
readings in favour of optimised output, resulting in imperfect results and putting 
individuals essentially at the mercy of opaque computer programs; faulty data, 
triggers, and simple programming errors can lead to poor credit scores and prevent 
individuals from accessing credit services for significant amounts of time. 
The Chinese Social Credit System is not directly comparable to simple 
financial credit scoring, at least not in terms of the Western concept of individual 
responsibility. First, it should be noted that the term “Social Credit System” (SCS) is a 
bit misleading: the SCS is not a single system, but an assortment of information 
collection and publicity systems established by various state authorities at different 
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levels of government. It is essentially a mass surveillance program that utilizes big 
data analysis technology. Secondly, this is where substantial cultural, philosophical, 
and legal differences between Chinese and Western spheres or traditions come to the 
fore. Harmony (和 hé or 和諧 héxié) is an important concept in the Chinese 
philosophical tradition. The origins of the notion lie in Confucianism, and its legalist 
interpretation, following the thinking of Chinese Warring States period (c. 475–220 
BCE) philosopher Xunzi, is a central part of the modern state ideology of People's 
Republic of China. (Rošker 2013).  
Unsurprisingly, many commentators in the West have vehemently objected to 
the SCS, noting its incompatibility with Western cultural and political values as well 
as liberal democracy. The SCS also conflicts with the notion of the rule of law, 
because it lacks transparency and blurs the line between law and politics (Mac Síthigh 
& Siems 2019, 17–18). While those who hold Western political and philosophical 
sensibilities may balk at the intrusiveness of the SCS, it aligns with — or is at the 
very least based on — Chinese cultural norms and China’s worldview. The professed, 
markedly paternalistic intention of the SCS is to create a more harmonious, well-
organized society, which, as noted earlier, comes at the expense of citizens’ personal 
freedom and privacy. Personal responsibility is defined in relation to the wider 
collective society, not to individuals or personal values, principles or convictions.  
What is often forgotten or ignored in the West, however, is that the SCS was 
(and still is to a large extent) primarily an economic control system. China has had 
issues with fraud for decades now, resulting in low consumer trust in markets. In 
addition to being a mass surveillance system targeted at “private” citizens, the SCS is 
a heavy-handed scheme to improve public trust by enforcing social credit standards 
on businesses operating in mainland China. However, given the dubious human rights 
track record of the People's Republic of China, one would be naïve to assume that the 
SCS cannot or will not be used as a tool to suppress political dissent and persecute 
non-conformist elements of Chinese society. 
In conclusion, the way in which one views China’s social credit score system 
and the possibilities created by it, both positive and negative, seems to depend 
exclusively on the philosophical and political axioms a person holds. If one values 
political, social, and economic freedom as well as individual rights above everything 
else, the SCS appears to be a totalitarian nightmare waiting to happen or already 
underway. On the other hand, if one values security and social harmony, the SCS can 
be seen as a tool to strengthen the moral standards of society and to improve people’s 
trust in one another as well as businesses – as long as they conform to the standards of 
harmonious behaviour set by the Communist Party of China (CPC), of course. 
There are also the questions of data ownership, consent, and tech-literacy, 
which relate to both credit scoring and the SCS. Who owns the collected data, the data 
collector —  be they private or public agents — or the person from who the data was 
collected? Does an individual have a right to, at the very least, access and potentially 
remove their personal data, collected by different agents and often with the consent of 
the user, from the Internet (commonly referred to as the “right to be forgotten”)? How 
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does tech-literacy factor into matters related to algorithmic governance? The 
following sections will discuss the opacity problem as well as the questions of 
individual consent and accountability. 
 Individual Consent to Algorithmic Governance — T. Saarnio 
Individual consent to algorithmic governance is one of the most pressing issues 
during this era of digitalization and big data. We are constantly exposed to data 
collection from various different authorities including big corporations and 
governments. It is difficult to determine when an individual has given sufficient 
consent for different aspects of algorithmic governance. 
In this section, I will first discuss individual consent on a more general level 
and examine some problems that currently exist in the way consent is achieved, for 
example on social media platforms. Secondly, I will analyze individual consent in two 
separate cases, China’s social credit system and the US FICO credit system. 
The concept of individual consent 
To put it simply, consent means giving an approval to something or someone. Consent 
can have various forms and meanings for different areas of work or study. In this 
context, I will define individual consent and what makes it valid by using the General 
Data Protection Regulation from the European Union. 
For an individual’s consent to be valid, it must be freely given, which requires 
genuine free choice without any disadvantage if the individual refuses consent. The 
individual must also be able to withdraw consent at any time and this should be 
possible without any additional trouble. In addition, consent is not freely given if 
there is a power imbalance between the individual and the other party. This is 
particularly the case if the other party is a public authority or there is an employer–
employee relationship. In these situations, the data subject might not have actual free 
choice (EU, 2016). 
Consent must also be informed, which requires at least the following 
information: the identity of the collector of data, purposes for data collection, type of 
data that is collected and how the data might be used (Article 29 Data Protection 
Working Party, 2017). Clear and plain language in the agreements is also required 
according to the General Data Protection Regulation (2016). The act of giving consent 
and the language used in the privacy and terms of service policies have become the 
subjects of increased scrutiny. 
Emerging problems in achieving individual consent 
Social media platforms have a significant influence over individuals’ lives. The fear 
of missing out often overpowers privacy concerns one might have. Recently, some of 
the tech giants have also been caught for imposing a “forced consent” on their privacy 
terms, which has resulted in fines. A forced consent refers to the exclusion of an 
individual from the use of service if he or she does not consent to the terms. However, 
this is just one of numerous problems. 
297
THE LEGITIMACY OF ALGORITHMIC GOVERNANCE  
 
Ignoring privacy and terms of service policies online is a significant problem. 
As McDonald & Cranor (2008) presented in their study, it would take us 
approximately 201 hours per year to read all of the privacy policies that we encounter 
online. The increasing regulation of data use and privacy policy might actually make 
matters worse in this regard. Regulation requires more detailed and specific privacy 
and terms of service policies. Furthermore, these policies are often very difficult to 
understand, even if one would take the time to read them (Obar, 2015, 4). 
Obar and Oeldorf-Hirsch (2016, 19, 22-23) have also investigated this 
problem in their study about giving consent without reading the privacy policies. 
Their results were clear: a great majority of individuals ignore the privacy and terms 
of service policies on social media platforms. Individuals saw these policies as an 
“unwanted impediment” and “nuisance”. Information overload was seen as the 
primary factor for their dislike of the policies. These findings suggest that privacy 
policies do not work as they should and this system has failed in terms of achieving 
individual consent. 
Case studies: China’s Social Credit System and the US FICO credit system 
China’s Social Credit System (SCS) includes many flaws from the point of view of 
individual consent. As Chen and Cheung (2017, 357) point out, credit scoring and 
rating of individuals with the help of big data is not completely unique, but there are a 
few features that differentiate the Chinese system. These include the scale of data 
collected, how it is used and most importantly, the lack of a legal system to protect the 
individuals and their data. 
Public credit information (PCI) is the record of the collected data of an 
individual, which determines one’s trustworthiness. Here, we can identify the first 
problem: the government does not need individual consent to collect PCI. 
Furthermore, there is actually no legislation in China to protect the right to privacy. 
The legislation implies that private interests can be subordinated to public interests 
and that there is no protection for an individual in case of an intrusion from a public 
authority. In addition, the SCS is mandatory and individuals might be penalized for 
being rated “untrustworthy”. It is not clear for the individuals what contributes to their 
social credit scores or how their data is being used (Chen & Cheung, 2017, 364-365).
  
China’s SCS is undoubtedly problematic, and there is a conflict between 
public interest and individual freedom. Individual consent is threatened particularly 
when we examine it through the European regulation framework (GDPR). Chinese 
legislation fails to protect the individuals and it gives a carte blanche for the 
government to collect and use personal data. 
The US FICO credit score system determines consumers’ creditworthiness. 
The score is used when an individual wants to take out a loan from a bank, for 
example. The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) is the regulatory framework for 
credit reporting agencies and it determines how credit and debt information can be 
collected, used and shared. The FCRA was enacted to “promote the accuracy, fairness, 
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and privacy of consumer information contained in the files of consumer reporting 
agencies” and to “protect consumers from the willful and/or negligent inclusion of 
inaccurate information in their credit reports”. According to the regulation, a credit 
reporting agency must 1) provide an individual with the collected information upon a 
request, 2) get the individual’s consent before providing information to a third party, 
3) investigate information which an individual disputes, and 4) correct or delete 
inaccurate information (FCRA, 2018). 
It seems that the FICO credit score system has a rigid regulatory framework to 
protect the privacy of an individual. However, there has been one fundamental issue 
with the regulation. Individual consent is not needed to collect data for the credit 
score. The credit score system has been criticized by the US Congress for the 
“commodification of consumers and their personal data” and reform has been called 
for (testimony quoted in Leonhardt 2019). The criticism has had an effect because in 
the future individual consent will be needed for the data collection and the consumers 
can also opt not to use the credit score if they wish to (Leonard 2019). This is 
certainly a vital improvement regarding individual consent. 
China’s Social Credit system has some built-in flaws and problems concerning 
individual privacy and consent. The US FICO Credit System works better in this 
regard, but it is not in any way perfect either. Individual consent is of paramount 
importance during this era of our growing online presence and algorithmic 
governance. Regulation on this subject should be comprehensive and also revised 
regularly.  
Questions of Opacity in Algorithmic Governance — A. Vuori 
Algorithmic governance affects the legitimacy of governance. This raises some 
concerns, amongst them problems of opacity. Opacity problems rise from the lack of 
transparency in how algorithms are created and from differences between how experts 
and uninitiated people understand how algorithms work. In addition, people can be 
subjected to computational classifications, invasions of privacy and various 
surveillance methods in ways that are not equal across the general populations and 
thus possibly discriminatory. 
First, I will consider what opacity means in algorithms. Next, I will bring up 
various concerns about opacity in algorithms. I conclude with a look at opacity in 
China’s social credit and the US FICO systems. 
What is opacity in algorithms? 
According to Burrell, algorithms operate on data and using that as input, they produce 
an output. These are opaque in that people who receive these outputs rarely have a 
concrete sense of how or why the algorithm has produced a particular output for them 
and how that output has been constructed from the inputs (Burrell 2016, 1). Similarly, 
the inputs that the algorithm use are also often unknown to users. 
In digital contexts, transparency does not simply pertain to revealing 
information or keeping secrets, but continually deploying, configuring and resisting of 
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platforms, algorithms and machine learning protocols that manage visibility (Ananny 
& Crawford 2018, 983). Ananny and Crawford note that calls for transparency 
assume that seeing a phenomenon creates opportunities and obligations to make it 
accountable and thus there would be opportunities to change it. The logic behind 
transparency is that observation of a given system produces insight into it. This leads 
to the creation of knowledge that is required to govern the system and hold it 
accountable (Ananny & Crawford 2018, 974). The more knowledge you have about a 
system, the better you can hold it accountable. Thus, transparency leads to a reduced 
amount of opacity in a system, as increased visibility gives both the experts and the 
laymen a better understanding about how an algorithm produces any given output. 
Problems of opacity 
Burrell identifies multiple types of opacity in algorithms. Opacity can be an 
intentional form of self-protection for corporations and institutions. They might want 
to keep their algorithms secret because they don’t want their competitors to have that 
knowledge (Burrell 2016, 4). Similarly, Pasquale notes that financiers can keep their 
operations opaque on purpose, when they seek to avoid regulations (Pasquale 2015, 
2). One form of algorithmic opacity is self-protection for corporations and 
institutions, when they seek to protect their competitive advantages. This can lead to 
the dodging of regulations, avoidance of responsibility and consumer manipulation. 
Danaher notes that many algorithmic systems operated by government agencies are 
protected by secrecy laws to prevent people from gaming or hacking those systems 
(Danaher 2016, 254). 
Burrell notes that writing and reading code is a specialized skill that most 
people are not capable of (Burrell 2016, 4). Programming is different from learning 
and understanding human languages, since programming must be readable by 
machines for it to work in the first place. Human understanding for the uninitiated 
would be necessary to achieve full transparency. Burrell notes that to address this 
form of opacity, there would have to be widespread educational efforts to make public 
audiences more knowledgeable about these mechanisms (Burrell 2016, 4). Similarly, 
algorithmic decision-making processes often use personal information without the 
person’s informed consent (Zarksy 2016, 12). Analyses often affect individuals in 
arbitrary manners, and the persons in question often lack understanding of the process 
and its inner workings. In an environment in which these kinds of systems operate, 
individuals have limited abilities to question the process or submit corrections (Zarksy 
2016, 12). Automated processes create a sense of arbitrariness and they neglect the 
need for understandable explanations for the process and its outcomes. 
Opacity can also ensue from a mismatch between mathematical optimization 
in high-dimensionality characteristic of machine learning and the demands of human 
scale reasoning and styles of semantic interpretation (Burrell 2016, 2). Algorithms are 
often systems that are constructed from multiple components. On one hand, 
programmers must be able to read and understand the code that operates any given 
algorithm, and on the other hand they must also understand how the algorithm 
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operates in action and how it processes the data it is given. Burrell notes that while 
large datasets and clear codes might be comprehensible on their own, when there is an 
interplay between them that causes complexity in the algorithm which in turn leads to 
opacity. With greater computational resources, and many terabytes of data to mine, 
the number of possible features to include in a classification category rapidly grows 
beyond what can easily be grasped by a reasoning human (Burrell 2016, 9). 
Danaher notes that a major concern about opacity in algorithmic governance is 
people’s ability to participate in political procedures since this is undermined by the 
growing usage of algorithmic governance (Danaher 2016, 249). The rationales 
underlying the mechanics of the procedure must not be opaque to those affected by 
the procedures, and thus opacity in the system is a problem. Decision-making 
procedures should be rationally acceptable for those affected, and the more opacity 
there is, the more this acceptance is hindered (Danaher 2016, 252). 
Zarsky notes the problematic sides of automated algorithm processes. If they 
use forbidden factors such as race, or proxies correlated to racially marked attributes, 
to decide upon allocations, they are socially unacceptable. If they use a skewed or 
biased data set, they might lead to outcomes that discriminate against particular 
groups of people. In addition, algorithms can provide outcomes that generate a 
disparate impact, such as in implicating groups of people to a larger degree than their 
part in the general population (Zarksy 2016, 9). 
Opacity in China’s Social Credit System 
China’s social credit system lacks protections for citizens’ personal data, and thus the 
system is a laboratory for big data experimentation, data intelligence and mass 
surveillance. This leads to a system in which individuals are uncertain about what 
exactly contributes to their credit scores, how they are combined with the state system 
and how their data is used (Chen & Cheung 2017, 357). This means that the credit 
system is very opaque when it comes to citizens’ understanding of the system. 
According to Kostka, the algorithms used to calculate individual scores are not in the 
public domain, and so they are opaque (Kostka 2019, 1588). He also raises a point 
about how citizens perceive the system; people are concerned that the system does not 
credit everyone equally and that people in powerful positions are favoured, while 
simultaneously the Chinese government maintains a positive image of the social 
credit system through the state media (Kostka 2019, 1588-1589). This is an example 
of opacity as a form of protection for government agencies. 
US FICO system 
In contrast to the Chinese social credit system, the US FICO system is more 
transparent and less opaque. Since the FICO algorithm considers known inputs from 
users such as credit history, payment history and credit mixes, the data the algorithm 
uses is not completely opaque. In addition, as laid out in the Fair Credit Reporting 
Act, the agency must for example delete inaccurate information (and thus reduce the 
risk of opacity in algorithms input data) and provide users with collected data upon 
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request (FCRA, 2018). Even though there are concerns about algorithmic governance 
in FICO, these points at least reduce the problems of opacity in FICO. 
Accountability of Algorithmic Systems and Algorithmic Governance
  — E. Uutela 
We have already discussed ethical considerations, individual consent, and the opacity 
problem when it comes to algorithmic governance. But one important aspect of 
legitimacy is accountability: can we hold a piece of code accountable, and if we 
cannot, how can we make sure algorithmic systems are governed properly and are 
accountable to citizens? 
There are great hopes for new technologies to improve the accountability of 
our governance. Lepri et al summarize these hopes quite nicely: “The turn towards 
data-driven algorithms can be seen as a reflection of a demand for greater objectivity, 
evidence-based decision-making, and a better understanding of our individual and 
collective behaviors and needs” (Lepri, Oliver, Letouzé, Pentland & Vinck 2017, 
612).  The widespread use of algorithms is driven in part for the hope that they may 
be able to surpass implicit biases inherent in human judgments. 
There is, however, a lot of discussion about the other side of the coin, as well. 
Danaher analyses algocracy, “a governance system which is organized and structured 
on the basis of computer-programmed algorithms” (2016, 247). He suggests that the 
increasing reliance on algocratic systems poses a threat to legitimate decision-making 
because they are not comprehensible for human understanding (2016, 254). 
As a solution to the threat of algocracy, Danaher reviews and analyzes the 
human application of algorithms (2016, 258).  He considers: epistemic enhancement 
of the human mind with technology or drugs (2016, 260); sousveillance technologies, 
in other words using algorithmic governance and radical openness towards those who 
hold power (2016, 261–262); and individuals forming partnerships with algorithms 
(2016, 263). Danaher, however, is not overall hopeful that any of these will solve the 
problem. Most of the solutions I will go through in this section focus on some form of 
a human review or a very light version of sousveillance. 
However, many societies are on some level bureaucracies, some kind of 
democracies, more or less mediacracies, and very likely also algocracies. Yet none of 
these alone defines or delimits human-algorithm interactions and decision-making 
procedures. Our surrounding culture and personal values affect strongly which one of 
these “-cracies” we most subscribe to and which ones we criticize the most. This is an 
important notion for accountability since our current systems are in no way flawless, 
and the accountability questions often include political struggles. 
Danaher’s application of humans in, on and out of the loop (2016, 248, based 
on the division of robotic weapon systems by Citron & Pasquale in 2014) in any 
algocratic system seems to offer a useful frame to analyze accountability questions. 
When humans are in the loop, they make the decisions and are therefore accountable. 
When humans are on the loop, they can still be held accountable because they oversee 
the operations and have the possibility to override at any time. When humans are out 
302
THE LEGITIMACY OF ALGORITHMIC GOVERNANCE  
 
of the loop and machines function independently, the question of accountability gets 
harder. When humans see only the results of work done by machine alone, do they 
have the means to evaluate the process that lead to these results and can they be 
understood with human reason? This is, at its core, the argument Danaher (2016, 254) 
makes about the threat of algocracy. 
Quite often, transparency is seen as a requirement for accountability: the idea 
is that if a system can be observed in detail, it can be governed more efficiently 
(Ananny & Crafword 2018, 974). Ananny & Crawford list a number of problems with 
transparency as an ideal (2018, 977–982), but evaluating accountability is hard 
especially when governing algorithmic systems wherein humans are off the loop for 
two reasons: the nature of these systems is networked and structured, and 
technological proficiency is necessary to understand what is seen. They suggest that 
instead of requiring us to see inside each individual part of a structure including 
algorithms, we need to understand how the assemblage of humans and algorithms 
works together as a system: instead of looking inside something, we should look 
across (Ananny & Crafword 2018, 983–984). This could offer a similar perspective of 
accountability that is applied right now.  For example, it is often considered more 
important for people to understand how the process of creating new legislation works 
instead of focusing on detailed meeting procedures of committees. On the other hand, 
it can be argued that citizens should still have access to those details if they wish to 
scrutinize them, and algorithmic systems might not allow it (Danaher 2016, 254). 
Another way to ensure accountability is to embed the governance of 
algorithms in the existing structures that watch over those who hold power. 
Diakopoulos (2014, 402–404) introduces ways for journalism to use reverse 
engineering to reveal unintended side effects of algorithmic systems and help the 
public to understand how algorithms affect our societies and every-day lives. 
Journalistic media could keep an eye on the development of algorithms in a similar 
way it takes a critical look at politicians and institutions. Reflecting back to Danaher’s 
article (2016, 258–259), this is a form of review bringing humans back to the loop, 
and reverse-engineering can shed light on areas that would otherwise be in the dark 
for the human reason. 
Lepri et al. introduce project OPAL that uses both technological and socio-
political elements to vet algorithmic systems with key shareholders. In addition to 
vetting, they point out that using blockchain technologies would offer citizens more 
power in deciding how their data can be used and at the same time improve 
accountability by making post-decision audits possible. This is a great way to improve 
human participation and offer a view over possible discriminatory policies in 
algorithmic systems, even though they cannot guarantee full fairness or transparency 
(Lepri et al 2018, 623–624). 
When it comes to FICO, the key problem regarding accountability is that it 
does not take all relevant information into consideration. This kind of prioritization 
that might include (hidden) biases is one of the common uses of power in algorithmic 
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systems (Diakopoulos 2014, 400–401). At least in FICO’s case, the criteria are public 
and thus open to discussion in the public sphere, also by the means of journalism. 
China’s Social Credit System is, however, another case. China is not only 
governing citizens by using algorithms but also governing how businesses and 
organizations use algorithms. It does not matter if humans are in, on or out of the loop 
if the government is not accountable to its citizens. And if the press is not free, it 
cannot help keep algorithms or the organizations using them accountable. This goes 
back to the point I made earlier: accountability is always also a political struggle and 
algorithms — or some version of algocracy — are in no way detached from the other 
aspects of our societies. 
To conclude, the question of accountability in algorithmic governance is not 
simply technical but is rather deeply linked to other aspects and values a society 
holds. This can be clearly seen when comparing commercial credit scores like FICO 
and China’s Social Credit System: in the latter case, there is not much room for 
accountability because governmental structures are not held accountable to citizens in 
the first place. From a transparency perspective, there will likely always be nooks in 
algorithmic systems that are hard to comprehend for humans. However, journalism 
can play a role by reverse-engineering these systems more visible to the public, there 
are ways to increase human participation to make these systems fairer, and this offers 
a possibility to hold the assemblage of algorithms and humans accountable for 
citizens.  
Conclusion 
Complex credit scoring systems influence society in multiple ways and it is therefore 
necessary to analyze and try to predict how the system affects the legitimacy of 
algorithmic governance. These systems aim to create security and order in society, but 
they can still determine citizens’ creditability or credibility in the wrong way. 
Therefore, it is important to recognize and consider how algorithmic governance is 
used to guide citizens’ behavior and how it dominates the norms and principles in 
society. 
Taking cultural, philosophical, and legal contexts into account when 
discussing algorithmic governance systems, legitimacy, and ethics are paramount. 
This applies especially when we compare different systems that originate from two 
distinct cultural spheres. Acknowledging the differences allows for a greater 
understanding of the subject matter, helping researchers and students alike in 
navigating the plurality of complex philosophical topics. However, claims of 
relativism or pluralism are not and should not be used as a shield from criticism. 
There are several concerns, both ethical and practical, to be raised regarding 
algorithmic governance and the issue of legitimacy – regardless of the origins of an 
algorithmic governance system. 
From the perspective of individual consent, China’s Social Credit System has 
many problems. The consent is not voluntary, one cannot withdraw from it, and the 
purposes for collection or usage of data are not disclosed to the individual. In general, 
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China lacks comprehensive legislation for privacy protection. In spite of the broad 
regulatory framework, the USA FICO Credit System is not perfect either. For 
example, in most cases the data is collected without individual consent, and its precise 
means of assaying consumers’ data to issue credit decisions remains opaque to 
borrowers, and disadvantaged individuals may be further undermined. Problems 
within the FICO credit system have been noticed and the US Congress is already 
planning on improvements. 
Opacity in algorithmic governance refers to the transparency and opaqueness 
of the system. If the inputs that are given to an algorithm are clear, and the way in 
which the algorithm produces an output from those inputs is also clear, the system is 
not opaque. Whereas if the inputs are not clear, if individuals have little to no 
understanding of how the algorithm comes to a particular output from the given 
inputs, the system is opaque. In the examples of China’s social credit system and 
FICO considered here, the human aspect of creating opacity has been the chief 
concern. 
For the question of accountability of algorithmic systems to matter, a society 
should consider the government’s responsibility towards its citizenship first. The level 
of accountability required is a result of a political struggle, and reflects the values a 
society holds. There will likely always be areas of algorithmic systems that are 
opaque to human reason, but instead of thinking whether we can hold a piece of code 
responsible, we should look into the possibility of holding the whole system of code 
and humans accountable, and journalism can offer ways to increase citizens’ access to 
algorithmic processes for example via reverse-engineering. 
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Abstract 
The Chinese Social Credit System is a highly debated reputation system, which has 
sparked investigations of its global counterparts. This novel use of information and 
communication technologies raises important questions for democracy. We consider 
the different reputation systems conceptually together as Social Reputation Models 
(SRMs) in order to investigate their implications for different areas of deliberative 
democracy. We begin by asking whether SRMs are inherently totalitarian, and then 
move on to consider how lack of privacy in SRMs might challenge Habermas’ theory 
of deliberative democracy. We then focus on two specific areas of deliberative 
democracy in relation to SRMs, namely the foundational ideals of respect and 
surveillance in the criminal justice system. The final section argues that “Big 
Nudging” and SRMs are in many aspects similar, and examines the implications 
technologically empowered behavioural and social controls have for autonomy, moral 
judgement, and free will. Our aim is to investigate the implications of conceptually 
bound reputation systems for deliberative democracy from various theoretical and 
empirical perspectives. 
 
Keywords:  Deliberative democracy, surveillance, big data, privacy, free will, Social 
Credit System, nudge, respect 
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Technological development has globally transformed societal, political, and economic 
structures. It has been argued that it constitutes a fourth revolution in both our 
worldview and self-understanding (Floridi, 2014, 89–93). Advancements in 
information and communication technologies (ICTs) have immensely increased the 
possibilities of behavioural and social control, surveillance, and the manipulation of 
individuals on behalf of public and private entities. 
In this paper we will consider some of the implications of this evolution for 
various elements of deliberative democracy, in specific freedom, privacy, respect and 
rule of law. Our point of departure is the Chinese Social Credit system (SCS), which 
has been researched to some extent in recent scholarly work (Creemers, 2018; 
Botsman, 2017; Chen & Cheung, 2017, Síthigh & Siems, 2019). Our interest, 
however, is to highlight the fact that social reputation models that rely on computation 
are emerging in other parts of the world as well (Botsman, 2017, 168). Although it is 
beyond the scope of this paper to investigate all models, it has been suggested that 
there is some resemblance between the different models. Hence, we think it is fruitful 
to include them in our analysis to provoke questions and offer tools that can be 
applied to various models, especially in the setting of deliberative democracy. We will 
consider these different reputation systems conceptually together as Social Reputation 
Models (SRM). In practice, we will heavily derive from the Chinese model in our 
analysis, as the available literature has guided us in our work.  
We begin by exploring whether big data and surveillance should be 
characterized as totalitarian. We look at what threats the potential totalitarian nature of 
big data and surveillance along with an SRM could have on democratic values. 
Further, we aim to investigate whether a comprehensive SRM, resembling the 
Chinese SCS, could be implemented in a deliberative democracy setting. We then take 
Habermas’ theory of deliberative democracy and apply it to the privacy dimension of 
SRMs. We argue that diversity among citizens is reduced due to conformity pressures, 
as well as the algorithmic nature of SRMs inhibiting the intelligible debate on privacy 
in the first place. These in turn challenge the basic building blocks of Habermasian 
deliberative democracy.   
In later sections, we narrow the focus on deliberative democracy to first 
examine surveillance and its implications for criminal justice in an inclusive 
democratic process. More specifically we investigate how surveillance affects 
criminal behaviour and compare trends to deliberative democratic theories addressing 
rule following. Second, we explore the foundational ideal of respect as a tangible part 
of free will within SRMs, relying mostly on the SCS in the empirics. We argue, that 
SCS is undermining free will by limiting the sphere for respect via computation. 
Finally, we will consider SRMs as the next advancement from “big nudges”, which 
we argue together represent forceful behavioural designs that undermine deliberative 
democracy. 
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The Totalitarian Nature of Surveillance and Its Impacts on 
Deliberative Democracy – Victoria Ristikangas 
In this section, we discuss if and how new technologies, big data and especially 
surveillance have totalitarian characteristics and whether the growth of the utilization 
of these systems in governance will potentially create an Orwellian reality. This 
section also introduces the Chinese Social Credit System (SCS for short) and touches 
upon the potential impacts of the potential totalitarian characteristics of big data and 
surveillance and their implications for deliberative democracy. An interesting question 
is whether an SCS type of governance system could be implemented in the West in a 
deliberative democratic setting. 
In today's globalized world and with the ever-increasing influence that China 
has on the world stage, it would be naïve to believe that the policies China instils 
would not have any impact on the West. Furthermore, it is pressing to analyse whether 
these policies could be implemented, at least in some respect, in Western deliberative 
democracies as well. Moreover, with an increased emergence of reputation-based 
businesses (Uber & Airbnb), would the SCS represent such a drastic change in 
thinking? Creemers (2018) sees the SCS as an evolving practice of governance (p. 4). 
This section is divided into three parts; the first part looks at the SCS, the second part 
looks at surveillance’s threat to democracy and we conclude with some concluding 
remarks.  
The Chinese Social Credit System 
An initial version of the Chinese Social Credit System was launched in 2014 by the 
Chinese government in order to collect, harness and utilize mass surveillance and big 
data. The goal is to measure citizens’ creditworthiness, strengthen the rule of law 
(Creemers, 25, 2018) and monitor the social, political and economic conduct of 
individuals and companies alike. The SCS has been defined as a cluster of 
technology-driven tools for social control (ibid., 1), “social management” (ibid, 2), 
and a system that aims towards “greater public morality” (Chen & Cheung, 356, 
2017).  
Concerns about civil protections, privacy questions and lack of protective laws 
have been proposed due to the authoritarian characteristics of the Chinese 
government. As well, the SCS has received a lot of negative media attention from the 
West precisely due to the notion and worry that through the harvesting of big data and 
behaviour modifying surveillance, it might end up bringing about an Orwellian state 
(ibid., 356). In fact, the SCS has been determined by many in the West as an 
Orwellian nightmare (Chen & Cheung, 357, 2017; Creemers, 2, 2018). 
Is the SCS only a totalitarian surveillance tool or are its goals, means, and 
functions transferable to more open political systems? According to Síthigh and Siems 
(2019), some of the main issues with the SCS for the West stem from its opposition to 
cultural and political values consistent with individual freedom and democratic self-
governance. Its openly paternalistic tendencies exemplify authoritarian systems (18). 
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In addition to this value-conflict, a potential problem that the West has with the SCS 
concerns its lack of transparency and disrespect of the democratic idea of the division 
between political and legal power. 
Big data & surveillance – Threats to democracy? 
Orwell determined that a signifying element of a totalitarian state is the lack of 
privacy (Giroux, 109, 2015), which would align with the idea of state-led surveillance 
as totalitarian. However, in addition to the lack of privacy, what are the potential costs 
of remodelling the performance of social, economic and political life through big data 
and surveillance? In looking at whether surveillance poses threats to democratic 
institutions and practices, we find a myriad of arguments. 
Zuboff (2015) argues that a major problem with surveillance capitalism is the 
way dominant Internet corporations hold the majority of data power, which in turn has 
negative impacts on naturally democratic values such as freedom. “The modern state 
founded on a democratic ideal rooted in the right to privacy has been transformed and 
mutilated almost beyond recognition” (Giroux, 110, 2015). Giroux claims that 
surveillance and big data embody a collapse in the democratic principles and values 
of liberty, privacy and freedom. The partnership of corporate-state surveillance in the 
USA is “anti-democratic” (ibid., 109) due to democratic dissidence being classified as 
terrorism (ibid), in turn offering a challenge to civil liberties (114). Couldry (2017) 
states that surveillance poses a threat to autonomy (2), in addition to diminishing the 
individualized voices of people through the “normalization of continuous automated 
corporate surveillance” (13). Other areas wherein state-led surveillance poses a threat 
to democratic principles include civic participation, inclusivity and non-
discrimination, plurality, and freedom of speech, amongst others (Giroux, 126, 2015). 
Hill (2017) discusses how within democratic nations an emergence towards 
authoritarian and totalitarian directions is visible, e.g. through AI and big data (243). 
Unescapable surveillance “generates distrust and divisions among its citizens and 
diminishes their willingness to even dare to think freely” (Dorfman, 2014). Given 
these arguments which claim that surveillance is anti-democratic due to the loss of 
privacy, freedom and autonomy, and posing threats to democratic principles such as 
civic participation and plurality, it seems to be a straightforward argument that a 
widespread state surveillance scheme would not fit within a democratic state. What is 
more, the type of behavioural modification attempted through the SCS that is being 
introduced in China seems to be totalitarian and anti-democratic. 
On the contrary, Síthigh and Siems offer the only real counterargument to the 
notion of the totalitarian nature of SCS and surveillance. They argue that these types 
of models, where technology is connected to individuals’ reputation, form a 
possibility for, instead of diminishing, supporting new forms of civic engagement 
(Síthigh and Siems, 2019, 26). Moreover, a larger pool of diverse data increases, 
equalizes, and democratizes access to markets and resources. In the SCS model, as 
stated by Síthigh and Siems, citizens actually have more control over the impact of 
their actions, which can be viewed as a positive outcome. Moreover, the reception of 
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the system by Chinese citizens who have participated in the pilot SCSs has been 
surprisingly positive and effective. Finally, based on a cross-regional survey, Kostka 
and Antoine (2018), found that the SCS has altered the behaviour of participants. 
Conclusion 
The question of whether the SCS is going to purely bring about an Orwellian 
nightmare as many critiques have posed or if it would, in fact, increase democratic 
participation remains to be answered. This section of the paper, however, argues that 
while the Orwellian characteristics of surveillance might be easy to criticize, 
researchers and policymakers in the West should focus on doing more research on the 
topic. What is more, the SCS should be assessed in detail instead of simply being 
labelled as non-compliant with western values and a mere tool of surveillance. In 
conclusion, what will happen if Western liberal democracies also attempt to 
implement tools similar to the SCS? Will a type of SCS, say something called a Social 
Reputation Model (SRM), find its way into democratic state policies? A foundational 
problem with implementing an SRM in a democracy seems to boil down to the value-
conflict between liberty and authoritarianism. However, as seen in the examples of 
US surveillance schemes, existing credit score ratings and an increase in reputation-
based businesses, an extension towards a more comprehensive social credit system is 
already anticipated by current AI and big data tools. 
Deliberating Privacy – Matilda Mahne 
With the rise of big data, there have been increased concerns about data privacy (Tene 
and Polonetsky, 2011). This becomes a particular consideration with an SRM such as 
China’s SCS. Looking through the lens of privacy, this section seeks to explore how a 
holistic SRM could challenge Jürgen Habermas’ theory of deliberative democracy. We 
argue that an SRM decreases diversity among citizens through the lack of privacy, as 
well as generally obstructs the collective will-formation of privacy laws, as the system 
is unintelligible to the citizens. These issues challenge the foundational building 
blocks of Habermasian deliberative democracy. To form the basis of analysis, we first 
consider Habermas’ notions on deliberative democracy. We then show how 
conformity pressures through lack of privacy challenge that form of democracy, and 
finally, we discuss how the black-box nature of SRMs inhibits a collective 
deliberation on informational self-determination.  
When examining privacy in deliberative democracies, we need to look deeper 
into the Habermasian concepts of public and private spheres. Habermas considers the 
Greek origin of these words: the sphere of the polis was where free citizens discussed 
and interacted as equals, while the sphere of the oikos was reserved to hidden 
interactions, “each individual in his own realm,” which consist of the domestic realm 
(Habermas, 1989, 3-4). For Habermas, the private sphere is where individuals are 
most in control of their own actions and communications (Fuchs, 2011, 221). In the 
public, politicians are participants in public discussions in finding common interests, 
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and he holds deliberation to be essential in politics that should be open with regard to 
its practice (Habermas, 1996). 
This leads us to briefly consider deliberation itself. In Habermas’ view, this 
form of democracy is shaped by a collective search for common interests, and this 
involves negotiating and bargaining between conflicting private interests (Habermas, 
1996; Wiklund, 2005). In order to engage in this collective search, he argues that 
subjects who are capable of speech and action can engage in argumentation and 
understanding, which will eventually reach will-formation in society (Habermas, 
1989, 58). This is what he calls communicative (or practical) rationality, which is 
founded on mutual understanding. Deliberative democracy, then, is formed of diverse 
individuals and collectives who, through communicative rationality, engage in a 
search for common interests over conflicting private ones. 
An SRM can challenge deliberative democracy through the lack of privacy, 
and steering of behaviour, that creates conformity pressures. Built on a system of 
rewards and punishments based on citizens’ scores, an individual’s score exhibits 
either conforming (encouraged) or nonconforming (discouraged) to the set norms in 
an SRM. The right to privacy “…will operate to reduce or to eliminate the pressure 
imposed by the actual or perceived views of others (...) privacy rights helps to insulate 
people from conformity” (Sunstein, 2003). The lack of privacy, then, increases 
pressure to conform. Limiting privacy goes against what Habermas sees as the 
function of deliberative democracy. For him, conflicting private interests need to be 
negotiated in the public sphere (Habermas, 1996; Wiklund, 2005), not cut out entirely 
through coercive measures. Dissent, in that sense, is needed and welcomed (Sunstein, 
2003). If there are pressures to conform to certain behaviours and opinions, this 
undermines the quest to bring diverse opinions to the table and openly discuss and 
deliberate issues in the public sphere to find common interests. Speech should be 
encouraged, not limited (Schwartz, 2000, 1652). An SRM might not be compatible 
with deliberative democracy, as the lack of privacy creates reputation pressures that 
frustrate efforts to openly discuss diverse opinions. 
This next part focuses on the black box nature of SRMs that can prevent the 
process of democratically deliberating privacy issues. The privacy question here is 
essentially connected with informational self-determination, defined as “individuals, 
groups, or institutions determining for themselves when, how, and to what extent 
information about them is communicated to others” (Westin, 1968). This view holds 
that the individual can decide what to keep private and what is communicated to 
others. With regard to the individual, Habermas holds that “[t]he identity requirement 
for the determination of a collective subject capable of self-determination and self-
direction is fulfilled by the sovereign territorial state of classical international law” 
(Habermas, 2003, 89). Essentially, it is the result of collective negotiation that decides 
an individual’s autonomic capabilities in a democratic nation. Communication can 
also be seen as inherent to negotiating individual self-determination (Susen, 2018). 
However, in order to engage in collective negotiation, rather than algorithmic 
coordination or strategic self-maximization, there has to be communicative rationality. 
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Can there be communicative rationality if the system of SRMs is not intelligible for 
the citizens?  
Algorithmic governance can have major implications for Habermasian 
deliberative democracy through its unintelligibility to its subjects. SRMs are often 
viewed as a black box (Vedder and Naudts, 2017; Campbell-Verduyn et al., 2017). For 
example, it is not clear how the Chinese version of an SRM is constructed, and how 
data is collected and integrated into the scoring system (Liang et al., 2018). Due to the 
complex nature of the algorithms used to build such structures, interpreting and 
articulating them becomes especially difficult (Vedder and Naudts, 2017). The opaque 
construction of SRMs undermines the ability to use rationality or contextual 
understanding to evaluate them. Decision-making intelligible to its stakeholders, then, 
could be compromised, which threatens the citizens’ ability to engage in collective 
bargaining over data privacy. If the system cannot be understood, issues of 
informational self-determination cannot be fully considered in the public sphere. 
Considering the calls for openness in governance, and common interests which are 
found through communication by rational actors, algorithmic governance such as the 
SRM in China provide a large challenge. As citizens might not fully understand how 
the system was built, data was gathered and their scores were formed, the algorithmic 
nature of SRMs does not make the system fully accountable to its users. If the basis 
for deliberative democracy is achieving mutual understanding in civic dialogue, the 
complex use of algorithms for rewarding and penalizing individuals’ action objects 
the authenticity and application of communicative rationality.  
In sum, from the perspective of privacy, there are at least two ways in which 
SRMs threaten Habermas’ notion of deliberative democracy. First, the SRM has a 
high potential to erode diversity among citizens’ behaviour and opinions. Escaping 
reputation pressures allows for individuals to develop their own opinions and bring 
them forth to the public sphere for consideration. Second, the black-box nature of the 
SRM can frustrate efforts to collectively deliberate informational self-determination. 
While these considerations may seem lightyears away, some forms of SRMs already 
exist in democratic nations. It might not take that long until a crisis prompts increased 
state surveillance and securitisation, as has been experienced in the wake of 9/11 
(Macnish, 2014), and we now contemplate with Covid-19 virus. The privacy nexus 
between deliberative democracy and SRMs remains a complex issue, which this paper 
has attempted to explore. Further considerations should include inspecting the 
security issues stemming from lack of privacy, with the possibility of data falling into 
the wrong hands.  
Surveillance and Criminal Justice in a Deliberative Democracy  
 – Lili Schatz 
Theories about how deliberative democracy functions have a focus on individuals and 
communicative participation in society. Jürgen Habermas claimed that citizen 
participation and informed communication govern deliberation, ensuring that the 
outcomes in democratic processes are legitimate (Olson, 2011). John Rawls theorised 
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about an individual's self-interest and how society should be fair and equal to all its 
members (Rawls, 1995). Habermas and Rawls laid a base for theories on a 
deliberative democratic process. The main features of a society that functions in a 
deliberative democratic way are shared practices and as a part of those practices, 
shared rules (Rawls, 1995). The assumption is that individuals commit to constitutive 
rules, meaning that both implicit and explicit rules that are formalized in some way 
are internalized by members of a society and followed voluntarily. This means that a 
deliberative democracy requires collective intelligibility and cooperation between 
citizens. Individuals need to understand and agree with the rules of society. In 
addition, participation should be based on free will and political freedom (Bächtiger, 
Dryzek, Mansbridge and Warren, 2018). Surveillance and scrutinization of individuals 
through information that holds everyone under a microscope impacts behaviour 
(Liang et al., 2018). A question that this paper aims to answer is how this scrutiny can 
affect the individual in the criminal justice system and what implications it has 
regarding a deliberative democratic process. 
Surveillance and deliberative democracy 
In 2004, the European Parliament stated that mass surveillance by governments 
cannot be justified and only targeted surveillance could be argued for. This means that 
only individual cases could be looked at when monitoring personal data, and a reason 
for this was needed. Suspicions of criminal behaviour were a perquisite for this kind 
of surveillance and a warrant and legal basis needed to be provided. However, this 
idea changed as European collective efforts were made to fight terrorism after 2006 
(Maras, 2012). The Data Retention Directive by the European Parliament and 
European Council justified storing big data of individuals to surveil possible terrorist 
activity. What is common with mass surveillance is that individuals believe that only 
people who are suspects of crime are monitored to some extent (Maras, 2012). The 
idea of individuals participating in democratic processes and voluntarily following 
rules to meet a shared goal becomes problematic when citizens aren’t informed about 
how they are being monitored. The idea that individuals have the free will to follow 
constituted rules becomes skewed when they are being monitored without their 
knowledge. It could therefore be argued that data surveillance for criminal control is 
going against the traditional ideal of deliberative democracy. 
Surveillance of information on individuals that is hidden is problematic, yet 
the consequences of open record-keeping of encounters with the criminal justice 
system poses a new threat: system avoidance. In the United States, the extent of 
surveillance when it comes to crime has experienced a dramatic increase in the past 
decades. Records about criminal behaviour or contact with legal authorities are stored, 
and 47 million US citizens had a file with a criminal justice agency in 2014 (Brayne, 
2014). This mapping of criminal information has led to individuals avoiding 
institutions that keep records in general. Citizens that know of their records being 
collected avoid even educational, medical, financial and labour market institutions, to 
avoid records being kept, and are less prone to engage in civic or religious institutions 
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(Brayne, 2014). This shows how surveillance and the criminal justice system can 
form a population that is detached from a democratic society. When looking at 
deliberative democracy, this kind of surveillance could be a threat to the commitment 
of citizens, and participation in democratic processes can suffer through system 
avoidance. 
Rules and social credit 
John Rawls focused on how society works in a just way and how rules govern 
individuals. He distinguished between two types of rules, namely constitutive and 
regulative rules. Constitutive rules are set, either implicitly or explicitly, when 
regulative rules are the justifications of actions that are taken. Regulative rules 
therefore focus more on the moral obligation that individuals experience when 
following a constitutive rule. As an example, each chapter of criminal law is a 
constitutive rule in the legal framework of a community, yet when a person does not 
steal because it is the “wrong thing to do,'' they are following their internalized 
regulative rules (Rawls, 1995). Explicit regulative rules are not necessarily 
formalized, yet citizens follow them since they share a mutual understanding of how 
they work. In a deliberative democracy, individuals need to understand these rules and 
have the desire and free will to follow them for a shared purpose. 
When it comes to extreme cases of surveillance through data, it can be argued 
that both constitutive and regulatory rule-following are being monitored to the extent 
that a person's free will is minimized. In the case of the Chinese Social Credit System, 
both public and private spheres of life are being monitored. Naturally, crime also 
plays a part in the model. Criminal activity is monitored and stored in a personal 
credit score (Liang et al., 2018). The aim is to reduce crime by punishing citizens 
through the reduction of their social score, which has implications on what they can 
and cannot do, for instance when it comes to traveling. In practice, if a person 
jaywalks or steals from a shop and gets caught, their credit suffers. However, the 
extent of control reaches behaviour that is not deemed criminal, yet just “bad” by the 
government. The state surveils individuals by gathering their data and provides 
rewards or punishments for correct behaviour (Liang et al., 2018). Therefore, the 
government is not only monitoring the explicitly stated legal constitutive rules but 
also explicit rules of good conduct, as defined by the government. When thinking 
about Rawls ́ regulatory rules and the inner processes of rule-following, it could be 
argued that by monitoring the behavioural traits of individuals, the government is 
trying to also control the regulatory rules that steer an individual's behaviour. 
Conclusion 
By critically examining surveillance and its impacts on behaviour in criminal justice 
systems, some implications for deliberative democratic processes are evident. 
Although surveillance might minimize criminal behaviour in society, it impacts 
behaviour on an individual level. It can be argued that the effects limit the agency and 
free will of citizens, hindering their participation in a deliberative democratic process. 
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Concealed surveillance of personal data raises questions about whether individuals 
are being voluntarily monitored, or whether it is a form of control, that threatens the 
idea of deliberative democracy, where participation in rule-following is voluntary. 
Moreover, individuals that are aware of the scrutiny of surveillance avoid systems that 
leave information behind completely. System avoidance creates a subpopulation of 
individuals who don’t participate in democratic processes, which limits deliberation in 
those societies. Finally, in extreme cases such as social credit that is not merely based 
on criminal activity, but social interactions and behaviour, the implications of a 
marginalized group of avoidance could be far more problematic when thinking about 
participation in society and democracy. 
SRMs and Free Will within Deliberative Democracy: The 
Foundational Ideal of Respect explored – Nuura H. Naboulsi 
In this section, we will argue that SRMs undermine the foundational ideal of free will 
within deliberative democracy by limiting the sphere for respect via computation. We 
do this by combining empirical examples of a computed human sphere with theories 
of free will and respect. This argument begins from the premise that human agency 
can alter historical conditions of possible experience, thus recognizing the continental 
tradition of thought (Rosen, 1999, 665). 
The early stages of digitizing identity and reputation through various rating 
systems are evident in the Chinese social score and Western applications, such as 
Peeple, Yelp, Airbnb and DateCheck. They represent reputation applications, using 
behavioural economics, that fail to capture the full spectrum of human experience in 
computing it to a game that incentivizes strategic communication (Botsman 2017, 
168-185) and aims to suppress collective expression (King et al., 2013). A Chinese 
person’s score depends on their online friends’ activities. This is highlighted by the 
system providers by warnings of befriending people of a lower score and exemplified 
in chat rooms where average score people seek high scorers (ibid.). Whether this is 
rooted in a psychological obsession of feeding a sense of control (Botsman, 2017, 
168), an imposed emerging economic rationale (Zuboff, 2015), or something else is 
currently debated. Nonetheless, an intuitive anti-democratic impression of SRMs can 
be deduced with a practical application of certain conceptualized ideals attached to 
deliberative democracy, namely free will, and respect as a tangible part of it.  
The notion of free will is highly contested and an intrinsic part of its 
discussion is on morality (Mele, 2014). In all theories of deliberation, the ideal of 
mutual respect is central (Bächtiger et al., 2018, 4). In practice, this refers to 
individuals actively listening and trying to understand the meaning of a speaker’s 
statements, rather than perceiving those statements as objects to be dismissed, 
demeaned, manipulated or destroyed (ibid.). This ideal has been institutionalized to 
varying degrees globally, e.g. in the United Nation’s Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. It is beyond the scope of this paper to engage in an in-depth exploration of the 
various conceptualizations of mutual respect. Yet, for the purpose of the argument, it 
can be stated that in deliberative democracy the ideal of respect is widely agreed on, 
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evident in its institutionalization and that violations against it are often controlled by 
different measures, including for example criminal law. Further, we can think of 
respect as a sphere, in which we are free to navigate, and which exists in direct and 
indirect interactions with others, who are also committed to the ideal. 
The SRMs invade this sphere of respect by computing aspects of it. The 
Chinese Social Credit Score does this via the above-mentioned discouragement to 
interact with individuals of a lower score due to the fact that it can affect one’s own 
ranking. In doing this, the statements of those individuals become “objects to be 
dismissed or demeaned”. The personal score, of course, consists of several (some 
unknown) factors, and these are likely not neutral toward treating all individuals with 
equal respect. For instance, if one is unexpectedly unable to pay rent due to an illness 
that results in unemployment, that worsens one’s economic situation and thus, drops 
one’s score. This situation does not necessarily imply that other people lose their 
innate respect for this individual. Yet, the gamified sphere for respect within the score 
system encourages exactly that. In the interest of protecting one’s own score, people 
are incentivized to abandon previous conceptions of mutual respect and to act 
according to ideals introduced by the score system. Therefore, the system invades and 
shapes the sphere for respect in ways that are contradictory to fundamental 
conceptions of respect in deliberative democracy. It further undermines free will, by 
imposing computed, institutionalized structures upon the social sphere, hitherto 
reserved for the pursuit of conversation oriented toward achieving mutual 
understanding and deliberation.  SRM controverts the above-mentioned ideals of 
communicative rationality which operate at the background of culture to make it a 
product of its subjects’ interests. That is not to say there are no other invasive social-
economic mechanisms in operation, nor that the social sphere is currently intact. We 
only observe that the described functions of SRMs undermine mutual respect, 
communicative rationality, and an ethos underlying deliberative democracy. 
The SRM ideals reflect the interests of SRM providers, in the explored 
scenario of the Chinese government and business leaders. Those ideals might or might 
not align with deliberative conceptions of society. What can be established from this 
short exploration is that the above provided example based on the known functions of 
the Chinese score system violates certain ideals of deliberative models. It justifies and 
encourages direct discrimination based on at least economic income, which is affected 
by multidimensional socio-economic factors — including ones independent of 
individual capabilities, e.g. inequality (Wade, 2014, 322). This, in turn, is directly 
contradicts what the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the fundamental 
ideal of respect, tacitly recommend as the basis for deliberation.  
The generation at the intersection of institutionalized deliberative ideals and 
its emerging SRM substitutes has the potential to encourage questioning the gradual, 
discrete institutional replacement of democratic ideals. We have attempted this by 
presenting a case, in which the contradiction of ideals can be illustrated in a clear 
theoretical manner. Speaking from this intersection, our argument cannot be divorced 
from the contextual conditions of its historical emergence, which heavily dictates our 
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understanding of democracy among other commitments (Critchley, 2013, 11). 
Nevertheless, we have sought to formulate our argument on theoretical and empirical 
grounds without relying on an essentialist approach to the human sphere. We would 
like to highlight this by demonstrating how the argument built so far can be applied 
notwithstanding the position on free will, which is a highly contested topic (Mele, 
2014). As ubiquitous as the notion of free will might be, the idea that certain spheres 
of human life have been kept relatively separated from political and economic 
interests so far might achieve consensus. They have been apart in the sense that the 
level of their impact on human will, however one might view it, has never reached the 
intensity of SRMs due to the scale of these applied novel technologies. Therefore, the 
fact that ideal of respect as a rather tangible concept that has been rethought 
repeatedly in human history, and (as a result) changed, ought to provoke the following 
question: Whether or not free will is illusionary, do we wish to let the SRM rationale 
enter more deeply into our private spheres of life in such a way that profoundly it 
shapes our capabilities in all spheres? This is one of the questions we propose should 
be addressed in further discussions on SRMs and computation more generally. 
We have illustrated how the Chinese social score undermines deliberative 
democracy and free will by limiting the sphere for the foundational ideal of respect 
via methods of computation. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss all known 
SRMs, which might or might not function to similarly invade the human sphere, as 
some have suggested (Botsman, 2017). We have demonstrated how the computed 
respect within the Chinese model is limiting the domain of respect by encouraging 
discrimination.  This is because the created scores are interdependent and consist of 
factors such as economic income, which, individually should not necessarily shape 
the sphere for respect between individuals. Yet the score encourages strategic 
communication, discrimination and imposes certain models and ideals. The explored 
case was shown to violate the ideals of deliberative democracy, free will, and respect. 
We have argued that the incentivized strategic communication and discrimination are 
grounded on political and economic interests, which deserve scrutiny in the face of 
their gradual institutionalization. We have further attempted to appeal to both sides in 
the debate on free will, by questioning whether it is desirable to allow these specific 
interests to gain a more prominent position in the human sphere via computation. It is 
the task of further research to engage in a more in-depth analysis of the limitations of 
computation, and the challenges it poses to deliberative democracy. 
Big Nudging – a Liberal Equivalent of an SRM? Implications for 
Autonomy, Free Will, and Moral Judgement – Johan Wahlsten 
As the purpose of SRMs is to shape and control citizen behaviour towards more 
desirable patterns of conduct, they can also be examined as a subsequent step in the 
relatively novel conceptualization of big nudging (Helbing, 2019a, 28). Nudging is a 
notable policy trend of the last two decades, based on paternalism, which holds that 
governments and private actors ought to push or “nudge” individuals towards conduct 
that is more beneficial both for the individual and society. By altering the choice 
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architecture of individuals nudges aim to incite favourable behaviour (see, e.g., Thaler 
and Sunstein 2008). Specifically, big nudging is, simply stated, the behavioural 
aspirations of shaping individual’s behaviour enhanced immensely by the emergence 
of big data1 (Helbing, 2019a, 38). Sætra posits that as big data allows for the 
gathering of significantly more information from individuals and their actions than 
previously, it makes nudging both highly more efficient and customisable, 
transforming nudge to a shove (Sætra, 2019, 2–3).2 Yeung uses digital 
gerrymandering, i.e., voting manipulation, as an extreme illustration of such control 
(Yeung, 2017, 12).  
The affiliations between technocratic big nudging and SRMs also apply to 
some extent to the Chinese SCS, even if at this moment the SCS does not intend to 
hide its paternalism and no high-level algorithmic governance is currently utilized in 
it (Creemers, 2018, 26–27). As Creemers has luminously pointed out, the SCS is a 
logical continuation of the Chinese political tradition that emphasizes the state’s role 
as the supreme moral and behavioural authority. (ibid., 5–7). For Helbing, big 
nudging as a centralized top-to-bottom technocratic behavioural control is in many 
respects an equivalent of such a totalitarian regime, but “with a rosy cover” (Helbing 
et al., 2019, 80). In what follows, we will argue not only that the two are not 
dissimilar, but that forceful behavioural designs empowered by recent technological 
development undermine free will, autonomy, and moral judgement, and thus 
deliberative democracy, to a greater extent than the run-of-the-mill nudging. Plenty of 
time and space have been dedicated to debates on the conundrums and possibilities of 
nudging. Here, we do not have the opportunity to consider these debates in detail, but 
rather we will consider some relevant issues in the context of large-scale endeavours 
for behavioural modification made possible by the advancement of technology.  
Undermining the cornerstones of (deliberative) democracy 
A relatively frequent argument against individualised social control empowered by 
big data and operating through a feedback loop is that it crams us to “filter bubbles”, 
where diversified and surprising experiences, required for proper democratic 
participation (Yeung, 2017, 15, 17–18) and creative thinking might be discouraged or 
even abolished and social cohesion destabilized (Helbing et al 2019., 77, 80). What is 
more, as Helbing proposes, when behavioural goals are set externally, personal 
development is hindered and democratic pluralism thwarted (ibid., 85). The concerns 
                                               
1 Big Data is often characterized by Doug Laney’s “three Vs”:  high volume, velocity, 
and variety of data (Laney, 2001). Based on a review of existing literature and 
definitions De Mauro et al. have offered a consensual definition: “Big Data represents 
the Information assets characterized by such a High Volume, Velocity and Variety to 
require specific Technology and Analytical Methods for its transformation into 
Value.” (De Mauro et al., 2015). 
2 For other discussions on big nudging see Helbing, 2019b (especially chapters 4, 7 
and 11). Others call it “hypernudging” (Mills, 2019; Yeung, 2017). These scholars 
have somewhat different conceptualizations of the term, which reflects its novel 
status. 
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about data collection and informational privacy are also valid in these discussions 
(Yeung 2017, 9–10).  
However, in our view, these are not necessarily the most crucial issues in big 
nudges and SRMs. As many scholars have noted, already the more regular examples 
of behaviour control by nudging, such as healthier snacks placed at eye level in 
cafeterias, can have negative effects on a citizen’s “control over her own deliberation” 
and possibility to consider alternatives (Hausman and Welch, 2010, 130). 
Consequently, they can be understood to bypass the individual's conscious decision-
making process (Mills, 2013, 32), and in essence then challenge intentional action 
(Searle, 1995, 6–7). More importantly, if the behavioural expectations and parameters 
are not transparent, these potent controls can also deprive individuals of an essential 
prerequisite for both political freedom and moral responsibility and thus also 
deliberative democracy; namely they challenge free will (Mele, 2014, 6). Such 
deceptions and smokescreens are probable because behavioural controls targeting 
psychological mechanisms are most effective when they are enacted “in the dark” 
(Bovens, 2008, 3). Such a possibility is also more likely if machine learning is heavily 
involved, due to the opaque black-box nature of algorithmic governance (Creemers, 
2018, 27; Perel and Elkin-Koren, 2015, 482, 488).  
As Sætra argues, behavioural guidance with low or non-existent transparency, 
targeting the pre-rational and subliminal functions of the individual by manipulating 
choice architecture, undermines both negative and positive liberty. How big nudges or 
credit scores meddle efficiently with the choice architecture of citizens can also 
impede with one’s options, which according to Sætra, and the prominent philosopher 
Joseph Raz, makes them coercive (Sætra, 2019, 5–7; Raz 1986, 377–378). And the 
more effective and secretive this manipulation is, the more detrimental the effects are 
for liberty, autonomy and free will. If we agree with Sætra that big nudging is 
coercive, it is obvious that covert behavioural manipulation reinforced by 
technological developments can be also viewed as an outright challenge against the 
widely accepted ideal of the absence of coercive power in deliberative democracy 
(Bächtiger et al., 2018, 5).  
Likewise, if we accept that covert and robust behavioural and social controls 
use psychological force as their means of coercion (Sætra, 2019, 7–8), then it is 
evident that what Alfred Mele calls modest free will – an individual having free will to 
the extent he is not subject to undue force – is under threat (Mele, 2014, 78). And as 
free will is often accepted to be an essential condition for moral responsibility, 3  
strong behavioural controls may also put this facet of our humanity under 
contestation. Big nudges and SRMs are malignant to (collective) moral responsibility 
also in the context of freedom of action. Seamus Miller importantly emphasizes that 
any moral responsibility prerequisites an intentional action (Miller, 2010, 122). But if 
individuals are shoved towards certain behaviour unknowingly or interfered in their 
options with a menace of harm if a different option is chosen, then what can we say 
                                               
3 Some however neglect free will is a precondition for moral responsibility (see “Free 
Will”, no date, paragraph 9–10). 
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about the existence of intentionality or autonomy, and therefore of moral 
responsibility? Who is responsible for actions done under forceful behavioural 
control? At the very least, big data powered behavioural control can weaken moral 
judgement, since internal conscious deliberations might be overridden. The 
importance of asking why I ought to or not ought to do what I do should not be 
underestimated.  
Away with manipulation, down with deliberation 
It seems apparent then that the simultaneous developments in technology and 
behavioural policy aspirations have grave implications for our autonomy, free will, 
and democracy. Even if SRMs are yet to be developed as such in Europe or North 
America, we claim that big nudging is their close relative and they are not necessarily 
in accordance with liberal ideals of democracy. Some nudges may be benign (John et 
al., 2009, 366–367), but when technology increases its effectiveness and allows for 
more sophisticated methods of behavioural control, with possible elements of 
algorithmic governance and machine learning, the dangers grow increasingly. The 
urge for holistic top-to-bottom social and behavioural governance and circumscribing 
of liberty and self-government ought to be resisted. As Sætra, too, suggests, rational 
persuasion is much more preferable for this if we wish to preserve autonomy and 
liberty (Sætra, 2019, 7). In complex systems, short-cuts circumventing practical 
reasonable persuasion and debate for altering people’s behaviour are easily ill-fated. 
There is no magic wand for complicated issues. Even when we accept bounded 
rationality, we should not settle for big nudging and other machine-enhanced means 
of advanced behavioural control, but have aspirations for better (Niemeyer, 2014, 31). 
If the issues mentioned are allowed to persist, the age of digital enlightenment and 
informed citizens will be a far cry, to paraphrase Immanuel Kant for the 21st century 
(Kant, 1784). 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we have argued that: 
  
● Surveillance is anti-democratic due to loss of privacy, freedom and autonomy 
and poses threats to democratic principles such as civic participation and 
plurality. More research, however, is needed before SRMs can be entirely ruled 
out as non-compliant with Western values.   
● There are two ways in which SRMs threaten Habermas’ notion of deliberative 
democracy from a privacy-perspective: lack of privacy in SRMs has a high 
potential to erode diversity among citizens by creating conformity pressures, 
and the black-box nature of the SRM can inhibit collective deliberation on 
informational self-determination. These issues challenge Habermas’ reasoning 
advocating communicative rationality that is needed to debate common interests 
in the public sphere, which he identifies as foundational for deliberative 
democracy.  
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● The effects of surveillance limit the agency and free will of citizens and hinder 
their participation in a deliberative democratic process. Concealed surveillance 
of personal data raises questions about whether individuals are being voluntarily 
monitored, or whether it is a form of control that threatens the idea of 
deliberative democracy, where participation in norm-following is voluntary. In 
turn, individuals who are aware of the scrutiny of surveillance may completely 
avoid systems that might record and share information about them. This system 
avoidance then could exclude a group from democratic participation.  
● The Chinese social score undermines the foundational ideal of free will within 
deliberative democracy by limiting the sphere for respect via computation. It 
further incentivizes strategic communication and discrimination, which are 
founded on political and economic interests. The model is directly against 
institutionalized ideals of deliberative democracy and respect and poses a 
challenge to their future. 
● Big nudges and SRMs are both forceful behavioural designs empowered by 
recent technological developments. They undermine free will, autonomy, and 
moral judgment, and thus democracy to a greater extent than previous means of 
social control. If covert, this manipulation further can be viewed to challenge the 
absence of coercive power in deliberative democracy. 
 
Through these five interconnected sections, we have attempted to shed light on the 
complex implications of SRMs on deliberative democracy. Deriving from theoretical 
and empirical accounts, we have found that SRMs have the potential to undermine 
different aspects of deliberative democracy. Throughout this paper, we have echoed 
that despite this development, the incorporation of more holistic behavioural control 
in democratic nations might become reality, evident in current surveillance and data 
manipulation practices.  
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